期刊名称：Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
印刷版ISSN：1068-5502
出版年度：2015
卷号：40
期号：3
页码：457-475
出版社：WAEA
摘要：This study hypothetically analyzes the distribution of the premiums paid and thus the subsidiesreceived by farmers participating in the Risk Management Agency (RMA) multi-peril cropinsurance program. The results show a wide spread in the effective subsidy levels, to wheresome producers might not be receiving any subsidies at all (i.e., they actually pay close to theirfull actuarially fair premium), while others only pay a small fraction of their actuarially fairpremium. More importantly, the results show that “shrinkage” estimators such as the one usedby the RMA have the unintended negative consequence of disproportionally subsidizing farmerswho are less effective in managing risk. Producers whose farms exhibit higher downside yieldvariability receive much more generous subsidies than those with lower levels of yield variability.
