摘要：The paper analyzes the choice of organizational structure as solution to thetrade-off between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizingcosts for implementing high efforts. The analysis includes the ownerof a firm, a top manager and two division heads. If it is more expensive toincentivize the division heads, the owner will prefer full delegation of authorityto them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on privatebenefits of control. In that situation, decentralization is optimal given thatselfish behavior is more important than cooperation for maximizing returns,but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is optimalfor cooperation being crucial. If, however, incentivizing the divisionheads is clearly less expensive than creating incentives for the top manager,the owner will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominatingissue, but partial delegation if selfish behavior is crucial.
关键词：authority; centralization; contracts; decentralization; moral hazard
