摘要：We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependentexternalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed,and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary andsucient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We thenapply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model inwhich the unit production cost of a rm depends on both the technologyof the rm and the human capital of the manager hired, andshow that if technology and human capital are complementary, thepositive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rationalexpectations, or even if rm technology and human capital aresubstitutable yet the substitutive e ect is dominated by the marginale ects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rationalstable matching. However, if the substitutive e ect on the unit productioncost is suciently strong or the market demand is sucientlyhigh, the negative assortative matching is a rational stable matching.
