摘要：We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring ambiguouspriors. First, we find that in equilibrium, S typically mixes between messages triggeringdifferent behavior by R while R himself mixes after some message. Technically, the mixingperformed by S is equivalent to mixing over classical partitional strategies. We interpret mixingby respectively S or R as embodying two different modes of ambiguous communication.Second, we find that for sufficiently high ambiguity, more than two messages are often necessaryto implement the optimal decision rule of S, though only two actions are available to R. Ifonly two messages are available and S faces his preference twin, he may be unable to implementhis optimal decision rule and influential communication may be altogether impossible.We remark that these results would not emerge in an expected utility environment. Third, wefind that there often exist influential equilibria that do not implement the optimal decision ruleof S, which is not the case in the absence of ambiguity. Fourth, we show that the addition of alittle ambiguity may generate influential communication that is unambiguously advantageousto S. Fifth, we consider a smooth version of our model and find that some of our key findingsextend to this setting.
