期刊名称:Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
印刷版ISSN:1955-611X
出版年度:2015
出版社:Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
摘要:In the context of the deep contrast between the shale gas boom in the United States and the recent ban by France of shale gas exploration, this paper explores whether climate policy justifies developing more shale gas, taking into account environmental damages, both local and global, and addresses the question of a potential arbitrage between shale gas development and the transition to clean energy. We construct a Hotelling-like model where electricity may be produced by three perfectly substitutable sources an abundant dirty resource (coal), a non-renewable less polluting resource (shale gas), and an abundant clean resource (solar). The resources differ by their carbon contents and their unit costs. Fixed costs must be paid for shale gas exploration, and before solar production begins. Climate policy takes the form of a ceiling on atmospheric carbon concentration. We show that at the optimum tightening climate policy always leads to bringing forward the transition to clean energy. We determine conditions under which the quantity of shale gas extracted should increase or decrease as the ceiling is tightened. To address the question of the arbitrage between shale gas development and the transition to clean energy, we assume that the social planner has to comply to the climate constraint without increasing energy expenditures. We show that when the price elasticity of electricity demand is low, a binding financial constraint leads to an overinvestment in shale gas and postpones the switch to the clean backstop. We calibrate the model for Europe and determine whether shale gas should be extracted, depending on the magnitude of the local damage, as well as the potential extra amount of shale gas developed because of a financial constraint, and the cost of a moratorium on extraction.
关键词:Shale gas; Global Warming; Non-renewable Resources; Energy transition