期刊名称：International Journal of Security and Its Applications
印刷版ISSN：1738-9976
出版年度：2014
卷号：8
期号：3
页码：71-78
DOI：10.14257/ijsia.2014.8.3.08
出版社：SERSC
摘要：Though the information technology outsourcing (ITO) can help many companies to reduce the total costs of their information technology (IT) projects and seek a more efficient allocation of resources, the ITO-based projects probably have the insecure risks of unexpected costs and even the failure of the whole project. After the quantitative analysis with the principal-agent theory towards the security problem of the ITO-based projects, a new incentive reward-punishment model was proposed in this paper, in order to reduce the ITO insecure risk and generate optimal contract under the asymmetric information condition. The experimental results show that the construction of the new model has positive significance for guiding the outsourcing enterprise management in security.
