期刊名称：Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers (früher: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers)
印刷版ISSN：0785-3572
电子版ISSN：1456-6184
出版年度：2014
卷号：2014
出版社：Suomen Pankki = Bank of Finland
摘要：The global nancial crisis of 2007-2008 has given rise to new regulatory ini- tiatives to put restrictions on the size and term of bankers' pay. We revisit the question whether these regulations are justi ed, both theoretically and empirically. We model bonuses as a series of sequential call options on pro ts and show that they provide the higher risk-taking incentives the shorter is the time between the payment points. However, using data on CEO bonuses at the end of 2006 and our model, we nd no robust relationship between risk-taking incentives and US banks' stock returns during the global nancial crisis. The crisis returns are re- lated negatively to leverage and positively to the market to book equity ratio. Our ndings suggest that regulating leverage would be more e ective than regulating bankers' compensation.
