期刊名称：Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers (früher: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers)
印刷版ISSN：0785-3572
电子版ISSN：1456-6184
出版年度：2015
卷号：2015
出版社：Suomen Pankki = Bank of Finland
摘要：We model a banker's future bonuses as a series of call options on the bank's pro ts and show that bonus caps and deferrals reduce risk-taking. However, the banker's optimal risk-taking also depends on the costs of risk-taking. We calibrate the model to US banking data and show that lengthening the standard one-year bonus payment interval has no material impact, whereas capping the bonus at the level of the base salary substantially reduces the bankers risk-taking. Our results suggest that the European Union's bonus cap reduces risk-taking whereas bonus clawbacks as prescribed in the Dodd-Frank Act appear to be ine ective.
