期刊名称：Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers (früher: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers)
印刷版ISSN：0785-3572
电子版ISSN：1456-6184
出版年度：2015
卷号：2015
出版社：Suomen Pankki = Bank of Finland
摘要：Concern that government may not guarantee bank deposits in a future crisis can cause a bank run. The government may break its guarantee during a severe crisis because of time-inconsistent preferences regarding the use of public resources. However, as deposits are with- drawn during the bank run, the size of the governments liability to guarantee the remaining deposits is gradually reduced, which increases the governments incentive to provide the promised guarantee. This in turn reduces depositorsincentive to withdraw, which may explain why bank runs sometimes remain partial. Our model yields an endogenously determined probability and size of a partial bank run. These depend on a common signal as to the future state of the economy, the cost of liquidity provision to banks, and the governments reputational cost of breaking the deposit guarantee. We apply the model to a multi-country deposit insurance scheme, an idea that has been aired in the context of the European Banking Union.
关键词：Bank crises; Information induced bank runs; Deposit;guarantee; Bank regulation
