期刊名称：OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers
电子版ISSN：1815-6797
出版年度：2015
期号：72
DOI：10.1787/5js6g5khdvhj-en
出版社：Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
摘要：This paper investigates farmers’ incentives to participate voluntarily in carbon offsetmarkets when environmental credit stacking is allowed, that is, farmers can stack waterquality credits with carbon credits. The implications of stacking on additionality ofenvironmental services in interlinked markets, market participation rates, and marketequilibrium prices are analysed by developing a conceptual framework of environmentalcredit stacking, which is applied with data estimates for the US Corn Belt. Analysisshows that credit stacking increases farmers’ participation in carbon offset markets, andthat such increased participation provides additionality in environmental serviceprovision. It is further shown that ecosystem markets are interlinked so that credit pricechanges in one market will shift credit supply in another market, thus affectingequilibrium prices. Empirical application of the framework shows that provision of CO2-eq offsets through reductions of nitrogen application or through the establishment ofgreen set-asides is not profitable without water quality credits. A conversion fromconventional tillage and reduced tillage to no-till is profitable in some cases, althoughcurrent low carbon offset prices and transaction costs have a significant negative impacton the number of participating parcels. When farmers are allowed to stack water qualitycredits the profitability of carbon sequestration practices increases. Reduced nitrogenapplication levels becomes a profitable option and 21% of field parcels - representing4.6 million acres- participate in the market with water quality credit prices at base levelsof USD 3/lb for N and USD 4/lb for P. The establishment of green set-aside andstreamside buffer strips becomes profitable in the lower productivity and highly erodiblelands with base prices of nutrient credits. If water quality trading markets are small thenhigh participation rates among farmers may result in an oversupply of nutrient credits andas a consequence equilibrium credit prices and farmers’ credit revenue would decrease.
