期刊名称：European Journal of Business and Social Sciences
印刷版ISSN：2235-767X
出版年度：2013
卷号：2
期号：3
页码：121-139
出版社：European Society of Business and Social Sciences
摘要：This study aims to determine the effect of earnings management on private benefits of control, and to study the indirect relationship between the control mechanisms and the private benefits through earnings management. Most French companies are family owned and very concentrated. Private benefits of control are particularly high. They can be extracted by the owners of blocs and managers through the related party transaction and excessive executive compensation. If controlling shareholders manage the results to transfer maximum wealth of the company, the existence of internal governance mechanisms such as the director’s board and the audit committee appear as limiting factors to the effect of earnings management on private benefits of control. Drawing on a French sample, of 44 listed firms, during the period 2001‐ 2011, the empirical results show that earnings management is positively associated with private benefits of control and the board of directors. Our work also offers insight to policy makers regarding the power of control mechanisms. The audit committee and director’s board can moderate the relationship between earnings management and private benefits of control.
关键词：private benefits of control‐related party;transactions‐earnings management‐director’s Board‐Audit;Committee‐excessive executive compensation.
