Current theoretical and policy-based explanations of security in the Philippines have portrayed “politics” and “security” as distinct and separate fields. However, the recent “2011–2016 National Security Policy: Securing the Gains of Democracy”, has conflated “security” and “politics”, as may be observed in its two national security goals “to promote internal socio-political stability” and “to exercise full sovereignty over its territory”. Although likely derived from administrative expediency, the composite policy definition is also likely to result in the conceptualisation of political goals that are only partially attainable and of a security environment that will remain “unsecured”. As this appears to be a norm of governance in the Philippines, this paper examines the possibility that national security policy-making is likely more concerned with the survival of the regime during which the policy was created rather than with the long-term stabilisation of the entire state. Several theories may be useful in accounting for this behaviour; namely, small states conflict theory, securitisation theory and threat normalisation theory. This paper is intended to show that the definition of threat corresponds to threat-acceptance and may likely lead to threat-toleration than to threat-resolution.