摘要：The scope of this paper is to present the doctrine of law of Kant, showing the problems that formalism generates. It will be seen that the criterion of Kantian justice (categorical imperative of law) is the coexistence of liberties with universal laws and that injustice is characterized when this is prevented. Kant proposes metaphysical principles to the right, thus seeking to hold a moral foundation of the legal. He distinguishes the ethical laws of legal laws and establishes a common foundation for both: the moral laws. The right has a moral foundation. However, this is ignored when Kant deals with the right of need and the right to equality. According to the author, coercion is necessary for the law. However, there are two cases where this does not occur: the right to equity (without coercion right) and the right of necessity (coercion without the right). Why Kant does not solve the problem of these two rights from the metaphysical foundation of law? A theory of strictly formal justice is possible, in the Kantian manner? The article argues that a formal theory of justice is inadequate.
