出版社：Catholic Faculty of Theology, University of Split
摘要：The main topic of the article is the role of apprehension and moral dispositions in Newman´s theory of assent. The first chapter focuses on apprehension as the foundation of rational character of the assent, and there we find the arguments which Newman offers as a proof for his thesis that every assent is a rationally founded act regardless of our ability to prove through strict-scientific evidences the proposition we are assenting to, or if we can understand it com- pletely. To clarify that, Newman introduces the difference between apprehension and understanding as two diverse levels of knowled- ge, where understanding represents the more perfect of the two. The second chapter deals with moral predispositions which, alon- gside apprehension, represent the second pre-condition of assent. Newman thought that for assent to a certain proposition it is not enough to have certain intellectual abilities which will secure our apprehension of the proposition, rather we have to have certain moral predispositions – for example love towards the truth – which will allow us to assent to a proposition which we had apprehen- ded. The third chapter entitled The Assent as a Personal Act unites the premises from the first two giving us an overview of Newman´s understanding of the assent as a personal act which in itself inclu- des the whole person with all of its intellectual and moral virtues, personal characteristics, experience, desires and knowledge. The final chapter is comprised of a short overview of the main themes and conclusions enlisted in the previous three chapters.
关键词：assent; apprehension; moral dispositions; personal act
