期刊名称：CREED Working Papers / Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making
出版年度：2016
出版社：Amsterdam
摘要：We experimentally investigate the relationship between an investor and a projectmanager. Project managers choose from a pool of projects, the success probabilitiesof which are uncertain. Information about the future success probability of a projectis gained by observing its outcome. Investors can change projects, but also have tochange project managers if they want to do so. An additional joint project or a voluntarytransfer precedes their interaction. We hypothesize that investors favor projectsthat are managed by project managers with whom they have shared positive experiencesin the past, even though these past experiences do not provide any informationabout a project's success probability. The role of this social element is isolated using acontrol treatment in which the role of the project manager does not exist. Interactionthrough a voluntary transfer plays a clear and signi cant role in the investors' decisionmaking, whereas the inuence of merely sharing a positive or negative experience provesmore complex.
关键词：Relationship banking; experiment; relationships; social ties; group formation;investment
