摘要：Standard analysis of mergers in oligopolies along the lines of the popular Farrell-Shapiro Frame- work (FSF) relies, regarding its policy conclusions, on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profitable mergers. If this assumption were held, a positive external effect of a.proposed merger would represent a sufficient condition to allow the merger. However, the em- pirical picture on mergers and acquisitions reveals a significant share of unprofitable mergers, and economic theory, moreover, demonstrates that privately unprofitable mergers can be the result of rational action. Therefore, we drop this restrictive assumption and allow for unprofitable mergers to occur. This exerts a considerable impact on merger policy conclusions: while several insights of the original analysis are corroborated (e.g., efficiency defense), a positive external effect does not rep- resent a sufficient condition for the allowance of a merger any longer. Applying such a rule would cause a considerable amount of false decisions
