期刊名称：Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences
印刷版ISSN：1584-174X
电子版ISSN：2392-6260
出版年度：2014
卷号：1
期号：1
页码：69-75
出版社：Academia Romana, Filiala Iasi, Institutul de Cercetari Economice si Sociale Gheorghe Zane
摘要：It is usually agreed that the Revelation Thesis about experience – the idea that the knowledge we gain by having an experience somehow "reveals" the essence, or nature, of this experience – only requires that we know the essence of the experience, not that we know, of this essence, that it is the essence of the experience. I contest this agreement. In the light of what I call the "Essentiality of Essence Principle" – the principle that whatever is in the essence of something is also essentially so – I argue that the Revelation Thesis does require that we know, of the essence of an experience, that it is the essence of the experience, and draw some conclusions about the plausibility of that thesis
