期刊名称：Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences
印刷版ISSN：1584-174X
电子版ISSN：2392-6260
出版年度：2014
卷号：1
期号：1
页码：77-87
出版社：Academia Romana, Filiala Iasi, Institutul de Cercetari Economice si Sociale Gheorghe Zane
摘要：According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about external objects and how we could have access to it
关键词：dogmatism ; evidence ; explanationism ; inference to best explanation ; knowledge ; skepticism
