期刊名称：Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences
印刷版ISSN：1584-174X
电子版ISSN：2392-6260
出版年度：2014
卷号：1
期号：1
页码：89-107
出版社：Academia Romana, Filiala Iasi, Institutul de Cercetari Economice si Sociale Gheorghe Zane
摘要：Current responses to the question of how one should adjust one's beliefs in response to peer disagreement have, in general, formed a spectrum at one end of which sit the so-called ' conciliatory' views and whose other end is occupied by the 'steadfast' views. While the conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that one is required to make doxastic conciliation when faced with an epistemic peer who holds a different stance on a particular subject, the steadfast views allow us to maintain our confidence in our relevant beliefs. My aim in this paper is not to adjudicate between these views. Rather, I shall f ocus on a particular strategy, namely, denying the appearance of epistemic symmetry between peers, that the steadfast views standardly invoke in support of their position. Having closely examined certain representative examples of the steadfast approach, I will argue that this strategy is fundamentally flawed
