期刊名称：Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences
印刷版ISSN：1584-174X
电子版ISSN：2392-6260
出版年度：2014
卷号：1
期号：1
页码：111-119
出版社：Academia Romana, Filiala Iasi, Institutul de Cercetari Economice si Sociale Gheorghe Zane
摘要：Weisberg (2009) introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization (Jeffrey 1983), and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg's paradox. Weisberg (2014) argues that perceptual undermining also poses a problem for ranking theory (Spohn 2012) and for Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer 1976). In this note I argue that perceptual undermining does not pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weisberg's paradox is a false alarm
