摘要：This paper seeks to understand the rationality and potential value ofmaintaining a “non-negotiation” policy as opposed to a more ambiguousapproach in which negotiation is one of multiple possible actions. Under theassumption that terrorists start as actors desiring political change, a formalmodel of a sequential game between a group with an agenda of politicalchange and a government is presented. The model shows that costs for thegovernment occur at a greater speed than the costs for the would-be terroristgroup, but costs are dependent on government type. Democraticgovernments are more likely to want to end the game early, while nondemocraticgovernments may be in a better position to wait out the would-beterrorist group. Additionally preemption becomes more likely for nondemocraticgovernments when the probability is high that the group desiringpolitical change will engage in hostility and for democratic governments whenthe government lacks the ability to negotiate or the costs of doing so arehigh. Taken together, the model shows that a strict non-negotiation policynever leads to lower costs for the government.
