Starting from falsificationism, as developed by critical rationalists as POPPER, FEYERABEND and LAKATOS, the criticism of this study is directed against the empirist research practice, that is going to dominate empirical research methods of the social sciences. This research practice minimizes the growth of our knowledge concerning our human and societal problems in favour of mere exactness and certainty. Falsificationism succeeds in developing a model of test that shows the far distance between theories and its empirical basis. It is therefore necessary to construct a set of general and specified theories of observation, that is background-theories, which only permit such tests. Such a methodological approach shows that there is not any longer consistency or contradiction between a basic statement and a theory, but only between scrutinized theories and the concerning theories of observation. Thus appears the challenging problem concerning the criterions of acceptability of theories, for we do not know apriori which of the contradictory theories has to be dropped out. This problem can only be solved by the principle of progressive change according to which we not only accept or rule out single theories but series of such theories in so far as such a proceeding implies a progressive change, e.g. growth in truth-content and minimization in falsity-content.