首页    期刊浏览 2024年11月05日 星期二
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility
  • 其他标题:How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Hiller, Fernando Rudy ; Hiller, Fernando Rudy
  • 期刊名称:Manuscrito
  • 印刷版ISSN:0100-6045
  • 出版年度:2016
  • 卷号:39
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:5-32
  • DOI:10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.FRH
  • 出版社:UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
  • 摘要:Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds.
  • 其他摘要:Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds.
  • 其他关键词:control;fair opportunity;reasons-responsiveness;responsibility;moral luck;Nagel
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有