摘要：The Crisis in the Euro Zone threatens to break up the Euro and perhaps derail the European Union itself. Many argue that a Member State exiting the Euro would be not only unthinkable, but also a practical impossibility, given the status of the “constitutionality” of European law, the treaties forming the European Union and the Euro, and customary European law. Europeans have been, for centuries, very creative in forging economic and trading alliances—some that appeared to be political alliances and even elementary union. They have also, on more than one occasion, attempted to confect monetary stability. Some of these attempts were successful for long periods, while the monetary bits have often not been so successful. This article explores the proposition that a unilateral exit, an expulsion of a member, a breakup of the European Monetary Union (EMU), or even a breakup of the European Union itself is possible under international law. Indeed, some or a combination of the foregoing may transpire. Some consider such an action impossible inasmuch as Member States have relinquished their sovereignty. It can, however, be argued that a Member State can either withdraw or be ejected from the EMU under existing law.
关键词：Euro Zone; European Monetary Union; EMU; EU; European Union; Rhodian Law; Hugo Grotius; Francisco de Vitoria; Treaty of Rome; European Monetary System; EMS; ECU; European Currency Unit; Economic and Monetary Union; EMU; TFEU
