标题：Incentive-Restricted Mechanism to Department Manager in the Process of Knowledge Transfer in the Guarantee Enterprise Under Condition of Asymmetric Information
出版社：Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
摘要：Guarantee industry is recognized as the high-risk industry in the world, and business risks and personnel risks are two main risks that guarantee enterprises face. Nowadays, guarantee enterprises in China, have great requirements for high quality and ability of the business personnel, but the labor market cannot supply enough talented guarantee people, and this phenomenon highlights the importance and urgency for the guarantee enterprises to provide business personnel training programs. This paper uses the principal-agent theory to explain the incentive-restricted mechanism of preventing department managers’ moral hazard under the real condition of information asymmetry, and verify the validity of theory model of mathematical analysis through an empirical research.
其他摘要：Guarantee industry is recognized as the high-risk industry in the world, and business risks and personnel risks are two main risks that guarantee enterprises face. Nowadays, guarantee enterprises in China, have great requirements for high quality and ability of the business personnel, but the labor market cannot supply enough talented guarantee people, and this phenomenon highlights the importance and urgency for the guarantee enterprises to provide business personnel training programs. This paper uses the principal-agent theory to explain the incentive-restricted mechanism of preventing department managers’ moral hazard under the real condition of information asymmetry, and verify the validity of theory model of mathematical analysis through an empirical research.
关键词：Moral risk;Incentive and restraint mechanisms;Knowledge transfer;Guarantee company
