其他标题：Study on the Internal Driving Forces on Allocation of Urban and Rural Construction Land—Based on the View of the Benefit Games among the Participants
其他摘要：Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to study the internal driving forces in order to optimize the allocation of urban-rural construction land. The paper analyzes the issues from the view of the benefit games among the participants (local government, enterprises and farmers). Methods: The cost-benefit and the game analysis methods are used in the paper. Results: The results of this paper show that the different allocation ways of urban-rural construction land, which includes the land expropriation, the rural land rearrangement and the trade in an asymmetric information market, involve the different participants and their cost benefit including the local government, enterprises and farmers, based on the cost-benefit and the game analysis methods. Conclusion: The paper concludes that the scarcity of land economic supply leads to the interest conflict among the participants, and the results of the allocation of urban-rural construction depend on their different roles and the choice of benefit in the allocation process. At the same time, the following conclusions can be made: In the way of land expropriation, enhancing farmers' consciousness of protecting their land rights as well as governments' cost of violation can effectively curb governments’ motive of seeking profit by depressing land compensation. In the way of rural land remediation, when no companies participate, the game outcome of the government and the farmers is uncertain. Governments prefer to provide preferential policies implemented by the business-led. However, in this case, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and the game outcome depends on monitoring costs of farmers, the possible cost savings and intensity of penalties for non-com- pliance. In the way of market allocation, due to the presence of asymmetric information, companies may choose to damage the interests of farmers leaving the fair trade. This means that government’s regulation is needed in the course of land market transactions to raise the cost of violations and standardize the market behavior of the business.
关键词：城乡建设用地配置 ; 内在动力 ; 参与主体 ; 博弈分析 ; Allocation of Urban-Rural Construction Land ; the Internal Driving Forces ; the Participants ; the Benefit Game Analysis
其他关键词：城乡建设用地配置 ; 内在动力 ; 参与主体 ; 博弈分析 ; Allocation of Urban-Rural Construction Land ; the Internal Driving Forces ; the Participants ; the Benefit Game Analysis
