摘要：This paper investigates the association between large shareholder’s identity and stock price synchronicity in a country where investor protection is weak. Results show that stock prices in Jordan have synchronous behavior especially when the firm is large, consistent with previous empirical evidence on stock price behavior in low per capita GDP countries. Most of the public corporations are owned and controlled by families. In most of the family-controlled firms, the controlling family is also involved in firm’s management leading to loose separation between ownership and management. Furthermore, stock prices of family (government)-controlled firms are significantly less (more) synchronous than those of widely held corporations. The pyramid structure is the most widely used indirect control mechanism but results in little deviations between ownership and control.
其他摘要：This paper investigates the association between large shareholder’s identity and stock price synchronicity in a country where investor protection is weak. Results show that stock prices in Jordan have synchronous behavior especially when the firm is large, consistent with previous empirical evidence on stock price behavior in low per capita GDP countries. Most of the public corporations are owned and controlled by families. In most of the family-controlled firms, the controlling family is also involved in firm’s management leading to loose separation between ownership and management. Furthermore, stock prices of family (government)-controlled firms are significantly less (more) synchronous than those of widely held corporations. The pyramid structure is the most widely used indirect control mechanism but results in little deviations between ownership and control.
