出版社：Centre for Studies in Social Justice, University of Windsor
摘要：The dominance of medicalized “psy” discourses in the West has marginalized alternative perspectives and analyses of madness, resulting in the under-inclusion (or exclusion) from mainstream discourse of the firsthand experiences and perspectives of those who identify as Mad. We argue that this marginalization of firsthand knowledge(s) demands closer critical scrutiny, particularly through the use of critical reflexivity. This paper draws on Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, whereby a person is wronged in his or her capacity as a knower, as a useful framework for interrogating the subjugation of Mad knowledge(s). Also examined is the problem of sanism, a deeply embedded system of discrimination and oppression, as an underlying component of epistemic injustice. Sanism assumes a pathological view of madness, which can be attributed to what Rimke has termed psychocentrism: the notion that pathologies are rooted in the mind and/or body of the individual, rather than the product of social structures, relations, and problems. The paper examines how sanism marginalizes the knowledge(s) of Mad persons and contributes to epistemic injustice, and considers possibilities for advancing social justice using Mad epistemological perspectives
