摘要：In section I, I argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. In section 2, I argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault. The argument in section 2 is based on the notion that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on attaining the goal of truth. In section 3 I describe two cases in which it is best from an epistemic point of view to knowingly retain inconsistent beliefs. In section 4 my goal is to put into perspective the charge that relativism ought to be rejected because it involves one in inconsistency.
关键词：deductive closure, doxastic commitment, epistemic appraisal, epistemic faults, epistemic relativism, inconsistency, maximizing truth and minimizing falsehood, rationality, relativism, self-contradiction
