期刊名称：International Journal of Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：1923-4007
电子版ISSN：1923-4015
出版年度：2011
卷号：2
期号：3
页码：p68
语种：English
出版社：Sciedu Press
摘要：The objective of the paper is to develop deeper insight into how the firm’s incentive systems are designed and, whether the CEOs compensation pay-to-performance schemes really align the incentives of executives and shareholders. Logit and Stepwise regressions on executive compensation data of 231 listed companies’ belongings to four countries from the Anglo-American and the Euro-continental corporate governance models over the period 2004-2008 show that pay-to-performance incentives serve likely shareholders as they tend to create value. Moreover, sensitivity analyses point out that their effects on the Long Term Total Shareholder Return (LTTRS) are far from unanimous. They often depend on the context in which they are planned and executed. More specifically, they are even large than the property rights are stripped, the institutional ownership is less restricted, the governance quality is better, the investor protection is high, and the legal system is common law one.
