期刊名称：Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology
印刷版ISSN：1414-4247
电子版ISSN：1808-1711
出版年度：2002
卷号：6
期号：2
页码：299-314
语种：Portuguese
出版社：Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
摘要：In this paper I consider two related threats to the idea that our beliefs compose a germine worldview the global skeptic challenge to the clam that our beliefs are somehow grounded and the suspicion that our beliefs have no relation to the world whatsoever I consider these two threats from the point of view of aur activity of doubting in order to establish what follows from our capacity to doubt any claim although not all at once I argue that the two threats can be dispelled if we attend to a careful consideration of what is involved in doubtmg Once these threats are disrnissed we find ourselves in a position that enables us to critique both a naturalist conception of our worldviews and the conception of reasons that has been recommended by Brandom.
关键词：Ceticismo;Davidson; visão de mundo;crenças;dúvida global;Ceticismo;Davidson; visão de mundo;crenças;dúvida global
