期刊名称：Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology
印刷版ISSN：1414-4247
电子版ISSN：1808-1711
出版年度：2000
卷号：4
期号：1
页码：79-88
语种：English
出版社：Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
摘要：I show that Susan Haack's foundherentisit theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any proposition). Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certam beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true. This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their jusfication from experience, contrary to coherentism.
