The divided self: courage and grace as agents of change.
Bland, Earl D.
One of the disquieting aspects of modern life is when people lack
integrity or exhibit incongruence between their public self and private
self. While it is common to alter one's interpersonal presentation
to satisfy the demands of a given environment and to maintain social
decorum, some individuals experience an actual division in functioning
where one aspect of their self-experience operates in opposition to, or
isolation from, another more preferred construction of the self.
Self-division is often seen in those who attempt to keep undesirable and
corrupt activities, compulsions, attitudes, or behavioral tendencies
from invading a more socially accepted self-presentation, thereby
preserving an adequate sense of self and the perception of moral
probity. The contradictory states of self-expression and the energy
spent on concealing objectionable parts of the self regularly lead to
frustration and stagnation of self-development and spiritual formation.
Moreover, beyond personal conflict, these splits in the self can
devastate a person's intimate relationships and have negative
ramifications for one's career and public life. Popular examples
are numerous and often provide fodder for media outlets that revel in
the perceived hypocrisy of politicians, clergy, and other public
notables.
This article addresses the clinical and social problem of
self-division. To begin, I illustrate the clinical problem by giving a
case description of the divided self as it is experienced in the
intersubjective world of a psychotherapy client and therapist. Following
the use of case material and modern self and relational theories to
clarify the experience of divided self-states, I briefly discuss how
contemporary Christianity might understand the self as divided. In
particular, Evangelicals often structure discussions about internal
conflict or self-division around questions of personal piety. A look at
Scripture and theological discourse will provide important reference
points to understanding the self and various beliefs and attitudes
regarding disavowal of self-experience. Finally, the clinical challenge
of clients who present with problems related to a divided self is
discussed. The article concludes with specific thoughts regarding the
virtues of courage and grace and their application to treatment of those
who deal with self-division.
Experiencing a Divided Self
Jon, a 42-year old husband and father of three, presented for
therapy after being referred by his local pastor. Jon and his wife had
talked a few times with their pastor after his wife discovered evidence
of an online affair that had been going on for several months. The
resulting family distress clearly exacerbated quiescent marriage
difficulties and both his wife and pastor thought he should seek
individual treatment. Sessions began with Jon feeling significant shame
and embarrassment at his predicament. He was filled with remorse
regarding his actions and worried that his family would lose faith in
him. Further he worried his wife would tell people outside the family
and he was unsure how to respond if friends or extended family found out
about his error in judgment or his resulting marital distress. Jon
reported that his wife was very angry at him and there were frequent
marital fights where he would find himself caught between feeling very
guilty and responsible while at the same time angered that in the eyes
of his wife his life had essentially been reduced to a few acts of
failure and betrayal. The current state of his marriage was especially
difficult for Jon as he indicated that he had been generally happy in
his marriage; he loved his wife and often felt emotionally close to her.
Further sessions revealed that Jon was the second of three children
raised in a fairly conservative Evangelical Christian home. Jon
remembers his father being authoritarian and distant with little
engagement outside of conversations about work and the occasional
baseball discussion. He was often gone in the evenings on sales calls or
to board meetings at church. Although more nurturing Jon's mother
was more introverted and Jon suspected she was smarter than his father
to whom she was always deferring. Jon characterized his sibling
relationships as competitive and shallow. He recalls having friends
while growing up, but always feeling different; an outsider.
As Jon became comfortable he shared more about his sexual
experiences indicating that while he had viewed pornography sporadically
as an adolescent and young adult he had become progressively more
interested in pornography as he entered into his midlife. In the second
month of treatment Jon revealed that he also participated in internet
gambling and had lost several thousand dollars over the past ten years.
He hesitantly disclosed two short but intense affairs with female
colleagues about five and two years prior to entering treatment. Jon
indicated that he had never talked about his affairs and he was very
afraid of his wife, friends, or members of his church finding out about
his infidelity. Although his wife knew he gambled some, neither she nor
anyone else knew the extent of his financial losses. Jon experienced
palpable shame when discussing these matters and he expressed anger and
frustration that he could act so contrary to his Christian beliefs. He
did not know how to stop "acting out" as he called it, and
declared that he felt almost resigned to a future of moral infractions.
His sexual actions were even more confusing as he reported that he and
his wife enjoyed what he considered to be a decent sex life which,
although not overly spontaneous, retained a satisfactory rhythm.
Jon felt divided. Initially reluctant to discuss his sexual and
financial misappropriations he was eventually able to talk about how
this aspect of his life felt uncontained. He wondered if he was addicted
to pornography or gambling, but would absolve himself of this condition
by talking about how he could go for extended periods without pursuing
either vice. His shame and distress were most intense when he thought
about how his actions were so contrary to his public persona as a solid
Christian, member of a local evangelical church, and serving on the
board of a small mission's organization. Jon's initial
sessions were filled with lamentation about why he engaged in such
hypocritical actions.
Understanding Self-Division
How are we to understand Jon and his self-experience? Whatever our
response, it is important to realize that Jon and individuals involved
in these types of situations often react to their own actions with
disbelief and indignation, as if the action was perpetrated by a
different, split-off person. These patients are keenly aware of their
hypocrisy but often feel helpless and baffled with regards to
effectively altering their behavior. It might be tempting to see shadows
of psychosis or psychopathy in this type of conduct, but the symptom
pattern typically does not include gross cognitive distortions even
though reality is distorted to some degree in order to lessen the
severity of negative affect. For instance, these patients will often
minimize the potential impact or intent of their behavior which allows
them to decrease anxiety when engaging in the incongruent behavior.
Psychopaths, or those with antisocial personalities, will often engage
in this type of morally questionable behavior, but unlike the
antisocial, Jon, and patients like him, are very concerned about how
their incongruent behavior is perceived by others. Despite many defenses
to safeguard the self, most recognize that their behavior or attitude is
not desirable and want to preserve a higher moral life. They desire to
eradicate the errant part of the self (Goldberg, 2000).
Although clinical deliberations of patients like Jon may run the
spectrum of available theoretical models I will restrict the frame of
this discussion to more contemporary self psychological and relational
perspectives. Historically, such behavior would be categorized in
psychoanalytic theory as a gross failure of superego functioning.
Rangell (1974) used the term "compromises of integrity" (p. 7)
and hypothesized that uncontrolled narcissistic needs lead to a decrease
in adherence to otherwise accepted moral stances. Weak superego
structures give way under the weight of libidinal imperatives and
self-interest. More recently Naso (2006, 2007) expanded a psychoanalytic
understanding of moral hypocrisy by describing serious lapses in
integrity as a complex psychological process in which moral standards
are disavowed in a way that allows the person to maintain the cherished
moral beliefs and deny that their immoral behavior is discrepant from
these moral standards. In psychoanalytic self psychology Heinz Kohut
(1971) conceptualized such phenomena as a divided self state. He
asserted that paradoxical personality characteristics could best be
understood as evidence of a vertical split in the self. In contrast to
the horizontal split of repression where certain ideations or
perceptions are unconscious recall the oft used iceberg metaphor in
classical psychoanalytic theory--a vertical split involves a: "...
side-by-side, conscious existence of otherwise incompatible
psychological attitudes in depth [italics original]" (p. 177).
Goldberg (1999) goes on to describe the state as "a significant
division of the organization of the person . The experience for the
person is one of a separation: a parallel and coexisting other" (p.
3). A critical mechanism of this divided state is disavowal. Because the
experience of self-division is one of incongruity, the person usually
wants to rid him or herself of one part while emphasizing the more
desirable part. One often experiences alienation from part of their
experience as if an element of their behavioral response was foreign
and, as Garfield (2005) states, "not immediately recognizable to
the client as being part of his or her 'normal' repertoire of
intentions" (p. 250). Disavowal makes it possible for a person to
engage in a behavior, remain cognizant of his or her action, and
simultaneously categorize the behavior as not me.
Disavowal also involves concealment. As the client tries to
maintain a cohesive self-state he or she tends to hide the unacceptable
part from significant relationships including the therapist. The person
sees his or her conduct as an indulgent weakness or evidence of
immaturity, but denies underlying need states. Guilt and shame may
follow times when the person engages in the disavowed action, but
frequently affect is isolated from experience as the action is
occurring. If the person is good at concealment, guilt and shame only
become salient when the hidden behavior is discovered. At the point of
discovery much effort is expended to minimize the seriousness of the
behavior or the effect of the behavior on self or others. Unfortunately,
one can see that if the disavowed action is not experienced as part of
one's intentional frame, one does not actually feel connected to
the split off action--it is almost as if another person is responsible.
Therefore, the shame or guilt that might accompany discovery of the
action is not necessarily connected to a full appreciation of the
inappropriate conduct, e.g., stealing or infidelity, and its effects on
others. Rather, the primary reason for the guilt and shame is
narcissistic injury. The person has been shown to be different than who
he or she presents; it is embarrassment at being found out.
Goldberg (1999) contends that the construction of a divided
self-state is precipitated by early developmental experiences that
necessitated obliteration of certain desires or needs deemed
unacceptable by early caregivers or cultural rules. In these
circumstances, the disaffirmation of self-experience by parents and
other caregivers is sometimes pervasive, but more often selective, where
only certain self-states are deemed objectionable. The objectionable
experiences vary but often include states of strong emotion,
self-indulgent or compulsive actions and wishes, sexual interest or
desire, questioning of accepted familial and cultural mores, and other
self-experiences that may offend or distress the caregivers.
Tragically, in these circumstances the child is unable to avail
parental empathy or the security of parental temperance which would
otherwise assist in emergent attempts to attain equanimity of
self-experience by taming one's desire. Undesirable behavior cannot
be confronted and metabolized absent the threat of relationship
disintegration. The ignored and disaffirmed aspects of the self, which
are often embedded or shrouded in bodily sensations of agitation,
hunger, and sexual desire, are then disavowed from primary self-states.
Exteriorized from principal modes of self-expression the intemperate and
disavowed needs are vulnerable to unfettered display in any manner or
action. In this state, disowned behavior and desire: "... is both
scorned and saved, but never discarded despite one's resolve. It is
retained in another place and returned to periodically" (Goldberg,
1999, p. 25). Consequently, the person is not able to gain a sense of
intentional volition or governance over undesirable behavior. Garfield
(2005) argues that when one does not have a sense of volition or
governance over behavior the person is handicapped in his or her ability
to fully appreciate the consequences of an action. Goldberg (1999)
further proposes that the early experience of those who disavow a piece
of the self often involve caretakers encouraging both sides of the
split. For instance, a child is encouraged to suppress certain desires
to the point where even acknowledging that one desires the unacceptable
is an anathema, e.g., it is not enough to act unselfishly; one must deny
that one has selfish desires. Conversely, implicit permission is given
to the child to engage in the behavior as long as it is not discovered
by the caregiver. The unspoken message is: obey the rules, but if you
break the rules, don't get caught.
Unequal Division, Multiple Divisions.
Conceptualizing a split-off section of the self is an appealing
framework for understanding incongruous behavior. However, tempting as
it is to view the divided self as a clean vertical partition, this is
rarely the subjective experience. For example, when Jon gambled
excessively he did not become totally amoral or disconnected from all
aspects of his identity and self-expression. He was polite to people,
kind to the casino workers, and even wondered if they were Christians.
He reflected curiously on the disparity between his behavior and how he
believed he was supposed to act. At times it seemed as if his gambling
and his pornography usage were mild behavioral aberrations, like a tic
or slip of the tongue; a brief interruption in the ongoing consistency
of his life. In these circumstances conceptualizing Jon as divided seems
to overstate the case.
Another variation arose about 4 months into treatment with Jon
after he participated in a two week work trip sponsored by his church.
While on the trip Jon was involved in rebuilding storm damaged homes
along with witnessing at some evangelistic outreach activities. Jon
remarked that this was a thoroughly engaging trip where he felt alive
and close to God. Not only did Jon believe he was acting in love as he
ministered to those whom he saw as less fortunate, the trip was almost
rapturous in that he felt tremendous compassion and selflessness. Jon
sensed a vital congruence between his self-experience and the Christian
he had always wanted to be. Jon also remarked that during his time away
he had not once encountered any problems with sexual fantasizing and
masturbation.
As we talked further, however, it became clear that the euphoric
sentiment of the work trip had dissipated. With a mixture of frustration
and resignation Jon disclosed that when he returned home the distressing
habits returned and assumed their regular role in his life, activating
familiar melancholic thought and behavioral patterns to which he
responded with various levels of shame, guilt, determination, prayer,
abstinence and indulgence. He then wondered if the only way to live a
good Christian life was to quit his job, and go into charitable work
fulltime.
While wrestling with the disjunction in Jon's sense of self
two lines of thought emerged. First, instead of the undesirable elements
of self-experience, Jon seemed to have split off an ideal sense of self.
Caught in the pressures of everyday life, Jon was unable to identify any
affective linkage to the self he exposed on the work trip except
longing. It was as foreign to him as the infidelity he participated in
with his female colleague. He did not feel a complete sense of
intentionality or control regarding idealized versions of his
self-experience. Back in his familiar surroundings, he bewailed the
hopelessness of his spiritual development and wearied of never being
able to sustain allegiance to a preferred sense of self.
The second curious dimension of Jon's experience is the role
of context as a determiner of self-experience. Prior to his trip Jon
made no pledges to stop his habitual behavior nor did he even think much
about it when he returned. Yet, it did not take long before he was aware
of the dichotomous nature of his self-state. The singular purpose of his
activity when he was rebuilding distressed homes sharply contrasted his
normal life experience where his focus is multitudinous: family, job,
church, home duties, children's activities, budget, and on and on.
Maybe Jon is right, the only place he can sustain a contented spiritual
life is in a relational context different and more focused than the one
in which he typically resided. Although it may be difficult to imagine
the relational context as being the sole determiner of Jon's
self-experience, Wachtel (2008) argues that the self is only known and
experienced within relational contexts. The intrapsychic component of
behavioral repertoires is relationally grounded and one may experience a
transformation of inner affective leanings or unconscious
vulnerabilities based on the external relational context. Furthermore,
this creates the potential for providential or divine influence to
operate in a different meaning context where new realities or
possibilities may become evident.
The spiritual influence on Jon's quest for greater harmony
between disparate elements of his self-experience is contextually
embedded and accessible to him to the degree he is able to manage and
engage the available relational and spiritual influences in his
contextual surround. In this sense the Spirit of God does not operate
separate from the internal and external realities, but emerges as Jon
engages God either through contextually grounded internal psychological
and spiritual processes or external behavioral acts. Therefore,
Jon's paradoxical responses in his spiritual life, particularly his
experience of fragmentation or self-cohesion, becomes a bit easier to
grasp if we look at the divergent nature of the contexts and the
accompanying demands of each environment. Dislocated from ongoing life
circumstances with all of its stressors and historical meaning, Jon
accessed an ideal version of the self while doing spiritually focused
charity work. On the other hand, when Jon returned home where all
allegiances are split and stressors abound, attaining the same level of
spiritual attunement was more difficult due to multiple contextual
priorities.
Furthermore, if context is taken seriously then the concept of
multiplicity in the work of Mitchell (1993) and Crastnopol (2002, 2007)
may help explain the experience of Jon and others with similar
difficulties. The psychological distress experienced by those who act
other than how they desire is diverse, but typically involves a sense of
alienation from one's self. For Mitchell this experience of
alienation is connected to the discontinuity between one's felt
experience and the context in which that experience occurs. For example,
in the early part of treatment Jon had a great deal of difficulty
talking about his inappropriate use of chat rooms and pornography
without concentrated feelings of embarrassment and shame. He
reluctantly, and only after several attempts to clarify, answered
assessment questions about his sexual history and any sexual
indiscretions. When I pointed to the apparent discomfort he had talking
about his behavior he admitted to the intense embarrassment he felt, it
was akin to being exposed. After several sessions we were able to talk
about how he resisted the idea that he found pornography and other women
alluring; he was annoyed and embarrassed with the part of him that took
pleasure in expressing sexual desire detached from the complex and
sometimes frustrating relational politics of his marriage. Tentatively,
he revealed that using pornography and his affairs was absent the
apprehension he felt when he would approach his wife regarding his
sexual needs. Yet, even the admission that he felt intense sexual desire
outside the context of his marriage or the implication that he might
enjoy such episodes, increased his shame and seemed to give him clear
evidence that there was an objectionable part of his character that
required annihilation. Overwhelmed by the shame and guilt he experienced
after his assignations Jon could not make sense of why he would desire
these experiences when they provided only a relatively short duration of
pleasure and satisfaction. In addition, the emotional fallout of
violating his own moral prohibitions--to say nothing of being exposed to
his friends and family--did not allow much reflective space wherein Jon
could fully understand the split nature of his behavior. In treatment,
after Jon was allowed time to consider his situation, he came to
understand (albeit with some anxiety) why pornography and other women
were sexually desirable in a corporeal sense, after all, there was
nothing physically wrong with his sexual response system. Jon could also
accept the expression of sexual desire within the monogamous
relationship with his wife; sexual desire was not Jon's problem.
For Jon, the psychological disconnect emerged when he attempted to
locate his infidelity and pornography use within his Christian
worldview; his beliefs about appropriate marital intimacy; or even
within the realm of acceptable moral behavior. Jon could not justify his
action within a Christian context except that the action be construed as
alien, sin, a weakness, or temporary lapse in judgment. Jon's
continuation of the vertical split required that he employ various
rationalizations or complete disavowal as a defense in order to tolerate
the disparate behavior. As therapy allowed Jon to examine his struggle,
Jon found it particularly difficult to accept these apparent opposing
sides of his sexual expression without immediately sliding into
condemnation of the undesirable. It seemed to Jon that if he accepted
pornography and other women as alluring he would have to accept that a
part of his sexuality was untethered from what he believed to be
correct. Even more threatening was the possibility that he enjoyed this
experience of liberty. Could this really be part of who he was?
Interestingly, Mitchell (1993) comments: "What may seem authentic
in the context of one version of the self may be quite inauthentic with
respect to other versions" (p.131). For Jon, it was impossible for
him to imagine a legitimate version of self as desiring other women and
pornography.
In Jon's early development the only place he was able to find
expression of his sexual desire was in unacceptable behavior. Raised in
a conservative Christian home, Jon stated that although his parents did
not directly communicate negative messages about sexual behavior, he
always felt sexuality was something he should not talk about and that
his adolescent sexual desire was evidence of his depraved state. The
stoic and formal nature of his interactions with his parents were
difficult to penetrate. Jon found that whenever he would become
vulnerable or reveal some aspect of his experience that was engaged in
any moral struggle he was met with authoritarian detachment. His parents
could not respond to these struggles without situating their sympathy
within a larger message of moral prohibition and condemnation. This was
especially true regarding sexual behavior. Another quote from Mitchell
may clarify our understanding:
There are people who experience
sexual desire, or hunger for food, as
a welcome sign of vitality. Others
experience desire as a toxic impingement.
Still others have no idea at all
when they might be desirous of sex
or food but decide by the clock.
Finally, others never seem to experience
desire or hunger at all.. The
meaning of these bodily events, the
psychological significance they contain
regarding the self, derives not
from their inherent properties but
from the way early relational patterns
have structured them vis-a-vis the
self. (p. 127)
In therapy, Jon revealed that in his early relational patterns
sexual desire was disembodied and contorted to fit narrowly defined
limits of appropriateness. Childhood expressions of sexual curiosity
between him and his siblings and later desires regarding masturbation
were severely shamed. He came to believe that any experience or
expression of sexual desire outside the bounds of a monogamous Christian
marriage could not be integrated into an acceptable concept of self.
Despite Jon's attainment of the correct pathway to sexual
fulfillment through marriage, Jon had not integrated all desire into his
marital relationship. His self-loathing of strong desire prevented this
aspect of self-experience from entering into his marriage for fear that
his wife would confirm what he already suspected; that he was a pervert.
What is Jon to do?
In Crastnopol's (2007) language the self is configured in a
multiplicity of ways: "it becomes evident that a person's
experience is actually characterized by a complex patterning of
self-acceptance, self-toleration, and self-rejection" (p. 8). In
the variety of contextual configurations we see how versions of Jon are
continually organized, destroyed, and reconstituted as he seeks to
sustain a viable self-experience. With his wife he organizes his
self-experience and a concurrent level of esteem to reflect an
understanding of her needs, which allows him to be an effective husband
and father. Unsequestered desire is concealed and tolerated as
immaturity or selfishness. Past inappropriate behaviors are rejected as
flukes, irrelevant to any current relational situation. In addition,
each of these self-experiences can be located on a continuum between
intrapsychic and interpersonal. The rejected versions of the self are
often concealed from others while acceptable and tolerable self-versions
are prominent players in his self-presentation. Jon organizes his
aberrant behavior as external to a true expression. It is not what he
intends to do.
Christians, Therapy, and the Divided Self
Noted British theologian John Stott (1986) characterizes the
Christian life as constantly living between "the
'already' and the 'not yet'" (p. 240). Behind
this pithy phrase Stott is identifying what, for many Christians, is a
difficult conundrum in life. How do we make progress in our spiritual
formation when we are saddled with so many aspects of the self that do
not reflect the type of Christian we want to be? In his wisdom, Stott is
reminding us that the Christian life is lived in a state of tension or
paradox. Already we are able to live within the bounds of God's
love and grace, confident that he works in our lives for the good; but,
not yet are we able to fully detach from our fallen nature. Until death
we are embodied creatures who grapple with opposing forces. The very
idea that we must be "... conformed to the likeness ..." (Rom
8:29, New International Version--NIV), presupposes a process we call
spiritual formation, wherein we seek transformation to an ideal--Christ.
This journey is the essence of living a Christian life.
At times, however, Christians may be reluctant to embrace the
notion that being a Christian involves what J. A. Rogers (1992) referred
to as "dissonance and estrangement" (p. 11). The sometimes
contradictory reality of our lived experience is interpreted as evidence
of immaturity or vestiges of our former self that we must expunge if we
are to be truly Christian. At this point it might be helpful to draw
some distinction between contradictions we experience in striving for
virtues and contradictions related to the failure to eradicate some
behavior that is seen as sinful. It would be the difference you feel
when you did not show sufficient compassion to a needy person as opposed
to the disjunction you might feel if you had a habit of stealing from
your place of employment. The former feels more like a growth area while
the latter, the focus of this article, is seen as grossly dissimilar to
ethical Christian conduct.
Perhaps the clearest articulation in scripture of a divided sense
of self is Paul's discussion in Romans 7. The passage is embedded
in Paul's theology of the law and grace and generally communicates
that the established Jewish law is incapable of transforming a
person's inner life. Amazing in his frankness, Paul states: "I
do not understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what
I hate I do" (Romans 7:15, NIV). Theologians have debated the exact
meaning of this passage for centuries (Briscoe, 1982; Moo, 1996). Was
Paul talking about life before salvation, or was he talking about the
struggle of a confessing Christian? Was he referring to himself or was
he referring to others? The answer to these questions may have
implications for a theological interpretation of divided self states,
but a more experience near reading of the passage, at least for many
Christians, may be one of identification. One does not have to
experience the level of self-division discussed earlier in this article
to resonate with Paul. Sometimes we do things we know we ought not to
do. Luther (1525/1976) put a visual image to Paul's quandary in his
work The Bondage of the Will:
Thus the human will is, as it were, a
beast between the two. If God sit
thereon, it wills and goes where God
will; . If Satan sit thereon, it wills
and goes as Satan will. Nor is it in
the power of its own will to choose,
to which rider it will run, nor which
it will seek; but the riders themselves
contend, which shall have and hold
it. (p.72)
While it is hard not to be distracted by the fatalism in
Luther's metaphor, I think this passage, like Paul's account
in Romans 7:15, speaks to the subjective experience of those who live
divided from themselves. As stated earlier, it is not just that the
experience is one of division, but that this partitioned part of the
self often feels peripheral to intentional control. Again, we are
reminded of descriptors such as alienation and estrangement.
It would be easy at this point to digress into an integration
discussion where we compared the psychological understanding of the
divided self and the theological meaning of Romans 7 and other passages
that refer to the contradictory nature of humans (e.g., Jeremiah 17:9).
No doubt this is an important discussion, but one that may distance us
from the essentially interior nature of this problem for many of our
clients, Christian or otherwise. Instead of an academic exercise, the
remainder of the article considers how we might expand the level of
meaningful engagement with clients who must endure distressing
incongruity in self-experience. First, for the person of faith, any
experience of a divided self is a psychospiritual phenomenon where
intention, desire, impulse, restraint, and belief intermingle and
collide to produce complex emotional reactions. Psychological processes
influence and mediate spiritual or religious experiences. Also, the
activities of one's faith, communal and otherwise, act to scaffold
meaning wherein a person comes to understand his or her self-experience
as a believer. For example, I know certain things are worthy of pursuit
or detrimental to my Christian life because I live in a Christian
context (internal and external) that guides my choices and
interpretation of actions. This is true not only of the client, but of
the Christian psychologist or pastor who may treat the person who is
distressed about his or her behavior. In other words, when the Christian
enters therapy with another Christian, the therapeutic space is
contextualized by unspoken assumptions about what Christian means, both
in terms of cognitive assent and behavioral acts.
Any Christian who enters therapy encounters moments when faith
concerns either implicitly or explicitly emerge into the therapeutic
situation. This entree of belief into the therapeutic frame is often
magnified when both the therapist and the client are Christians. In some
encounters faith explicitly enters in the form of verbal exchanges
between the client and therapist, in others the therapist might
implement a treatment strategy that has explicit Christian components.
In still other instances, the fact the therapist is a Christian serves
important holding functions where the alliance is enhanced due to the
client's positive transference attributions towards the Christian
therapist.
While the concern of what it means to be a Christian moves in and
out of an intersubjective therapeutic space any time both parties are
believers; I have observed this to be of significant concern for those
who manifest divided or multiple self states. In the oft nuanced
therapeutic environment where self states are continually being
revealed, hidden, contorted, or constructed; due to fears of rejection,
the client with tendencies towards concealment and disavowal may begin
and end a course of therapy without ever revealing the split off
component of the self. More often the split is presented cloaked in
anxious or defensive posturing, or only hinted at in the presenting
material. Transference concerns about the patient's acceptability
and maturity as a Christian are sometimes more acute when the therapist
is Christian. I do not want to suggest that Christian therapists are the
only ones who deal with clients who are fearful of judgment, nor do I
think this is the case in all instances where both parties are
Christian. I merely want to stress that sometimes, like all material in
the therapeutic endeavor, similar faith characteristics in the client
and the therapist may create hesitation as to what is revealed, often
due to projective fantasies on the part of the client, which may be
subtly confirmed by the therapist's counter-transference reactions.
I'm thinking of a supervisee's reluctance to explore an
adolescent client's distress regarding masturbation. The supervisee
disclosed that he felt strange talking about such a private topic and
further probing revealed that the supervisee had not resolved his own
confusion regarding how masturbation could be expressed in the life of a
Christian. The obscure and indirect language my supervisee used was
partially due to his unfamiliarity with therapeutic conversations, but
he also revealed that he did not know what to think about masturbation
in the realm of morally acceptable behavior.
Goldberg (1999) discusses how sometimes therapists find themselves
confused as to how to respond to the client's self-division because
the therapist also has split off self-states and the treatment process
provokes the therapist's internal affective distress. In an effort
to quiet their internal unease therapists may end up aligning with one
or the other side of the client's split. For instance, if the
therapist engages in disavowal and concealment of her own intolerable
actions, the expression of similar states within the client may elicit
therapeutic responses aimed at suppression and eradication of the
disavowed action thereby repeating the exact pattern of relating that
created the disavowal. Paradoxically the therapist may secretly revel in
the client's expression of the disavowed action unconsciously
gratifying her own disavowed self who seeks a voice and freedom. Another
possibility, which may occur in Christian circles, is a cyclical pattern
wherein the therapist unconsciously encourages the patient to express
the disavowed action or desire, seek atonement for the act once it is
completed, and then suppress or disavow the desire or action again. This
cycle of confession and repentance resonates with the Christian subtext
of both the therapist and client leaving both gratified that restoration
has occurred in the aftermath of the offense.
Courage and Grace
I am not unsympathetic to therapeutic techniques and programs aimed
at the suppression and eradication of certain behaviors expressed in
those with divided selves. There are circumstances when disavowal and
suppression are effective management tools, and in the right context may
be sufficient to interrupt or permanently eliminate destructive
behavioral patterns. However, I wish to speak to a therapeutic
sensibility that I think locates the divided self within a larger
context than the attainment of right action. I do not think this
sensibility necessitates a particular therapeutic orientation or
modality; rather it is a therapeutic way of being that I have found
helpful in the treatment of divided self-states.
In his book on acceptance and change Hayes (1994) defines
acceptance as, "experiencing events fully and without defense, as
they are and not as what they say they are" (p. 30). I find this
definition intriguing because it seems a lot like what happens when a
person shows grace to another. Therapists are supposed to be good at
accepting, it is often what we refer to as a core condition of
therapeutic action (C. R. Rogers, 1961; Schafer, 1983). Christians who
act in similar ways label their behavior grace and use Christ's
acceptance of us, despite our fallen condition, as the example to be
imitated. Now grace is clearly a complex word with all kinds of
implications, but for our purposes I want to look at grace in its
expression of acceptance. What does it mean for me to accept or show
grace to my client? In relation to theology I am referring to how the
client/therapist relationship may participate in the process whereby
salvation by grace results in the "... gradual therapeutic
transformation of our lives" (Maddox, 1994, p.145).
Grace, in the form of acceptance, is critical for the person who is
dealing with a divided or disavowed segment of the self. If I am correct
in assuming that the developmental trajectory of divided self-states
begins in an environment that says do not be who you are, then the only
environment that will repair or ameliorate the distress of these states
is one of thorough acceptance. In this vein, I propose that the
therapist must extinguish any need for the client to immediately alter
his or her disavowed action in an effort to create a place for
observation and curiosity regarding the behavior and why it persists.
The difficulty of this task depends on the client and therapist's
ability to tolerate a complete unfolding of the action in all its forms
and permutations. Just like the early caretakers, the therapist may
struggle to accept the disavowed action especially if it is counter to
his or her own morals and values. The client may have difficulty
examining the behavior without needing to disparage the action as a
censurable aspect of the self. Conscious or unconscious collusion may
also occur if both agree that the disavowed action must be eliminated.
Instead of understanding and tolerating the divided nature of the self,
both therapist and client are focused on the suppression of the unwanted
behavior. This is accomplished by labeling the behavior in various ways
to keep it external to the self: sin, impulse, compulsion, or weakness
to name a few. Strategies are then employed to eradicate the behavior
and therapeutic success is seen as the client being able to successfully
overcome temptation.
Therapy courses like the one just described are successful as long
as the client's disavowed self does not reemerge, which, in my
experience, often happens. Therapy then becomes one more failure, and
the divided self is resurrected as the most reliable method for managing
the self. Hayes (1994) gives us a pathway out of this dilemma when he
comments about the nature of context as a determiner of psychological
distress: "The meaning of psychological events is found in the
relationship between those events and their psychological makeup . The
same psychological events in another context are no longer 'the
same psychological events'" (p.13). When the therapist and
client are less interested in changing the nature of the self than in
understanding the self, they are freer to construct new meanings of
self-states; meanings that are more flexible and generative of new
possibilities when it comes to thought and action.
Let us return to the case of Jon to highlight the fertile nature of
an analytic and accepting therapeutic environment. As treatment
progressed Jon became more and more willing to talk about the split
nature of his sexual expression. The discomfort about acknowledging a
tainted enjoyment of his extramarital activity decreased and we were
able to explore some of the relational meanings and longings that gave
momentum to his experience of sexual compulsion. He began to talk about
the disappointment and anxiety he felt with his wife, whom he linked
with the stifling and stoic childhood in which he did not feel free to
express strong passion. He complained that no one wanted to see him as
he really was; his quiet, suburban, Christian life left him stultified
and lonely. In addition, Jon felt that talking to his wife about his
disappointment and desire for more sexual connection was an indication
of weakness--evidence of a person who could not control his passions.
Once Jon recognized that his compulsion towards pornography and virtual
flirtations was a way of avoiding the tremendous fear he felt at
approaching his wife, he was able to see his pornography use as more
than just undesirable behavior. In his fear of her reaction he dreaded
that his desire would not be reciprocal and that she would spurn and
derogate his relational need to feel wanted. As we continued to explore
these meanings Jon began feeling an increased sense of agency and choice
regarding his sexual behavior.
One may critique this stance as prone to endless analysis without
any change in behavior; something that will frustrate both the client
and the therapist. While I agree that the line between understanding and
action is sometimes difficult to determine, I do not see the two as
dichotomous entities, nor do I see the therapist as a passive agent
unable to influence the therapeutic space beyond the creation of a safe
and respectful environment. Grace as acceptance asks the client and the
therapist to engage in undefended observation of the self without hiding
behind any cultural and religious prohibitions regarding what is, and
what is not, appropriate to look at. Here I see the virtue of courage as
essential to therapeutic progress. The client must be encouraged to
courageously admit the disavowed or concealed part of the self and
accept it as a legitimate expression of the self. In addition, it is not
just the underlying emotional motivators that need to be accepted, it is
the distortion of these emotions through various behaviors that also
needs acceptance. Jon needed to understand that his involvement in
clandestine affairs and pornography provided soothing for a vapid and
lonely internal self-state. Jon also needed to accept that his actions
constituted infidelity. Moreover, Jon needed to understand the many
implicit behavioral and thought patterns that precipitated his disavowed
actions. When eradication efforts are instituted prior to adequate
understanding and acceptance, part of the self remains alienated.
To bolster an atmosphere of courage the therapist is often called
to endure contradictory counter-transference reactions without
abandoning authenticity. Interestingly, there is some debate as to how
this is best accomplished. Goldberg (1999) argues that it is critical
that the therapist remain neutral in his or her response to the
expression of the client's disavowed actions, regardless of how the
therapist might feel about these actions personally. At times this is
difficult, especially if the behavior is morally reprehensible, e.g.,
stealing or infidelity; or, if the therapist has a similarly constructed
disavowal process. Neutrality may be doubly difficult if the therapist
and client are Christian and are operating in a therapeutic space
saturated with implicit expectations about acceptable Christian
behavior. The neutrality and empathic responsiveness of the therapist
ideally will allow for examination of the split self-state and foster
integration.
In a rebuttal to Goldberg (1999), Henry Friedman (2002, 2003)
wonders why therapist neutrality is essential for the integration of
one's disavowed states. Specifically he states:
I believe that Goldberg does ignore
... what I regard as the essence of
intersubjectivity, namely the acceptance
of distinctly different sensibilities
that are in opposition to each
other. The analyst's individuality is
assigned to the role of a counter-transference
that must be worked
through rather than allowed to enter
into the process in a fashion that is
ultimately therapeutic. ... I would
insist that it is the very frank discussion
of the analyst's negative
response to destructive behaviors that
is vital in achieving therapeutic effectiveness
(2003, p.156).
Although Freidman does not articulate specifically how he would
frame such a "frank discussion" his notion of the
therapist's subjectivity as important in the therapeutic space is
significant. Freidman's view allows for a clarification of my
earlier statement that the therapist must extinguish any need to alter
the clients disavowed action. Authentic engagement does not involve the
therapist needing the client to be different than who he or she is.
However, this does not mean that the therapist cannot communicate his or
her response to the disavowed action of the client; some disavowed
actions are quite blameworthy. The difference is when a therapist, for
his or her own reasons, needs the client to alter the disavowed action.
When this happens the therapist reenacts the traumatic context in which
the disavowal originally developed (do not be who you are); but when the
therapist responds authentically to the disavowed action without the
need for the client to be different, opportunity for observing the
behavior and how others might react to the behavior is created. Grace,
in this instance, is experienced in a relationship where the client is
encouraged to courageously face the therapist's authentic opinion
of the disavowed action understanding that one can be accepted and
connected while still having parts of the self that are in need of
change or management. This type of therapeutic space allows the client
to wrestle with and explore the pain of non-acceptance that has been
internalized and stop the unhelpful self-flagellation.
Creating a place for observation and understanding also allows the
client to explore failure in self-control or how the disavowed action
may speak to needs the client would otherwise deny. Jon's eventual
ability to articulate a deep longing to be wanted and desired was
painful. He began to realize that the affairs and pornography had
awakened a need that he did not know existed. It was also a need that
was not being met in his marriage. I eventually referred Jon for marital
counseling where, even though he was able to work through some concerns
related to marital distrust, he was left with sense that his wife would
never completely understand the depth of his longing. His occasional
lapses into the use of pornography bothered him and he continually
wondered if I thought he was a poor Christian because of his lapses. As
his therapist I was torn, the Christian undertone of the therapy and my
own values weighed on me, pushing me to confront a behavior that was
immoral; yet I was also sympathetic to his rediscovered needs and the
tragedy of his marriage. In an effort to manage my own tension I found
that a sustained and even empathic hovering (Stozier, 2001),
authenticity, and the avoidance of certitude best accomplished what I
believed was grace.
This empathic stance is essential in that it communicates the
therapist's unrelenting hope, so critical for problem resolution.
The therapist who sees change as possible despite the repetitive cycle
of disparate acts is needed by those who disavow parts of the self.
Expressions of grace in the form of acceptance of the same thing over
and over without the demand for change instills the idea that one can
continue the struggle and still be acceptable. If we return to John
Stott's comment about the Christian life: the already, the not yet;
it seems that the therapeutic demonstration of grace through acceptance
fertilizes the ground wherein clients can courageously pick themselves
up after one more failure and face the dichotomy they have long sought
to conceal.
Grace shown by the therapist may also be met with resistance if the
client is unable to give up the idea that they must be free of the
disavowed action. In these cases acceptance on the part of the
therapist, without a strong investment in the attainment of proper
behavior, is tantamount to an endorsement of the despised action. I
recall early in my career as a therapist working with a young single
gentleman who wanted to stop masturbating. My willingness to explore the
behavior and understand the reasons behind his difficulty were met with
strong resistance as he just wanted to be free of this annoying habit. I
did not manage this case very well as I was unable to hold his fear and
affirm his need for disavowal. However, I have since come to see the
outcome as a failure of courage. Courage, as Tillich (1952) described
it, is "self-affirmation 'in-spite-of,' that is in spite
of that which tends to prevent the self from affirming itself" (p.
32).
In our present context, courage involves the affirmation of the
self despite existing in a state where one wants to expunge an element
of self. For the therapist, it involves the difficult task of creating a
therapeutic space where both parties are free to be authentic and
connected. Courage also allows the client to recognize the importance of
behavioral limits on the disavowed part of the self. In the context of
grace, limitations and prevention strategies do not have to be
punishment or depravation; a way to get rid of some aspect of the self.
Rather, in the context of acceptance the client is able to embrace a
better vision of him or herself. He or she can seek management and
integration of the disavowed part because it really is a better way to
live. Courage allows the client to be in a state of unfulfilled desire
or dissatisfaction - to feel the feelings as they really are, not as
they say they are according to the patterned responses gleaned from
early relationships. Courage allows the therapist to sustain a hovering
stance of grace, one that embodies Paul's solution to the dilemma
of self-division, "Who will rescue me from this body of death?
Thanks be to God--through Jesus Christ our Lord!" (Romans 7: 24-25,
NIV). I want to argue against a reading of this passage that would
suggest Paul is acquiescing to the struggle between good intention and
evil desire. He is not saying: "stop struggling--just give it to
Jesus." Rather, I think this speaks to Paul's understanding
that it is only in relational connection to Christ, a Christ who accepts
him in full consciousness of his struggle, that he is able to experience
the transformation of his fallen self. Similarly, confidence in the
certainty of an accepting relationship with a therapist allows one to
engage in uncensored examination, and the freedom to choose and live
differently becomes possible.
References
Briscoe, D. S. (Ed.). (1982). Romans. The communicator's
commentary. L. J. Olgilvie (Gen. Ed.). Waco, TX: Word.
Crastnopol, M. (2002). The dwelling places of self-experience.
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 12, 259-284.
Crastnopol, M. (2007). The multiplicity of self-worth. Contemporary
Psychoanalysis, 43, 1-16.
Friedman, H. J. (2002). Book review: Being of two minds.
Psychoanalytic Psychology, 19, 403-408.
Friedman, H. J. (2003). Reply to Barbara Fajardo (2003).
Psychoanalytic Psychology, 20, 155-157.
Garfield, D. A. S. (2005). The vertical split in neurosis and
psychosis: Motor acts and the infrastructure of agency. Psychoanalytic
Review, 92, 249-270.
Goldberg, A. (1999). Being of two minds: The vertical split in
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.
Goldberg, A. (2000). Errant selves: A casebook of misbehavior.
Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.
Hayes, S. C. (1994). Content, context, and the types of
psychological acceptance. In S. C. Hayes. N. S. Jacobson, V. M.
Follette, & M. J. Dougher (Eds.), Acceptance and change: Content and
context in psychotherapy (pp. 13-32). Reno, NV: Context Press.
Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. Madison, CT:
International Universities Press.
Luther, M. (1976). The bondage of the will (H. Cole, Trans.). Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker. (Original work published 1525)
Maddox, R. L. (1994). Responsible grace: John Wesley's
practical theology. Nashville, TN: Kingswood Books.
Mitchell, S. A. (1993). Hope and dread in psychoanalysis. New York:
Basic Books.
Moo, D. (1996). The epistle to the Romans. The new international
version commentary on the New Testament. G. D. Fee (Gen. Ed.). Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
Naso, R. C. (2006). Immoral actions in otherwise moral individuals.
Psychoanalytic Psychology, 23, 475-489.
Naso, R. C. (2007). Beneath the mask: Hypocrisy and the pathology
of shame. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 24, 113-125.
Rangell, L. (1974). A psychoanalytic perspective leading currently
to the syndrome of the compromise of integrity. International Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 55, 3-12.
Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Rogers, J. A. (1992). Dissonance and Christian formation. Journal
of Psychology and Christianity, 11, 5-13.
Schafer, R. (1983). The analytic attitude. New York: Basic Books.
Stott, J. R .W. (1986). The cross of Christ. Downers Grove, IL:
Intervarsity.
Strozier, C. B. (2001). Heinz Kohut: The making of a psychoanalyst.
New York: Other Press.
Tillich, P. (1952). The courage to be. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press .
Wachtel, P. L. (2008). Relational theory and the practice of
psychotherapy. New York: The Guilford Press.
Earl D. Bland (Psy.D. in Clinical Psychology, Illinois School of
Professional Psychology, 1996) is a Professor of Psychology at
MidAmerica Nazarene University in Olathe, Kansas. Dr. Bland's
interests include the integration of psychology and faith,
psychoanalytic self psychology, narcissistic disorders,
psychology-clergy collaboration, and virtue development.
An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Christian
Association for Psychological Studies 2006 Annual Conference,
Cincinnati, OH; March, 2006. Correspondence regarding this article
should be addressed to Earl D. Bland, Psy.D., MidAmerica Nazarene
University, 2030 East College Way, Olathe, KS 66062. Email:
ebland@mnu.edu.
Earl D. Bland
MidAmerica Nazarene University