The Lousy Racket: Hemingway, Scribners, and the Business of Literature.
Curnutt, Kirk
The Lousy Racket: Hemingway, Scribners, and the Business of
Literature. By Robert W. Trogdon. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press,
2007. 320 pp. Cloth $39.95.
Fifteen years ago, James L. W. West III published an article in
Sewanee Review entitled "Did F. Scott Fitzgerald Have the Right
Publisher?" For most scholars, this was the heretical equivalent of
asking whether Jesus might have fared better as a Buddhist or Mohammed
as a Unitarian. Even today, two decades after Charles Scribner's
Sons merged with Macmillan and then was bought out by Simon and Schuster
in 1994 and reduced to little more than a boutique imprint, the once
venerable firm continues to exert a myth unlike any other in publishing
circles. General readers to whom such important American industry names
as James T. Fields, Bennett Cerf, Pascal Covici, or Nan A. Talese mean
nothing know of editor Maxwell Perkins--and not because Perkins brought
J. P. Marquand and Alan Paton to the house, either. It thus seemed a
poke to the eye of literary legend for West to ask whether This Side of
Paradise might have been an actual bestseller as opposed to a succes de
scandale had a competing publisher with a more daring business approach
rolled out a massive print run on the red carpet of a publicity blitz.
Who else but Perkins would have stuck by Fitzgerald through his
penurious years? Who but Scribner's would have printed Tender Is
the Night at the bleak height of the Depression? Who would have
encouraged The Last Tycoon knowing fully and sadly well that its author
was unlikely to last to its completion?
In the end, West's provocative essay was less the critique of
Scribner's methods that its title suggested and more a reminder to
fellow scholars that publishing was--and always will be--a commercial
endeavor. As any number of frustrated writers can testify, how a book is
distributed and advertised often plays as much of a role in the making
of reputations and readerships as any measure of its quality. Between
production costs, promotion, and the always abstruse accounting methods
by which books are discounted, returned, and--the worst fate this side
of being pulped--remaindered, publishing continues to be one of the
snakier capitalist shell games. Few in the profession, including the
bean counters, are able to do more than cross their fingers and hope the
ledger ends up more black than red. And yet that very financial
ambiguity in many ways creates a space for "literature" to
exist in a commercial environment--because there is an ingrained
expectation that the majority of one's seasonal list will not turn
a profit, publishers are (or used to be, anyway) more tolerant of
losses. Often the goal is only to make enough to keep creditors at bay
until next year's batch hits bookstores.
Publishing used to be a gentleman's business, in other words,
and writers used to benefit from that fact. However flustered Fitzgerald
may have been by Scribner's inability to justify why Paradise
peaked at just under 50,000 copies when his celebrity made him one of
the nation's most recognizable writers, he was unwilling to leave
Perkins for another house with more panache for exploiting his fleeting
flapper cachet. He knew that the proximity of his name to Henry
James's could only elevate his reputation long term, and he also
understood that another firm would cut him the minute his Bernices
outgrew bobbed hair.
Reading Robert W. Trogdon's The Lousy Racket, I was so
reminded of West's essay that I kept wondering whether "Did
Ernest Hemingway Have the Right Publisher?" might be an appropriate
subtitle for this admirable study. The question is equally sacrilegious,
but for different reasons--arguably, Scribner's only had commercial
expectations for Fitzgerald's The Beautiful and Damned (1922) and,
perhaps, The Great Gatsby (1925). The popularity of Paradise caught the
firm off-guard, and Fitzgerald's first two story collections,
Flappers and Philosophers (1920) and Tales of the Jazz Age (1922),
performed quite handsomely for a genre that was essentially considered a
loss-leader for novels. By the time of Tender and Taps at Reveille
(1935), publication was a de facto favor meant to maintain
Fitzgerald's spirits; nobody anticipated making money from his work
anymore. Hemingway was a different case. Once A Farewell to Arms (1929)
broke the l00,000 mark (at the beginning of the Depression, no less),
Scribner's was always eager for the next blockbuster, and they had
to support vanity projects like Death in the Afternoon (1932) and Green
Hills of Africa (1935) before hitting it big again with For Whom the
Bell Tolls (1940). Then came a long period of inactivity (the entire
1940s) and the critical disaster of Across the River and into the Trees (1950) before The Old Man and the Sea (1952). Would another publisher
have weathered such dry spells for the prestige of the Hemingway name?
Would another agree to publish a trifle like The Torrents of Spring (1926) for the chance to later do a writer's "true" debut
novel? And sight unseen at that, as The Sun Also Rises was when Perkins
first signed Hemingway?
Perhaps the first thing that The Lousy Racket clarifies is how
contradictory Hemingway could be about his own career ambitions. On the
one hand, unlike the Ezra Pounds who loathed the mass audience,
"[h]e wanted his works to be read by as many people as he could
reach and thus had to balance the demands of art with those of a popular
audience" (1-2). And yet that balancing act did not mean he was
willing to pander to the marketplace. Even while knowing that "his
experimentation was lost on most readers and that the so-called common
reader wanted something different [than radical modernist fiction]"
(6), he nevertheless drew a line in the sand on matters of language,
publicity, and subsidiary deals when they might "influence the way
he wrote" (3). Essentially, Hemingway wanted to have his cake and
eat it too, and that, as Trogdon reveals, often placed Perkins in a
tricky balancing act, at once discouraging the star author from
alienating mainstream audiences (as in the famous "c-s-r"
contretemps in A Farewell to Arms [82]), while encouraging him not to
stray too far from his true metier, fiction, amid the often gassy travel/sportsman yarns of the Green Hills era (158).
The generous excerpts from the Hemingway/Perkins correspondence
cited in The Lousy Racket testify to Perkins's patience in dealing
with Hemingway's grousing about advances, royalty rates, and sales
statements. In return, Hemingway often pretended to lack sound business
sense--a pretense that seems especially facetious when it dovetails with
veiled threats to move elsewhere should Scribner's prove unwilling
to pony up: "Will you be prepared to advance me $6,000 on the book
of stories[?]" he asks in reference to Winner Take Nothing (1933).
"This is ... the minimum that will hold poor old Papa's
affectionate loyalty. The advance ... is less than the sale on day of
publication of this last $3.50 masterpiece [i.e. Death in the
Afternoon]" (128).
Such exchanges puncture the myth that book making is a
collaborative enterprise between writers and publishers. Instead,
writers are contracted labor often left in the dispiriting position of
having to beg for their bread and butter. They may create the goods that
go into the marketplace, but they still work for the interests who
produce them. One of Trogdon's three helpful appendixes makes a
worthwhile point: whatever his fame and stature, Hemingway never
finagled a royalty rate higher than 20 percent out of Scribner's.
Even on a "$3.50 masterpiece," that's a whopping 70
cents.
Those familiar with Trogdon's previous essays and his valuable
collection Ernest Hemingway: A Literary Reference (Carroll & Graf,
2002) have been anticipating this book for some time now. Having studied
with two of the best--Michael Reynolds and Matthew J. Bruccoli--Trogdon
demonstrates his own mastery of at least two valuable scholarly traits
undoubtedly learned at the hands of these mentors. From Bruccoli he has
inherited a no-nonsense style of presenting facts and figures--right
down to the decimal point--that recalls the old (but by no means
antiquated) William Charvat school of scholarship on the profession of
American writing. Thus, we learn that while Scribner's printed
"a total of 101,500 copies" of Across the River and into the
Trees, "25,701 copies of the novel [were] still on hand" six
months later, not counting the "'somewhere around 10,000'
returns" that Whitney Darrow, head of the sales department,
reported to Charles Scribner III.
[T]he firm had sold 93,738 copies, paying Hemingway a royalty of
$50,960.70. (In 2005 terms, this amount would equal $395,037.82.)
The chart also records that there were no sales after this date.
The discount Scribners gave bookstores and jobbers at this time was
44 percent of the list price (i.e., they sold copies of Across the
River and into the Trees for $1.68). The firm would have grossed
$157,479.84 on these 93,738 copies. After paying Hemingway's
royalty and the $20,000 advertising cost, the firm would have had
$86,519.14 left to cover its other expenses. (240)
For those of us lackadaisical about balancing our own checkbooks,
the recitation of such accounting can be intimidating, and yet it also
proves strangely fascinating, for the economics of the book business
provides a perspective on Hemingway's output not typically found in
extant biographies. Reading such passages, several questions come to
mind. Did Scribner's consider that $86,519.14 a healthy return on
its investment? Most likely not, Trogdon implies. Would average readers
regard that $1.68--$13.28 in 2005 dollars, by the way--as a reasonable
price for a badly flawed book? And who are those booksellers who would
dare to return 10,000 copies of Papa?
The traits Trogdon has picked up from Reynolds are equally
valuable: how to arrange, dramatize, and pace a compelling narrative
through the swirl of such facts and figures. Minimizing the
critic's own interpretive presence and allowing characters to speak
without interference are key. In the hands of a Marxist theorist,
telling the story of how The Sun Also Rises was packaged and promoted
might easily result an interminable bog of superstructure analysis
intended to prove a tendentious cultural point about the desire of
Charles Scribner's Sons to escape its stodgy reputation with this
racy expatriate tale. Instead, Trogdon prints a memo from
Scribner's editor William Cary Brownell that speaks volumes:
We were speaking of the only other fastidious houses the other
day. But our range is wider our business larger in scope and our
sympathies broader. Of an occasional slip in holding our equally
strict standards we might excusably therefore be more tolerant
ourselves and expect friends to be--especially as we have no
material or moral interest in incurring the reproach of pedantry by
exercising a censorship over what the Time Spirit not only accepts
but calls for.... [A]ccordingly, we might go ahead and see what
happens. A single mistake would not be fatal and would be a guide
for the future. (38-39)
Suffice it to say, Perkins did not tell Hemingway that some at
Scribner's regarded Sun as a potential "slip" or
"single mistake." Instead, what emerges from such excerpts is
a sense of the often overlooked supporting cast at the House of
Scribner, including not only Charles II and III (curiously, IV receives
only cursory mention here), but Brownell, Darrow,
advertising-man-turned-copy-editor Wallace Meyer, Scribner's
Magazine editors Robert Bridges and Alfred Dashiell, and even
Perkins's secretary, Irma Wyckoff. (Perkins's internal memos
regarding Hemingway's blue streak had to be handled gingerly during
dictation so as to not offend Ms. Wyckoff). While Perkins rightly
dominates the narrative, Hemingway's work benefited from the input
of this talented staff--often in ways that he neither fully understood
nor appreciated.
Illuminating the business angle of Hemingway's career through
a chronological survey has one drawback. What is truly new in The Lousy
Racket may not always stand out, even to informed readers. Those with a
thorough knowledge of the biographies may take for granted the more
familiar chestnuts, such as Hemingway's hardball strategy of
writing The Torrents of Spring to force Horace Liveright to free him
from his contract so he could join the Scribner's fold; his
sarcastic ire over the blanks in A Farewell to Arms ("the operation
of emasculation is a tiny one--It is very simple and easy to perform on
men--animals and books--It is not a Major operation but its effects are
great" [69]); the HEMINGWAY'S DEATH galley slug that so
spooked him while correcting the proofs of his Spanish bullfighting book; and Leland Hayward's brokering the Life publication of The
Old Man and the Sea. Assuming one knows these stories inside-out can
lull one into failing to appreciate less-publicized anecdotes. For
example, as Trogdon notes, Hemingway despised Whitney Darrow
"because he thought Darrow did not work hard enough to sell his
books and was too quick to place them with cheap reprint houses"
(11). That irritation boiled over in 1931 when two such houses, the
Modern Library and Grosset and Dunlap, licensed reprint rights for
Farewell with Scribner's, a deal that to Hemingway was tantamount
to "saying good bye to all further income from its sale for an
outright cash payment" (94). Perkins's reply was conciliatory but unswayable as he lectured his now bestselling author, the market for
a $2.50 book had been exhausted, and it was up to reprint houses to
serve the $1.00 masses. (This was before the widespread popularity of
paperbacks in the late 1940s).
Hemingway's later and highly uncharacteristic willingness to
shape For Whom the Bell Tolls to appeal to Book-of-the-Month-Club
readers is also fully explored. Beginning in early 1940, not only did
Hemingway for the first time allow Charles III and Perkins to read a
novel while in the composition stage, but he also proved more amenable
to suggestions for revision, including "modify[ing Robert]
Jordan's thoughts on masturbating in chapter 31 because Scribner
had been bothered by it" (213). Trogdon even suggests that it was
Charles III and not Perkins who pushed the BOMC sale. "I suppose
you have heard of the good fortune that has befallen Ernest,"
Perkins wrote to Fitzgerald in September 1940 (barely three months
before Fitzgerald's death). "[The BOMC represents] the stamp
of bourgeois approval. [Ernest] would hate to think of it that way, and
yet it is a good thing, practically speaking" (213). Trogdon even
gives due notice to the quirky typos and gaffes that made their way into
print. How many of us knew that somebody at Scribner's printed
salesman's dummies promoting Hemingway's 1937 novel, To Have
and To Have Not? (179). While the publisher never made a similar mistake
with The Beautiful and the Damned, it did, much to its chagrin, briefly
issue a press release for a novel called For Whom Tolls the Bell (207).
The real discovery here, however, is the advertising figures that
document what Scribner's spent promoting each Hemingway book.
Another valuable appendix lists the exact amounts: from 179 print ads
costing a total of $6,558.93 for Sun to a whopping 504 for Bell totaling
$43,567.09 (260). Trogdon's research into the Scribner's
archive demonstrates just how vital aggressive advertising was to the
bookselling business. But if discovering that a paltry $3,360.79 went
into The Fifth Column and the First Forty-Nine Stories in 1937 raises
the question of what Scribner's spent that same year on Marjorie
Kinnan Rawlings's The Yearling (itself a BOMC selection)--alas,
that question is beyond the scope of The Lousy Racket. What is not,
however, is Hemingway's enduring belief that Scribner's
perpetually shortchanged him when it came to promotion. An intriguing
exercise for putting his displeasure in context is to calculate the
percentage cost of each Hemingway volume's advertising against the
profits it brought in. The budget for The Torrents of Spring, for
example, was $796.54. Given that the total printing for the book was a
mere 2,785 copies, Scribner's spent roughly 28 cents per copy (19
percent of the $1.50 purchase price) on pushing the book. After
deducting the ads' cost and Hemingway's $500 advance from its
total potential sales, the publisher was at best looking at a slim
profit potential of $2,880.96--if the book sold every single copy (which
it did not). More than any other evidence, such facts prove that
Scribner's did not regard Hemingway as a cash cow.
Equally important is recognizing how ill-informed Hemingway was
about the investment that went into his books. While the "scant
notice and small sales" of the 1930 reprint of In Our Time did not
seem to bother either the author or the firm (104), Hemingway was irate
whenever he felt he was not being pushed hard enough. The most
illuminating moments involve the books that, by any standard, must have
struck Scribner's as difficult sales: Death in the Afternoon and
Green Hills of Africa. In each case, Perkins proved a stern tutor on the
economics of the book business. When Hemingway questioned the sales
department's commitment to Death in the Afternoon, Perkins informed
him (in Trogdon's words) that "the firm adopted a direct-mail
strategy, sending out two circulars--the first to 161,000 people, the
second to 10,000--in hopes of stirring interest" (124). Interest
remained decidedly unstirred. Similarly, when the author blamed his
editor for tapering sales of Green Hills of Africa ("Nothing was
done to overcome the bad daily reviews by putting ads in those paper
[sic] quoting from the good weekly reviews when it would have done some
good" [166]), Perkins defended Scribner's strategy, which
Trogdon bluntly summarizes: "Books that continued to sell well, the
profits of which went back into the advertising budget, were promoted
more extensively than books that did not. While this may have been good
business, it could not have been much solace to Hemingway...."
(167). By the time To Have and Have Not stalled at 39,038 copies--better
than any previous book since A Farewell to Arms, but still nowhere near
its six-figure mark--Hemingway assumed an air of exasperation:
"Will you tell me, frankly, whether you plan to try to sell anymore
copies of the book?" To which Perkins replied: "We spent
$9,500 in newspaper and magazine advertising, and we sent out hundreds
of thousands of lists and circulars and Bookbuyers. We sent out through
our own store, and other stores, imprinted, 87,000 postcards announcing
the book to individuals, to arrive on the day of publication.... We
cannot push it [more] in any big way" (184).
Granted, Perkins's responses sound harsher when taken out of
the context of his generally congenial correspondence with Hemingway,
but Trogdon demonstrates why they need to be considered at this point in
Hemingway studies. Such exchanges reveal Hemingway's misdirected
anger at the ebb and flow of his popularity as well as his editor's
tolerance for authorial bluster. Indeed, at no point did the impeccable
Mr. Perkins fire back with the response that many authors receive today
when they-complain that their publishers are not doing enough to bolster
sales: "Write a better book."
The question thus remains: "Did Ernest Hemingway Have the
Right Publisher?" The Lousy Racket emphatically says yes. By
providing a richer and more in-depth angle on the
Hemingway-Scribner's relationship than we have heretofore enjoyed,
Trogdon's book reveals just how far the firm was willing to go to
try to maintain Hemingway's audience, even in the 1930s, when his
work seemed to push his readers away. It is highly doubtful that
Liveright, Knopf, John Day, or any other of the more artistic houses of
the period would have tolerated such valleys in hopes of another
peak--much less market those valleys as much as Scribner's did
despite knowing full well when Hemingway was lost in a dell of his own
making. Sad to say, the economics of today's publishing no longer
allow for such tolerance. The more the business of making books is
corporatized and conglomerated in our media-synergized world, the
farther such partnerships recede into the misty stuff of legend.
--Kirk Curnutt
Troy University, Montgomery