Information asymmetry in the French market around crises.
Bellalah, Mondher ; Aboura, Sofiane
ABSTRACT
This paper posits itself in the stream of literature related to
event studies and in particular the September 11th event. It is the
first study to our knowledge that investigates the impact on the French
financial market of September 11th, 2001 and September 21st, 2001. Was
there any information asymmetry around these two dates? How did French
investors react to these tragic events?
We implement an information cost model and a jump diffusion model
to capture the magnitude of shocks in stock price processes. We found
that the information linked with the domestic event has been straight
away absorbed while the information related to the international event
has been spread out between the 12th and 17th September.
JEL Classification: C13, G13
Keywords: Information costs; Implied volatility; Jump diffusion
model
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the strong assumptions underlying the standard financial
theory is that investors are perfectly informed about security returns.
This is not a reasonable assumption since investors pay to obtain
information. Information is regarded today as a valuable commodity. In
practice, information is costly. In fact, investors do not invest in all
the available assets in the market place. They choose a subset from the
available assets. They selected only the assets about which they are
informed. Tesar and Werner (1995) found strong evidence of a home bias
concerning domestic investment portfolios. This home bias can be partly
explained by the transaction costs, but also by the information costs
that are defined as the cost of collecting, gathering and treating the
flow of information required for asset allocation. Falkenstein (1996)
explained that the preference for some assets is explained by low costs
of transactions but also by the fact that investors tend to trade on
assets for which they hold information. Forester and Karolyi (1999)
showed that the abnormal returns of a given portfolio can be explained
by the asymmetric information. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) showed that
assets whose information is available to a restricted set of investors
offer greater expected returns than assets with widely dispersed
information. Kadlec and MC Connell (1994) explain that the variation in
share value is attributed to investor recognition factor as highlighted
by Merton (1987). He introduced a modified capital asset pricing model,
CAPM, relaxing the hypothesis of equal amount of information for each
investor. This model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete
information may provide some insights into the behavior of security
prices.
Bellalah and Jacquillat (1995) have extended this version of CAPM
with incomplete information to option valuation deriving an option
formula taking into account an information cost for the option itself
and another information cost for its underlying. This model is shown to
correct some of the bias of the standard Black-Scholes (1973) model. As
a consequence, it can also help explain certain stylized facts of the
volatility smile. Bellalah, Aboura, Villa and Prigent (2000) explained
that the inclusion of information costs impact on the smile asymmetry and that this model can produce asymmetric smiles even if the physical
distribution is symmetrical. Recently, Bellalah and Mahfoudh (2004) used
a model with stochastic volatility and jumps in the presence of
incomplete information to explain the smile effect.
In this article, we compare the out-of the sample performance of
the information cost model (denoted ICM) with as benchmark, the jump
diffusion model (denoted JDM) of Ball and Torous (1983, 1985) and Maltz
(1996). The objective is twofold. First, we check the behavior of the
models around the September 11, 2001 attack and the explosion of the AZF factory in Toulouse, the September 21st. At this moment, many people in
France made a connection between both events. The idea is to understand
how the French market reacted to these shocks. This is an important
question in empirical finance since it sheds light on the behavior of
the markets around these events. This can provide some new insights and
explanations of the reaction of the markets to these events.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
theoretical models to be tested and discusses the impact of the
information costs on the volatility smile. Section III presents the
sampling methodology. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section
V summarizes and concludes.
II. THE THEORETICAL MODELS
Information plays a central role in financial markets. Using models
which account for the effects of incomplete information can help to
explain some deviations between market prices and model prices.
A. The Information Cost Model
We propose to display the theoretical model of Bellalah and
Jacquillat (1995). This model is an extension of the Merton's
(1987) CAPM with incomplete information. The central hypothesis in the
Merton's (1987) model is that an investor includes a security in
his portfolio only if he has some information concerning the first and
the second moment of the return distribution. The model is:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] (1)
Where E([R.sub.S]) is the equilibrium expected return on security
S, E([R.sub.m]) is the equilibrium expected return on the market
portfolio. R is one plus the riskless rate r, [[beta].sub.S] is the beta
of security S, [[lambda].sub.S] is the equilibrium aggregate
"shadow cost" for the security S, [[lambda].sub.m] is the
weighted average shadow cost of incomplete information over all
securities in the market place. This model is an extension of the CAPM
to an environment of incomplete information. Indeed, when
[[lambda].sub.m] = [[lambda].sub.S] = 0, the model collapses to the
CAPM. The value of a European call is derived in Bellalah and Jacquillat
(1995) as being equal to:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] (2)
where:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]
with N(x) being the cumulative normal density function. The terms
[[lambda].sub.C] and [[lambda].sub.S] correspond respectively to the
information costs on the option and the underlying asset. When
[[lambda].sub.C] = [[lambda].sub.S] = 0, this formula collapses to the
Black-Scholes (1973) formula.
Figure 1a shows that the more the access to the information is
costly, the more the option call price grows with a magnitude higher for
in-the-money (ITM) options than for out-of-the money (OTM) options. This
stylized fact is at the origin of the asymmetry in the smile due to the
inclusion of information costs.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Figure 1b displays the difference between the Black-Scholes (1973)
prices and the ICM prices. We note that the spread between both prices
increases along with the information costs moreover when options are
in-the-money or at-the money (ATM). In Figure 1c, we note that the more
the volatility level is weak, the more the difference between ITM and
OTM options is high. Figure 1d reveals that the more the maturity is
long, the more the price difference between ITM and OTM options
increases.
B. The Jump Diffusion Model
After the introduction of geometric Brownian motions, much
attention was devoted to Poisson distributions as an alternative
specification of stock returns. This was supported by various empirical
evidence concerning "abnormal" variations in the stock price
process. Large values of returns occur too frequently to be consistent
with normality assumption. Both skewness and kurtosis are captured by
the Poisson distribution. However, the expansion of these models are
limited to the fact that there are few cases where closed-form solutions
are given, specifically when there is a non zero probability of early
exercise, or when the distribution of jumps is neither lognormal nor
discrete. In this section we assume that [S.sub.t] follows a log-normal
jump diffusion, i.e., the addition of a geometric Brownian motion and a
Poisson jump process. This price process under the risk-neutral
probability can be shown to be:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] (3)
Wit [q.sub.[tau]] a Poisson counter with average rate of jump
occurrence [lambda] (prob(dq=1)=[lambda]dt) and k the jump size. Ball
and Torous (1983, 1985) and Maltz (1996) supposed as a realistic
simplification that during the life of the option (overall for
short-term options), there will occur at most one jump of constant size.
If no events occur in the option life, the associated probability is (1
- [lambda][tau]) and will be [lambda] [tau] if one event occurs during
this time interval. When such event occurs, there is an instantaneous
jump in the stock price. Ball and Torous (1983, 1985) call this
simplified version as the Bernoulli distribution version of the
jump-diffusion model.
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] (4)
where:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]
This formula corresponds to the Black-Scholes (1973) call option
value weighted by the probability of a jump and by the probability of no
jump with the stock price divided by the expected value of a jump, (1 -
[lambda]k[tau]).
III. DATA DESCRIPTIONS
The call options database covers every day of September 2001. This
database can be given, upon request, by EURONEXT S.A. The twenty days
considered in September are the 3rd, 4th
5,6,7,10,11,12,13,14,17,18,19,20,21,24,25,26,27 and 28th.
These options are short-term European style PXL options written on
the CAC 40 Index. We have in total 7015 intra-daily call options divided
in 6327 out-of-the-money and 688 in-the-money options. The database
contains: the strike price, the future price, the premium, the maturity
and the risk-free interest rate. The maturities that are included go
from 27 days to 6 days. The EURIBOR 1 month interest rate is used as a
daily proxy of risk-free rate and was downloaded from DATASTREAM. The
stream of dividends is also extracted from DATASTREAM.
IV. THE OUT-OF-SAMPLE VALUATION ANALYSIS
This section conducts some empirical tests and shows how to
estimate some of the model's parameters. This allows measuring the
empirical effects suggested in this study.
A. The Information Cost Estimation Procedure
We estimate the implied volatility [[sigma].sub.ICM], the option
information cost [[lambda].sub.C] and the underlying information cost
[[lambda].sub.S] minimizing the following loss function:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] (5)
where [C.sub.ICM]([[sigma].sub.ICM], [[lambda].sub.C],
[[lambda].sub.S]) is the theoretical call option price of the model,
which is calculated for any option in a given current day's sample.
B. The Jump Diffusion Model Estimation Procedure
We estimate implicitly the parameters of the jump diffusion model.
We estimate the jump occurrence parameter [lambda], the jump size
parameter k and the implied volatility [[sigma].sub.JDM] by minimizing
the following loss function :
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] (6)
where [C.sub.JDM]([lambda],k,[[sigma].sub.JDM]) is the theoretical
call option price given by the jump diffusion model that is calculated
for any option in a given current day's sample.
C. Implied Parameters
Table 1 displays the parameters estimated from three models.
[[sigma].sub.BS], [[sigma].sub.ICM] and [[sigma].sub.JDM] are
respectively the implied volatilities of the Black-Scholes (1973) model,
ICM and JDM. [[lambda].sub.S] and [[lambda].sub.S] represent
respectively the information cost of the underlying index and of the
option. [lambda] is the jump intensity and k is the size of the jump.
The three volatility measures seem to have the same behavior even
if they differ by their values. It is not surprising to see that the
Black-Scholes (1973) (denoted BS) volatility is the highest in average
since the effect of the attack is absorbed by the jump parameter in the
JDM and by the two information costs in the ICM. The effect of the
attack is overall reflected the September 12th, since it occurred less
than three hours before the closing of the French market. The BS implied
volatility has increased by more than a half (53.68%) from September
11th to 12th while the JDM volatility has rosen by 44.33%. The ICM
volatility remained stable by a neglectible increase of 0.5%. At the
same moment, in September 11th, the CAC 40 index has decreased by 4.69%
while the VX1 volatility index has increased by a huge amount of 105%
according to the MONEP.
The information costs remained relatively stable through time. The
same stability is observed for the average annualized jump occurrence,
which is equal to 0.77 times per year. This means that the probability
that a jump is observed in average before the expiration date is equal
to 6.45%. The average annualized size of the jump as been multiplied by
two and three, respectively the September 12th and 13th. The highest
values for the size parameter are reached on September 17th (-0.7042)
and September 21st (-0.9203).
The highest values for the volatilities were on September, 21st
where the AZF factory in Toulouse has blown up. From September 21st to
22, the BS volatility has grown by an amount of 13.7% while the security
information cost has risen by 340% showing that the investors paid
theoretically more for increasing their information to reallocate their
assets. From September 20th to 21st, the jump size has grown to 45.52%.
92% of the variation was explained by a jump in the stock price process
and not by a volatility phenomenon.
The impact of the September 11th was reflected through the
volatility and jump parameters the day after, but the impact had a
second magnitude on September 17th. The reason is that the NYSE was
closed from September, 11th until September, 17th. Therefore, the French
market couldn't import the necessary amount of volatility from the
domestic market. This means that there was not transmission of
information concerning the magnitude to give for this event, which
justifies the stability of the information cost parameters around this
period.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper posits itself in the stream of literature related to
empirical anomalies and event studies. It uses models accounting for the
effects of incomplete information in explaining some market reactions.
We discuss the impact of the tragic events occurred in September 2001,
namely, the September 11, 2001 attack and the blow up of the AZF factory
in Toulouse.
The principle is to quantify the reaction of French investors
relative to these events. We implemented an information cost model to
check if the price of information has varied around these two dates. As
a benchmark, we choose a jump diffusion model to capture the magnitude
of the shock in the stock price process.
We found that the impact of September 11th was strongly reflected
in terms of volatility and jump only from September 17th. The principal
reason is that the French market did not import abroad volatility since
the main US markets were closed from September 11th to 17th. The impact
of the September 21st was strongly reflected through a rise of
volatility and overall through a rise of the jump parameter in the stock
price process that explains around 92% of the price variation. In
contrast with the previous event, the information is here domestic and
was rapidly absorbed by the French market.
The extension of this study will quantify the impact of these
shocks through a stochastic volatility model allowing for jumps to
observe the behavior of the correlation coefficient and volatility of
volatility parameters that drive the smile dynamic. A possible framework
for this future work, can be the model of Bellalah and Mahfoud (2004)
accounting for the effects of stochastic volatility, jumps and
incomplete information.
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Mondher Bellalah (a) and Sofiane Aboura (b)
(a) University of Cergy and ISC Group,
Mondher.bellalah@eco.u-cergy.fr
(b) University of Paris-Dauphine, Paris
Table 1
Implied parameters
BS ICM
Date [[sigma].sub.BS] [[sigma].sub.ICM]
03/09/01 0.2443 0.2194
04/05/01 0.2382 0.2125
05/09/01 0.2415 0.2171
06/09/01 0.2627 0.2294
07/09/01 0.2787 0.2458
10/09/01 0.3115 0.3588
11/09/01 0.2943 0.3601
12/09/01 0.4523 0.3763
13/09/01 0.3547 0.3061
14/09/01 0.3621 0.3023
17/09/01 0.4829 0.4685
18/09/01 0.4102 0.3376
19/09/01 0.3708 0.2945
20/09/01 0.4433 0.3865
21/09/01 0.5041 0.4764
24/09/01 0.4811 0.4422
25/09/01 0.4158 0.3441
26/09/01 0.3491 0.3322
27/09/01 0.2834 0.2687
28/09/01 0.1562 0.1767
Average 0.3468 0.3178
ICM
Date [[lambda].sub.S] [[lambda].sub.C]
03/09/01 0.0910 0.0046
04/05/01 0.0931 0.0044
05/09/01 0.0963 0.0044
06/09/01 0.1330 0.0016
07/09/01 0.1371 0.0013
10/09/01 0.0503 0.0086
11/09/01 0.0454 0.0088
12/09/01 0.0565 0.0083
13/09/01 0.0325 0.0093
14/09/01 0.0323 0.0093
17/09/01 0.0801 0.0041
18/09/01 0.0395 0.0091
19/09/01 0.0273 0.0095
20/09/01 0.0379 0.0094
21/09/01 0.1671 0.0151
24/09/01 0.0686 0.0082
25/09/01 0.0404 0.0090
26/09/01 0.1370 0.0015
27/09/01 0.1219 0.0100
28/09/01 0.0071 0.0101
Average 0.0747 0.0073
JDM
Date [[sigma].sub.JDM] [lambda] k
03/09/01 0.2139 0.7776 -0.1843
04/05/01 0.2069 0.7773 -0.1864
05/09/01 0.2121 0.7779 -0.1877
06/09/01 0.2243 0.7723 -0.2385
07/09/01 0.2409 0.7721 -0.2450
10/09/01 0.2638 0.7665 -0.2978
11/09/01 0.2815 0.7740 -0.1275
12/09/01 0.4063 0.7659 -0.3220
13/09/01 0.2765 0.7438 -0.5136
14/09/01 0.3306 0.7742 -0.2399
17/09/01 0.3914 0.7265 -0.7042
18/09/01 0.3329 0.7504 -0.5441
19/09/01 0.2927 0.7416 -0.6134
20/09/01 0.3661 0.7401 -0.6324
21/09/01 0.4085 0.7123 -0.9203
24/09/01 0.3932 0.7588 -0.6720
25/09/01 0.3861 0.7777 -0.2660
26/09/01 0.3020 0.7659 -0.4817
27/09/01 0.2665 0.7853 -0.2019
28/09/01 0.1553 0.7232 -0.0317
Average 0.2975 0.7744 -0.3808