"Street" crime: a view from the left.
Platt, Tony
According to survey after survey, "street" crime ranks as
one of the most serious problems in working-class communities. In
1948.only 4 percent of the population felt that crime was their
community's worst problem. By 1972, according to a Gallup Poll, 21
percent of the residents of metropolitan centers reported crime as their
major concern. (1)
People not only think that they are threatened by crime, they are
also taking action to defend themselves. Several years ago, Chicago
citizens formed the South Shore Emergency Patrol, composed of some two
hundred black and white residents, to patrol the streets at night and on
weekends; in Boston's Dorchester area, the community has begun
crime patrols; in New York, Citizens Action for a Safer Harlem has
organized blockwatcher programs, street associations, and escort
services for the elderly, while an armed citizens' vigilance group
patrols the streets of Brooklyn on the lookout for arson and burglaries;
in San Francisco, a member of the Board of Supervisors recently urged
the formation of citizen anticrime patrols to curb muggings; and in the
relative peace and quiet of a college town like Berkeley, the Committee
Against Rape and several neighborhood associations are meeting to plan
ways of stopping violent attacks against women. (2)
The phenomenon of "street" crime has been largely ignored
by the US left. On the one hand, it is treated moralistically and
attributed to the parasitical elements in capitalist society,
mechanically following Marx and Engels's famous statement in the
Communist Manifesto that the "lumpenproletariat may, here and
there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its
conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a
bribed tool of reactionary intrigue." (3) On the other hand,
"street" crime is either glossed over as an invention of the
FBI to divert attention away from the crimes of the ruling class or
romanticized as a form of primitive political rebellion. Whether it is a
form of reactionary individualism, or a fiction promoted by the
bourgeoisie to cause confusion and false consciousness, or another
manifestation of class struggle, is not a matter of theoretical
assertion and cannot be decided by dogmatic references to Marxist texts.
What is first needed is a thorough investigation of the scope and nature
of "street" crime, concrete information about its varieties
and rates, and an appreciation of its specific historical context. This
essay sets out to summarize and analyze the available information, thus
providing a realistic basis for developing political strategy.
Reporting Crime
In 1931, the International Association of Chiefs of Police
developed the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) system and selected seven
felony offenses for index purposes, on the grounds that the victims, or
someone representing them, would more likely report such crimes to the
police. The seven offense groups include: homicide, robbery, aggravated
assault, forcible rape, burglary, larceny (grand theft), and auto theft.
These are the crime statistics from which trends in the incidence of
criminality are regularly reported in the media. When these reported
crimes are converted into rates per 100,000 population and comparisons
are made across time, for example 1968 to 1973, each of the index
crimes, with the exception of auto theft, increased 25 to 50 percent. In
1976, according to the UCR, nearly 11.5 million serious crimes were
reported to the police, a 33 percent increase from 1972, and a 76
percent increase from 1967. (4)
Critics of the FBI's reporting system have pointed out that
the dramatic increase in crime rates is exaggerated and misleading since
it reflects higher rates of reporting crime, technological improvements
in data processing, better record-keeping systems, and political
manipulation by the police, rather than a real increase in the level of
crime. While there is no evidence to support sensational media
announcements about sudden crime waves, crime is certainly not
exaggerated by the FBI. On the contrary, it is grossly underestimated.
The most accurate information about the scope of "street"
crime is to be found in the federal government's Victimization
Surveys. The Surveys, part of a statistical program called the National
Crime Panel created by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) in 1973, are an attempt to assess the extent and character of
criminal victimization by means of a representative probability sampling
of households, businesses, and persons over the age of 12. The Surveys,
which do not include homicide, kidnapping, "victimless" crimes
(such as prostitution, pimping, sale of drugs, etc.), and business
crimes (such as fraud, false advertising, tax evasion, etc.), are
limited to personal (rape, assault, and armed robbery) and property
(theft, auto theft, and burglary) crimes.
Most "street" crime is not reported to the police. The
Census Bureau recently concluded that there were nearly four times as
many crimes committed in 1975 and 1976 as reported to the police. (5) A
1973 victimization study found that fewer than one in five persons
report larceny to the police. (6) Some experts estimate that only 10
percent of all rapes are reported; the reporting rate for wife beating
is even lower. (7) A "self-report" study estimates that about
one out of every 30 delinquent acts comes to the attention of the
police. (8)
The primary reason for not reporting crimes is the belief that the
police are either incapable of solving crimes or are likely to aggravate
the situation by brutalizing or intimidating the victims. This distrust
of the police is realistically based on the extensive experiences of
working-class communities, especially racial and national minorities,
with police brutality and ineffectiveness. According to a recent
national public opinion survey, blacks think that the police are doing a
poor job almost three times more than do whites. (9) (See Table 1 on the
following page.)
According to a recent study by Paul Takagi, black males are killed
by the police at a rate 13 times higher than for white males. (10) But
police killings are only a small part of the total level of state
brutality directed at the civilian population. It is not an exaggeration
to say that millions of Americans now alive have been beaten by the
police. Data cited by James Q. Wilson, a political scientist at Harvard,
show that 5 percent of all blacks (over one million people) and 2
percent of all whites (over four million people) report themselves
unjustifiably beaten by the police. And sociologist Albert Reiss, in an
LEAA-financed study, found that the police used unnecessary force in 3
percent of all police-citizen encounters, representing hundreds of
thousands of cases of brutality per year. When these data are understood
in the context of peer and family relationships, a very large proportion
of the population on a day-to-day basis faces or fears the possibility
of police violence. (11)
Additionally, the police have a very poor track record in solving
and prosecuting serious "street" crime. A two-year Rand study,
released in 1976, reported that substantially more than 50 percent of
all serious crimes reported to the police receive no more than
superficial investigation by detectives and investigators. Unless the
patrolman on the scene makes an arrest or a patrol car accidentally
stops a burglar for speeding, concludes Rand, there is little chance of
a successful prosecution. (12)
The selective recruitment and militaristic training of the police,
aggravated by institutionalized racism and sexism, encourage them to
regard "high crime" areas as either a combat zone requiring
the dispassionate objectivity of a professional soldier or a
"subculture" of violence and depravity where victimization is
culturally inevitable. Not surprisingly, policing the ghettos and
barrios vacillates from extraordinary violence to cynical resignation.
This does not mean that all rank-and-file police operate in this
way. There are many individual officers and a small number of
progressive caucuses, such as the Afro-American Patrolmen's League
in Chicago and Officers for Justice in San Francisco, who are genuinely
concerned about protecting working-class communities from crime. But
their efforts are easily frustrated, partly because the roots of
"street" crime are deeply embedded in social conditions over
which they have no control, and partly because their efforts are
continuously undermined and sabotaged by the political police and
"red squads," who make it their business to destroy community
and political organizations that are trying to combat drug pushing,
pimping, rape, and other forms of parasitical criminality.
[TABLE 1 OMITTED]
Scope of Crime
According to a 1977 Gallup Poll and a survey of 70 countries, the
United States has the highest crime rate of all capitalist and European
countries. One of every five homes was victimized by crime; 15 percent
of working-class communities reported that they were afraid of being
victimized by crime in their own homes, while 43 percent thought that
crime had increased in their neighborhood. (13)
During 1974, according to the Victimization Surveys, over 39.5
million persons over the age of 12 were victimized by selected, serious
crimes, an increase of 7.5 percent over 1973. In 1975, there was another
2 percent increase to nearly 40.5 million estimated incidents of
victimization. (14) And the latest Census Bureau study reports over 41
million for 1976. (15) This is almost four times higher than the
FBI's UCR index. Moreover, it should be remembered that these
estimates do not include homicide, "victimless" crimes
(illegal drugs and prostitution, for example), or the "hidden"
figures of "white-collar" crime--price-fixing, health and
safety violations, tax fraud, embezzlement, false advertising,
etc.--which cause immense suffering and untold deprivation in
working-class communities.
The Victimization Surveys have caused considerable embarrassment to
the government, which had hoped to use them to demonstrate that
LEAA's "war on crime" was winning some major battles. The
Surveys, however, have instead demonstrated that the rate of
"street" crime has gradually increased, despite the 55 percent
increase in criminal justice expenditures, from $11 billion in 1971 to
$17 billion in 1975; despite the fact that the number of police almost
doubled in the decade between 1965 and 1975; despite a flourishing
criminal justice-industrial complex that has upgraded the technological
capacity of the police and introduced computers, weapons systems, data
retrieval devices and modern communications equipment to a hitherto
"backward" bureaucracy; despite the advice and thousands of
research studies conducted by the "best and brightest"
scholars from the most privileged universities and corporate think
tanks.
Not surprisingly, the federal government recently called a halt to
the Victimization Surveys, even though they were widely regarded as one
of the very few worthwhile and reliable projects initiated by LEAA. The
reasons for this action are quite obvious. Not only did the Surveys
expose the bankruptcy and incredible waste of the government's
"war on crime." They also supported the conclusion that
"street" crime is not simply a by-product of the capitalist
mode of production, a logistics problem to be solved by technocrats
trained in "systems analysis." Rather, it is shown to be a
phenomenon endemic to capitalism at its highest stage of development.
Victims of Street Crime
"Street" crime is primarily an intra-class and
intra-racial phenomenon, media stereotypes to the contrary. (16) White
women are most likely to be raped by white men; young black men are most
likely to be robbed by other young black men; and working-class families
are most likely to have their homes vandalized or ripped off by
strangers living only a few blocks away.
The victims of "street" crime are overwhelmingly poor
people, particularly blacks and Chicanos living in metropolitan areas.
LEAA's 1973 Victimization Surveys found that, with the exception of
theft, families with annual incomes under $3,000 were the most likely to
be victimized by serious crimes of violence and property loss. (17)
Another study, using the same indices, reported that the unemployed were
more likely to be victims of crime in rates two to three times higher
than those employed. (18)
Racial and national minorities, especially blacks, have the highest
rate of victimization. A 1975 LEAA study in the five largest cities
found that:
* Blacks and Chicanos in Philadelphia and Los Angeles are most
likely to be victimized by assault and robbery.
* Blacks in Philadelphia and Chicago are the most victimized by
theft.
* Black family households in all five cities suffer the highest
rates of burglary and auto theft.
* In Philadelphia, blacks are twice as likely as whites to be
burglarized.
* In Chicago, blacks are twice as likely as whites to be victimized
by auto theft. (19)
Follow-up nationwide studies, released in 1976, similarly found
that the highest incidence of violent and property crime is among the
poor and unemployed, specifically, the superexploited sectors of the
working class, young men, and single or separated women. Blacks have
higher victimization rates than whites for rape, robbery, and assault.
Moreover, blacks over age 20 are robbed at two to three times the rate
of their white counterparts. (20) (See Table 2.)
While crimes of violence account for less than 10 percent of
"street" crimes, they are an important source of
demoralization and victimization in working-class communities. Rape,
assault, child- and wife-beating, and homicide not only cause great
personal suffering to the victims and their relatives and close friends,
but also undermine collective solidarity.
This is not a recent phenomenon. Family life under industrial
capitalism, as Engels observed in The Condition of the Working Class in
England, was "almost impossible for the worker." Impoverished
living conditions, long hours of work and little time for recreation
made family life a continuous round of problems and tensions. Wives and
children, doubly exploited by economic dependency and male supremacist
ideology, are regular targets of brutal assaults. "Yet the working
man," noted Engels in 1845, "cannot escape from the family,
must live in the family, and the consequence is a perpetual succession
of family troubles, domestic quarrels, most demoralizing for parents and
children alike." (21)
Under monopoly capitalism, social and family life is particularly
difficult in the superexploited sectors of the working class, where
economic hardship, a chaotic labor market, uprooted community life
("urban renewal"), and deteriorating social services provide a
fertile environment for individualism and demoralization. A recent
study, prepared for the W.E.B. DuBois Conference on Black Health in
1976, reveals for example that about 95 percent of blacks victimized by
homicide are killed by other blacks.
In 1974, almost 11,000 of the 237,000 deaths of nonwhites in the
United States, the overwhelming majority of whom were black, were
from homicide. More than six percent of the black males who died
during this year were victims of homicide as were over two percent
of the black females. Among blacks homicide was the fourth leading
cause of death, exceeded only by major cardiovascular diseases,
malignant neoplasms, and accidents. All of the infectious diseases
taken together took a lesser toll than did homicide.
White men are killed by homicide at a rate of 9.3 per 100,000
compared to a rate of 77.9 per 100,000 for black men of comparable age.
To put it another way, "the difference in life expectation between
white and black males is seven years. Almost a fifth of that is due to
homicide.... More than twice as many blacks died from homicide in 1974
as from automobile accidents, and homicides accounted for about 40
percent as many deaths as cancer." (22)
While the Victimization Surveys and other studies show that
minorities are responsible for a higher incidence of violent
"street" crimes, such as rape, robbery, assault, and homicide,
than whites, this does not mean that crime is simply a racial
phenomenon. (23) Historically, "street" crime has tended to be
concentrated in the marginalized sectors of the labor force and in the
demoralized layers of the working class, irrespective of skin color or
ethnic origin. (24) Today, it is those families with annual incomes
below the poverty line which fill the police stations, jails, and
hospital emergency rooms. Since blacks, Chicanos, Native Americans, and
Puerto Ricans are disproportionately concentrated in the superexploited
sectors of the working class, they are also disproportionately
represented in police records and as victims of crime.
The risk of victimization is closely tied to the material
conditions of life. Black women suffer a higher rate of rape than white
women because they are more exposed to the insecurities of public
transportation and poorly policed streets; the elderly, living on fixed
incomes in downtown rooming houses, are much more physically vulnerable
than their counterparts in suburban "leisure" communities;
families that cannot afford to install burglar alarms or remodel their
homes into fortresses are easier prey for rip-offs and thefts; small
businesses, unable to buy the protection of private security agencies,
are more likely to be burglarized; apartment buildings, guarded by
rent-a-cops, doormen, and security fences have a lower rate of burglary
than do public housing projects and tenements; and working parents,
hustling low-paying jobs with erratic hours in order to pay the daily
bills, cannot hire tutors, counselors, and psychiatrists or turn to
private schools when their children become "delinquency"
problems.
Crime and Class
The current high level of crime and victimization within the
marginalized sectors of the working class can be partly understood in
the context of the capitalist labor market. The "relative surplus
population" is not an aberration or incidental by-product. Rather,
it is continuously reproduced as a necessary element of the capitalist
mode of production and is, to quote Marx, the "lever of capitalist
accumulation.... It forms a disposable industrial reserve army that
belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at
its own cost. Independently of the limits of the actual increase of
population, it creates, for the changing needs of the self-expansion of
capital, a mass of human material always ready for exploitation."
(25)
For this population, the economic conditions of life are unusually
desperate and degrading. The high level of property crime and petty
hustles cannot be separated from the problems of survival. Commenting on
the process of primitive accumulation in 15th- and 16th-century England,
Marx observed that the rising bourgeoisie destroyed the preexisting
modes of production through the forcible expropriation of people's
land and livelihood, thus creating a "free" proletariat that
"could not possibly be absorbed by the nascent manufactures as fast
as it was thrown upon the world." Thousands of peasants were
"turned en masse into beggars, robbers, vagabonds ... and
'voluntary' criminals...." (26) For these victims of
capitalism, crime was both a means of survival and an effort to resist
the discipline and deadening routine of the workhouse and factory. (27)
But crime was not only a manifestation of early capitalism, with
its unconcealed plunder, terrorism, and unstable labor market. Crime was
endemic to both the rural and urban poor in 18th-century England. (28)
And at the peak of industrial capitalism in the mid-19th century, Engels
vividly described the prevalence of theft, prostitution, and other types
of widespread victimization in working-class communities. "The
British nation," he concluded, "has become the most criminal
in the world." (29)
With at least 41 million persons annually victimized by serious
"street" crimes in the United States, it is clear that
monopoly capitalism has aggravated rather than reduced the incidence of
crime. Recent studies, prepared for the United Nations report on
Economic Crises and Crime, support the argument that the rate of
criminal victimization is not only correlated with crises and
"downturns" in the capitalist economy, but also with the
"long-term effects of economic growth," (30) thus giving
support to Marx's "absolute law of capitalist accumulation--in
proportion as capital accumulates, the lot of the laborer, be his
payment high or low, must grow worse." (31) The economic
underpinnings of "street" crime are underscored by the
findings of the Victimization Surveys that over 90 percent of serious
offenses are property related (theft, burglary, robbery, etc.). (32) Not
surprisingly, most "street" crime is disproportionately
concentrated in the superexploited sectors of the working class, where
unemployment rates of 50 percent are not uncommon.
But "street" crime is not only related to economic
conditions; nor is it solely restricted to working-class neighborhoods.
A series of national studies, conducted by Martin Gold and his
colleagues, found little difference in rates of juvenile delinquency
between blacks and whites or working-class and petty bourgeois families.
(33) Their latest study reports that "white girls are no more nor
less frequently or seriously delinquent than black girls; and white
boys, no more nor less frequently delinquent than black boys; but white
boys are less seriously delinquent than black boys." (See Table 3.)
Moreover, when delinquency is correlated with socioeconomic status, it
is found that "higher status" boys (i.e., the sons of the
petty bourgeoisie for the most part) are more likely than working-class
boys to commit thefts, steal cars, and commit assaults. (34)
"Street" crime, like white chauvinism and male supremacy,
is most brutal in (although by no means limited to) the superexploited
sectors of the working class. Monopoly capitalism emiserates
increasingly larger portions of the working class and proletarianizes
the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie, degrades workers' skills
and competency in the quest for higher productivity, and organizes
family and community life on the basis of its most effective
exploitability. It consequently makes antagonism rather than reciprocity
the norm of social relationships 35
Under monopoly capitalism, family and peer relationships become
even more brutal and attenuated. The family as an economic unit is
totally separated, except as a consumer, from the productive processes
of society. Adolescents are denied access to the labor market and forced
to depend on their parents, who bear the costs of their subsistence and
education. As a result, millions of youth, including many of the
children of the petty bourgeoisie, "become subject to an
extraordinary variety of social problems that accompany the statuses of
dependent able-bodied persons in our society." (36)
"It is only in its era of monopoly," writes Harry
Braverman in Labor and Monopoly Capital, "that the capitalist mode
of production takes over the totality of individual, family, and social
needs and, in subordinating them to the market, also reshapes them to
serve the needs of capital." While more and more of the population
"is packed ever more closely together in the urban environment, the
atomization of social life proceeds apace.... The social structure,
built upon the market, is such that relations between individuals and
social groups do not take place directly, as cooperative human
encounters, but through the market as relations of purchase and
sale."
As more family members are required to work and the pressures of
urban life intensify, the family is required to "strip for action
in order to survive and 'succeed' in the market society."
Thus, urban life, governed by capital and the profit motive, "is
both chaotic and profoundly hostile to all feelings of community."
The "universal market," to use Braverman's appropriate
term, not only destroys the material foundations of cooperative social
relations, but also permeates even the most private domain of personal
life, setting husband against wife, neighbor against neighbor. (37)
"In short," as Engels observed over a century ago,
"everyone sees in his neighbor an enemy to be got out of the way,
or, at best, a tool to be used for his own advantaee." (38)
Crime as Rebellion?
There is a tendency within the New Left to glorify crime as
"primitive rebellion" and interpret it as a form of
spontaneous, anticapitalist revolt. There is definitely some support for
this position when we examine previous historical eras.
According to Eric Hobsbawm's well-known study of criminality
in precapitalist and agrarian societies, "social banditry" was
a form of class struggle and often a precursor or accompaniment to
peasant revolutions. "The point about social bandits," he
writes, "is that they are peasant outlaws whom the lord and state
regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are
considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters
for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men
to be admired, helped, and supported." This respect for
"social bandits" was based on their defense of the oppressed
and their selective theft of the oppressor's crops and property.
(39)
"Social banditry" or its equivalent persisted throughout
at least 200 years of primitive accumulation, as displaced peasants
asserted their traditional communal rights to subsistence through
poaching, smuggling, and shipwrecking against bourgeois claims to the
supremacy of capitalist private property. (40)
But not all criminality was a blow to class rule in agrarian and
early capitalist societies. Peasant society was also victimized by
"professional" criminals and "common robbers" who
did not make any class distinctions between their victims; and the rural
and urban poor in 18th-century England were regularly demoralized by
theft, robbery, and other types of intra-class victimization.
Criminality as an effective, though limited, method of waging class
warfare began to decline with the development of industrial capitalism.
There were two important reasons for this. First, modernization reduced
the means of protection and survival. The technology of communications
and rapid forms of transportation, combined with economic development,
public administration, and the growth of the state, deprived banditry of
the technical and social conditions under which it flourishes. Second,
and more importantly, the organized working class developed collective,
political associations that were far superior to individual criminality
or even the organized self-help of banditry. As Engels observed:
The earliest, crudest, and least fruitful form of rebellion was
that of crime.... The workers soon realized that crime did not help
matters. The criminal could protest against the existing order of
society only singly, as one individual; the whole might of society
was brought to bear upon each criminal, and crushed him with its
immense superiority. Besides, theft was the most primitive form of
protest, and for this reason, if no other, it never becomes the
universal expression of the public opinion of the working-man,
however much they might approve of it in silence. (41)
Under monopoly capitalism, "street" crime bears little
resemblance to the social banditry of Sicilian peasants, of the pastoral
nomads of Central Asia, or even of the rural poor in mercantile England.
Contemporary "bandits" are more likely to rip off their
neighbor or rob the local mom-and-pop store than to hold up a bank or
kidnap a corporate executive. And they are more likely to be regarded as
pariahs in the community than to be welcomed as heroes. Nor can theft
from supermarkets and chain stores (which is widespread) be considered a
modern equivalent of banditry, because bourgeois rule is not weakened by
such activity, and the cost of such theft is generally passed on to the
consumer in the form of higher prices or inferior commodities. It is
only among ultra-leftist sects, which have no base of support within
working-class communities, that such banditry is still practiced and
glorified.
Conclusion
The political solution to "street" crime does not lie in
mystifying its reality by reactionary allusions to "banditry,"
nor in reducing it to a manifestation of "lumpen" viciousness.
The former is utopian and dangerous because it defends practices that
undermine the safety and solidarity of the working class (and glorifies
spontaneity and putschism); the latter objectively legitimates the
bourgeoisie's attack on superexploited workers, especially black
and brown workers.
While "street" crime is associated with the most
demoralized sectors of the working class, we must be careful about
making mechanical and ahistorical generalizations about the
"lumpen" and "dangerous class." As Paul Hirst has
correctly pointed out, Marx and Engels took a very harsh and
uncompromising attitude to "street" crime, not from a
moralistic perspective, but out of concern for building a disciplined
and principled workers' movement. "Their standpoint,"
notes Hirst, "was uncompromisingly political and based on the
proletarian class position. Marx and Engels ask of any social class or
sociopolitical activity, what is its effectivity in the struggle of the
proletariat for socialism, does it contribute to the political victory
of the exploited and oppressed?" (42)
Marx and Engels based their evaluation on both a class analysis of
criminality and a concrete investigation of the role of the
"lumpenproletariat" in specific political struggles. Thus,
they argued that the "lumpen" weakens the workers'
movement by living off the workers' productive labor, for example
by theft, as well as by serving the bourgeoisie as informers, spies,
collaborators, and adventurists. (43)
The contemporary workers' movement must take an equally
uncompromising stand against organized, parasitical forms of
victimization and against "criminals" and prisoners who become
"snitches" and agents of the political police. Pimping,
gambling rackets, illegal drug operations, etc., are just as damaging to
working-class communities as any "legal" business that profits
from people's misery and desperation.
But we must be careful to distinguish organized criminality from
"street" crime and the "lumpen" from the
superexploited sectors of the working class. Most "street"
crime is not organized and not very profitable. Most theft, for example,
is committed by individuals, and each incidence of "street"
theft amounts to much less than $ 10044 Moreover, there is typically no
direct economic advantage associated with crimes of personal
violence--rape, homicide, assault, etc.
The conditions of life in the superexploited sectors create both
high levels of "street" crime and political militancy. The
urban black community, for example, is hit the hardest by
"street" crime, but it is also the locus of tremendous
resistance and struggle--as witnessed by the civil rights movement, the
ghetto revolts of the 1960s, and the anti-repression struggles of today.
Moreover, of the thousands of blacks who annually go to prison for
serious crimes of victimization, many have become transformed by the
collective experience of prison life and participate in numerous acts of
solidarity, self-sacrifice, and heroism--as witnessed by the conversion
of Malcolm X, George Jackson, and countless other anonymous militants in
the strikes and uprisings at Soledad, San Quentin, Attica, etc.
While the link between "street" crime and economic
conditions is clearly established, we must guard against economism.
Crime is not simply a matter of poverty, as evidenced by the
unparalleled criminality and terrorism of the ruling class. Nor is
"street" crime explained by poverty, for petty bourgeois youth
in the United States are probably just as delinquent as their
working-class counterparts, and there are many impoverished nations in
the world that do not in any way approach the high level of criminality
in this country. The problem of "street" crime should be
approached not only as a product of the unequal distribution of wealth
and chaotic labor market practices, but also as an important aspect of
the demoralizing social relations and individualistic ideology that
characterize the capitalist mode of production at its highest stage of
development.
NOTES
(1.) Center for Research on Criminal Justice, The Iron Fist and the
Velvet Glove. San Francisco: Institute for the Study of Labor and
Economic Crisis (1977): 14.
(2.) Christian Science Monitor (November 13, 1973); New York Times
(April 16, 1977; July 21, 1977); San Francisco Chronicle (January 25,
1978). According to the Law Enforcement News (January 3, 1978), the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration is now funding some 600 anticrime
projects at a cost of $37 million.
(3.) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (1955): 20-21.
(4.) "The Politics of Street Crime," Crime and Social
Justice 5 (Spring-Summer, 1976): 1-4.
(5.) San Francisco Chronicle (February 20, 1978).
(6.) Michael Hindelang et al., Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics: 1974. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (1975):
233.
(7.) Center for Research on Criminal Justice: 14.
(8.) Jay Williams and Martin Gold, "From Delinquent Behavior
to Official Delinquency," Social Problems 20(2) (Fall, 1972):
209-229.
(9.) James Garofolo, Public Opinion about Crime. Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office (1977): 28.
(10.) "The Management of Police Killings," Crime and
Social Justice 8 (Fall-Winter, 1977): 34-43.
(11.) "The Management of Police Killings": 42.
(12.) U.S. News and World Report (October 10, 1977).
(13.) San Francisco Chronicle (December 22, 1977).
(14.) Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal
Victimization in the United States: A Comparison of 1973 and 1974
Findings. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (1976).
(15.) San Francisco Chronicle (February 20, 1978).
(16.) Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal
Victimization in the United States: 1973. Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office (1976).
(17.) See note 16 above.
(18.) John E. Conklin, The Impact of Crime. New York: Macmillan
(1975): 26.
(19.) Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal
Victimization Surveys in the Nation's Five Largest Cities.
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (1975).
(20.) LEAA, Criminal Victimization in the US: 1973.
(21.) Frederick Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in
England. Moscow: Progress Publishers (1973): 168.
(22.) Yongsock Shin, Davor Jedlicka, and Everett Lee,
"Homicide among Blacks," Phylon 38(4) (December, 1977):
398-407.
(23.) For data on the high homicide rate among Native Americans,
see Charles Reasons, "Crime and the Native American," in
Reasons and Kuykendall (eds.), Race, Crime and Justice. Pacific
Palisades, CA: Goodyear (1972): 79-95; for data on alcohol-related
deaths among blacks in Georgia, see George Lowe and Eugene Hodges,
"Race and the Treatment of Alcoholism in a Southern State,"
Social Problems 20(2) (Fall, 1972): 240-252; for a discussion of the
high rates of rape, robbery, and assault among blacks, albeit from a
cultural and "racial" perspective, see Michael Hindelang,
"Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes," American
Sociological Review 43(1) (February, 1978): 93-109.
(24.) See, for example, Edward Green, "Race, Social Status,
and Criminal Arrest," in Reasons and Kuykendall: 103-123.
(25.) Karl Marx, Capital. Vol. I. New York: International
Publishers (1975): 632.
(26.) Marx: 734.
(27.) Dario Melossi, "The Penal Question in Capital,"
Crime and Social Justice 5 (Spring-Summer, 1976): 26-33.
(28.) See, for example, Douglas Hay et al., Albion's Fatal
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England. New York:
Pantheon (1975).
(29.) Engels: 168.
(30.) United Nations Social Defense Research Institute, Economic
Crises and Crime. Rome: UNSDRI (1976).
(31.) Marx: 645.
(32.) LEAA, Criminal Victimization in the US'. 1973.
(33.) Williams and Gold: 209-229; Martin Gold and David Reimer,
"Changing Patterns of Delinquent Behavior among Americans 13
through 16 Years Old: 1967-1972," Crime and Delinquency Literature
7(4) (December 1975): 483-517.
(34.) Williams and Gold: 215-218. These findings have been
confirmed by Paul Takagi in a current (unpublished) study of delinquency
among Chinese youth in San Francisco. For a methodological critique of
the Gold studies, see Hindelang. "Race and Involvement in Common
Law Personal Crimes": 103-104.
(35.) See, for example, David Harvey, Social Justice and the City.
London: Johns Hopkins University Press (1973).
(36.) Herman Schwendinger and Julia Schwendinger, "Delinquency
and the Collective Varieties of Youth," Crime and Social Justice 5
(Spring-Summer, 1976): 7-25.
(37.) Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York:
Monthly Review Press (1974): 271-283.
(38.) Engels: 170-171.
(39.) Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits. New York: Delacort (1969): 13-23.
(40.) See, for example, Douglas Hay et al.
(41.) Engels: 250-251.
(42.) Paul Hirst, "Marx and Engels on Law, Crime and
Morality," in Taylor, Walton, and Young (eds.). Critical
Criminology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
(43.) See note 42 above.
(44.) LEAA, Criminal Victimization in the US: 1973.
Tony Platt *
* Tony Platt is a member of the Editorial Board of Social Justice
(formerly Crime and Social Justice). He thanks Paul Takagi for his help
with the research and analysis. Originally printed in Crime and Social
Justice 9 (Spring 1978): 26-34.
Table 2:
Type of Victimization
Race of Victim
White Black and
Other Races
Base 143,217,000 19,019,000
Rape and attempted rape 90 158
Robbery 599 1,388
Robbery and attempted
robbery with injury 207 473
Serious assault 108 294
Minor assault 99 179
Robbery without injury 213 589
Attempted robbery
without injury 179 326
Assault 2,554 2,929
Aggravated assault 954 1,656
With injury 301 599
Attempted assault with weapon 653 1,057
Simple assault 1,600 1272
With injury 399 289
Attempted assault without weapon 12201 983
Personal larceny with contact 267 678
Purse snatching 57 126
Attempted purse snatching 44 47
Pocket picking 166 504
Personal larceny without contact 9,209 7,671
Source: Michael Hindelang et al., Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics, 1974, US Department of Justice, LEAA, 1975,
Table 3:
Frequency and Seriousness of Delinquent Behavior
by Race and Sex
Median
Less More
Frequent Frequent
White Boys 36% 64%
(408)
Black Boys 38% 62%
(53)
White Girls 68% 32%
(328)
Black Girls 65% 35%
(*8)
Less More
Serious Serious
White Boy 58% 42%
(408)
Black Boys 47% 53%
(53)
White Girls 78% 22%
(32B)
Black Girls 73% 27%
(48)
Source: Jay Williams and Martin Gold, "From Delinquent
Behavior to Official Delinquency," Social Problems 20(2)
(Fall, 1972).