Medicare Part D and prescription drug prices.
Berndt, Ernst R. ; Frank, Richard G.
CONGRESS passed initial versions of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act in late June 2003. This landmark
legislation provided for a prescription drug benefit for all Medicare
beneficiaries over age 65 and for individuals under age 65 who have
certain disabilities. This new prescription drug benefit is called
Medicare Part D. The House and Senate versions of the bill differed, and
after considerable negotiations and maneuvering, the House passed a
unified version of the bill by a 220-215 vote on November 22, 2003. On
the next day, the Senate passed the legislation by a 54-44 vote. On
December 8, 2003, President George W. Bush signed the final conference
committee version into law. The Medicare Part D prescription drug
benefit was fully implemented on January 1, 2006.
The congressional and public debate on the merits of this
legislation was extensive and heated. Controversy surrounded issues such
as what would the effects of moral hazard on prescription drug demand
and prices be? How should the Federal Government exercise its
considerable buying power? How restrictive or broad should formularies
be? How much competition should there be among private plans offering
benefits? How high would monthly premiums be, and how would they vary
with benefit design? And of course, how much would this new program
cost?
Medicare Part D has been with us now for over a year. What has
happened? In terms of assessing its impact on prescription drug prices,
there are at least three important considerations on which we focus in
this paper. First, how has the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the
source of official government price statistics, monitored and measured
prices paid by consumers (the Consumer Price Index (CPI)), as well as
prices received by manufacturers from sales to the first point in the
distribution chain (Producer Price Indexes (PPIs) subsequent to the
implementation of Medicare Part D? Specifically, what measurement
changes and assumptions were required in order to assess the impact of
part D on consumers' and producers' prices? Second, given
provisions of the part D legislation and the BLS procedures for
measuring prices, what do we as economists expect regarding the impact
of part D on consumers' and producers' prices? And third, what
price changes have been observed by the CPI and the PPIs leading up to
and then following full implementation of the part D legislation on
January 1, 2006?
Background history and literature
Over the years, as U.S. public policy has lead to expanding health
insurance coverage, policy analysts have evaluated not only government
and elderly out-of-pocket expenditures on health care but also the price
and quantity components of these expenditures.
Related concerns have focused attention on the overall price
inflation experienced by the elderly versus the nonelderly and more
specifically on relative prices paid by the elderly, versus the
nonelderly for health care goods and services.
For at least seven decades, the BLS Medical CPI (MCPI) has grown
about half again as fast as the overall CPI; between 1927 and 1996, for
example, the MCPI rose at an average annual growth rate of 4.59 percent,
compared with 3.24 percent for the CPI (Berndt and others 1998a and
1998b). In the 11 years since then, between January 1996 and January
2007, these average annual growth rates were 3.91 percent for the MCPI
and 2.49 percent for the CPI. Congressional concern over these
differential rates of inflation has involved a number of initiatives.
Prior to the introduction of Medicare in July 1966, the Social
Security Administration anticipated that the existence of the new
insurance might have an impact on medical care prices. Therefore, in the
summer of 1965, the administration arranged with BLS to collect
supplementary prices for three surgical procedures and two in-hospital
medical services that were particularly prevalent among the elderly
though not necessarily limited to them. The three surgical procedures
were cholecystectomy (removal of the gall bladder), prostatectomy
(removal of the prostrate gland), and fractured neck of femur (hip
surgery), and the two in-hospital services were acute myocardial
infarction (treatment of heart attack) and cerebral hemorrhage (stroke).
Among the major results of this study, as stated in a report to the
President and summarized by Dorothy E Rice and Loucele A. Horowitz, was
the finding that the index of the five in-hospital surgical and medical
procedures that were particularly significant for the aged did not
increase as rapidly during 1966 as the combined index for
physicians' fees regularly priced for the CPI (Rice and Horowitz
1967, 28; U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1967). (1)
Several decades later, in response to a mandate contained in the
1987 amendments to the Older Americans Act of 1965, the BLS created an
experimental price index for elderly consumers (CPI-E). The CPI-E
employs differential expenditure weights for the elderly (defined as
households headed by persons aged 62 and older) and the nonelderly based
on data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), but the CPI-E
assumes that within each category weight, the distribution of prices,
the outlets in which consumers buy, the use of coupons, and the
availability of discounts, as well as the quality of the items
purchased, are the same for the elderly and as for the nonelderly (U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics no date). From 1982
through 1996, the CPI-E for the elderly grew 67.9 percent, while the CPI
rose 62.5 percent, implying that over that 15-year period, the average
annual growth rate of the CPI-E, at 3.77 percent, was slightly greater
than the 3.53-percent growth rate of the overall CPI (Berndt and others
1998a and 1998b). In the 11 years since then, between January 1996 and
January 2007, the averages have been 2.68 percent and 2.49 percent,
respectively. The larger health care expenditure weights for the
elderly, along with greater measured medical price inflation, account
almost entirely for the difference in the growth rates between these two
series. In this context, one qualifying note emphasized by the Boskin
Commission was that medical care prices are likely to have overstated inflation by not fully accounting for improvements in quality (U.S.
Senate Finance Committee 1996). If this is correct, then as Moulton and
Stewart have noted "A reduced rate of inflation for medical care
would mitigate and perhaps eliminate any difference between the CPI-E
and the official CPI" (Moulton and Stewart 1997, 21). (2)
Relatively little research has focused on price differentials
between the elderly and the nonelderly for health care goods or
services. (3) Among various medical care goods and services,
pharmaceuticals have become an increasingly important component of the
medical care armamentarium. Moreover, prescription drugs are likely to
be one case in which within stratum consumption patterns of the elderly
likely differ substantially from those of the nonelderly.
Berndt and others (1998a and 1998b) have examined whether
prescription drug price inflation in the 1990s differed between the
elderly and the nonelderly, when age-related substrata variations in
consumption were taken into account. They examined prices at three
alternative points in the distribution chain and reported three sets of
findings.
First, at the initial point in the distribution chain involving
manufacturers' sales to wholesalers, retailers, and
hospitals--transactions that are monitored and reported by various BLS
PPIs--there is essentially no age-related aggregate price differential
despite very significant differences in the baskets of drugs ultimately
destined for use by the elderly and the nonelderly. Specifically, using
prescription drug data from the National Disease and Therapeutic Index
survey, maintained by IMS Health, to record elderly and nonelderly
number of prescriptions by therapeutic class and applying these
proportions to the BLS PPI weights by therapeutic class, the authors
found that the PPI for pharmaceuticals destined for ultimate use by the
elderly increased from 1.000 in 1990 to 1.331 in 1996, while that for
the nonelderly rose a virtually identical amount, from 1.000 to 1.329,
over the same 6-year period.
A second finding focused on an intermediate point in the
distribution chain involving acquisition prices of retail pharmacies for
purchases primarily from wholesalers as measured by the IMS retail
prescription audit; these retail sell-in transactions take place at a
point in the distribution chain that is in between the PPI and CPI and
is not monitored by BLS price measurement programs. The authors focused
on three therapeutic areas--antidepressants (used twice as intensively
by the nonelderly, at 4.69 percent, as by the elderly, at 2.35 percent),
broad and medium-spectrum antibiotics (also used about twice as
intensively by the nonelderly, at 15.79 percent, as by the elderly, at
7.44 percent), and calcium channel blockers (for hypertension, used
about three times more intensively by the elderly, at 6.18 percent, as
by the nonelderly, at 2.01 percent). The authors found that between 1990
and 1996, retail acquisition price inflation for antidepressants
destined for use by the elderly, at 7.02 percent, was less than that for
ultimate use by the nonelderly, at 10.9 percent. Further research
revealed that the elderly disproportionately used older generic drugs
whose prices rose less rapidly than branded drugs during this time
period. For antibiotics, however, especially from 1992 to 1996, the
reverse occurred--the antibiotics price index for the elderly increased
7.74 percent, while that for the nonelderly rose only 2.40 percent.
Additional research suggested that the greater elderly price inflation
since 1992 appeared to reflect the more rapid growth in the
elderly's use of the newest, branded drugs for which bacterial
resistance was generally less likely. Finally, for the calcium channel
blockers, there was essentially no difference in price inflation between
1990 and 1996-10.0 percent for the nonelderly and 11.1 percent for the
elderly.
Data constraints prevented Berndt and others (1998a and 1998b) from
undertaking a comparable analysis of retail sell-out prices across
various therapeutic classes. Instead, the authors confined their
analysis to sales by retail pharmacies to consumers and other payors
(monitored by the IMS method-of-payment survey) to the antidepressant
therapeutic class. Over all age groups, between 1991 and 1996, gross
margins for antidepressants sold by retail pharmacies (sell-out prices
relative to sell-in prices) fell about 3.5 percent, in part because of
the growth of managed care and pharmaceutical benefit manager firms
during that timeframe. Additional research found that young consumers
appeared to have enjoyed most of the benefits of the increased buying
power of managed care, for gross margins on the antidepressants they
purchased fell by 3.8 percent. In contrast, for the antidepressants
purchased by the elderly who are disproportionately large users of
generic drugs, retail margins actually increased slightly.
These results suggest that no general age-related pattern of price
inflation differentials for prescription pharmaceuticals is likely to
emerge. Instead, the empirical significance of brand versus generic
consumption, use of new versus old drugs, and various age-related
quality attributes (once-a-day versus multiple daily dosages, extent of
adverse interactions with other drugs, and seriousness of side effects and adverse reactions) must most likely be examined on a class-by-class
basis before any general conclusions can be reached. (4) Moreover, even
these class-specific variations may change with time, particularly when
major institutional and market changes take place.
An example of such a major legislative development is the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, which was passed
by the U.S. Congress in 2003 and which mandated a Medicare Part D
prescription drug benefit for the elderly and disabled, beginning on
January 1, 2006.
Medicare Part D: Timelines, essential features, and BLS price
measurement
Legislative history and essential features
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act
(Medicare Modernization Act) was introduced into the House of
Representatives on June 25, 2003, sponsored by Speaker Dennis Hastert.
After an initial electronic vote failed, several Republicans changed
their vote, and early on the morning of June 27, 2003, it passed by a
216-215 vote. The Senate passed its version of the bill by a 76-21 vote
on June 26, 2003. The bills were then unified in a conference committee
and came back to the House for approval on November 21, 2003. After
various legislative maneuvers and vote changes by congressional
representatives, around 5:30 a.m. on November 22, 2003, the House passed
the unified bill by a 220-215 vote. The Senate's consideration of
the conference report was less heated but still controversial, and the
bill finally passed the Senate by a 54-44 vote on November 23, 2003.
President Bush signed the bill into law on December 8, 2003 (Wikipedia
2006).
Under provisions of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, a
prescription drug benefit was created as Part D of Medicare, to become
available beginning January 1, 2006, whereby Medicare beneficiaries
(including those disabled and under age 65) would receive a statutorily
defined standard prescription drug benefits after a $250 annual
deductible, would pay 25 percent of costs up to $2,250, 100 percent of
costs between $2,250 and $5,100 (a gap of $2,850, commonly referred to
as the "donut hole"), and 5 percent of costs above $5,100.
Plans were granted freedom to construct alternative benefit designs that
were actuarially equivalent to the standard benefit, such as no
deductibles and tiered copayments rather than 25 percent coinsurance (Cubanski and Neuman 2006). Expected monthly premiums were estimated to
be about $37, with variations depending on copayment structures,
formulary design, and retail pharmacy network benefit provisions.
As a temporary and transitional step to assist beneficiaries more
immediately with their prescription drug purchases, the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003 also created a program whereby
Medicare-approved discount cards were issued to beneficiaries for use
beginning on June 1, 2004. These cards were to help seniors purchase
prescription drugs at reduced prices until the full part D benefit was
implemented in January 2006. The discount cards did not provide actual
insurance benefits but instead were cards issued by Medicare-approved
private-sector entities (pharmacies, pharmacy benefit management firms,
insurers), giving Medicare beneficiaries approximately a 15-20 percent
discount on out-of-pocket cash prices for prescription drugs; discounts
were on the steeper end for generic drug purchases (U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006). Subsidies were also made
available to some low-income beneficiaries. Other important dates were
October 1, 2005, the first day for private companies to release details
of their individual plans, and November 15, 2005, the first day that
individuals could enroll in a part D prescription drug plan.
One other significant aspect of the Medicare Modernization Act of
2003 concerned those individuals over age 65 who had been receiving
prescription drug benefits under state Medicaid programs and those under
age 65 with certain disabilities. These "dually eligible"
beneficiaries saw responsibility for purchasing their prescription drugs
transferred from Medicaid to the Medicare Part D program, effective
January 1, 2006. It is estimated that these dually eligible individuals
accounted for about 29 percent of all part D enrollees (Cubanski and
Neuman 2006, exhibit 5, page w8). Under the Medicaid
"most-favored-nation" rules, manufacturers have been required
to offer Medicaid the lower of the "best" price they sell to
the private sector or a discount of 15.1 percent below the average
manufacturer price for branded drugs, whichever is lower. (5) Under
Medicare Part D, however, pharmaceutical manufacturers instead
negotiated prices with private prescription drug plans (PDPs) (Frank and
Newhouse 2007). Manufacturers' prices charged to PDPs were exempt
from the "most-favored-nation" pricing calculations.
Medicare Part D price monitoring by the BLS
Given the substantial lead time between initial legislative
approval in June 2003 and final full implementation of Medicare Part D
in January 2006, the various BLS price measurement programs had
considerable time to adapt their data collection and aggregation
procedures as necessary to reflect changing prices associated with
implementation of Medicare Part D.
Since the PPI measures prices only at the first point in the
distribution chain (for pharmaceuticals, most commonly from
manufacturers' sales to wholesalers and large retail chains), price
changes directly realized by Medicare Part D beneficiaries are out of
scope--the PPI does not identify and monitor prices paid by final
purchasers, such as the elderly at retail or mail order. For the PPI,
therefore, implementation of Medicare Part D required no significant
changes in the data gathering protocols. Instead, the PPI continued to
introduce new branded and generic drugs as supplemental samples into its
sample of price quotes on an annual basis. (6)
In contrast to the PPI program, the BLS CPI program faced a number
of serious challenges in adapting its price measurement protocols to
capture price changes resulting from the introduction of the
transitional Medicare discount card and then the launch of the full
Medicare Part D program. Because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) Web site contained a pricing utility set up explicitly
for beneficiaries to determine how the various discount card plans
compared with each other in terms of drugs covered and their prices,
beginning in October 2004, the CPI flipped a portion of its existing
sample--the senior cash-discounted portion that had been receiving about
a 10-percent discount--from discounted cash to Medicare discount card,
where the sample recorded an average additional discount of 15 percent
off retail and mail order cash prices; these quotes were then employed
in the aggregate index calculations (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2006). As of December 2004, the BLS had been collecting
1,111 price quotes for prescription drugs (U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005). Since CMS ceased supporting the
pricing utility that yielded the Medicare discount card price quotes in
November 2005, for November and December 2005, the BLS estimated these
price quotes as being approximately 25 percent off the full cash price
quotes they continued to collect. (7)
To account for the introduction of Medicare Part D in January 2006,
the BLS CPI program employed a variant of the directed substitution rule
by which the product characteristics of the new item were already known
and determined (rather than going through the entire disaggregation process). In particular, the CPI recorded the price changes that
occurred for the same prescription as it switched from being paid with a
Medicare-approved discount card (December 2005) to the full Medicare
Part D benefit price (January 2006). The latter was calculated by taking
quotes from a single nationally offered private prescription drug
benefit plan that conveniently allowed direct pricing via an online
pricing utility. (8) In cases where the national part D plan only
offered the generic equivalent of a brand drug covered by the discount
card plan, the CPI recorded the price change between the brand discount
card and the generic part D price. Note that only the changes from the
discount card to part D were captured by the BLS CPI and that the quoted
changes are those based on a single national plan. (9) In particular,
the CPI program has not attempted to capture price quotes of formerly
uninsured cash, or partly insured, customers who subsequently obtained
part D coverage. Similarly, since direct substitution procedures were
employed, any switches from retail to mail order that occurred because
of part D private prescription drug plan benefit design were also not
captured by the CPI.
Because a portion of the Medicare-approved discount cards that came
into the CPI sample in 2004 was rotated out of the sample and was not
adequately re placed through rotation, BLS augmented its
Medicare-approved discount card sample to match CMS' estimate that
approximately 3.7 percent of the U.S. population had been issued such
cards. This was accomplished by the BLS randomly assigning part D quotes
to their existing sample. As a result, the part D sample may not mirror
a market snapshot that would have emerged had the BLS initiated the part
D drugs from the pharmacy based on their traditional "last 20"
prescription method. We note in passing that in the future, when BLS
initiates a new sample frame, it will finally be able to measure and
directly compare prescription drug prices paid by the elderly through
Part D with purchase prices paid by the nonelderly. These new data could
yield some very interesting research findings and in principle, could be
incorporated into the CPI-E.
Coincidentally, the BLS CPI program has been wrestling with how to
incorporate prescription-only to over-the-counter (Rx-to-OTC) switches
into its medical care CPI, which includes both types of drugs. Two very
prominent recent Rx-to-OTC switches have involved Claritin for the
treatment of allergies (switch approved November 27, 2002) and Prilosec
OTC for the treatment of frequent heartburn (approved June 20, 2003)
(U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2003, 2002). Conversations with BLS
CPI personnel reveal that when there is an Rx-to-OTC switch, the BLS
treats the initial price of the OTC variant as the final price of the Rx
version, and then it treats subsequent OTC price changes as only
affecting the OTC price index. Note that since the BLS CPI is based on a
Laspeyres aggregation framework, which has the property of reproducible
aggregation, the Laspeyres aggregate of an Rx price index and an OTC
price index is numerically equivalent to a Laspeyres index aggregated
simultaneously over all Rx and OTC products. (10) A related pilot
project is under way at the BLS CPI program, involving the creation of
separate brand and generic CPIs for prescription pharmaceuticals.
Currently, the BLS only publishes an aggregate of prescription
pharmaceuticals.
Expectations regarding impact of Medicare Part D on BLS price
measures
As we have written elsewhere, we believe the BLS faces enormous
challenges in reliably measuring price inflation for health care goods
and services, including prescription drugs. (11) The introduction of
Medicare Part D benefits likely increases these challenges and
difficulties for the BLS. What are reasonable expectations regarding how
the introduction of Medicare Part D affected price inflation as measured
and reported by the pharmaceutical CPI and PPI? Four points are worth
noting.
First, prior to the implementation of Medicare Part D, about 25
percent of the elderly had been paying cash prices for prescription
drugs for the entire year. (12) As of January 1, 2006, these individuals
became eligible to enroll in Medicare Part D and benefit from the lower
prices negotiated on their behalf by private prescription drug plans
(Frank and Newhouse 2007). Because undoubtedly, not all of those who
were eligible actually enrolled (estimates are that slightly more than
90 percent of those eligible obtained creditable coverage (Cubanski and
Neuman 2006)), as we have seen, the price declines experienced by those
individuals who did enroll will not have been captured by the CPI. In
this sense, to the extent such transaction types are not being captured,
growth in the prescription drug CPI has been overstated. Looking to the
future, although some Medicare Part D transactions will have been
uncovered by the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) data (none from 2005,
but presumably those from the 2006 CES), the resulting new CES weights
will be set as of December 2007 for use beginning finally with the
January 2008 CPI.
Second, we expect the introduction of new or additional insurance
to increase demand due to moral hazard. Danzon and Pauly (2002) have
estimated that between 25 percent and 50 percent of the total growth in
U.S. prescription drug spending between 1987 and 1996 can be attributed
to increased drug insurance coverage by employers and Medicaid. On the
other hand, since as noted earlier, a substantial portion (between 25
percent and 40 percent) of new Medicare Part D beneficiaries had
previously been paying cash prices, branded manufacturers now faced a
reduced demand from the cash-paying segment of consumers. Which of these
two effects dominates--increased demand from moral hazard versus reduced
number of cash-paying customers--is not obviously a priori. Whether the
combined demand function over cash-paying and new Medicare Part D
insured individuals shifted outward or inward is in theory ambiguous and
is therefore an empirical matter. Also unclear are expectations
regarding the timing of any price changes. Specifically, whether price
increases occurred on or after the time of the implementation of
Medicare Part D or in anticipation of it depends on numerous factors
beyond the scope of this paper.
Third, as noted above, switching dually eligible individuals from
Medicaid coverage, which entailed "most-favored-nation"
pricing to Medicare private prescription drug plans (PDPs), which are
not subject to the Medicaid mandatory rebates, provided the PDPs with
less bargaining power than the state and Federal Medicaid purchasers had
previously been able to exercise. Recall that it is estimated that 29
percent of the Medicare Part D enrollees had previously been dually
eligible (Cubanski and Neuman 2006, exhibit 5, page w8). To the extent
that this has occurred, we might expect prices of drugs
disproportionately used by the previously dually eligible individuals to
increase more rapidly than other drugs, at least as measured by the PPI.
Below we comment on the therapeutic drug classes that are likely to be
more intensively utilized by previous dually eligible individuals.
Fourth and finally, in their negotiations with CMS regarding
formulary design, the PDPs were constrained by CMS to include a minimal
number of (often at least two) drugs with preferred status in each
therapeutic class and in some cases, such as the antidepressants, all
drugs (Huskamp, et al. 200; Huskamp 2003). Since payers' buying
power relative to manufacturers stems in large part from payers'
ability to either exclude drugs entirely from their formulary or at
least banish them to the third tier with the highest copayment, this
broad formulary policy constrained the buying power of the PDPs, and may
have led to reduced rebates and increased prices.
Together, these four considerations suggest that potentially
offsetting impacts on prices are associated with the passage and then
the implementation of Medicare Part D legislation. The net effect of
these various impacts is in theory ambiguous, and is therefore an
empirical matter. Moreover, given the 30-month timespan between the June
2003 initial passage of the legislation and its full implementation in
January 2006, it is also unclear what to expect in terms of the timing
of any price changes--price changes in anticipation of the full
implementation of the Part D benefit could be larger or smaller than
those following its implementation. However, what is clear is that we
expect PPIs in therapeutic classes, including drugs disproportionately
used by previous dually eligible individuals, to increase more rapidly
than PPIs for drugs in other classes.
Results: Trends in BLS measures of pharmaceutical CPI and PPI price
inflation
We now move on to a discussion of trends in BLS measured price
inflation, with a particular focus on dates surrounding developments in
Medicare coverage of prescription pharmaceuticals. We begin with the CPI
and focus on five time periods over the last 11 years.
The first two periods are (1) January 1996-January 2000 (the early
history) and (2) January 2000-June 2003 (June 2003 was the month in
which initial House and Senate versions of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act were passed). We then divide
the following 30-month time period until the January 1, 2006,
implementation of Medicare Part D into two equal 15-month time
intervals: (3) June 2003-September 2004 and (4) September 2004-December
2005. We then focus on the year following the implementation of the
Medicare Part D program: (5) December 2005-December 2006. For each of
these time periods, we compute average annual growth rates.
Results: The CPIs
As we noted earlier, the set of price quotes interpreted as
reflecting Medicare Part D transactions is based in part on the
BLS' flipping Medicare discount card quotes on to Medicare Part D,
based on online price quotes from a single national private prescription
drug plan' Web site and in part on randomly taking certain existing
price quotes and converting them to a part D comparison over time. The
latter set of quotes may, however, have not originally been those of
elderly individuals, and thus the composition of prescriptions in the
part D subsample may not be representative of that for the overall
elderly population enrolled in part D.
In table 1, we compare the distribution of prescriptions by
therapeutic drug class in the overall sample of prescription drug CPI
quotes with that in the part D subsample over the January-October 2006
timeframe. There are six therapeutic classes in which there are zero
part D quotes--the prescription shares of these classes except for
anesthetics (at 9.67 percent) in the overall sample are quite small, and
together, the six zero-share part D classes account for 12.94 percent of
the overall sample prescriptions. Not surprisingly, in the
cardiovascular and metabolics/nutrients classes, the elderly part D
share is considerably larger than in the overall sample; in contrast,
for central nervous system and analgesics, the elderly part D share is
smaller than in the overall sample.
Average annual growth rates of various CPIs are presented in table
2 over the five time intervals discussed above. In the first row, we
provide average annual growth rates of the "all items-urban"
CPI, and in the second row, the experimental or elderly CPI (E-CPI) for
"all items-urban." The E-CPI grows slightly more rapidly than
the "all items" CPI, with the differential ranging from about
0.10 percent to 0.22 percent and having no distinct time trend. Previous
literature has attributed this differential to the larger share of
medical care expenditures for seniors along with above-average inflation
for medical care.
In the third row of table 2, we show average annual growth rates
for the overall medical care CPI, and in the fourth row, the medical
care E-CPI, which differ to the extent that the elderly and nonelderly
shares of the components (medical care commodities, medical care
services, hospital and related services, and health insurance) of
overall medical care differ, and these components experience varying
rates of inflation. In three of the five time intervals, the medical
CPI-E grows slightly less rapidly than the overall medical CPI, and the
reverse occurs in two time periods. Over the 11-year timeframe between
January 1996 and January 2007, the medical CPI-E grew at an average
annual growth rate of 3.905 percent, virtually identical to the overall
medical CPI, at 3.913 percent.
Rows five and six provide average annual growth rates separately
for medical care services and medical care commodities; the BLS does not
compute experimental CPI-Es at this level of aggregation, only overall
CPIs. In each of the five time intervals, average annual growth rates of
medical care services (which includes physicians,' dental, hospital
and nursing home and adult day care services) are greater than those of
medical care commodities (prescription and OTC drugs and medical
supplies), with the differential since 2000 ranging between 1.0 percent
and 2.3 percent and tending to become larger in more recent times.
Finally, in the last row of table 2, we provide average annual
growth rates for prescription drugs, which include medical supplies.
Between 1996 and 2005, annualized price inflation for prescription drugs
ranged from about 3.6 percent to 4.3 percent, but in 2006 following the
implementation of Medicare Part D, it fell to about half its previous
rate, to 1.856 percent. In summary, in recent times, there appears to
have been a substantial decline in the rate of growth of the CPI for
prescription drugs, particularly following the implementation of the
Medicare Part D benefit in January 2006.
Results: The PPIs
We now turn to a consideration of the PPIs for pharmaceuticals.
Recall that the PPI monitors prices received by the manufacturer (net of
discounts and prompt payment price reductions) from sales to the first
point in the distribution chain, which for pharmaceuticals is usually
either wholesalers or large retail chains. Participation by
manufacturers in reporting to the BLS is voluntary; participation rates
have been around 65 percent. Although considerable pharmaceutical
manufacturing takes place in Puerto Rico, from the vantage of the BLS
PPI program, Puerto Rico is not part of the United States. (13)
The BLS PPI for pharmaceuticals includes both prescription and OTC
products. Medicaid purchases are explicitly out of scope for the CPI
(because they are government purchases), but for the PPI, the identity
of the ultimate consumer is irrelevant; thus, the PPI will incorporate
prices paid by among others, Medicaid purchasers (that is, state
governments and the CMS). In principle, the pharmaceutical PPI also
tracks changes in prices that occurred when Medicare-Medicaid dually
eligible individuals switched to the Medicare Part D program in January
2006, although the types of transactions are defined quite narrowly and
at best, changes in weights occur only at annual intervals.
We report average annual growth rates for various pharmaceutical
PPIs in table 3 for five time intervals: (1) June 2001-June 2003
(because some price series did not begin until June 2001); (2) June
2003-September 2004 (the first 15 months after initial passage of the
Medicare Part D legislation); (3) September 2004--December 2005 (the
final 15 months before the implementation of Medicare Part D in January
2006); (4) December 2005-December 2006 (to monitor changes associated
with the first year of the implementation of Medicare Part D); and (5)
January 2000-December 2006 (for some price series, data from the
beginning of this decade). We remind readers that the PPI is a sample of
products selected using probabilities proportional to sales; while we
mention particular brand products in various therapeutic classes below,
we have no information regarding whether those specific brands are in
the PPI sample.
The first row in table 3 indicates that the overall pharmaceutical
PPI has grown at about 4.1 percent annually since 2000, with slightly
larger annual growth at 5.4 percent in the 15 months leading up to the
implementation of Medicare Part D; (14) since December 2005, growth has
returned to just under 4 percent. There is considerable heterogeneity in
average annual growth rates, both across time intervals and among
therapeutic classes. Prices of prescription analgesics (pain medicines),
for example, only grew at a 1.4-percent annual rate in the 15 months
leading up to the implementation of Medicare Part D, but then they grew
at a much larger 4.9-percent annual rate following its implementation.
(15) By contrast, prices of anticoagulants grew at a 4.7-percent annual
rate between June 2003 and September 2004, but since then, they have
grown at 0.1-0.2 percent annually. (16)
The antispasmodic/antisecretory market class includes drugs for the
treatment of heartburn (such as the [H.sub.2]-antagonists and proton
pump inhibitors--brands like Zantac, Prilosec and Nexium). This category
has experienced particularly volatile price growth--averaging around 3.5
percent annually from June 2001 to September 2004, then grew at a very
high annual rate of 22.8 percent up through December 2005, (17) and
continued to grow at a 5.1-percent annual rate since then. (18) In table
1, this class of drugs would be in the gastrointestinal category, and
data there suggest that the prescription drug share of gastrointestinal
drugs is approximately the same for the elderly and nonelderly. We know
of no data on whether this class of drugs is consumed disproportionately
by the previous dually eligible individuals.
Returning to table 3, we see that cancer therapy products (where
utilization might be expected to be disproportionately by the elderly,
though typically covered by Medicare Part B for many years) had an
average annual growth rate of about 4.4 percent over the entire January
2000-December 2006 timeframe. In the 15 months leading up to the January
2006 implementation, prices rose at an annual rate of 3.7 percent and
since then, at a slightly smaller rate of 2.5 percent. By contrast, the
class entitled "other neoplasms, endocrine system and metabolic
diseases, including hormones" includes a number of antiosteoperosis
drugs for postmenopausal women, and thus its utilization is likely to be
disproportionately by the elderly. (19) As seen in table 3, over the
entire January 2000--December 2006, price growth has been relatively
high in this class, averaging 8.6 percent annually; between September
2004 and December 2005, it increased at an average annual growth rate of
11.1 percent, and most recently, it continued at a relative high average
annual growth rate of 11.7 percent.
Of particular interest in the context of Medicare-Medicaid dually
eligible individuals are psychotherapeutic drugs, which are used
disproportionately by Medicaid beneficiaries. (20) For the entire class
of psychotherapeutic drugs, price growth accelerated from about 6
percent annually between June 2001 and September 2004, to about 8
percent annually since then. (21) The next row in table 3 indicates that
this price acceleration was particularly marked in the antidepressant
subclass of psychotherapeutic drugs. For antidepressants, the average
annual growth rate between September 2004 and December 2005 was 14.6
percent, more than twice that during the previous 15 months at 6.3
percent; (22) this average annual growth rate has fallen since the
implementation of Medicare Part D, but it is still substantial at 10.1
percent in 2006. (23) Interestingly, average annual growth rates are
lower, albeit still considerable in the subclass of psychotherapeutics designated as "other psychotropics, including tranquilizers,"
which includes the second generation atypical antipsychotic drugs for
treatment of schizophrenia and bipolar mania disorder. In recent years,
the medical literature has identified several medications within this
class as being associated with side effects of weight gain and diabetes,
and their cost-effectiveness over earlier less costly products has been
called into question. (24) For this aggregate class of other
psychotropic drug, prices grew at an average annual growth rate of
around 6.0 percent between June 2003 and September 2004, they grew at a
slower annual rate of 3.9 percent in the 15 months leading up to the
implementation of part D, and since then, they have grown at an annual
rate of 5.5 percent.
In summary, therefore, although there is considerable heterogeneity
over time intervals and among therapeutic classes, there is evidence
based on PPI trends suggesting that some prescription drugs likely
disproportionately used by the elderly (for example, the
antiosteoporosis drugs for postmenopausal women) and by the
Medicaid-Medicare dually eligible individuals that are now covered by
Medicare Part D (such as various types of psychotherapeutic drugs) have
experienced very considerable price growth leading up to and following
the implementation of the new Medicare Part D benefit. A common, but
clearly not uniform, pattern is that price increases in the 15 months
leading up to the implementation of the part D benefit in January 2006
were greater than those observed since its full implementation in
January 2006. Although at a much higher level of aggregation, this PPI
evidence is consistent with preliminary findings from Frank and Newhouse
(2007) that are based on more detailed brand data, which are discussed
below. However, there is also substantial PPI price growth during these
time periods for the antispasmodic/antisecretory class of drugs--drugs
that are not likely to be used disproportionately by the elderly. More
research will be needed to clarify these early findings.
Results from an additional data source
We have explored additional heterogeneity in the price response to
passage of the Medicare Modernization Act by examining price movements
among branded prescription drug products in the top 50 in U.S. sales,
based on detailed research where these drugs have been stratified by the
age composition of their purchasers. (25) We have constructed
pharmaceutical PPIs (Laspeyres and Fisher indexes) for this entire
sample of drugs and for various subsets. Using IMS Health data that
track sales of prescription drugs from manufacturers and wholesalers to
drug stores, we selected brand name drug products from among the top 50
in U.S. sales that had no generic competition. From among these, we
identified two cohorts of drugs that together included eighteen
products. The first consists of a set of drugs where 55 percent or more
of the sales of the drugs were likely to have been to people over age 65
(the sales shares by age are based on data on physician drug mentions
provided from surveys of physician office visits conducted by IMS
Health). (26) The second group is made up of drugs where less than 35
percent of the sales are likely to have been to people age 65 or more.
(27) From these data, we calculated monthly prices and quantity of sales
based on extended units. The period observed begins in June 2003 and
extends through June 2006.
Using these data, we constructed six price indexes that are
analogous to PPIs but that are at a much more disaggregated level.
Specifically, we calculated fixed-weight Laspeyres and chained Fisher
indexes for each of the two cohorts defined by the age of the
purchasers, as well as an overall index for all 50 drugs. This yields
six price index series. The six indexes are displayed in chart 1. The
fixed-weight Laspeyres indexes--L-elderly, L-nonelderly, and L-all
drugs--refer to the drugs disproportionately used by the elderly, the
nonelderly, and the entire set of 50 drugs, respectively; the
corresponding chained Fisher indexes are designated F-elderly,
F-nonelderly, and F-all drugs, respectively.
[GRAPHIC OMITTED]
Chart 1 reveals that the two PPIs calculated for the drugs in the
nonelderly purchasers cohort grew at lower rates than the cohort of
drugs where the majority of purchasers were over age 65. Thus, by June
2006 there was a 5.3 percentage point difference in the final value of
the Fisher index for the elderly and the nonelderly drugs (F-elderly and
F-nonelderly). The index for the elderly cohort ended between 3 and 4
percentage points higher, depending on the index, than the corresponding
index for all 50 drugs. Together, these data suggest that prices of
prescription drugs likely used to treat people over 65 years of age, and
thus are more likely to have been influenced by the passage and
implementation of Medicare Part D legislation increased more rapidly
than did drug prices for prescription drugs likely used to treat the
general population.
Concluding remarks
The implementation in January 2006 of the Medicare Modernization
Act that provided for Medicare Part D prescription drug benefits for the
elderly created monitoring challenges for Government statistical
agencies, such as the BLS. It has also created the opportunity for the
BLS eventually to assess any differences in prices paid by the elderly
and by the nonelderly for the same branded or generic prescription drug.
Although the implications of the Medicare Modernization Act for the PPI
program were relatively minor, those for the CPI program were greater
and more complex. The CPI program did not attempt to capture price
quotes of formerly uninsured cash-paying or partly insured consumers who
subsequently obtained part D coverage or for those switching from retail
to mail order because of part D. Hence, it is likely that the CPI for
prescription drugs overstated actual inflation between 2005 and 2006.
Nonetheless, it is notable that the CPI for prescription drugs grew only
by 1.9 percent between December 2005 and December 2006, roughly half the
annualized 3.8-percent rate in the previous 15 months.
With respect to the various pharmaceutical PPIs, theoretical
predictions regarding the price impacts of Medicare Part D are generally
ambiguous, since the moral hazard increase in demand could be offset by
the reduction in the number of cash-paying consumers. There is some
evidence suggesting that drugs disproportionately used by the elderly
(for example, antiosteoporosis drugs for postmenopausal women) and by
the Medicaid-Medicare dually eligible individuals subsequently covered
by Medicare Part D (for example, psychotropic drugs) experienced
considerable price growth leading up to and following the implementation
of Medicare Part D. Although the evidence is not uniform, a common
observed trend is for price increases in the 15 months leading up to the
implementation of Medicare Part D to be greater than in the previous 15
months following initial passage of the enabling legislation, and in the
year following full implementation.
Using data from a different source, IMS Health, on the 50 top
selling brands stratified by age of purchaser, we report evidence
consistent with the notion that between June 2003 and June 2006, price
increases for drugs likely used primarily by the elderly were larger
than were those for prescription drugs likely used primarily by the
nonelderly. (28)
The implications of changes in purchasing arrangements for drugs
used by Medicare beneficiaries and the resulting price impacts stemming
from the implementation of part D are just now beginning to be observed.
A great deal of new data will soon be emerging, which will facilitate
research on the impacts of institutional changes on both out-of-pocket
prices paid by consumers and on revenues received by prescription drug
manufacturers (analogous to CPIs and PPIs for prescription drugs). This
new learning is likely to be important for the interpretation of the
continued evolution of health care price indexes and for the evaluation
of public policies.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Frank Congelio, Dan Ginsburg, and Francisco Velez
at the Bureau of Labor Statistics for helpful discussions and data
support and Samuel Kina for research assistance. Professor Frank
acknowledges research support from the National Institute of Mental
Health, Grant ROIMH069721. A previous draft of this benefited from the
comments of Jack E. Triplett. Any opinions expressed in this paper are
those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond with those of the
institutions with which they are affiliated or the research sponsors.
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(1.) Rice and Horowitz report that the December 1965-December 1966
average annual growth rates ranged from 2.5 percent for cholecystectomy
to 6.9 percent for prostatectomy, and the combined index for
physicians' fees regularly priced for the CPI rose 7.8 percent
(Rice and Horowitz 1967, 25).
(2.) For additional discussion, see the various articles in Sharpe
(2006).
(3.) In this context it is worth noting that because of Medicare
reimbursement policies to physicians and hospitals, the elderly purchase
much of their health care under administered prices.
(4.) The cost-effectiveness of medications in certain classes
likely varies by patient age. Triplett (1999) links price indexes to
cost-effectiveness analyses.
(5.) For details, see Morton 1997; Frank 2001.
(6.) For a discussion of supplemental sampling and other details on
the PPI, see Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett 1993; Berndt and others 2000,
2001. We have benefited from correspondence with Frank Congelio in the
BLS PPI program regarding recent supplemental sample introductions.
(7.) We are not aware of any emprical analyses substantiating the
average 25-percent discount off of full cash price for these consumers.
(8.) Cubanski and Neuman (2006) report that 10 organizations
captured 72 percent of the part D enrollment, primarily in low premium
plans and those associated with name recognition. Two
organizations--UHC-Pacific (United) and Humana--dominated, together
accounting for 45 percent of part D enrollment.
(9.) We are unaware how the CPI program deals with varying
copayments, deductibles, and rebates.
(10.) This assumes of course that the OTC and Rx weights are
adjusted appropriately in month two after the switch.
(11.) For example, see Berndt and others 2000; Berndt and others
2001.
(12.) If beneficiaries that paid cash prices for part of the year
are counted this figure may be as high as 40 percent (Frank and Newhouse
2007).
(13.) For further discussion on details regarding the
pharmaceutical PPI, see Berndt, Grilliches, and Rosett (1993).
(14.) About a third of this inflation occurred between June and
July 2005.
(15.) About half of this increase occurred between June and July
2006.
(16.) A 41-percent decline in this PPI occurred between December
2000 and January 2001. BLS officials indicate this was due to entry by
generic drugs.
(17.) About half of this increase occurred between April and May
2005.
(18.) Most of this increase took place between June and July 2006.
(19.) From table 1, we see that the class of "hormones"
has roughly an equal share of around 10 percent for both the elderly and
the nonelderly. The hormones class also includes contraceptives,
however, which are not generally used by the elderly. Clearly, the
hormone class is heterogeneous.
(20.) For example, see Newhouse (2004); Duggan (2005); Frank, et
al. (2004).
(21.) Almost all of the September 2004-December 2005 inflation took
place between June and July 2005.
(22.) The PPI for antidepressants increased by 19.1 percent between
June and July 2005.
(23.) The antidepressant price growth is somewhat surprising.
Prozac, the leading selling antidepressant, lost patent protection and
experienced generic entry beginning August 2, 2001; yet from table 3, we
see that between June 2001 and June 2003, prices in this subclass grew
at an average annual rate of almost 11 percent. Similarly, the branded
antidepressant Zoloft lost patent protection and experienced generic
entry beginning June 30, 2006.
(24.) For example, see Freedman, et al. (2006); Lieberman, et al.
(2005); Polsky, et al. (2006); Rosenheck, et al. (2006).
(25.) This research has previously been discussed in greater detail
in Frank and Newhouse (2007).
(26.) Included in this group were the branded drugs Aricept,
Flomax, Xalatan, Forteo, Coreg, Plavix, Fosomax, Actonel, Norvasc, and
Evista.
(27.) This group includes Advair, Prevacid, Nexium, Singulair,
Acipbex, Zoloft, Effexor, and Wellbutrin XL (this last drug was dropped
from most analyses since a generic version of the molecule was also on
the market).
(28.) See Frank and Newhouse (2007) for further details.
Ernst R. Berndt is a professor at the Sloan School of Management at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is also director of the
National Bureau of Economic Research Program on technological progress
and productivity measurement. Richard G. Frank is a professor at Harvard
Medical School and a research associate with the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Table 1. Distribution of Prescriptions by Therapeutic
Class in the Overall and Medicare Part D Samples,
January-October 2006
[Percent]
Prescription share
Overall Part D
Therapeutic class sample sample
Analgesics 8.10 14.63
Anesthetics 9.67 0.00
Antidotes 1.16 0.00
Antimicrobials 9.88 9.76
Cardiovascular 14.30 17.07
Central nervous system 11.99 7.32
Gastrointestinals 5.26 4.88
Hematologics 1.79 2.44
Hormones 10.20 9.76
Immunologics 0.11 0.00
Metabolics/nutrients 9.57 14.63
Neurologics 3.47 4.88
Oncolytics 0.32 0.00
Ophthalmics 1.47 0.00
Otics 0.21 0.00
Respiratory tract 9.04 9.76
Skin/mucous membrane 2.00 2.44
Unclassified/miscellaneous 1.47 2.44
Total 100.00 100.01
Table 2. Annual Average Growth Rates
of Alternative Consumer Price Indexes (CPIs)
[Percent]
Jan. 1996- Jan. 2000- June 2003-
CPI Jan. 2000 June 2003 Sept. 2004
All items-urban 2.250 2.450 2.690
CPI-E-all items-urban 2.404 2.674 2.910
Medical care 3.206 4.324 4.297
CPI-E-medical care 3.158 4.468 4.380
Medical care services 3.201 4.675 4.821
Medical care
commodities 3.157 3.142 2.677
Prescription drugs 4.132 4.254 3.602
Sept. 2004- Dec. 2005-
CPI Dec. 2005 Dec. 2006
All items-urban 2.900 2.540
CPI-E-all items-urban 3.003 2.687
Medical care 4.103 3.563
CPI-E-medical care 3.893 3.297
Medical care services 4.498 4.094
Medical care
commodities 2.913 1.816
Prescription drugs 3.751 1.856
Table 3. Average Annual Growth Rates of
Alternative Producer Price Indexes (PPIs)
[Percent]
June 2001 June 2003 Sept. 2004
through through through
PPI June 2003 Sept. 2004 Dec. 2005
All pharmaceuticals 4.23 4.38 5.42
Analgesics--prescription 3.49 3.59 1.36
Antibiotics--broad
and medium spectrum 3.31 5.31 5.35
Anticoagulants 2.05 4.70 0.22
Antispasmodic/antisecretory 3.75 3.43 22.84
Other digestive or
genito-urinary preps 3.73 2.74 2.44
Bronchial therapy 6.23 4.10 1.94
Other prescription
respiratory preparations 7.98 6.20 6.94
Cancer therapy products 5.46 0.30 3.71
Other neoplasms,
endocrine system,
and metabolic diseases,
including hormones 10.92 7.29 11.06
Cardiovascular 3.95 4.60 4.04
ACE inhibitors 1.78 1.70 0.38
Other cardiovascular 5.74 6.32 6.90
Insulin/antidiabetes 6.09 9.47 6.99
Multivitamins-prescription
and over the counter (OTC) 0.80 0.81 -0.2
Other prescription
vitamins and nutrients 3.88 2.81 3.28
Psychotherapeutics 5.79 6.13 8.69
Antidepressants 10.99 6.26 14.59
Other psychotropics,
including tranquilizers 2.81 6.01 3.85
Other central nervous
system and sense organs -5.13 5.74 5.76
Skin prescription preparations 4.19 13.32 3.97
Dec. 2005 Jan. 2000
through through
PPI Dec. 2006 Dec. 2006
All pharmaceuticals 3.90 4.12
Analgesics--prescription 4.92 4.41
Antibiotics--broad
and medium spectrum 3.71 4.63
Anticoagulants 0.09 -5.47
Antispasmodic/antisecretory 5.13 7.33
Other digestive or
genito-urinary preps 4.19 n.a.
Bronchial therapy -0.9 3.52
Other prescription
respiratory preparations 4.54 n.a.
Cancer therapy products 2.53 4.39
Other neoplasms,
endocrine system,
and metabolic diseases,
including hormones 11.66 8.63
Cardiovascular 3.88 3.90
ACE inhibitors 0.00 n.a.
Other cardiovascular 6.63 n.a.
Insulin/antidiabetes -0.99 4.28
Multivitamins-prescription
and over the counter (OTC) 1.63 1.30
Other prescription
vitamins and nutrients 2.90 n.a.
Psychotherapeutics 7.66 5.89
Antidepressants 10.09 10.21
Other psychotropics,
including tranquilizers 5.45 n.a.
Other central nervous
system and sense organs 2.61 n.a.
Skin prescription preparations 6.84 n.a.
n.a. Not applicable because the BLS series begins in June 2001.
ACE Angiotensin-converting enzymes