Towards a new conceptualization of the homo-economicus contributions to the consumer theory.

Fernandez, Rodrigo A.

INTRODUCTION

One should begin this paper with a concept of the philosopher Mart��n Heidegger: "the true movement of sciences takes place by the more or less radical revision (although it is not transparent in itself) of the fundamental concepts." [Heidegger, M. 1926, p. 20] (1) Which raises two aspects fundamental to understand the history of any field of science, first that science is in movement and that it evolves constantly and secondly that this evolution is consequence of the revision of concepts that are often considered as fundamental stones of science itself. The economy as a scientific activity is not apart from this fundamental truth.

In the present paper a critical revision of some assumptions is made that underlie in the Neoclassical Consumer Theory, specially those referring to characteristics of the Economy Agent or Consumer, which is identified in Literature, and throughout this paper also, as the Homo-Economicus or Economy Man equipped with an extreme rationality and a tendency towards the mathematical optimization in the consumption decisions.

Facing this limited and axiomatized vision of the consumer, product of the successive mathematical refinements that began with the Marginal Revolution at the end of the XIX century, opposes an alternative consumer definition, based in Heidegger's philosophy, in which it tries to replace, in principle from the theoretical point of view, the Homo-Economicus for a Dasein-Economicus, i.e. a consumer who should incorporate Dasein's own characteristics, as done by Heidegger in his paper.

In this paper one does not try to obtain an operationalization of the concepts, nor a compatible formalization with the predominant one in the mainstream, in other words it does not procure the axiomatic and mathematical expression, characteristic of the Neoclassical Consumer Theory, of the new concepts, but that such are evaluated from an abstract and single point of view, and only the potential consequences are considered to advance in this way.

In general the paper can be divided in two well differentiated parts: in the first part the characteristics will be identified from the Neoclassical Consumer Theory of Representative Economy Agent or Homo-Economicus and the critics are indicated to the underlying assumptions; in the second part the advantages will be developed in a summarized way to incorporate in the definition of economy agent the characteristics of man (Dasein) from Heidegger's conception, in the words of the philosopher himself: " the diverse disciplines show everywhere the tendency today to establish new foundations for their research." [Heidegger, M. 1926, p. 20] (2)

And nevertheless, it is ill-fated that when Heidegger exemplifies those disciplines that establish new foundations, he mentions mathematics, physics, biology, history, theology, but not the economy.

DEVELOPMENT

What is an economy agent?

For the economists in general and the theoretical economists in particular, the economy agent is the inhabitant of the economy models and constitutes the basic unit of analysis for the study of the economy behavior. The economy models are used in general for the study of the behavior of the agents, and the form in which these are related among themselves.

In education, and even in practice, from the economy the criterion usually is adopted to subdivide the economy in two great approaches: Microeconomics and Macroeconomics. As clarified by Foley (December 2002), while Microeconomics Approach requires directly and immediately the conceptualization of an economy agent, i.e. the individual who makes his decisions, the Macroeconomy Approach also requires that the relationship between the behavior of the economy agents and the added information be explained. Gonzalez (2004) proposes directly that the dichotomy is not pertinent, between micro and macro, and indicates its epistemological consequences, as well as the lack of consistency between the individual election and the social one understood as the aggregation of individual elections.

On the other hand, in the mentioned Microeconomic Approach, the economy agent is characterized by Rubinstein (2006) as the unit that responds to a scene denominated of the Election Problem, in which the agent must select some variant of a set of available alternatives, following a process that allows him to analyze and to evaluate all the alternatives available, which is called Rational Election. Thus, the same author indicates that far from looking for in the presentation of the model a foundation for the recommendation of economy policies, the theoretical model fulfills the mere role to constitute: "... the arena in which we research the concepts that we used while we thought on the economy in real life". [Rubinstein, A., 2006, p. ix] (3)

In this arena called Consumer Theory, the economy agent, is limited to decide the action to be done by means of a process in which:

* He asks himself: What is the desirable thing?

* He asks himself: What is the possible thing?

* He chooses the most desirable among the possible alternatives

One must clarify that the term Rational Election, does not imply any type of judgment of value with respect to the alternative chosen by the agent, but that it refers to the adjustment of means to the aims, as clarified by G��mez (2002) when enumerating some of the epistemological assumptions of the neoliberal economy: "To choose, to decide and to act rationally, means to adopt the means suitable to maximize the attainment of the objectives (assumption of the reduction of human rationality to instrumental rationality, means-aims)." [G��mez, R., 2002, p. 34] (4)

Homo-Economicus in historical perspective

From a very simplified historical perspective, it is not a surprise the association between the assumptions that underlie to the economy agent and the epistemological position caused by the founders of the neoclassic model. In fact, the description made by Rubinstein of the Rational Consumer or Economy Man (Homo-Economicus) and that at present moment corresponds with what is taught in the microeconomic courses of economy careers; begin to be satisfied with the Marginalist Revolution.

Considered historically as the period in which the Neoclassical Approach of the Economy Theory is formalized, the Marginalist Revolution begins between 1871 and 1874 in papers by William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and Leon Walras. Nevertheless, it must be clarified that exactly in its beginnings, even when the mathematical formalization of the economy theory propitiated, the assumptions of the behavior of the agents did not arise from an ad-hoc axiomatization, but of some particular philosophical doctrine, for example in the case of Jevons of Bentham's utilitarianism that proposed pleasure and pain as the basic reasons that move the human acts, in the case of Walras the philosophy of the natural right, or in the case of Menger his Aristotelian formation that took him to the search of the essence of the economy phenomena by means of a theoretical research with the objective to produce exact or natural laws, to deepen these appreciations we suggest reading Backhouse (1985).

Even though the philosophical sustenance of the assumptions is undeniable on the agents in the origins of marginalism, the later development of the economy concentrated in the solution of the problem of the general balance would culminate in the Arrow-Debreu model, in which it proceeds to the axiomatization of the Consumer Theory whose canonical version can be found in Debreu (1959). As a consequence, this new approach, concentrated in the individual consumer and his preferences (that came in replacement of the usefulness concept), brings prepared the abandonment and the forgetfulness of the Classic Approach that estimated a society divided basically in three different social classes: Workers, Capitalists and Landowners; which implied tacitly, according to Foley's (2002), schematic version of the economy, that the behaviors of the people could be understood as the behaviors of an economy agent pertaining to some of the mentioned classes.

In this sense, from Foley's (2002), perspective with the appearance of the Representative Economy Agent, product of the marginalist revolution and the later evolution of the theoretical economy itself, based on the use of the mathematical language, the differences of classes with the consequent simplification in the decision schemes are eliminated. Now the economy agent represents those characteristics that were shared by all the people, in as much that all men are to a certain extent workers who offer their work force, and in greater or smaller measure they are also proprietors of some assets which produce profits and/or landowners, becoming therefore the Economy Agent a model on the scale of the whole society.

The Homo-Economicus as Consumer

In this scale model, the behavior of the representative agent was synthesized in an only objective, which consisted basically of solving an election problem.

Retaking the historical perspective it is possible to identify a set of critics to the assumptions that underlie in the Homo-Economicus, most of them can be deepened in Boldeman (2007):

* Methodological Individualism: according to which the explanations of the economy phenomena can be reduced to the sums of the actions of each one of their members, which would interact in a mechanical form, determinists, and that therefore would be possible to express in mathematical terms in the style of the Newtonian physics.

* Exogeneity Preferences: according to which, and as it is specified in G��mez (2003), our desires are formed previously and are independent of our economy activity. Another way to understand it is to consider that in this assumption a reasoning of circular type is hidden according to which the Preferences explain the behavior, which as well is defined by the Preferences.

* Individuality of the Preferences: Also understood as the egoism of the economy agent, in the most elementary positions of the neoclassic theory, the preferences are derived from independent functions of usefulness, in other words it is assumed that economy agents, equivalent to Robinson Crusoe when he lived absolutely alone on the island. In this sense, any type of interdependence of the earnings / preferences, as well as the possibilities of tastes or preferences constructed sociall, were prohibited

* Opposition between Preferences and Values: As commented in G��mez (2003), in the neoclassic scheme of election one does not consider the differentiation between absolute and relative necessities, trivializing the decision of consumption in a mere election of goods from absolutely personal and individual optics. On the other hand, in Cohn (August 2000) they are mentioned among other critics as an excess of over-simplification and the impossibility to consider the impact of matters of gender in this model

* Instrumental Rationality: Equivalent to reduce the economy problems to a susceptible optimization of mathematical treatment, in particular this is translated in the Consumer Theory as a maximization of the earnings. From this approach it would not be rational to act according to the respect of moral values, if the election implied a diminution of the personal utilities.

* Limitless Management of the Information: the agent was equipped with certain abilities in the collection and prosecution with enormous amounts of information, referred so much as to the prices of the goods as to their characteristics or qualities. In fact studies on Conductist Economy have demonstrated by means of empirical experimentation that the supposed conditions for the resolution of the optimization problem are not fulfilled in reality, therefore contradictions with respect to the assumption can be read in Rabin (September 1996), usual related to the symmetry of the preferences facing risks of loss and profit, infeasibility of the theory of the earnings expected for the decision under uncertainty, and other violations to the basic assumptions of the consumer theory.

The question of the being in the Consumer Theory

Independently of the critics derived from the Conductist Psychology/Economy, there exist sufficient reasons from a net epistemological point of view to consider the necessity to redefine the Economy Man, in as much and as soon as the underlying assumptions do not comply exactly to the observable behavior of the man acting in economy surroundings (nor experimental). Although it is possible to agree with Moscati's (2003), affirmation, according to which the neoclassic approach of the consumer theory does not abjure from realism, but that it simply subordinates to the search of conceptual integrity and preservation of its systematic and mathematical approach; the pretended defense of the logic/mathematic approach, that would guarantee the respect to scientific canons of the theory, would attempt against the most elementary criteria of falseness.

In its attempt to construct a scientific economy, in the style of natural sciences and especially of the Newtonian physics, the theory of the consumer went on turning the Economy Man into the equivalent of the Billiard Ball that moves in an infinite table and without friction. Thus they ended up accepting a series of ontological assumptions, under the thesis of the Methodological Individualism, in which the Economy Man is isolated from all contact with other agents, and for which its decision of consumption is based on a scheme of arrangement independent of the other agents and also independent of the preferences of their own actions (for example, economy activity) of the economy agent himself.

In order to exemplify the previous affirmation consider that the preferences, or in colloquial terms the tastes, of the consumer must satisfy a series of requirements, in mathematical terms they must fulfill the completeness properties (that can compare any pair of goods and decide if it prefers one of both or if they result indifferent) transitivity (if it prefers X 1 to X 2 and prefers X 2 to X 3 then he prefers X 1 to X 3 ) and symmetry (in the case of the two goods between which the consumer is indifferent, it is valid as much that X 1 is indifferent to X 2 because X 2 is indifferent to X 1. Without entering details it is illustrative to consider what is estimated to fulfill with these conditions implies thus for the consumer, in Debreu (1959) one can read:

"The preorder of preferences of the i-th position consumer completely expresses its tastes with respect to food, dress, housing..., work and, also, with respect to the consumption in some date or place over others. The preferences considered here do not take into account the value from the resell of the merchandise; i-th position consuming is not interested in them more than in the personal use of which it will make them the object." [Debreu, G., 1959, p. 71] (5)

This axiomatization in which the preferences are considered as clear, also considered as clear, the goods on which the consumer will choose, to represent the position equivalent to the philosophy previous to Heidegger's, and which is represented in the phrase: "Entity everywhere and always at discretion. It's true. But from where do we know that all this that we adduce and we enumerate with such certainty, is in each case entity" [Carpio, A. 1984, p. 432] (6)

In other words the axiomatization hides under the form of a representative agent, who is the consumer, an only scheme of representation or understanding of the consumer goods under the form of a rational election process. Nevertheless, as Heidegger proposes: "the explicit and transparent exposition of the question by the sense of the being demands the previous and suitable exposition of a being (of Dasein's) with regards to its being." [Heidegger, M., 1926, p. 18] (7)

Perhaps it is the moment for asking the Consumer Theory itself if it is not necessary to make an explicit and transparent of the exposition question in the sense of the rational election, which will derive in the previous and necessary exposition of a consumer with regard to his election process. In as much the theoreticians of the economy raise, that behind the election process by what is desirable and possible, Heidegger's contribution is fundamental since according to the philosopher the being which is man and what Dasein's calls has exactly the possibility of the being which is to ask.

Behavior of the Economy Man and the Entity Being

Within the neoclassic consumer theory, one of the most controverted aspects in terms of falseness is related to one of the most accepted laws of the economy, the one that postulates the negative slope of the demand curve, or in other words the negative or inverse relation between price and amount. Mark Blaug says:

"It was Marshall that discovered the so called universal Law of Deman, is unfortunately subject to a possible exception, i.e., Giffen's paradox, the case in which, expressing it in modern language, the positive effect-rent of a variation in the price is so great that it eliminates the negative substitution-effect generated by such variation". [Blaug, M., 1980, p. 187] (8)

In this sense, it is interesting to point out that starting off from a minimum set of axioms; the consumer theory can explain, from the theory itself, the positive or negative curve, justifying the results in terms of the magnitude of the effect-rent, which is to the practical aims unobservable. On the other hand, these axioms are the base of the behavior of the consumer, who would be in last instance, an implacable rational classifier--of goods. It is evident that the excellent behavior of consumer, for the theory, does not refer to the use of the goods but the one called rational behavior, or as summarized by John Green:

"A supposed which impregnates the consumer behavior theories which we are going to treat is that the consumers behave rationally. Whatever the use that the economist gives the word 'rational' it is a very special use; we see first what is understood by this term ... For the economist, rational behavior is a behavior according to a systematic order of preferences." [Green, J., 1976, p. 24] (9)

Independently that the consumer derives earnings from the own goods, in the consumer theory the excellent behavior is not respect to the goods but to the process of election. In other words, the relationship man--goods, or in philosophical terms the relationship man--being, is also considered as given, as from there the consumer theory is elaborated, and for that reason it is possible to be understood in terms of the philosophy previous to Heidegger.

When Carpio (1984) affirms:

".. the important thing is that all man's behavior depends on the 'being' whatever the entity: his attitude varies according to talks about another man, or a god, or a landscape, or

a business, or a hammer, or a symphony, and differs the behavior because each one of these entities has a diverse form of 'being', because, the respective 'being' is diverse". [Carpio, To, 1984, p. 432] (10)

In this paragraph one points out the overcoming implied by Heidegger's conception as to the previous philosophy that set off from the being, in which the philosopher called forgetfulness of the being. One can then think in analogous way that in the neoclassic theory there was also was a forgetfulness of the being or a forgetfulness of choosing.

Characteristics of the goods and understanding-the being

One must emphasize, perhaps as an exception to this forgetfulness of the being of the neoclassic theory, the contribution that Kevin Lancaster makes to the theory of the consumer, when he establishes that the important thing is not the goods in themselves but their characteristics, or in other words the services that the goods offer the consumers. As commented in Green (1971) Lancaster's dissatisfaction with the consumer's traditional theory was that it explained in not a very satisfactory way, for the persons' consumer preferences appealing in last instance to the Deux ex machina, of the order of preferences of the consumer, which will exhibit serious problems of interpretation in those cases in which the introduction of new products is wanted to be studied which would tend to destroy the preexisting order and to modify it by a new one, without there being able to make comparisons.

One of the advantages recognized by Lancaster is that in his approach the common things are the called corner, by means of which the reason would be explained by which the consumers choose to consume something of some good and nothing of many other goods, incompatible behavior with the assumption of strict convexity of the indifference curves that as sure the possibility of obtaining unique inner solutions, and whose empirical implication would be translated in which the agents would tend to consume something (a little) of all the goods.

Another of the advantages recognized by Lancaster is the ones derived from the stability of the preferences with respect to the characteristics of the goods, in this sense Green (1976) says: "... it is more likely than the preferences referred to the characteristics change less through time, either by means of publicity, or by means of others through time, than the preferences referring to the goods ... "[Green, J., 1976, p. 172] (11)

The author's example is illustrative as to the functioning of the characteristics:

".. Diverse toothpastes constitute a group of goods closely related because those trade marks, and only they, offer the following characteristics: prevention of dental decay and whitening of teeth... it is clear that the characteristics offer a base to relate the goods among themselves ..." [Green, J., 1976, p. 169] (12)

Even though Lancaster maintains the essential order of consumers' preferences which defines itself on the characteristics, would be incorporating in his approach aspects relative to the behavior of the consumer and their relation with the goods.

In as much Lancaster advances on the form in which the consumers understand (make sense of the use) of the goods realizes the equivalent to the introduction of understanding the being of the consumers' theory, and without referring Heidegger's philosophical categories, he even raises it as a pre-ontological understanding, in as much as the consumers would understand the useful-being, among other things, of each good; and as Carpio (1984) says: "... because only on the base of understanding-the-being, man can enter into relation to the entities, and conceive them, and handle them ... "[Carpio, 1984, p. 433] (13)

From the Homo-Economicus to the Dasein-Economicus

Although Lancaster's approach opens new possibilities, as an alternative to the traditional neoclassic consumer's approach theory, it is possible to point out as a disadvantage that this approach has had little later developing impact, and some critics allege that the impossibility to measure the preferences in the traditional neoclassic theory is replaced by the concept of characteristics with similar disadvantages be they operative or measurable.

On the other hand, the disadvantages derived from the methodological individualism, and specially the virtual isolation are not solved either by the axiomatization of the Consumer Theory subject the Economy Man, so that he can make his election of consumption in an independent way of the elections of the other agents, nor on the impact of the own goods consumed in the well-being of the other agents. A phrase of Heidegger (1926) is significant on the matter of a potential strategy to approach the problem, when he proposes Dasein's analytical one:

".. one should not apply to this entity in a dogmatic and constructive way any idea of being and reality, however "obvious" it be: nor should they be imposed to Dasein, without previous ontological examination, "categories" sketched as from such idea. The way of access and interpretation must be chosen, on the contrary, in such a From this perspective it is clear that the traditional neoclassic approach assumes the Cartesian position, limiting the consumer's cogitations of the process of election of the goods. way that this entity should be shown just as it is, immediate and regularly in its daily media". [Heidegger, M., 1926, p. 27] (14)

It is possible to ask oneself at this point if it would be possible to abandon the Robinson-Crusoe-consumer-, who lives isolated in his world of elections, or in strict terms if some unreal assumptions can be raised, or to replace them by others more closer to reality according they arise from Behavioral Economics studies. In other words to change the Homo-Economicus for a Dasein-Economicus, which would imply to rethink the economics agents according to Carpio (1984) based on: "... the open character of man, means that the Dasein should not have to be understood as an isolated subject, such as the I in the Cartesian way of thinking, locked up in itself with its own cogitations. On the contrary, the Dasein is being-in-the-world " [Carpio, 1984, p. 439] (15)

From this perspective it is clear that the traditional neoclassic approach assumes the Cartesian position, limiting the consumer's cogitations of the process of election of the goods.

Existence and the Pretended Valorative Neutrality

To try the construction of a Dasein-Economicus is much more that to surpass the critic with respect to the Methodological Individualism, by means of the appeal to simply include in the function of maximization of the agent, some variable that allows contemplating its interrelation with the rest of the beings. Thus thinking it would not suppose greater change, and it would convert the Dasein a mere man-thing corresponding to the philosophy previous to Heidegger. On the contrary, the elaboration of a Dasein-Economicus from the economy supposes the effort to equip the agent with existence (ec-sistent--being of Dasein), and to establish the difference between the consumer and the objects of its consumption (which are-in-front-of-the-eyes).

The de-codification of the economy man would have immediate consequences on each one of the enunciated critics, but fundamentally it would impact on the so called ethical assumptions that underlie the theory, even though such are hidden in a pretended neutrality that would locate the economists in the rank of technocrats whose only function is the to establish the consequences of the different alternatives, without even daring to issue a value judgment as to the measures to be implemented.

In this sense one of the ethical traps in which the neoclassic economy falls derives ue alive, introducing therefore the necessity to include in the economy analyses, and more important in those of economy policy, the satisfaction of minimum levels of subsistence for the so called absolute necessities (roof, food, health, education) without which one would refuse man's essence. from the assumption of optimality in the sense of Pareto (under the title of First and Second Well-being Theorems), that can be understood as the valuation of the efficiency in the process of rational election. From this assumption it is understood that the market assigns the resources in an optimal way, including the so called corner solutions as extreme results. This solution in corner implies that an egalitarian distribution of the goods in the society is equally efficient, like a distribution absolutely concentrated in which one of the agents has the totality of resources /goods.

In economy terms, when equipping the agent with existence, one would be discarding those decisions in which:

* the Dasein were considered a thing, e.g., the evaluation of alternatives would not be possible which implied the slavery of a person

* the possibilities (existence) of Dasein were limited, for example it could not continue alive, introducing therefore the necessity to include in the economy analyses, and more important in those of economy policy, the satisfaction of minimum levels of subsistence for the so called absolute necessities (roof, food, health, education) without which one would refuse man's essence.

Budgetary, Consumption Set and the World

It remains to ask from the alternative approach which are the considerations that would have to be done to equip the Dasein with the economy focus, fundamentally because in his original analysis Heidegger (1926) recognizes the contributions of:

"Philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, "politics", poetry, biography and historiography, have researched, by different ways and in variable proportions, the behaviors, faculties, forces, possibilities and the destinies of the Dasein. [Heidegger, 1926, p. 27] (16)

But he does not mention the economy. In this sense, he would be of particular importance of researching on the role of the private property, since in a capitalist society between the moments of be-before-the-eyes and be-handy there is the act of acquisition of the goods.

This is perhaps one of the contributions that, in the neoclassic consumer theory model, it is clear; in such a way that they can be-handy those goods that are within the budgetary set, whereas the rest of the objects are simply be-before-the-eyes. So that the agent can make contact with the beings, so that he can take care of the things and to make use of the earnings of the beings, even in the daily attitude the Dasein must buy those goods, so that the definitions on the property and the form to incorporate it in the analysis are not trivial, in as much in the present world, the world in the present state of the capitalist system, finishes up conditioning the plexus of references and meanings, in other words the spending power of the Dasein end up acting as a limit to its own world.

This limit is not something physical, but that it has to do with the referenciality of the useful, and especially with the form in which the Dasein understands the references of the beings to which it is related. From this approach, when considering a Dasein-Economicus, one can surpassed the critic made with respect to the Preferences Exogeneity, in as much as the world is that as from which the Dasein gives to mean as to which being it can behave, and how it can do it, as enunciated by Carpio (1984) mentioning Heidegger.

Summing up, the Dasein-Economicus would stop being a representative agent of everything that the consumers have in common, and would once again be more like the vision than the classic had of the economy agent, as conditioned in its possibilities by the social class to which it belongs.

Consumer Dispositionality and Rationality

The traditional interpretation, and its consequent neoclassic axiomatization, of the concept of consumer rationality, refers to the supposed that prevents the consumers to act in an inconsistent way, in other words prohibit the contradictory elections.

It is possible to point out that the Conductist Economy has proven repeatedly that the normal conduct of the people is apparently irrational, i.e., the rationality assumption is not fulfilled. In this sense the change of the Homo-Economicus by the Dasein-Economicus would allow to incorporate into the consumer theory, the existential Dispositional and Comprehension, which contribute to understand the open-state, i.e., the form in which man discovers the beings as useful, and how he relations himself to other men.

Thus, the Dispositional understood as a state of mind or affection capacity would make possible the introduction in the consumer theory of the alternative ways in which the consumer would disposed to the act of consumption or of election, to constitute concrete ways of the insertion of the consumer in the world.

In his analysis on the Dasein as affective disposition Heidegger (1926) indicates an aspect with deep connotations for the theoretical economy: " the 'mere mood' opens the There more originally; but also it closes it more obstinately than non-perception." [Heidegger, 1926, p. 140] (17)

On the one hand, it would imply to reconsider what Literature has denominated Bounded or Limited Rationality which would not only be derived only due to the lack of Information (or ignorance of the parameters of the model on behalf of the agent in the language of Sargent (1993)), but of deeper questions (affective) that would force the agent to act against the Information available. From this optics the affective or psychic analysis of irrational behaviors as a result of feelings or situations, would be made possible, for example threats, before which one would give up the criteria of calculation of maximization imposed by the traditional theory.

CONCLUSION

As a summary, in the paper some assumptions characteristic of the Representative Economy Agent of the Neoclassical Consumer Theory have been reviewed, as a way of axiomatization of the action abilities they constituted in guarantee of economy rationality and are the base for the strategy of behavior foundation in the construction of economy models that go beyond the consumer theory itself, and manage to include the complete fan of approaches in the economy, which has been called the economy main current.

In addition to the historical and methodological contextualization, that explains the origin and development of the Homo-Economicus, some criticisms, have been made, such as: Methodological Individualism, Preferences Exogeneity, Preferences Individuality, Opposition between Preferences and Values, Instrumental Rationality, Limitless Handling of Information. From this perspective it has been pointed out that the form in which Homo-Economicus was constructed, corresponds to a traditional philosophical approach and that was surpassed by Heidegger's Philosophy, in as much it considers man, consumer, as another being, without worrying about the questions relative to the being

Finally, some basic elements of Heidegger's Philosophy have been used, trying to introduce the distinction of the being in the definition of the economy agent, which is called Dasein-Economicus, to indicate the form in which the mentioned critics could be surpassed.

Fecha de recepci��n: 21/09/09

Fecha de aprobaci��n: 26/11/09

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Please refer to articles Spanish bibliography.

Fernandez Rodrigo A.

Universidad Nacional de Misiones.

Facultad de Ciencias Econ��micas.

Ruta Nacional No 12-7 km 1/2 - C.P. 3304.

Miguel Lan��s--Misiones--Argentina.

Email: rafernandez@fce.unam.edu.ar