On the concept of transition.
Colombatto, Enrico
This article reassesses the meaning of transition. After a critical
review of the traditional approach, it is argued that meaningful
transition requires emphasis on the change of the institutional
path-dependent process. In this light, the issue of transition may also
apply to the West. Put differently, the notion of transition is here
referred to a broader context than that acknowledged by the orthodox
view and now includes the dynamics of power, the attitude toward risk
and uncertainty within a civilization, and ideology. It is maintained
that changes depend heavily on the opportunities for rent seeking, which
may be enhanced or stifled by technological progress or other exogenous events.
Introduction
The economics of transition was born out of the collapse of the
Communist regime in Eastern Europe. This collapse is probably due to two
reasons. First, it was not politically suitable to call East-European
economies by their real name-developing or undeveloped countries. That
would have been at odds with the political objectives of making the
former Communist countries feel treated as equals by the Western
community and of preventing possible nationalistic tensions in that part
of the world. Second, a new name had to be coined to justify policies
that proved rather ineffective in the Third World experience but were
proposed once again--sometimes in different versions--in the
East-European context. One may thus wonder whether the economics of
transition makes any sense at all, or whether its usefulness may be
better perceived from other perspectives.
The purpose of this article is to suggest an answer to such
questions. In particular, sections 1 and 2 review the orthodox
approaches to transition and some efforts to meet their shortcomings.
Sections 3 and 4 reformulate the scope for a theory of transition to
developed countries and reassess the legitimacy and rationale of
governmental economic intervention in the Western world. The key element
of this reappraisal is summed up in section 5, where a new concept of
transition is put forward, focused on the individual rather than on a
society or a country.
The Classical Approach
From the classical viewpoint, the issue of transition is closely
connected with that of growth. In particular, the classical school
emphasized the static technical features of economic systems. Trade and
labor specialization, together with higher capital endowment and
improved (maritime) transportation, (1) were rightly considered
conducive to growth and higher living standards. Since the economics of
technological progress played a secondary role or no role at all, it is
plausible to claim that the classical school ignored two crucial
elements: the possibility of changing production functions through the
acquisition of knowledge and the influence of institutions on
transaction costs.
As a consequence, the classical case for transition implies a
strong plea in favor of free trade, limited governmental intervention,
and--especially in the case of poor countries--foreign aid to enhance
capital formation. Put differently, classical transition refers to
countries that move out of mercantilist practices, as well as to those
in critical need of better infrastructure (e.g., railways in the Western
world during the second half of the nineteenth century). From a
normative perspective, the classical school, therefore, spells out the
desirable policies to enhance growth in relatively poor countries, (2)
whereas, from a positive standpoint, classical transition applies to a
country that complies with the appropriate set of sound economic rules
but has not yet secured the full benefits they are supposed to generate.
In this light, countries are simply classified as those who are on their
way toward their potential consumption-possibility frontier and those
who are not; that is, as those that grow; those that do not grow because
the minimum requirements for growth have not been attained; (3) and
those that have already achieved maturity and no longer expand. In a
nutshell, classical transition theory turns out to be the analysis of
the minimum conditions for growth and of how they can be obtained.
The Neoclassical View
Neoclassical economics has surely led to major analytical results
and has allowed scholars to study in sophisticated detail the features
of the allegedly perfect machine known to some as the
"Nirvana" economy. The cultural and institutional incentives
that drive individual behavior, however, have been, by and large,
overlooked. Similar to the classical teaching, neoclassical modeling
describes a static world where exogenous transaction costs prevent it
from functioning flawlessly. Time and learning play a limited role and
so does institutional dynamics. As suggested by Hodgson, (4) it is no
coincidence that neoclassical economics is cherished throughout the
political spectrum.
The neoclassical perception of transition thus remains inadequate.
A transition economy is still perceived as a machine that for some
reasons--ignorance or market imperfections--runs below its full
potential. Developed and developing economies do differ, either because
the blueprints are not equally accessible, or because such blueprints
are not equally and easily put into practice, so that agents need time
to adapt to the new rules of the game. There is no doubt, however, that
all these rules allow the reproduction of the allegedly ideal system and
are to be introduced as quickly as possible. (5)
The normative undertaking of the neoclassical economist is,
accordingly, twofold. On the one hand, he tries to export the Nirvana
blueprint to all countries that are significantly below their
production-possibility frontier, whatever that may mean. Growth, then,
becomes the inescapable consequence of transition; hence, the role of
the so-called "Western expert" who is to explain and adapt a
well-known prototype to an unknown but supposedly easy-to-model reality.
Furthermore, he is supposed to suggest suitable aid packages in order to
reduce the cost of transition and make transaction costs acceptable.
Transition is the name of this experiment in social engineering.
Summing Up the Orthodox Economics of Development and Transition
What has been argued in the previous paragraphs suggests that
according to the orthodox view the difference between development and
transition economics is a matter of human capital and--in earlier
times--infrastructure. Developing countries are those where both these
variables are poor, while the problem with transition countries is the
past system of centralized planning, which prevented the economy from
benefiting from consumer sovereignty and specialization.
In both cases, foreign aid is believed to play a crucial role. In
developing economies, it is supposed to encourage education and to speed
up investment until a critical threshold is secured, beyond which,
growth and development become self-sustained. In transition countries,
foreign aid is to soften the adjustment-cost problems that the
institutional shocks generate. In addition, it makes a free-market
economy acceptable either to the rent-seeking minorities who regarded
themselves as better off during the Communist regime, or to those
workers who perceive the short-run costs of transition but do not care
very much for its long-run benefits.
From a practical viewpoint, the failures of mainstream development
and transition economics are apparent. They are apparent, due to their
disregard, vis-a-vis, for the institutional framework and the variables
that interact with both formal and informal rules and organizations.
Transition paths based on exogenous-growth hypotheses were indeed
justified from a static viewpoint, because the greater the distance from
the ideal blueprint, the greater are the opportunities for catching up.
The empirical evidence in this direction has, however, been
disappointing, to say the least. Attempts to go back to classical
economics and stress the role and the dynamics of factor endowments (be
it fixed capital or human capital) did provide answers to some of the
neoclassical riddles, but their overall predictive power remained
modest. (6)
Can We Escape Bad Economics?
Disillusion with the mainstream approach to growth has encouraged
analyses from different angles, and two lines of thought have proved to
be particularly popular. One has emphasized the interaction among
political players. Another has taken income distribution into
consideration.
On the Political-Economy Approach
The aim of political-economy analysis is to explain the manifest
contradiction between the availability of allegedly desirable
welfare-enhancing prescriptions on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
the systematic reluctance--by policy makers and public opinion alike on
the other--to follow the supposedly optimal blueprint.
By drawing heavily on public-choice theory, it is argued that the
introduction of standard neoclassical blueprints into a previously
distorted situation may run against more-or-less powerful pressure
groups. Policy-makers are surely vulnerable to particular interests.
Hence, although all politicians tend to accept neoclassical
prescriptions in theory (for it would be hard to object to a Nirvana
state), in fact, they tend to ignore the so-called public interest and
engage in ongoing negotiation with the various coalitions so as to
preserve their rents and power.
The public-choice addition deserves credit, for it surely fills the
gap between positive and normative orthodox theory by showing why good
theories are not necessarily put into practice by rational and
omniscient policymakers. Nevertheless, the fundamental weaknesses of the
orthodox vision persist. Since no theory is put forward regarding the
development of social and institutional variables, the enriched
mechanics offered by the political-economy approach assumes that the
rules of the game are constant and that they can hardly be changed by
the agents. This is, of course, a heroic assumption, as a consequence of
which, it becomes impossible to clarify the origin of the differences in
the rent-seeking, law-making game across the world.
In addition, the dynamics of transaction costs are indeed mentioned
to explain the birth of and the interaction among interest groups. But
the essence of growth, as a competitive process among different
institutional solutions aimed at reducing transaction costs and
disequilibria, is systematically disregarded. (7)
On Capitalism with a Human Face
A second line of thought suggests that successful growth recipes
can be accepted--and thus meet success--only if distributive issues are
taken into account adequately, and if higher income levels correspond to
higher living standards, to be measured according to more-or-less
sophisticated indicators (such as education, life expectations, and
exploitation of child labor).
Yet, social-justice criteria are not likely to produce noteworthy
results, unless one provides a satisfactory definition of social justice
itself and is ready to accept the concept of society as being distinct
from a system of interacting individuals. Unfortunately, the advocates
of social justice fail on both accounts. Their (declining) fortune seems
to profit more from their implicit promises of redistribution, which
justifies social engineering and satisfies envy rather than from their
proven ability to foster economic progress overall and/or individual
advancement.
As a matter of fact, growth with a human face has been another
experiment in free-market constructivism, whereby expert and scholars
have tried to solve the public-choice problem (interest-group
resistance), preserve the bureaucracies, and overcome the market
failures generated by a static free-market theory. In short, growth and
development have been transformed into an instrument functional to
vaguely defined social-justice policies.
Preliminary Conclusions
As mentioned earlier, by identifying economic progress with the
application of a known blueprint, mainstream economics has missed the
essence of transition and growth. Instead, these phenomena consist of
the development of new blueprints, which, in turn, depend on the
existing stock of knowledge and combine the stock of knowledge with the
rules of the game and with the individual proclivity to take advantage
of the existing opportunities. (8) In this light, transition can still
be defined as the change in the rules of the game. Such a change,
however, is not necessarily aimed at starting some kind of a mechanical
catch-up process, but, rather, at reducing transaction costs and
providing better opportunities to meet individual objectives. This has
important consequences, since it implies that the issue of transition
may clearly apply to the so-called developed world as well, and to
Western Europe in particular.
The persistence of missed opportunities in large areas of the West
over the last two centuries (9) calls for a deeper investigation of the
role of institutions and on the driving forces that have affected the
evolution of the rules of the game in Western societies. The approach
proposed in these pages is fairly close to that suggested by
institutional economists. One substantial difference must be stressed,
however. The institutional school investigates institutional development
and economic growth as path-dependent processes. These may be influenced
by other variables but are, more or less, always set into motion by
exogenous shocks. Contrary to that, it is here believed that the effects
of historical accidents depend heavily on the cultural features of the
societies they fall upon. In other words, the following pages argue that
the slow evolution of the patterns of individual behavior--perhaps more
aptly defined by Hayek (10) as the "sensory order"--leads to
the dynamics of civilizations. This may promote the advancement of the
stock of knowledge, as institutional scholars sometimes define it, but
may also promote rent-seeking games, as the public-choice school
maintains. (11) In turn, the state of civilization explains the need for
transition, as well as the chances for transition to take place.
Of course, this does not rule out the possibility of analyzing the
evolution of civilizations as self-contained stories that start from
historical accidents and develop, flourish, and decline according to a
set pattern; (12) for although unquestionably deterministic and rather
mechanical, these patterns usually rest on a dynamic theory of
development, which may differ among the various authors but,
nevertheless, does not suffer from the neoclassical flaws discussed in
the sections above. The crucial difference between the view proposed
here and the self-contained visions suggested in the literature stems
not only from the ambition to use the institutional insights, but also
to emphasize the role of the stock of knowledge, of coalition interplay,
and to combine vaguely-defined exogenous shocks with cultural change.
On the Origins of Western Behavior
The essential economic-policy question in today's Western
Europe can be formulated in two steps, which are related to each other.
First, although public opinion is not particularly unhappy with living
standards, there exists a prevailing feeling of dissatisfaction. It is
believed that Western Europe is producing well-below potential output
and that many resources are not allocated efficiently, including the
labor force.
Second, there is widespread agreement about what should be done to
attain better results--that is, improve the institutional framework.
(13) Nevertheless, the demand for better rules of the game has been
developing rather slowly. It has gone from a situation when
disappointing performance was attributed to lack of governmental
intervention along Keynesian guidelines to one where governmental
intervention needed to be improved and made more efficient, following
technocratic rule, to one where efforts were required to reduce the size
of the government machine altogether. Still, the role of government has
remained intact, (14) by and large, as the political space for truly
free-market parties has remained rather modest.
A Standard Interpretation The general framework summarized above is
usually explained in public-choice terms, whereby policymakers are
subject to pressure from rent-seeking interest groups. When these are
effective enough, they secure rents from politicians even when such
rents negatively affect overall welfare and growth. Those who suffer
from such rent-seeking activities are too weak to resist pressure or to
respond. (15)
Its dynamic version, whereby the amount of rent-seeking is a
function of income, surely enhances explanatory power over time and
provides a useful theory--say, to understand the expansion of the
welfare state in the second half of the twentieth century. The
possibility that rent-seeking groups affect the institutional
environment is not ruled out, either. However, although they do explain
how today's illiberal democracies work. (16) These theories do not
even attempt to ask why and how illiberal democracies became so
successful. As a consequence, they shed no light on their future
developments.
Current explanations also find it increasingly hard to delineate
how some categories of coalitions form their objectives, for
interest-group members oftentimes deviate from their expected,
utility-maximizing behavior. That is clearly the case when consumers
express themselves in favor of protectionism, even when the industries
to be protected are not those where consumers work. Large numbers of
youth (including among the unemployed) do advocate pervasive state
legislation and rigid labor markets, even when they do not have access
to significant unemployment benefits. Similarly, politicians find it
extremely hard to resist pressure from relatively small interest groups
(such as farmers) whose requests for subsidies are commonly perceived as
harmful to social welfare.
On the Role of the State
It is plausible to claim that individuals generally accept or
indeed advocate governmental intervention for three reasons. They might
believe that governmental action can at least partially compensate
market failures. In this case the state is then required to play an
active role as a producer. In addition, the state, instead of
individuals, is often asked to intervene and make decisions even when
there is no a priori reason to believe that such decisions are
preferable to those taken by individuals themselves. In this particular
situation, the state relieves the individual from the strains and
challenges involved in the decision-making process. Finally, the state
may be required to perform a redistribution policy, according to some
kind of allegedly agreed-upon social-justice criterion.
Rule of Law
The first set of cases regards the provision of rule-of-law, that
is, the quasi-monopoly of violence as a way to guarantee and defend
individual liberties against external aggression and domestic turmoil.
(17) By and large, this role is accepted as a general principle, but
frequent deviations tend to be tolerated whenever rule-of-law obstructs
democratically approved redistributive or collective-welfare goals. (18)
As a consequence, today's Western societies are not run according
to rule-of-law principles but, rather, by following some kind of
discretionary legislation, which, of course, leads to--and sustains--the
quest for discretionary power.
Personal Responsibilities
Relief from personal responsibilities--the second source of
legitimacy for state action--is not only important, per se, but also
because it allows people to understand when redistribution and/or
collective-welfare policies are more important than rule-of-law. This
amounts to saying that the overall attitude of individuals toward state
intervention depends crucially on their willingness to take personal
responsibility in the decision-making process. Of course, in most cases,
this attitude turns out to affect the degree of governmental
intervention, rather than being a clear-cut, yes-or-no decision. This
is, perhaps, apparent today, when the role of the state beyond
law-and-order, personal freedom, and sometimes even constitutional
guarantees is taken for granted. (19) It is worth remembering, however,
that for most of our (Western) history the crucial decision was not
about the optimal amount of state intervention but whether the state was
to intervene at all beyond rule-of-law. By and large, in Western
civilization, the answer was clearly negative until the end of the
eighteenth century. Until then, the boundary could be and was, indeed,
encroached upon. However, until some two centuries ago, the incumbent
ruler knew that whenever this happened, his legitimacy would be weakened
and his power jeopardized. In this light, the crucial question is, now,
to realize the mechanisms that led vast layers of the population that
decided no longer to be responsible for broad areas of the
decision-making process and to delegate the state instead.
Redistribution
The transfer of personal responsibilities is closely associated
with the issue of redistribution. This becomes apparent if one observes
that redistribution is seldom justified by referring to the principle of
transferring income but, rather, to the need to finance governmental
intervention according to principles of equity. In other words, fairness
is not usually justified by the need to define ex ante the desirable net
income (or purchasing power) of each individual, but rather by the need
to finance governmental activity according to each individual's
capacity to contribute (i.e., tolerance vis-a-vis tax pressure). This
leads to the concept whereby the idea of social justice is not deemed to
be acceptable, per se, but only as a guideline for expenditure
financing, and this concept sheds light on the fact that although direct
taxation is clearly progressive, in fact, the net result of governmental
action is much closer to neutrality than public opinion is induced to
believe. (20)
As is known from the public-choice and institutional literature,
redistribution also plays two additional roles. It is the instrument
through which social tensions are allegedly softened and through which
politicians strive to obtain power. The remaining part of this article
is now devoted to these aspects.
A Conjecture on the Evolution of Western Behavior
What, today, are defined as "Western societies" are the
result of the Judeo-Christian ethos, as it developed throughout the past
twenty centuries, and possibly more. Christian behavioral patterns are
far from uniform though Judeo-Christian path-dependent processes were
affected by various kinds of shocks in different geographical areas,
that is, in different environments. In other words, and in accordance
with the institutional literature, each of these major shocks gave way
to new path-dependent processes, which shared similar (Judeo-Christian)
rules of the game but did not necessarily lead to converging results.
The following paragraphs try to clarify some basic patterns in this
evolution, and to draw some conclusions corresponding to today's
world.
The West Until the Twelfth Century
For the purpose of the present analysis, the key fracture of the
paleo-Christian ethos with the pagan world is twofold: its vision of
risk and its concept of individualism. Risk, in the classical world,
meant discovering the unknown and challenging--sometimes even trying to
influence--destiny. Contrary to what seems obvious today, in the
pre-Christian period the acquisition of knowledge was understood to be
the moral duty of the individual, in order to prove his superior nature
as a human being and his right to citizenship, that is, to his becoming
a member of the community. Defying the gods would expose people to wrath
and punishment, but it was not regarded as socially or morally
disgraceful--at most--just foolish, for the individual was perceived as
the lowest layer of a continuum of more or less powerful divinities,
from Zeus down to semi-gods such as Hercules, or supermen such as
Achilles. Religion, as understood in the Christian era, was out of the
question.
Surely, the acquisition of civic dignity concerned a relatively
small number of people, that is, those for whom making ends meet was not
the foremost daily problem. It is important to note, however, that those
who could care about the acquisition of knowledge were not particularly
interested in enhancing their own material welfare. The elites were
already enjoying substantial rents, their time horizon was relatively
limited, transaction costs, in general, were too high to justify
"research and development," and rights on intellectual
property were hard to enforce. If anything, scarcity could be overcome
by robbing or enslaving the neighbors rather than by working harder or
finding new ways of production. It is no accident that warriors came
after "philosophers" in the social scale but well-ahead of
workers. Finally, there was, of course, limited interest in enhancing
the collective well-being of society as a whole, both because of
relatively modest concerns for the poor and--more important--because the
existing distribution of political power and of economic rents could
have easily been perturbed by a different distribution of wealth. The
bottom line was that the dynamics of institutions tended to be much more
responsive to the need of politics than of economic betterment. (21)
Within this framework, as from the fourth century, the Christian
message had an immense effect and drastically changed the rules of the
game. (22) In the classical world--which, in this context, started to
decline already before the Jugurthine wars--social status was the reward
of a painstaking process of individual discovery, whereby risk and
uncertainty were not eliminated but acted as the instrument through
which a man would acquire maturity and become a full member of the
community. Being able to challenge uncertainty was more relevant than
being able to reduce it.
On the contrary, in the Christian world, dignity was a built-in
feature of the human being, lost with Original Sin but partially
regained through baptism. The institutional consequences of this vision
can be hardly overestimated, for the Christian concept of individual
dignity succeeded where the Roman Empire had failed. On the one hand, by
guaranteeing equal rights to all Christians, (23) it enabled the Western
world of the time to absorb the Volkerwanderung and successfully resist
Islamic invasion. Second, Christendom provided social cohesion and a
fundamental path-dependence rule, by giving the Church the power to
guarantee legitimacy to rulers, ruling elites, and feudal institutions.
(24) Social cohesion came from the strikingly strong bond between
religious norms, Church authority, and secular power. Path dependence
and predictability were generated by the increasingly high costs of
staying out of such a social system, that is, of being non-Christian.
Incumbent rulers would have had weak legitimacy and been more exposed to
domestic uprisings or to foreign aggression legitimized on religious
grounds. Economic agents would have also been damaged by not accepting
the rules of the game enforced by the Church, since lack of religious
sanctions would have led to even less-enforceable contracts. Indeed, it
is no accident that, for a long period in Western European history,
financial transactions could take place only because of religious
guarantees.
In other words, starting from the fourth century, the Western world
evolved according to a path-dependent process rooted in the Christian
concept of the individual. This led to the birth of two powerful
interest groups. One was the Church itself, which acted to enforce the
established notion of the individual. The second was the individual
himself who was worthy of human dignity only as long as he belonged to a
recognized social group, did not strive for social mobility, and gave up
his will and power to acquire knowledge through a speculative process,
or wealth through entrepreneurial activities. Clearly, efforts to
acquire new knowledge and entrepreneurship would have been a realistic
threat to the Christian notion of a tolerant and subdued individual, and
thus to the existing social order.
Individualism Between the Twelfth and the Eighteenth Centuries
The pre-Christian concept had survived in some parts of Europe,
especially in those at the margin of the Volkerwanderung, where the
influence of the Church was substantially weaker. (25) Nevertheless,
until early 1200 A.D. there was no doubt that the theology of the
Original Sin had cancelled all ambitions to conceive the individual as
an agent willing to improve his status and experiment with new venues.
The ubi sunt teachings reinforced the widespread persuasion whereby the
soul had been contaminated by Original Sin and encapsulated into dirty
material spoils. The only way to acquire human dignity again was through
repentance and humiliation of the soul and of the flesh. From a social
viewpoint, the search for a group to belong to was far more important
than the search for the individual.
This view started to be questioned at the beginning of the twelfth
century and eventually led to the birth of the present subjectivistic
concept of the individual. The coming to maturity of hereditary
feudalism--a system initiated by the military requirements of the time
(26)--was probably one of the key events that explain a crucial change
in attitude. Feudalism gave rise to a new decentralized political
structure, and the king was, by and large, transformed into little more
than the president of a loose federation of local lords. This expanded
dramatically the need for trained scholars and intellectuals, hired by
feudal lords and by kings alike, to enhance and legitimize their
patrons' position against rival secular power and also to
counteract unwarranted encroachment by the Church. Universities were
thus created. Scholars were indeed almost invariably educated by
religious faculty, but they often found a career in the secular world,
where a new elite of entrepreneurs was being born out of the city
economy: the merchants. Intellectually trained (and loyal) people
started to become a political resource for the rulers. Put differently,
a new elite, based on personal qualities, started to come to the
surface. Education and intellectual abilities became an asset and a
reason for pride rather than for a sinful activity and a source of
heresy.
There is no doubt that, at the beginning, the change affected only
the elites. The vast majority of the population had other, vitally more
important, things to attend to than individualism. However, in the
following three centuries the world changed radically. Religious terror
intensified individual tensions and anxiety, but obsession with sin and
the virtual certainty of hell (27) encouraged people to pay more
attention to the joys of life. The introduction of purgatory and
confession forced individuals to look at sin as a private responsibility
rather than as an objective burden. (28) Black Death made labor scarce
and stimulated people to perceive their worth as human capital. The
expansion of the geographical horizons of the time created new
opportunities for trade and-more important--made it possible for the new
entrepreneurial class to emerge. (29) Sin was no longer the central
element regulating individual behavior, social relations, and political
structures. Instead, humanism accompanied and, in some cases, even
replaced the ethics of fear and submission.
New economic opportunities and a growing perception of the human
being as an individual led to a new ethics that was often against
Catholic principles but found a (slightly) more favorable religious
environment in the Reformation. (30) In short, humanism was a method to
appraise and evaluate the real world. Although addressed to the educated
elites only, in fact, it trickled down to almost all layers of the
population and became the Weltanschauung that allowed the Western world
to start its growth process, as we know it today. It justified and
encouraged scientific research, originality, free trade, and the
establishment of rule-of-law even vis-a-vis non-Christians. (31)
Individualism After the French Revolution
Surely, the humanist method and vision that shaped Western
civilization as from the sixteenth century was not consistently
accepted. Its logical policy implications were often overlooked. Free
trade was not always the rule; tolerance was far from widespread, and
nationalism gradually came to the surface. Science was also regarded
with suspicion in many reformed countries, as well. Rent seeking
increased as the cost of coercion fell, and nonencompassing interest
groups became more pervasive and powerful, including the bureaucracy and
the ability of governments to tax and thus increase--among other
things--warfare. Growth prospects were obviously harmed.
Humanist principles began to decline in continental Europe
following the French Revolution (they eventually collapsed with World
War I). On the one hand, at the end of the seventeenth century the
ability of the French administration to tax allowed a much-weakened king
to raise an army of nearly one million soldiers, (32) which, in a few
weeks, defeated the three major military powers of the time, combined.
This, undoubtedly, contributed to create a view of power that was no
longer perceived as the outcome of divine will but, rather, as the
result of the people's unity and might, of the national resolve.
That is, the notion of a collective will was about to replace humanist
subjectivism.
On the other hand, by achieving absolute monarchy and absorbing the
Enlightenment--itself an offspring of humanism--the Western world found
itself in a vacuum, for the legitimate claim of the monarchy to command
a huge amount of power was no longer acknowledged. The fight for power
could have begun any moment. In fact, it started where absolutism was
greater and the monarch weaker. The French Revolution did not destroy
power. It simply transferred it, from a weak monarch to a new class of
ruthless rulers, sometimes the leaders of democratically elected
assemblies, sometimes just the (totalitarian) self-appointed leaders of
the nation.
The aftermath of the French Revolution has been explained--among
others--by de Jouvenel (33) and de Jasay. (34) Democratic legitimacy
changed the political rules of the game, and the new rules gradually
affected individual behavior and attitudes. The notions of common will
and of common welfare acquired a clearer and clearer meaning in
continental Europe. The degree to which the common will could encroach on the individual became a matter of degree, surely not of principle.
The crucial novelty that became manifest during the French Revolution
was nothing else than the struggle for the power secured by the late
eighteenth-century state.
Since then, it has absorbed increasing amounts of energies and
resources. At the same time and because of it, the gradual rise in the
ability to exercise discretionary power by means of (illiberal)
democratic rules has raised the desire for security rather than for
individual freedom. For obvious reasons, this phenomenon became even
more acute after World War I and the crisis in the 1930s.
Toward a New Approach to Transition
Consistent with the institutional tenet, the previous section
suggests that Western Europe experienced four major path-dependent
processes in the Christian era. One refers to the period during which
institutions were driven by the political need for expansion and
conquest in order to protect borders, secure more slaves and
agricultural resources, and appease domestic interest groups. When that
process broke down, a new one became manifest in the early Middle Ages
and was characterized by the dynamics of Church power. A third came to
the surface when the humanist entrepreneur prevailed and gave birth to
the Renaissance. The final stage appeared in the aftermath of the French
Revolution, when entrepreneurship, rule-of-law, and individualism had to
come to terms with rapidly expanding democratic systems.
There is no doubt that the description of the path-dependent
processes that have characterized the Western world surely deserve much
closer investigation and detailed study, from institutional, religious,
and political standpoints. Nevertheless, the distinctive features,
although liable to further testing, are clear enough. On the contrary,
it is not at all clear whether change from one path-dependent process to
another is entirely accidental, as the institutional school maintains.
From One Process to the Other
Borrowing in part from Quigley, (35) it is here claimed that
path-dependent processes give rise to public-choice mechanisms that
involve political as well as economic pressure groups. In turn, the
relative weight of the economic and political variables depend on the
rules of the path-dependent game and on the transaction costs that
characterize both sets of activities. The role of exogenous factors
cannot be excluded. Contrary to the institutional view, however, it is
here argued that such shocks do affect the timing and sometimes also the
features of the institutional breaks but not their necessity; that is,
the fact that sooner or later a given path-dependent process breaks
down.
This can be observed during the first period considered above. As
the Roman Empire expanded geographically and more resources were needed
to support its administrative and military structure, rent seeking
became increasingly appealing and the burden on the population became
less tolerable. Loyalty to the emperor was no longer justified by the
half-sacred notion of Roman citizenship, or by the allegedly semi-divine
nature of the emperor. The incumbent political structure had to find new
ways to enhance its legitimacy. Christendom and the Church were the
answer. Put differently, Christendom was not a shock. Rather, it turned
out to be the result of an institutional selection process among the
various religious options available at the time. As we know, in the end,
this choice was not enough to save the (Western) empire, but it did
start the new path-dependent process.
The crossing from the early Middle Ages to the humanist process
presented similar features. The rules of the game dictated by church
power and, in particular, the amount of taxation required to sustain it,
turned out to be unsuitable to a new emerging class of (entrepreneurial)
individuals. A new ethics and new religious beliefs took over, a new
behavioral process was set into motion, within Catholic milieus, too.
The Church survived, of course, and continued to play an important role.
In Nietzsche's words, the Church was actually saved by Luther.
Richelieu and Mazarin would have been unthinkable without the
Counter-Reformation, but as from the middle sixteenth century, the role
of the Church in the leading areas of Western Europe changed
significantly with respect to previous times.
As time went by, the new entrepreneurial class learned about the
benefits of rent seeking. Protectionism gradually crept in. Mercantilist
attitudes in the name of the monarch or of the guild became more and
more frequent and, of course, contributed to enhancing the power of the
central government and weakened resistance to its action. Colbert was
surely no exception in sixteenth-century Europe. Pohl (36) quite aptly
reminds us that mercantilism did not always mean the same thing
everywhere and did not always lead to the same type of clashes.
Nevertheless, where and when the amount of centralized power became
large enough, and the Church weak enough, the race for power in the name
of the people began. New rules of the game were thus established or
imposed. Restoration did not turn the clock back. It just made clear
that power was contestable and incumbent rulers hesitant to cultivate
the notion of the collective will and to attend to it could be
overthrown by new leaders.
On Transition Once More
In light of the preceding discussion, transition might now seem to
be little more than an empty term. On the one hand, it is hard to
maintain that there exists a period of time during which the old
path-dependent process is finished but the new one has not yet started.
The fact that we are not able to see what the new process consists of
does not mean that the new process is absent. In fact, it may happen
that the new rules go together with old rules, and that different layers
of the populations move at different speeds, according to the different
rules. Stated differently, the key argument here is that societies
seldom change their path-dependence process overnight. When this is the
case, civil war and bloodshed are the outcome, especially when
minorities try to eliminate majorities.
On the other hand, transition might be used to describe and analyze
what happens to an economy (or a more-or-less-defined social structure)
when the interplay of rent-seeking coalitions ends up generating a
path-dependent process, eventually leading or contributing to its
downfall. (37) In this light, transition would become some kind of a
dynamic, public-choice investigation. Though acceptable, however, this
notion of transition would probably not be of great use, either. After
all, the terms of the rent-seeking game change continuously whenever
coalitions are allowed to interact. In other words, all countries are
almost always in transition unless a totalitarian regime stops rival
pressure groups from coming to the surface. (38)
In short, looking for new or emerging models of economic activity
may be an interesting speculative exercise but unlikely to be of great
use unless one understands how those models are going to be incorporated
in actual economic activity and give birth to new assignments of
property rights. For example, it is widely thought that today's
Western economies are following a free-market pattern and that
East-European countries have accepted such a model to shape their own
economic institutions. Yet, a quick look at the data on the size of the
governmental sector, of taxation, of regulation, or at the respect for
rule-of-law should make it clear to anybody that the Western world today
is not at all near the free-market paradigm and that Eastern European
leaders do not actually pursue free-market models. Indeed, in both cases
the political elites would easily lose consensus if they were to act
otherwise.
The Role of the Individual
The analysis presented in the previous pages suggests a perhaps
more promising avenue to evaluate the nature and the stage of current
path-dependent processes. Since societies are shaped, or at least,
influenced by groups of individuals, it seems reasonable to pay special
attention to the way in which individual preferences evolve. In this
respect, de Jouvenel (39) already pointed out that, in the modern world,
freedom is a secondary need. Security comes first. That is a crucial
statement with two important consequences. First, rent-seeking
activities are to be expected whenever there is a possibility of
extracting rents or of engaging in law-making negotiations even if rents
are to paid and the net gain turns out to be close to zero or even
negative. In fact, the purpose of rent seeking is not just to
appropriate rents (which have to be bought, anyway) but, rather, to
acquire stability and thus, reduce competitive pressures.
Second, one who promises stability, even without significant
redistribution, will always defeat a leader who promises freedom. This
does not necessarily mean that freedom is irrelevant. It does imply
though, that freedom becomes a relevant issue only when stability is
guaranteed. In a stable society, freedom may be more important than
additional stability but becomes a questionable target if accompanied by
less security. This concept can also be rather easily extended to the
role of ideology, for a socializing ideology can be highly effective in
creating political support, since it promises security within a large
social group. (40) Whereas, an ideology enhancing individual freedom and
protection against social infringements is more likely to meet failure.
By delegitimizing the notion of society or coalitions as political
entities prevailing on personal interests, individuals feel more
vulnerable. In this light, freedom or personal economic interest, in the
neoclassical sense, become marginal issues.
Therefore, it seems that the change in the rules of the game in
today's allegedly free-market societies is to be considered a
cultural issue rather than a mere technical one. If so, transition
should then be concerned with the change in individual perceptions,
preferences, and attitudes, both in Western economies and in the
East-European areas. In other parts of the world--say, formerly Soviet
Central-Asian countries--change in individual attitudes may even regard
other moral values and systems. In these situations, the assignment and
enforcement of property rights according to an ideal free-market model
may not only be less than acceptable but just inconceivable.
Hence, the chances of experiencing transition in the Western world
are at least as relevant as those typical for East-European countries,
where the new moral codes cannot be appreciated and perhaps understood
before a new generation, possibly two, have gone by. If anything, the
analysis of the Western case may be closer to our possibilities. What
makes it interesting from a subjective viewpoint is that security is, by
and large, taken for granted, while faith in the virtues of social
engineering, which, to a large extent is supported by the myth of the
collective will, is vanishing. Whether we are on the point of a humanist
comeback, however, remains an open question.
Enrico Colombatto
Professor of Economics
Universita di Torino, and International Centre for Economic
Research
Turin, Italy
Notes
(1.) Among other things, this latter element contributes to explain
why the Western world started to grow significantly only since the
second half of the fifteenth century, that is, after the Portuguese
introduced the caravel, which enhanced exploration and allowed
relatively safe and cheap, long-distance commercial transportation. See
P. Hugill, World Trade Since 1431 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1993).
(2.) Whether such policies are also effective is, of course,
another matter, still open to doubt. See, for instance, F. Rodriguez and
D. Rodrik, "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's
Guide to Cross-National Evidence," discussion paper, CEPR, n. 2143,
May 1999.
(3.) Until a few decades ago, these requirements were thought to be
a minimum amount of income, so that at least some resources would be
available for investment including infrastructure. Clearly, the features
and size of today's world capital markets make such minimum
standards virtually irrelevant.
(4.) G. Hodgson, "What Is the Essence of Institutional
Economics?" Journal of Economic Issues 34, no. 2 (June 2000):
317-29.
(5.) J. Winiecki, "Formal and Informal Rules in Post-Communist
Transition," Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 16, no. 1
(1998): 3-26.
(6.) See M. Olson, "Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some
Nations Are Rich and Others Poor," Journal of Economic Perspectives
10, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 3-24; and K. Arrow, "The Economic
Implications of Learning By Doing," Review of Economic Studies
(1962); 155-73, for a synthesis of the orthodox view, which includes
both classical and neoclassical elements.
(7.) See A. Alchian, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic
Theory," Journal of Political Economy 58, no. 3 (1950): 211-21, and
D. North, "Economic Performance Through Time," American
Economic Review 84, no. 3 (June 1994): 359-68.
(8.) D. North, "Big Bang Transformation of Economic Systems:
An Introductory Note," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics 156, no. 1 (March 2000) 3-8; E. Colombatto, "Is There an
Austrian Approach to Transition?" Review of Austrian Economics,
forthcoming.
(9.) A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992 (Paris:
OECD Development Centre, 1995).
(10.) F. Hayek, The Sensory Order (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1952).
(11.) This is also the essence of the (old) view of institutional
economics, as held by Veblen and Common. See Hodgson, "What Is the
Essence?" 326.
(12.) C. Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (1961; reprint,
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979).
(13.) It is worth emphasizing that overall agreement has also been
reached as for what should be done in detail. This regards the need for
a drastic reduction in the role of the state, better protection of
property rights and of contractual, voluntary agreements. These are
indeed the core features of a capitalist system.
(14.) Some window dressing has taken place, however. For instance,
direct state management has been replaced by regulation; centers of
power have moved away from national capitals to a federal center;
privatization policies have been carried through, although driven by
urgent needs for cash; rather than by solid free-market beliefs.
(15.) As is known, a reaction vis-a-vis rent-seeking groups is made
more difficult by the rules of the political game, whereby issues are
seldom discussed and voted upon by the population one at a time.
Instead, they are generally bundled together in rather vague terms or
programs once every four or five years. The electorate hardly knows what
the vote is about, and the policymakers succeed in hiding behind fairly
high information costs and, thus, low accountability. It is not
surprising that the emotional effect of a charismatic leader may become
far more important than his political record as a reformer or as a
promoter of rule-of-law and efficiency.
(16.) See F. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,"
Foreign Affairs (November/December 1977): 22-43, who uses the term
illiberal to denote the violations of individual liberties that normally
take place in today's modern democracies.
(17.) The argument whereby governmental intervention is supposed to
secure competitive conditions is a much more recent phenomenon, which
derives from the neoclassical idea of static competition and the need
for welfare-optimizing microeconomic policies. These issues will,
however, be neglected. Although the role of the state as a neutral
welfare maximizer still dominates the political debate, there is now
widespread agreement on the flaws of the Marshallian idea of competition
as opposed to its dynamic (Austrian) version.
(18.) Redistribution and collective welfare differ in one important
respect. Redistribution aims at transferring purchasing power from one
set of individuals to others, while collective-welfare action plans to
provide public financing and, sometimes, public production of selected
services, e.g., education, health, and social security. Such plans may
imply income transfers to the poor, but not necessarily. Indeed, in many
cases, the rich benefit from these programs to a larger extent than do
the poor.
(19.) "If the personal freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution
inhibit the government's ability to govern the people, we should
look to limit those guarantees" (President William J. Clinton,
August 12, 1993).
(20.) This has another important implication for it explains why
redistributive policies are limited to the national boundaries of the
state. Indeed, if Western societies really shared an ideal of social
justice--whatever that may mean--there would be no doubt about the most
deserving beneficiaries of the transfers, that is, the populations of
the low-income countries, where even modest amounts of money make the
difference between life and death. Yet, these kinds of transfers are
only a minor part of the state budget.
(21.) See E. Kaufer, "The Evolution of Governance Structures:
Entrepreneurs and Corporations," Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 152, no. 1 (March 1996): 7-29, who also points out
that private initiative was, however, held in some esteem in the
classical world, for slaves could acquire freedom through their labor
and efforts. As thinkers, as wide apart as Sieyes and Rousseau,
recognized centuries later, however, slavery and--more generally--a
class society with different political rights, was an indispensable
element to explain the concept of freedom in the classical world.
(22.) The emphasis on the fourth century is important for in that
period Christendom acquired political prerogatives and ceased to be just
a Middle-Eastern sect stemming out of the Jewish tradition. The
doctrinal aspects evolved accordingly. See, for instance, the brutal
solution to the Pelagian dispute (early fifth century) or the new
significance attributed to baptism. Contrary to its paleo-Christian
meaning, whereby baptism signified the sacrifice and resurrection of
Christ, as from the fourth century this sacrament identified freedom
from Original Sin.
Of course, this comment calls for another important question. One
may indeed wonder why the turn in the secular significance of
Christendom took place in the fourth century and not at a different
moment in history. Although this would lead us well beyond the scope of
these pages, the approach in this article suggests that the answer lies
with the Volkerwanderung itself, which put pressure on the military
structure of the Western empire, disrupted its organization, led to
increased taxation and stronger local rent-seeking positions, and
ultimately delegitimized imperial authority.
(23.) Of course, that does not mean that all were treated as
equals. It does mean that people could not legitimately be discriminated
against because of their inferior personal dignity. Put differently,
individual dignity was something that could be lost, mainly by means of
sin.
(24.) This is something that the Roman emperors perceived
relatively quickly, and that led them to encourage the diffusion of
Christendom and, eventually, to adopt it as the State religion.
Barbarian rulers followed quickly. Clovis, for instance, was christened
as early as 493 A.D., less than twenty years after the fall of the
western Roman empire.
(25.) A. Gurevich, The Origin of European Individualism (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995).
(26.) As is known, feudalism originated at the end of the ninth
century, as a response to the military facing the Empire from the south
(Islam), from the north (Normans), and from the east (Magyars). As
recalled by Kaufer, "The Evolution of Government Structures,"
another decisive element was the introduction of the heavy plow, which
led to the village economy (and later, to the cities).
(27.) J. Delumeau, Le Peche et la Peur La Peur Le Culpabilisation
en Occident, XIII-XVIII Siecles (Paris: Fayard, 1983).
(28.) Abelard had come close to heresy for having said something
similar at the beginning of the twelfth century.
(29.) Of course, the incentives for a better enforcement of
property rights strengthened. Success in this direction led to new
entrepreneurship. See also C. Jones, "Was an Industrial Revolution
Inevitable? Economic Growth Over a Very Long Run," working paper,
NBER, n. 7375, October 1999, for an attempt to quantify parts of this
mechanism.
(30.) The Weberian view of the causal link between the Reformation
and economic progress is now widely rejected. In fact, previous reform
movements failed because they came too early and did not find fertile
enough ground in the ethics of the individual of the time. That is,
pre-Lutheran movements were not satisfying the demand for a new version
of Christendom. There is, however, no doubt that substantial support
also came from the exceedingly high taxation by the Church, which
reached unprecedented peaks in the early sixteenth century and led to
widespread resentment across all layers of the German population.
(31.) See B. Krug, "On Custom in Economics: The Care of
Humanism and Trade Regimes," Journal of Institutional and Trade
Economics 155, no. 3 (September 1999): 406-28.
(32.) Before the French Revolution, a large European army numbered
about one hundred thousand soldiers.
(33.) B. de Jouvenal, Du Pouvior: Historie Naturelle de la
Croissance (1945; reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1993).
(34.) A. de Jasay, The State (1985; reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, 1998).
(35.) C. Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1979).
(36.) H. Pohl, "Economic Powers and Political Powers in Early
Modern Europe: Theory and History," Journal of European Economic
History 1 (Spring 1999): 139-68.
(37.) This pattern was already proposed in Quigley, The Evolution
of Civilization, who analyzed at great length the rise and fall of a
number of civilizations. These pages suggest that the same paradigm
could be used to analyze path-dependent processes within Western
civilization over the last two thousand years.
(38.) This is actually what happened under the Soviet regime in
Eastern Europe and still occurs today in many undeveloped countries.
(39.) de Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, chap. 18.
(40.) G. Miller, "Coalitional Instability, and Institutional
Transformation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
154, no. 4 (December 1998): 764-73.