Yu, Jiyuan. The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue.
Smith, Benjamin
Yu, Jiyuan. The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of
Virtue. New York: Routledge, 2007. xii + 276 pp. Hardback.
Aristotle famously described friends to be like mirrors, wherein a
person may see himself more truly. Jiyuan Yu employs this image in his
comparative study of Confucian and Aristotelian ethics. He argues that
by comparing these two moral traditions we may come to understand them
better and above all come to "a better understanding of virtue and
human perfection." Of course, Yu is aware of the charge that these
two ethical systems so removed in time, place, culture, and so forth are
incommensurable. Nevertheless, he thinks that this objection may be
overcome by a careful comparison of the topics on which the two
traditions seem to converge: teleology, the role of human nature in
ethics, and the importance of custom and politics.
In many respects Yu's project is quite successful. This is
especially the case when he draws attention to the teleological structure shared by both traditions. Aristotle's ethics famously
moves from an understanding of the human good as excellence (eudamonia)
to an account of virtue, which instantiates the human good, to a
description of the highest activity of contemplation. Yu explains that
there is a similar but distinct structure to be found in Confucian
ethics. "De" is the sort of habit that leads to
"ren," human excellence, which reaches its fulfillment in
"cheng," the fully complete human being. This is the ultimate
end of humanity, because in this state man mirrors the dao of heaven,
the pattern or form of all things.
Yu shows that a comparison of these two systems highlights the
importance of a fixed and yet dynamic account of human nature. For
Aristotle, the good of the human person can only be discovered once
man's characteristic function is identified. This task Aristotle
accomplishes in 1.7 of the Nicomachean Ethics wherein he identifies
reason as humanity's characteristic function. Yu identifies a
similar structure in Confucian ethics. Mencius, a student of Confucius,
states that "xing" (translated as heart/mind) is that which
distinguishes human nature from the other animals. It contains the four
roots of humanity, which are perfected by corresponding virtues:
compassion is perfected in benevolence; the sense of shame is perfected
in duty; the inclination to show respect develops into the habit
observance (piety); and the sense of right and wrong develops into
wisdom. What Yu shows is that in both Aristotelian and Confucian ethics
goodness is identified with the development of humanity's natural
potential. Thus, the foundation of both ethical systems consists in a
twofold realization, namely, the recognition of what a human being is,
along with a vision of what he may become if he fulfills the potential
of what he is. To put it in formulaic fashion: nature, potency, and
actualization. This is intriguing, because it suggests that there is
something permanently attractive about this sort of teleological
structure for those wishing to articulate a realist moral theory. On
these grounds, Yu has good reasons to think that a comparison of
Aristotle and Confucius may lead to a better understanding of virtue and
human perfection. Nevertheless, there is an element of
incommensurability that Yu's account fails to treat adequately.
Commensurability is a concept open to a wide variety of
interpretations. Nevertheless, there are two tests generally agreed
upon. The first demands that there be at least enough of a shared
conceptual structure to facilitate accurate translation. For example,
although Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and Scotus may have all disagreed
in important ways their theories could be adequately translated through
common concepts such as form, substance, and so forth. The second
requirement of commensurability concerns justification. Do two thinkers
share a standard by which their competing claims may be adjudicated?
Again this is so (to some degree) among thinkers in the same tradition.
Thus, although Bonaventure was more Augustinian in doctrine and Thomas
more Aristotelian, their competing accounts could be judged by a shared
standard: the canons of Aristotelian logic and Catholic tradition. Do
Confucian and Aristotelian ethics sufficiently share conceptual
structures and criteria of justification necessary to overcome the
possibility of incommensurability? I think the initial response must be
in the negative on both counts.
Upon further inspection, the very teleological structure that
appears to draw Aristotle and Confucius together actually sets them
apart. It shall be recalled that in Yu's explanation of
Confucius's account of the human good there are four terms (de,
ren, cheng, and dao) whereas for Aristotle there are only two: virtue
(arete) and excellence (eudamonia). We may of course add a higher form
of Aristotelian excellence that includes contemplation, but the
imbalance persists. Virtue, excellence, and contemplative excellence
roughly mirror de, ren, and cheng, but there is nothing in
Aristotle's ethics that obviously corresponds to dao and I think
this is of great importance.
The dao of heaven is the divine and permanent pattern of
things--the way in which things are to be ordered. The goal of
Confucius's ethics is for the human person to mirror the dao of
heaven; indeed this is the point of de, ren, and cheng; each of these
marks a component of the person's conformity to the dao. Thus, in
Confucian ethics, the end is something over and above the completion of
human nature; it is conformity to a transcendent order. Of course there
is nothing deficient in such an approach, but it does mark out a
difference between Aristotle and Confucius. For the former, the human
end is simply human completion, whereas for the latter it is completion
as well, but such completion is to be found in conformity to a divine
order. The end in the Aristotelian system is simply the perfecting of
what is in the agent, that is, a sort of intrinsic finality. By
contrast, for Confucius, the teleology is directed towards an extrinsic end: the dao of heaven.
Moreover, for Aristotle the content of the human good is derived
from human nature itself. This is not so for Confucius. To this claim it
may be objected that Mencius specifically treats human nature and its
development in his discussion of xing. However, Yu himself admits that
in Confucius's own writings there is no theory of human nature as
such. Mencius's focus on xing is a later development. For Confucius
the content of the human good is found in the ancient texts that
preserve the social and religious rites of the first Zhou dynasty, a
golden age in which the dao of heaven was perfectly manifested in the
social order. Thus it became Confucius's project to interpret,
preserve, and explain the texts of this heaven inspired time. It follows
that in its origin Confucian ethics is an intellectual tradition based
on sacred texts, which means that it was religious in nature.
Accordingly, Confucian and Aristotelian ethics are found to be
incommensurable in a second way: they do not share a common standard of
justification. Thus, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
Confucian and Aristotelian ethics are incommensurable in terms of their
conceptual structure and criteria of justification. Nevertheless, this
conclusion is not the final word, for like all great intellectual
traditions Confucian ethics was open to development--a development
accomplished by Mencius and aptly outlined by Yu.
According to Yu, it is Mencius who shift ed the focus of Confucian
ethics towards a consideration of observable human nature. It is worth
noting that Mencius did so under the pressure of consequentialists and
egoists' criticisms of Confucius's teaching. Mencius's
goal was to provide a rational defense of Confucius's ethical
beliefs and he did so in the same way as Aristotle by anchoring the
truth of morality on the reality of human nature. At this point we have
the development of a philosophy along side and in addition to a great
religious tradition. I do not mean to suggest that Mencius abandons the
dao-centered approach of Confucius altogether. Rather, from Yu's
own description, it appears that Mencius provides an ascending
philosophical complement to Confucius's descending (revelatory)
religious tradition; he does so in a way strikingly similar, at least on
the conceptual level, to the work of Christian Aristotelians during the
Middle Ages. I think this analysis of the development of Confucian
ethics is important for several reasons.
First, it overcomes the charge of incommensurabity. Although Yu
fails to see the degree to which Mencius altered and advanced Confucian
ethics, he highlights the role that Mencius places on the
nature-potency-actualization formula, which serves as the foundation for
a fruitful dialogue with Aristotelians. Moreover, Mencius does not
restrict himself to the texts of the Zhou dynasty in order to defend the
Confucian world-view; rather, he adopts an argumentative strategy
similar to Aristotle's by basing himself on reason and observation.
Thus, the Confucian ethics of Mencius overcomes the challenge of
incommensurability both at the level of translation and justification.
Second, if my interpretation is correct, Mencius represents the
philosophical development of a religious tradition. I think this is
important, because it conversely reflects what happened in the
Aristotelian tradition, in which Jewish, Islamic, and Christian
theologians incorporated Aristotelian ethics into religious traditions.
Thus in both Confucian and Aristotelian traditions we find virtue based
ethics open to integration with religious traditions that stress
conformity to an extrinsic, transcendent order. This suggests, perhaps,
that there is an intrinsic harmony between the intrinsic teleology of
virtue-based ethics and the extrinsic teleology (conformity to an
external object) of the great religious traditions. In this sense,
Yu's project is quite successful. Although he fails to recognize
the initial incommensurability between Confucius and Aristotle and the
degree to which Mencius transforms Confucian ethics, he nevertheless
provides all of the information and analysis necessary to do so. As Yu
predicted, a close comparison of Aristotelian and Confucian ethics does
indeed lead to a better understanding of virtue and human perfection.
Benjamin Smith
Aquinas College.
