The deadliest of games: the institution of dueling.
Kingston, Christopher G. ; Wright, Robert E.
1. Introduction
"Pistols at ten paces" and other forms of dueling were
once commonplace in Europe and the early United States (Holland 1997).
Alexander Hamilton, who graces $10 Federal Reserve notes, died in a duel
in 1804; Andrew Jackson, whose portrait appears on the $20, was
seriously wounded in two duels. Except for some politically motivated
dueling (Freeman 2001), the institution faded in the North in the early
19th century but at the same time waxed strong in the U.S. South (Seitz
1929) and West (Steward 2000). By the 20th century, the code duello had
largely disappeared from the United States (Wallace 1991) and Europe. To
this day, however, dueling persists in rural areas in some developing
nations, including Paraguay (Gunson 1998) and the Philippines (de Leon
2002).
Most analysts have treated duels as irrational affairs, a belief
that has deep roots. Victorianera Virginian Robert Reid Howison, for
instance, considered dueling a form of private war that "originated
in the wicked vindictive passions and propensities of fallen human
nature." Only when the "Kingdom of Christ shall be established
in all hearts," he opined, will dueling cease (Howison 1924). Many
others also considered dueling a barbaric activity (Morgan 1995, p.
228). The fact that most duels seemed to be fought over trivial
matters--or, in the terms of one writer, at "the drop of a
hat"--further suggests that dueling was essentially an irrational
activity.
By contrast, we contend that dueling contains a rational core that
can be modeled. After all, dueling has ended in many places though human
nature remains unchanged (Wright 2002a). Moreover, even wicked people
like Adolf Hitler have opposed dueling (Combs 1997). Both facts suggest
that something other than innate human depravity drives dueling
behavior. Yet, while a number of models of optimal firing strategies
under various circumstances have been proffered (see, for instance,
Blackwell 1948, Restrepo 1957, Kursin 1983, Radzik 1988), there has been
less attention to why the combatants might have rationally agreed to
duel in the first place.
Careful review of the historical literature suggests that most
duels were born of conflicts over resources, sometimes tangible
resources like land, lucrative government offices, market share, or
women (Morgan 1995, pp. 535-536), but usually intangible ones. In the
best recent treatments of dueling, Greenberg (1990) and Morgan (1995)
argue persuasively that duelists sought to defend their
"honor." Other scholars (Schwartz, Baxter, and Ryan 1984;
Billacois 1990; Keiser 1990; Weber 1999) and contemporaries (Anon. 1830)
make similar claims. Importantly, they contend that "honor"
was not a meaningless term or catch-all but rather a reference to
reputation for fair dealing, honoring contracts, and paying debts.
Financial responsibility, in other words, if not quite synonymous with
honor was at least an important component of the concept. Gentlemen did
not shoot each other over trivial matters but rather over accusations
that they had lied. Seemingly bizarre behavior, like gently tugging on a
rival's nose, was a major offense because it symbolized the
unmasking of a liar. The credit implications of such an accusation were
certainly negative. Seen in this light, duels take on a more rational
cast.
In fact, dueling thrived when and where credit markets were opaque
and highly personal in nature, as in early modern Europe, colonial
America, the antebellum South, late 19th century Mexico, and rural
Paraguay today. Where credit markets are more impersonal and formal,
like the antebellum North (Wright 2001, 2002b), Nazi Germany, and much
of the globe today, "honor" loses its strength as a credit
signal and dueling fades. Economies of scale and relatively low
transaction costs allow modern lenders to carefully screen applicants
through the use of credit histories, revenue statements, and balance
sheets. Personal credit markets, however, rely more upon outward
appearances than financial facts; holistic impressions of the
borrower's "character" reign supreme.
Southern planters often relied on personal credit markets and just
as often they were highly leveraged, even technically bankrupt. Thomas
Jefferson, for example, was a lifelong bankrupt who stayed one step
ahead of the jailer by borrowing from Peter to pay Paul (Sloan 1995).
Like Jefferson, most Southern planters owned tremendous assets but also
owed tremendous liabilities (Breen 1987). Further complicating their
financial affairs, many of their liabilities were essentially callable.
Most of their debt took the form of callable open book accounts or
relatively short term (one to five years) bonds and mortgages that had
matured but remained "at interest" at the mutual consent of
both lender and borrower (Kilbourne 1995). At the same time, many of
their assets were highly illiquid, like real estate, or
mission-critical, like slaves (Mann 2003). Similar to a bank short of
cash reserves, planters could not suffer any attack on their credit
standing lest they be run upon and ruined.
Unlike the formal lending sector, the personal credit market would
make loans to men like Jefferson so long as they remained honorable men
of character. A man who lost his honor, however, was no longer worthy of
credit. His fortune was jeopardized as he might be forced to sell assets
at unpropitious times in order to meet the demands of liability holders.
Unable to obtain new loans to pay pressing demands, he stared bankruptcy
and destitution in the face. An attack upon a man's honor,
therefore, was not a trivial affair but rather a dire threat to his
business and to his family's well-being. To those accustomed to
obtaining bank loans, risking life and limb to reestablish one's
credit seems absurd. To those accustomed to private credit markets, not
defending one's honor was the absurdity (Wright 2002a).
The customs of the code duello also point to the basic rationality
of the institution. Duels were not barroom brawls or spontaneous
gunfights but rather carefully planned events. In a typical scenario,
one man would insult another by tugging on his nose or accusing him of
being a liar, thief, or some other term that threatened to sour the
personal credit market's assessment of his creditworthiness. If the
accused thought the accusation potentially damaging, which he was likely
to do if the accuser was of a similar social rank and hence presumably
qualified to make the accusation, "negotiations" commenced.
Working through an agent called a "second," the accused sought
to persuade the accuser to withdraw, modify, or explain away the
damaging comment or action. If the accuser refused, the accused had to
decide whether the potential damage was sufficient to warrant
challenging him to a duel. If a challenge was issued, the accuser now
faced a decision: risk his life or admit that he had lied.
Unsurprisingly, the public scorned men who refused to accept a
challenge; its credit rating implications were also negative (Morgan
1995).
The challenged chose the weapons, time, and place of the encounter.
Other rules, like distance between the shooters, number of shots
allowed, and other details were also agreed to. If last minute attempts
at reconciliation failed, the men fought it out, with their seconds
nearby to ensure that this deadliest of games was fairly played. Dueling
was illegal in most jurisdictions so duels were usually conducted in
secret. Data are therefore sparse. Our best guess is that the chance of
surviving a duel was roughly 50%. Legal sanctions were extremely rare
because juries sympathetically entertained claims of
"self-defense" and surviving witnesses, usually just one of
the principals and the two seconds, often swore that the shooting had
been an "accident" (Piccato 1999).
The honor and creditworthiness of the winning duelist was upheld
and even enhanced. Accusations against his character were erased; the
winner had signaled the credit market that he was a manly, courageous
leader capable of defending his property and his interests. The loser
lost his life, but that outcome many thought preferable to living life
dishonored. Once accused, it was often better to have dueled and lost
than not to have dueled at all (Holland 1997; Piccato 1999).
Personal creditors did not punish duelists by restricting future
loans the way that banks appear to have done. The reason is that
personal creditors "won" whether their debtor survived a duel
or not. If the borrower lived, his credit remained high and a damaging
run on his assets was avoided. (A run could injure all creditors by
forcing the debtor to sell assets for prices far below fair value. Or, a
run could help some creditors at the expense of others if the debtor
showed favoritism by immediately liquidating some claims in full.) If
the borrower died, his estate went into a slow, managed liquidation.
Assuming the executor was an honorable man, creditors of the estate
could look forward to receiving their fair share of the estate's
assets, with legal interest if the debtor died while financially
solvent. Because probate proceedings were better conceived than most
early bankruptcy laws in the United States (the best of which were
short-lived and applied only to those in the commercial or financial
sectors), the death of one's debtor was often preferable to his
forced insolvency or involuntary bankruptcy (Mann 2003).
As joint-stock corporations, banks, insurance companies, and other
institutional lenders were not so patient. Moreover, they enjoyed
superior methods for screening credit risks and hence did not need to
rely on such gross proxies as "character." Perhaps most
importantly, they preferred that their clients lived to borrow again.
Realizing that long-term relationships reduced information asymmetry and
increased profits, they actively cultivated long-term relationships
(Bodenhorn 2000, 2002; Wright 2001, 2002b).
Consistent with the evidence, our story predicts that economies
devoid of extensive financial intermediation should experience more
duel-like behavior than economies with high levels of per capita
intermediation facilities. It also predicts that where the institution
of dueling is present, short-term interest rates and the incidence of
dueling should be positively correlated because as interest rates
increase personal creditors will be more likely to call the debts of
dishonored borrowers. Unfortunately, we are unable to test these
hypotheses rigorously due to the dearth of data on dueling. We show
below, however, that it is possible to model the motivations of duelists
in a way that illuminates many otherwise puzzling aspects of the
historical record.
The only previous paper to have explicitly modeled the
dueler's rational motivation for dueling is Allen and Reed (2006).
In their model, dueling serves as a screening device used to filter out
individuals with low levels of social capital for appointments to public
office in a patronage-based political system. In their (one-period)
model, the king first chooses a reservation level of social capital and
the probability of dying in a duel. Potential political appointees then
have the option of dueling, but individuals with social capital below
the reservation level will refuse to duel because their low level of
social capital means that they would have less to gain from membership
in the political ruling class (and by the same token, once in public
office, they could not be trusted by other members of the ruling class:
social capital serves as a bond for good behavior).
There are a number of difficulties with this interpretation. First,
it implies that dueling should be restricted to those seeking public
office and that all those seeking public office should first duel.
Neither of these predictions matches the historical facts well.
Furthermore, they argue that social capital "comes from attending
the same schools, social events, clubs, and churches," and is also
"acquired through education, marriage, business connections, and
family history." Many of these attributes are, however, observable,
or at least learnable (perhaps at some cost). Their key assumption that
social capital is unobservable is therefore largely unsupported. (1)
In our approach, a player's "honor" is not an
unobservable endowment, but an outcome of the player's strategic
actions in a repeated game in which players are randomly matched from
time to time to carry out credit transactions. An "honorable"
man is one who can be trusted-in this case, to repay a loan. In the
equilibrium we describe, a "dishonorable" man, having no
reputation to protect, is effectively excluded from borrowing, based on
a credible expectation that he would not repay loans; and from lending,
since he cannot issue challenges, and so has no way to credibly enforce
repayment. Honor--a trustworthy reputation--is therefore a valuable
asset, and well worth defending if necessary.
Kandori (1992) shows that cooperation can be sustained in a
repeated random-matching game if players can observe a reputational
"label," which indicates whether their current trading partner
has ever cheated in the past. Other papers study historical cases in
which such reputational information was shared via merchant's
correspondence (Greif 1993) or by judges (Milgrom, North, and Weingast
1990). All of these models assume, however, that cheating is observable
by third parties to the transaction, such as the other merchants in the
community, or the judge (Law Merchant) in Milgrom et al. Otherwise, the
reputation mechanism cannot work.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The institution of dueling defending one's honor---can be
understood in this light. In our model, "cheating" can
sometimes occur involuntarily, and only the debtor himself can observe
whether his failure to repay a loan is a result of deliberate
malfeasance or simply bad luck. In this scenario, we show how the
institution of dueling can provide an incentive-compatible mechanism
which enables an individual whose reputation has come into question to
credibly demonstrate his good faith and recover his honor. Essentially,
dueling must be costly enough that the possibility of a duel is daunting
enough to induce borrowers to make a good faith effort to repay loans ex
ante but not so costly that someone who is involuntarily forced to
default through bad luck would be unwilling to face a duel ex post, to
credibly demonstrate his good faith, recover his honor, and retain
access to the credit market.
2. Model: Dueling in Defense of "Honor"
For concreteness, we model the institution of dueling by focusing
on the use of "honor" to enforce a credit transaction between
two players a lender and borrower. A simple credit transaction is
depicted in Figure 1. First, the lender chooses whether to lend to the
borrower an amount x; next, the borrower chooses whether to repay with
interest, or to default. If the borrower repays the loan, both players
benefit (here, they receive a net payoff normalized to 1). However, the
borrower, having received the loan, can do even better (a payoff of 2 +
x) by reneging on repayment. For simplicity, we will assume throughout
the article that there is no formal enforcement mechanism in place: The
lender has no way to enforce repayment if the borrower chooses not to
repay.
Thus, there is a "fundamental problem of exchange" (Greif
2000): Unless the borrower can commit to repay the lender, the lender
will not lend, and the opportunity for beneficial exchange is lost (both
players receive a net payoff of 0). The unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium is (decline, default). As Greif argues, a similar
fundamental problem of exchange-or commitment problem--arises in many
important economic and political transactions, and a key role of many
institutions is to overcome such commitment problems.
To capture the role of dueling, we modify the basic credit
transaction as follows (Figure 2). First, as before, the lender chooses
whether to make a loan to the borrower. If the loan is made, then Nature
moves: With probability [epsilon], the project fails as a result of bad
luck. If the project succeeds, then the borrower chooses whether to
repay the loan (leading to a payoff of 1 for each player), or to
deliberately default. Only the borrower observes Nature's move, so
in the event of a failure to repay the loan, the lender cannot discern
whether the default has occurred as a result of bad luck or deliberate
default. If the borrower fails to repay the loan, the lender then
chooses whether to challenge the borrower to a duel (C) or not (N). (2)
If a challenge is made, the borrower can accept (A) or reject (R) the
challenge. If the borrower chooses A, then a duel occurs, and each
player suffers an expected cost c (reflecting the possibility of injury
or death). Note that the duel has no other effect on payoffs--it is
purely destructive. In particular, who wins the duel has no effect on
financial outcomes--shooting the borrower, for example, does not enable
the lender to recover his money; and since the lender is assumed to have
no way to enforce repayment, it is not necessary for the borrower to
shoot the lender in order to get out of repaying the loan.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
The one-shot game is easily solved: The borrower prefers to reject
a challenge; the lender is therefore indifferent about whether to
challenge a borrower who defaults; borrowers will always default rather
than repay the loan; and the lender will therefore never lend to begin
with. Dueling is meaningless, and the fundamental problem of exchange
remains.
Suppose, however, that the game is repeated. Specifically, consider
an infinitely large population of players who engage in credit
transactions. (3) All players are infinitely lived and have a common
discount rate, [delta]. At the start of each period, each player is
randomly matched with another, and within each pairing, one player is
randomly assigned the role of borrower, and the other player is assigned
the role of lender. Each lender-borrower pair then play the game
depicted in Figure 2. The probability of involuntary default is
[epsilon], which is independent across periods for each individual.
Assume in addition that each player's history of play is
publicly observable (all players can observe whether loans are repaid,
and all duels are public), with the exception that no player except the
defaulting borrower can observe whether a failure to repay a loan was a
result of bad luck or deliberate malfeasance (that is, only the borrower
observes Nature's move).
To capture the role of honor, suppose that at any moment in time,
each player in this society may be viewed by the others as being in one
of two states: honorable (H) or dishonorable (D). All players are
regarded as honorable unless, at some time in the past, they have either
(i) as a lender, failed to challenge an honorable borrower who did not
repay a loan, or (ii) as a borrower, refused a challenge from an
honorable lender. Such men, having failed to defend their honor, are
forever (and irreversibly) branded as dishonorable (cowards). This
binary label (honor/dishonor) has no direct physical consequences; its
consequences, and its significance, derive entirely from the beliefs and
expectations of the players and how those beliefs and expectations shape
their interpretation of events and their subsequent behavior. In
particular, suppose the players adopt the following strategy, which we
will refer to as the "Code of Honor":
* For Honorable Lenders:
--Lend to honorable men, and only to honorable men
--Challenge borrowers who fail to repay loans
* For Dishonorable Lenders:
--Never make loans
-- Never issue challenges
* For Honorable Borrowers:
--Whenever possible, repay loans from honorable lenders
--Do not repay loans from dishonorable lenders
--Accept all challenges from honorable men, and only from honorable
men
* For Dishonorable Borrowers:
--Never repay loans
--Reject all challenges
We will show that for suitable parameter values, the Code of Honor,
if adopted by all players, gives rise to a self-enforcing set of social
"rules" in which borrowers will always repay loans if possible
but in which dueling will nevertheless rationally occur on the path of
play. In this equilibrium, the value of a player's honorable
reputation is that it provides access to the credit market, so honor is
well worth defending, even at great cost.
Under the Code of Honor, an individual who loses his honor cannot
borrow in the future, since (as he has no honor to defend) he cannot be
meaningfully challenged in the future (it is costless for him to refuse
a challenge), and he therefore has no incentive to repay a loan. Knowing
this, no lender will lend to him; and if one were foolish enough to do
so, he would rationally default, as he expects no future loans whether
he repays or not. Similarly, since he has no honor to defend, a
dishonorable lender cannot meaningfully challenge a borrower who fails
to repay a loan, so he can be cheated with impunity (even if he issues a
challenge, the borrower can refuse the challenge without any loss of
honor). Lacking the ability to make meaningful challenges, a
dishonorable individual cannot expect any loans they make to be repaid,
and will therefore miss out on potentially profitable lending
opportunities.
Therefore under the Code of Honor (and under suitable parametric
conditions to be derived below), all individuals have an incentive to
maintain their honor. Even if a default were unintentional, a borrower
has an incentive to duel in order to maintain his honor and his access
to future credit. Similarly, a lender must duel to maintain, and
demonstrate a willingness to defend, his honor. Both parties enter into
credit transactions aware that, despite their best intentions, they
might ultimately have to face each other in a duel; and at the moment
when they duel, they do so despite "knowing" that (on the path
of play) neither of them has in fact attempted to deliberately cheat the
other. Nevertheless, the incentives created by the institution of
dueling leave them little alternative but to fight.
PROPOSITION 1. If
c > l + x (1)
c < 1/[epsilon] - (1 + x) (2)
and
c < [[delta][1 - [epsilon]-[[epsilon]x/2]]/1 - [delta] +
[delta][epsilon]] (3)
then the Code of Honor, if adopted by all players, constitutes a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated credit game with dueling and
random matching.
PROOF. First, note that the case of interest is the one in which c
is sufficiently small that the net expected return from an investment is
positive; that is, [epsilon]x < 2(1 - [epsilon]). However, this is
implied by Equations 1 and 2, so we do not need to assume it explicitly.
(4)
Let [V.sub.H] be the expected value of the stream of future payoffs
for a player whose status at the end of the period is H
("Honorable"), and let [V.sub.D] be the expected value of
future payoffs for a D ("Dishonorable") player. To verify that
the Code of Honor gives rise to a subgame-perfect equilibrium, we need
to check that no player has an incentive to deviate from the strategies
specified as long as all other players are also expected to conform to
those strategies.
First, note that under the Code of Honor, no D player expects to
receive a loan in the future, or that any loan he makes in the future
will be repaid; given these expectations, he has no incentive to make
loans, repay loans, or fight duels. Therefore, his expected payoff in
each future period is 0, so [V.sub.D] = 0.
Assuming all players follow the Code of Honor, an H player who is
matched with another H player as a lender has an expected payoff in that
period of
[[pi].sub.Lender](H,H) = [epsilon](-x -c) + (1 - [epsilon])(1) = 1
- [epsilon](1 + x + c);
whereas, an H player who is matched with another H player as a
borrower has an expected payoff in that period of
[[pi].sub.Borrower](H,H) = [epsilon](-c) + (1 - [epsilon])(1) = 1 -
[epsilon](1 + c).
Therefore, at the end of the period, an H player who expects to
meet only H players in the future has an expected stream of future
payoffs of value
[V.sub.H] = [[delta]/1 - [delta]][1 - [epsilon](1 + c) -
[epsilon]x/2].
For Honorable players (borrowers or lenders), issuing or accepting
a challenge to another Honorable player is incentive compatible as long
as the value of preserving one's honor (to retain future access to
the credit market) exceeds the cost. Under the Code of Honor, this is so
if
[V.sub.H] > c,
which (solving for c) can be rewritten as (3).
Given the expectation that default will lead to a duel, honorable
borrowers will repay honorable lenders if
2 + x - c + [V.sub.H] < 1 + [V.sub.H],
which reduces to (1) (this is the borrower's incentive
compatibility constraint). If they expect borrowers to repay whenever
possible (and duel otherwise), honorable lenders will make loans as long
as
(1 - [epsilon]) 1 + [epsilon](- x-c) + [V.sub.H] > 0 +
[V.sub.H],
which reduces to (2) (this is the lender's participation
constraint). If Equations 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied, then the strategy
with dueling gives rise to a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
As the proof of Proposition 1 shows, for the Code of Honor to be an
equilibrium, dueling must be sufficiently costly that ex ante, borrowers
prefer to make a good faith effort to repay loans whenever possible
rather than fight duels (Eqn. 1), but the cost of dueling is also
bounded above by the requirement that ex post, if an unavoidable default
occurs, it must be worthwhile to duel to retain future access to credit
(Eqn. 3). In addition, the probability of unavoidable default (~) cannot
be too high, or the high probability of dueling on the path of play will
make lenders unwilling to lend money to begin with (Eqn. 2). By
inspection of Equations 1-3, it is clear that the range of possible
values of c for which the Code of Honor is sustainable as an equilibrium
expands when players are more patient (higher [delta]), involuntary
default is less likely (lower [epsilon]), and for lower values of x
(implying a higher percentage return on loans and a lower temptation for
the borrower to default).
How restrictive are conditions (1-3)? This is, of course, somewhat
sensitive to the exact setup of our model. However, one approach to
answering this question is to make a guess at plausible numerical values
for the parameters. For example, if [delta] = 0.95, x = 4, and [epsilon]
= 0.05, then the Code of Honor is sustainable for values of c between 5
and 8.28. If [delta] falls to 0.9, however, then the range of possible
values of c tightens to [5, 5.27]. If instead x increases to 6, then the
range of c shrinks to [7, 7.79]. Alternatively, if a increases to 0.08,
then the range of c shrinks to [5, 5.73], but if [epsilon] increases to
0.1 (with [delta] = 0.95 and x = 4), then the Code of Honor would no
longer be sustainable for any value of c.
An alternative approach is to treat c as endogenous. One can
imagine the institution of dueling evolving over time, with the set of
dueling rules or customs (affecting the probability of injury) gradually
adjusting so as to maintain a value of c, which would make the Code of
Honor strategy, with dueling on the path of play, a possible
equilibrium. Thus, for example, taking [delta] = 0.9 and x = 5 as a
given, the Code of Honor is sustainable as an equilibrium for values of
[epsilon] up to 0.035. But if [delta] = 0.95 and x = 5 then it is
sustainable for [epsilon] [less than or equal to] 0.072.
More generally, Proposition 2 shows that, if involuntary default is
very rare ([epsilon] [right arrow] 0), these conditions approximate the
standard repeated-game condition that the discounted value of the stream
of gains from honest play must exceed the one-shot gains from cheating
(1 + x).
PROPOSITION 2. For any given values of x and [delta], if
[[delta]/1 - [delta]] > 1 + x
then a value of c exists such that the Code of Honor is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium for sufficiently low values of [epsilon].
PROOF. As [apsilon] [right arrow] 0, (3) becomes [delta]/(1 -
[delta]) > c, so a value of c can be found satisfying (1) and (3).
Moreover, as [epsilon] [right arrow] 0, l/[epsilon] [right arrow]
[delta], so (2) is satisfied.
Note that the role of dueling here is not to signal one's
hidden "type"; all players are identical, and none is
inherently more trustworthy or more courageous than another. Rather, the
point of dueling is to control moral hazard: Being honorable is a
property of one's past actions rather than one's inherent
characteristics, and the presence of a norm of dueling ensures that
honorable men will not deliberately default on loans, even if no one
else would ever know that a default were deliberate--an observation
which accords well with traditional interpretations of the notion of
honor. One could, however, extend our model to situations in which
borrowers differed in their costs of dueling, the riskiness of their
projects, or some other parameter. For example, if borrowers had private
information about their projects' probability of failure
([epsilon]), then a norm of dueling could also serve as a screening
device, filtering out borrowers whose projects involve a high risk of
default. Given the expectation that failure to repay a loan will require
a borrower to fight a duel or face dishonor, an honorable borrower who
anticipated a high probability of exogenous default ([epsilon]) in a
given period would be dissuaded from seeking a loan in that period and
thereby putting his honor (and future access to the credit market) in
jeopardy.
The grim trigger strategy used in the model is, of course, an
extreme case; in reality one might imagine more forgiving punishments.
In particular, one can readily imagine situations in which those who had
lost their honor (or had none to begin with) might have opportunities to
build or rebuild their reputation. Some duels might then be fought, or
provoked, deliberately to raise the status of the duelist. This function
of dueling is somewhat remniscent of Carmichael and MacLeod's
(1997) "gift-giving" theory. In that paper, players can give
wasteful gifts ("burn money") at the start of a long-term
relationship to establish their mutual good faith; the gift-giving
convention, though wasteful, can survive because it enables players to
credibly demonstrate their good faith and conduct mutually beneficial
trade. (5) Dueling, in our model, acts rather like a wasteful, public
"gift," one which is only worth making if one subsequently
plans to act "honorably" (i.e., not to cheat one's
trading partners) and which therefore can act as a credible
demonstration of intended good faith. Thus, the motivations of duelists
deliberately provoking duels (and risking their lives) in order to
establish an honorable reputation are effectively similar to those of a
borrower and lender who must duel to preserve their good names, even
following a default that (on the path of play) they both
"know" to have been involuntary.
Finally, note that we have treated c as symmetric across
individuals. One potentially interesting extension would be to consider
a world where individuals could develop a reputation for dueling skill
(such as fencing skill). The choice of whether to duel then becomes
trickier, as it will depend on both antagonists' dueling prowess.
But this in turn would affect one's incentives to develop a
reputation for dueling prowess in complex ways: Too good a reputation
for dueling might effectively exclude you from the credit market (by
reducing c), but a reputation as a lousy shot would also reduce the
credibility of any threat to defend one's honor (by raising c), so
everyone would want to borrow from and cheat you. Thus, asymmetric
values of c ought to tend to undermine the institution of dueling. It is
not surprising that, as Allen and Reed (2006) emphasize, many of the
rules which governed the practice of dueling (the code duello) appear to
have been designed precisely to increase the randomness of the outcome.
3. Concluding Remarks
Heretofore, game theorists have been primarily interested in the
mechanics of dueling, (i.e., strategies about when to shoot). Here, we
model the pre-engagement decisions leading up to the actual combat,
revealing that the classic gentlemen's duel was a very rational
affair, not a spontaneous outburst of violent emotion. Although some
duels were fought over tangible resources, like beautiful women and
lucrative offices, most duels centered around "honor," a
cultural code word for creditworthiness. Our model describes how dueling
to defend one's honor was a rational choice aimed at retaining
access to credit markets (and possibly other social and economic
interactions) under a prevailing norm which linked dueling to honor and
shunned those who had been dishonored. The model therefore helps to
explain why dueling was common where credit markets were personal, and
hence more oriented on outward appearances and less oriented on the
examination of audited financial statements, the monitoring of
restrictive covenants, and other modern techniques for limiting
information asymmetry.
Our model suggests that dueling might be more likely to emerge when
formal institutions for financial intermediation were absent, the
probability of default for unobserved reasons was low (or monitoring
costs would have been high), players had relatively long time horizons,
and when interest rates were not too high. When these conditions cease
to hold, and as transactions become increasingly complex and impersonal
(making it harder to discover whether one's potential trading
partner is "honorable"), the institution of dueling should
break down.
We would emphasize that despite its apparent irrationality, dueling
need not necessarily be regarded as a wasteful and socially inefficient
means of achieving incentive compatibility. In the presence of
asymmetric information, any governance mechanism which enables exchange
inevitably entails some costs. For example, in a modern legal system it
is necessary to pay police officers, lawyers, and judges. In other
cases, enforcement may require the transacting parties to incur the
costs of sharing reputational information, as in Greif's (1993)
study of a medieval trading community, or Milgrom et al.'s (1990)
model of the medieval Law Merchant. Other institutions involve
monitoring costs, such as the costs of monitoring workers in a firm, as
in Bowles and Gintis (1992), or of monitoring other members of a team,
as in Arce and Gunn (2005). From this perspective, the occasional
injuries and deaths caused by dueling may have been a worthwhile price
to pay to promote exchange in the societies in which it occurred, and
perhaps less costly overall than feasible institutional alternatives.
Of course, the concept of "honor" has broader
connotations than creditworthiness. While we have focused on the credit
market transaction because of its historical significance to dueling, a
similar logic can be extended to any situation in which an offended
party was unable to discern whether an offense was due to an intentional
act of opportunism or to an unintentional affront, or when monitoring
costs (the cost of discovering the true cause of an offense) were high.
If an injury, whether intentional or not, were expected to lead to a
duel, our model shows that individuals would have an incentive to try to
avoid injuring others, but that if, through bad luck, an injury
nevertheless occurred, the parties might find it necessary to
"satisfy" honor to leave their mutual good faith in no doubt
and to restore the mutual expectation of good conduct in the future.
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Christopher G. Kingston * and Robert E. Wright ([dagger])
* Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002, USA; E-mail
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([dagger]) Augustana College, 2001 South Summit Avenue, Sioux
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We thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier
version.
Received November 2003; accepted June 2009.
(1) Another somewhat related paper, but with important differences
from ours, is Volckart's (2004) study of feuding in late medieval
Germany. Unlike duels, the feuds Volckart studies involved efforts by
feudal noblemen to redress grievances by harassing, raiding, and looting
their opponent's lands and dependent peasants, sometimes for years.
Crucially, those waging the feud expected to gain from it directly
through plunder; whereas, in our approach no player expects to benefit
directly from the duel itself (though as we will show they may benefit
indirectly by defending their honor).
(2) An alternative formulation, more in line with historical
observation, would be to allow the lender to accuse the borrower of
cheating; then the borrower could issue a challenge; and the lender
would then have to decide whether to withdraw the accusation or accept
the challenge. Our formulation here is simpler, but still captures the
strategic essence of the situation, since if an accusation is expected
to lead to a challenge, then the lender would not make an accusation
unless he were willing to accept the ensuing challenge and fight a duel.
(3) The assumption of an infinitely large population is convenient
for technical reasons; specifically, it avoids having to deal with
incentive compatibility in subgames off the path of play, in which many
players have cheated in the past, so the value of maintaining a
reputation is lower. See Kandori (1992) for a discussion.
(4) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
(5) Theirs is an evolutionary model; in the presence of the
gift-giving convention, players who give gifts and then cheat and move
on do worse than gift-givers who subsequently act honestly.