Assigning intentions when actions are unobservable: the impact of trembling in the trust game.
Deck, Cary A.
1. Introduction
It is well established that individuals in laboratory games do not
always pursue their own maximum monetary payoff. In the ultimatum game,
materially self-interested second movers should accept any positive
payoff, and, thus, materially self-interested first movers should offer
the smallest possible positive amount (or zero). However, more equal
splits are frequently proposed and positive offers are often rejected.
(1) In an attempt to understand such behavior researchers hypothesize that subjects may attribute intentions to actions. (2) For example, a
minimal proposal might be considered greedy by a second mover, thus
prompting rejection as a form of punishment. A first mover may avoid
making a minimal proposal in order to try to avoid rejection, or because
of altruistic preferences, or for both reasons.
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) introduced the investment game,
which, unlike the ultimatum game, has a mutually beneficial, cooperative
outcome. In the investment game and the related trust game described
below, a first mover can forgo a certain payoff in favor of a larger
total payoff that will be allocated by a paired second mover. While
material self-interest predicts that the second mover will keep
everything--and, thus, the first mover should not forgo the certain
payoff more cooperative behavior is frequently observed. Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe found that 28 of 32 first movers sent more than the minimum
positive amount of money, and 11 of the 28 paired second movers returned
a greater amount than was received. This led Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
to conclude that cooperation was a "primitive" aspect of
behavior. Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing (2000), among many others,
find the behavioral pattern to be robust to various treatments. However,
Cox and Deck (2005) find that the level of social distance in the
experiment protocol can affect second mover behavior in the trust game.
(3) Similarly, in ultimatum games, negative reciprocity or punishment is
found to be dependent upon the context in which the game is played. (4)
This literature indicates that choices made by individuals depend
in part on the perceived intentions of other players and how people
expect their decisions to be interpreted. (5) Generous actions by the
first mover in the investment game are often interpreted as trusting,
while the second movers' sharing the larger total payoff is often
interpreted as positive reciprocity. However, to directly examine the
significance of motives one needs to verify that behavior differs for
the same nominal payoff decision in different circumstances. To
accomplish this one can decompose a game into a series of related games,
some with and some without the hypothesized motivation (see Cox 2004).
(6) For example, Cox and Deck (2005, 2006) examine the trust game and
the associated dictator game, in which the decision maker faces the same
nominal choices as the second mover in the trust game, as shown in
Figure 1.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
In Figure 1, the numbers at the end of a branch are the dollar
payoffs. In the trust game tree, the top (bottom) number is the first
(second) mover's payoff. In the dictator game tree, the bottom
(top) is the dictator's (other subject's) payoff. The number
at the middle of each branch is the number of subjects who made that
choice. Note that 8 of 24 ([congruent to] 33%) of the dictators chose
"cooperate" in the dictator game, and 21 of 33 ([congruent to]
64%) of the second movers chose "cooperate" in the trust game.
Together, data from the trust and dictator games support the conclusion
that there is significant play motivated by positive reciprocity in the
trust game. McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003) find essentially the same
pattern in a similar design in which first movers were required to play
down ("choose" trust) in the involuntary trust game (see
Figure 2).
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
It is clear from previous research that perceived intentions can
affect behavior. (7) Data reported by Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) in a
variation of the trust game framed as a contract demonstrate a similar
pattern. In their game the decision to defect by a second mover (i.e.,
not perform according to the contract) is followed by a node at which
with some probability nature (i.e., the "legal system") would
detect defection and enforce the cooperative outcome minus a penalty for
the second mover. While the findings are based upon repeated-play
environments, the general result is that for both small and large
probabilities of a second mover being penalized for defection there is
considerable cooperation (75% and 86%, respectively), but this is not
true for the intermediate case (30% cooperation). (8) In the
low-detection case one would expect at least as much cooperation as in
the trust game, given the repeated nature of the experiment, as was
observed. In the high-probability case, everyone, regardless of their
level of self-interest, should cooperate, and most did. However, the
intermediate case is basically a dictator control treatment in that the
first mover's decision is not a signal of trust because the legal
system is sufficiently developed that a risk-neutral, self-interested
first mover would not choose to exit. Thus, one would expect behavior to
be similar to that observed in a dictator game, which it was.
In all of the experiments discussed above subjects had complete
information about the payoffs of all players and there was no
uncertainty about what actions were selected. (9) However, in many
naturally occurring situations players do not have such complete
information. At one extreme, in which players know only their own
payoffs from each possible outcome, McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1998)
find that behavior closely matches the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prediction for fully rational, exclusively self-interested agents. Of
course, in that setting it is not clear how to interpret the motivations
or intentions of the other players.
Our article takes a complementary approach, one in which subjects
have complete information about payoffs but there is uncertainty about
what actions have been selected by others. That is, we ask whether
people are willing to give others the benefit of the doubt. To explore
this issue we consider a version of the trust game, referred to as the
trembling game, in which there is an exogenously determined chance that
the first mover's decision is reversed. When a second mover is
called upon to make a decision in the trembling game there is some
probability that the first mover did not actually trust the second
mover. It is our hypothesis that people who would select cooperate in
the dictator game control treatment would do so in the trembling game as
well. (10) Similarly, we hypothesize that those who would select defect
in the trust game would also select defect in the trembling game. (11)
Hence, we expect this type of uncertainty to affect only those motivated
by reciprocity, and therefore the percentage of people cooperating in
the trembling game should be at least as great as in the dictator game
but no greater than in the trust game. This approach allows us to
identify how unambiguous the connection between the decision task and
the perceived intention behind another's action leading to that
task has to be in order to induce reciprocity.
2. Experimental Design
One hundred and twenty subjects played the trust game shown in
Figure 1, with a 25% chance that the first mover's action would be
reversed. Subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes and were
paid a $5 show-up fee in addition to the payment determined by the
outcome of the one-shot game. Each subject participated in only one
session and had not previously participated in any similar
"fairness" experiments in our laboratory. The experimental
procedures followed identically those of Cox and Deck (2005), except
that a sheet of additional directions was distributed to each
participant. (12) This sheet read as follows:
Additional Directions:
Once a decision-maker 1 has made a decision by clicking on a branch
and pressing send, that decision-maker 1 will be prompted by the
computer to pick a number between 1 and 4 including 1 and 4. After
all decision-maker 1s have selected a number, the experimenter will
randomly draw a ball from a bingo cage. If the number the
experimenter draws does not match the number decision-maker 1
selected, then decision-maker 1's decision will remain unchanged.
However, if the number drawn by the experimenter is the same as the
number selected by decision-maker 1, then decision-maker 1's choice
will be reversed by the computer. Decisionmaker 2 will never know
the number selected by the decision-maker 1 counterpart.
After these additional directions were read aloud, subjects were
able to ask questions about this procedure. Also, the bingo cage and the
numbered balls were shown to the subjects, and there was a trial drawing
with explanation. Thus, a second mover knew that if her paired first
mover chose "trust" there was a 75% chance it would not be
reversed, and if her counterpart chose "exit" there was a 25%
chance that it would be reversed.
If second movers give first movers the benefit of the doubt,
behavior should be the same as in the regular trust game (64%
cooperation). If, on the other hand, imputation of intentions has to be
certain to generate reciprocal behavior, one would find less cooperation
than in the regular trust game. If reciprocity is fragile, then behavior
in the (trust game with) trembling treatment would be similar to
behavior in the dictator control treatment (33% cooperation). However,
an obvious difference between the trembling treatment and the dictator
treatment is the possibility of both players receiving $10. Based on
previous work, such a difference could affect second mover behavior.
(13) Therefore, we conducted another control treatment in which the move
at the first node was determined randomly by the flip of a coin.
Following the same procedures, 64 additional inexperienced subjects were
recruited. For this treatment, the sheet of additional directions read
as follows:
Additional Directions:
A Decision Maker 1 has no decision to make. The branch selected at
the Decision Maker 1 node will be determined by a coin flip.
Decision Maker 1's will leave this room, before the coin is flipped,
and return to the sign-in room.
After these additional directions were read aloud, subjects were
able to ask questions about this procedure and were given the
opportunity to inspect the coin. At this point the "first
movers" returned to the sign-in room and then everyone was shown
the decision tree for the trust game in Figure 1 and told which branch
would be selected by heads or tails. (14)
3. Results
The data from the experiments are presented in Table 1, along with
the data from Cox and Deck (2005, 2006) for comparison. Two findings are
readily apparent from the table. First, behavior of second movers is
virtually identical in the coin-flip and dictator treatments. One cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the two proportions are the same given
the p value of 0.908 for the two-sided z-test. (15) Given that the two
treatments generate the same behavior, subsequent analysis combines the
data from these two treatments. This finding is yet more evidence of the
robustness of behavior in dictator games. Recall that the result in
which 33% to 35% of subjects were cooperative was also reported by
Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) and McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003) for
their similar treatments, discussed above.
The second finding is that as hypothesized, the cooperation rate in
the trembling treatment nominally falls between the cooperation rates in
the regular trust game and the dictator/coinflip treatments. Of the 20
second movers in the trembling game who had an opportunity to choose, 11
(or 55%) chose cooperate. This is significantly more cooperation than is
represented by the 15 of 44 (or 34%) who cooperated in the
dictator/coin-flip games (p value of 0.057 in the one-tailed z-test of
equal proportions against the one-sided alternative). (16) In contrast,
the difference in cooperation between the trust and trembling games is
not significant (p value of 0.267 in the one-tailed z-test of equal
proportions against the one-sided alternative). (17) This indicates that
while there is some nominal slippage in cooperation, reciprocal behavior
is not fragile in this context. That is, people who are conditional
cooperators are willing to give others the benefit of the doubt by
acting as though others have behaved in a manner warranting cooperation
even if there is no certain evidence of that behavior.
A third finding is that even though second movers do not
significantly change their behavior with the introduction of trembling,
first movers do. In the trembling game, only 20 of 59 (or 34% of) first
movers selected trust. (18) This is significantly different from the 33
of 66 (or 50%) selecting trust in the regular version of the trust game
(with a p value of 0.069 in a two-tailed test). (19) That first movers
are divided approximately equally between the two options is a fairly
robust finding. For example, McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003) report
that 17 of 27 first movers trusted, behavior not significantly different
from 50%. Previous studies have not found a treatment effect for first
movers. For example, Cox and Deck (2005) find that switching from a low
social distance protocol in which subjects are paid in person to a high
social distance protocol in which payoffs are double-blind leads to a
significant decrease in cooperation but no corresponding decrease in
trust. (20)
The implication of behavior in the trembling game is that first
movers seem to expect second movers to respond to the uncertainty by not
giving the first movers the benefit of the doubt. Consider the decision
faced by first mover j in the trust game. Suppose she believes that the
second mover will select cooperate with probability [p.sub.j]. If she
picks exit, her utility will be [u.sub.j] (10,10), while the choice of
trust will result in an expected utility of [p.sub.j][u.sub.j](15,25) +
(1 - [p.sub.j])[u.sub.j](0,40). Normalizing so that [u.sub.j](0,40) = 0,
individual j will choose trust in the trust game if [p.sub.j] >
[u.sub.j](10,10) / [u.sub.j] (15,25) and will be indifferent between
exit and trust if [p.sub.j] equals this utility ratio. For a materially
self-interested, risk-neutral person, the preceding inequality simplifies to [p.sub.j] > 10/15 = 66%, which is close to the 63.6%
percent cooperation rate observed in the trust game. Now consider the
decision faced by first mover j in the trembling game. Suppose that she
believes the second mover will select cooperate with probability
[[pi].sub.j] if given the opportunity. Then if she picks exit, her
expected utility will be 0.75[u.sub.j](10,10) +
0.25[[[pi.sub.j][u.sub.j](15,25) + (1 - [[pi].sub.j])[u.sub.j](0,40)],
while the choice of trust will result in an expected utility of
0.75[[pi].sub.j][u.sub.j] (15,25) + (1 - [[pi].sub.j])[u.sub.j] (0,40)]
+ 0.25[u.sub.j] (10,10). Again normalizing so that [u.sub.j] (0,40) = 0,
we find that individual j will choose trust in the trembling game if
[[pi].sub.j] > [u.sub.j](10,10) / [u.sub.j](15,25). Thus, first
movers are predicted to be more or less trusting in the trust game than
in the trembling game depending only on their expectations ([p.sub.j] or
[[pi].sub.j]) for second mover behavior in the two games.
While the observed cooperation rate in the trembling game of 55% is
not significantly lower than the cooperation rate of 63.6% in the trust
game, it is nominally lower. The significantly lower occurrence of the
trust branch choice by first movers in the trembling game may be a
reflection of the lower nominal rate of cooperation in that game, but it
may instead be an addition to the growing literature on backward
induction failure, in which first movers fail to correctly anticipate
the subsequent behavior of second movers (Camerer 2003).
4. Conclusion
Often when people make decisions they have imperfect information
about the intentions behind another's perceived action, and,
therefore, they have to make inferences from what they observe. To
explore the ramifications of this type of uncertainty in a controlled
laboratory setting we introduce trembling into the trust game. In this
variant of the game, there is a 25% chance that the first mover's
action will be reversed. This design allows us to address two important
aspects of economic behavior. How do people behave when they have to
consider how the results of their imperfectly observable actions will be
perceived rather than how their actual actions would be perceived if
they were perfectly observable? How do people react when an observed
action may or may not have been intentional?
In response to the second question, we find that second movers are
willing to give the first movers the benefit of the doubt. Behavior for
second movers is approximately the same in the trembling game as in the
standard trust game, with a majority of the second movers who are given
the opportunity to make a decision deciding to cooperate. Further, it is
clear that second movers are considering the intentions of the first
movers. When the first mover decision is determined randomly by the flip
of a coin, the cooperation rate falls to one-third. This is
approximately the same cooperation rate observed in the dictator control
treatment for the trust game as well as in similar treatments reported
by Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) and McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003).
Even though second movers are willing to give the benefit of the
doubt, the answer to the first question is that first movers do not
anticipate this, as evidenced by the significant decrease in trust
resulting from the introduction of trembling. This does not necessarily
mean that first movers expect a large shift in second mover behavior. In
the trust game a risk-neutral materially self-interested first mover is
basically indifferent between trusting and exiting given the observed
behavior of second movers (as noted in section 3). Thus, any reduction
in anticipated cooperation could lead these first movers to strictly
prefer exit to trust. Of course, subjects with altruistic preferences or
ones that misperceive the risk of defection may continue to choose trust
in the trembling treatment. Ultimately, the impact of first movers
anticipating less cooperation in the trembling game, and more often
choosing exit, is that substantially fewer pairs reach the cooperative
outcome.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National
Science Foundation (grant number DUE0226344). The paper has benefited
from the suggestions of the anonymous referees.
Received July 2004; accepted December 2005.
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(1) See Guth and Tietz (1990) for a survey of experimental results
in ultimatum games.
(2) An alternative approach is to model utility as depending upon
the monetary outcomes of multiple players; see, for example, Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). However, these models have
had only limited success; see Deck (2001), Engelmann and Strobel (2004),
and Cox and Sadiraj (2005).
(3) Specifically, Cox and Deck (2005) find that second mover
behavior is less cooperative when the experimenter does not know the
identity of the subjects than when subjects receive their payoffs in
person from the experimenter.
(4) Responses to greedy proposals in ultimatum and mini-ultimatum
games have been found to depend on the decision context and payoff
structure (see Hoffman et al. 1994 and Cox and Deck 2005).
(5) See McCabe, Smith, and LePore (2000) for a general discussion
of intentions and "mind reading."
(6) Alternately, one can make comparisons by presenting a subject
with a collection of similar games and observing how choices vary with
the games' payoff structures (see Guth, Huck, and Muller 2001;
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003).
(7) As noted by McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003), this demonstrates
a critical shortcoming in purely outcome-based models, such as that
offered by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
(8) This discussion is based upon data from the last period in
which different treatments involved different probabilities of detection
and omits the session with fixed subject matching, as those subjects
knew they would continue to interact with each other in subsequent
rounds.
(9) Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) create uncertainty about the
outcome for a given action by introducing a lottery, but there is no
uncertainty about what action was undertaken.
(10) As discussed in the next section, there is an alternative
specification for a game that one could argue is a more appropriate
baseline than the dictator game. As revealed in section 3, behavior in
the dictator game and the alternative specification is
indistinguishable.
(11) A referee suggested an alternative hypothesis: a second mover
may feel bad that a first mover's decision could be reversed, and
this could make the second mover more likely to cooperate.
(12) A copy of all directions and handouts used in this study are
available from the authors upon request.
(13) For example, Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003) find that
payoffs along other branches of the game tree can affect behavior.
(14) In half of the sessions, heads corresponded to the exit
branch, and in the other half, heads corresponded to the trust branch.
The terms trust, exit, cooperate, and defect were never used in
interactions with the subjects; instead, neutral language was used
throughout. Participants were referred to as decision makers and not as
players or movers.
(15) In the case of comparing two sample proportions, a z-test
gives the same p value as a chi-square test. Here we use a two-sided
test because we have no prior belief about how behavior may differ
between these two treatments.
(16) A one-tailed test is used for second mover behavior because
previous research indicates a direction for the treatment effect, as
discussed in the Introduction. The treatment effect would not be
significant based upon a two-tailed test.
(17) The treatment effect would not be significant based on a
two-tailed test either.
(18) The response from one subject in the role of a first mover was
omitted from the analysis because that subject had previously
participated in a trust game experiment. Including this observation
would not change the substantive conclusions drawn in the article.
(19) In this case previous work does not indicate a specific
direction for the alternative hypothesis, and thus the question of
interest is simply whether there is a difference (as in a two-tailed
test).
(20) Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing (2000) find a lack of
treatment effect on first mover behavior in a study of the investment
game.
James C. Cox, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of
Policy Studies, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 3992, Atlanta, GA
30302-3992, USA; E-mail jccox@gsu.edu; corresponding author.
Cary A. Deck, Department of Economics, University of Arkansas, 402
WCOB, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA; E-mail cdeck@walton.uark.edu.
Table 1. Observed Behavior in the Four Games
Game Trust Trembling Coin Flip Dictator
Number selecting cooperate 21 11 7 8
Number selecting defect 12 9 13 16
Cooperation percentage 63.6 55 35 33.3
