Optimal monitoring with external incentives: the case of tipping.
Azar, Ofer H.
1. Introduction
Tipping is a significant economic activity, and yet its economic
implications have hardly been explored. Tips in U.S. restaurants alone
are around $27 billion a year. (1) Obviously, adding tips in other
establishments such as hotels and taxis, and in additional countries,
results in a much higher figure. Millions of workers depend heavily on
tip income. Wessels (1997), for example, reports that in the United
States alone there are over two million people who are servers as their
primary occupation, and the number may be 60% higher if we add those who
are servers as a secondary occupation. He adds that tips represent 58%
of servers' income in full-course restaurants and 61% in counters,
and that these figures are likely to be understated because servers
often underreport their tip income. Finally, tipping has become a source
of income in many different occupations: Lynn, Zinkhan, and Harris (1993), for example, consider 33 service professions that are tipped.
How has tipping become such a prevalent social norm? Who has an
incentive to support it? Do firms benefit from tipping, and in what
ways? I analyze the interaction between tipping, which can be thought of
as buyer monitoring, and monitoring by the firm. The analysis suggests
that by motivating workers to provide better service, tipping enables
the firm to reduce its costly monitoring of workers and to increase the
price it charges (because of the increased service quality). Therefore,
tipping increases the profits of the firm, so firms have an incentive to
support the tipping custom.
While this article focuses on the case of tipping, (2) the
theoretical model is applicable to additional examples in which workers
face external incentives (incentives that are not provided by the firm).
One such example is the satisfaction that workers derive from doing
their job well, especially in jobs that require initiative and
creativity. This satisfaction (often referred to as intrinsic motivation) motivates workers to excel even when they face no monetary
incentives to do so.
Another example is that of military pilots: Their future prospects
and expected salaries as civil pilots later in life depend on their
performance in the military, thus providing them additional incentives
to do their job well beyond the incentives provided by the military. (3)
Similarly, anyone who thinks he may change employers in the future
(whether voluntarily or not) has an incentive to work well in order to
be more attractive to the next employer. Potential employers receive
information about previous performance of the candidate from various
sources, such as letters of reference and items on the curriculum vitae.
Consequently, current performance affects the candidate's
reputation and his prospects with other employers, giving him incentives
to work well that are not provided by the firm.
The common theme in all the above examples is that the worker faces
external incentives to do what the firm also wants to achieve. In the
case of tipping, tips promote higher service quality, and the firm wants
to encourage high service quality as well; similarly, self-fulfillment and satisfaction from being successful, or reputation building in order
to improve one's value in the job market, motivate the worker to
work harder, which is also what the firm wants.
The existing literature about tipping is mostly empirical and
includes two main types of studies. One type interviews customers when
they leave a restaurant and tries to evaluate which variables affect the
tip size (for example, whether food quality affects tips). Major
contributions of this type include Bodvarsson and Gibson (1994, 1997). A
second type of study asks waiters to behave in a certain way (for
example, to touch the customer lightly or to write "Thank
you!" on the bill) and records the effect of this behavior on tips,
using a control group as a benchmark (see, for example, Crusco and
Wetzel 1984). (4) A unique and interesting study about tipping is the
experimental article of Ruffle (1998) in which participants in dictator and ultimatum games acted in a way that resembles tipping.
The theoretical work on tipping started with the pioneering work of
Ben-Zion and Karni (1977), who show that tipping is consistent with a
selfish customer only for the case of a repeat customer. They suggest
that, in order to explain why one-time customers tip, one should
consider altruistic behavior and social norms, which are not included in
their model. Jacob and Page (1980) suggest that optimal monitoring may
involve monitoring by both the owner and the buyer who interacts with
the monitored employee. Sisk and Gallick (1985) argue that tips
ultimately protect the buyer from an unscrupulous seller (or his agent)
when the brand-name mechanism for ensuring contractual performance is
insufficient. Schwartz (1997) suggests that tipping can increase the
firm's profits when it enables price discrimination between two
consumer segments that differ in their demand functions and their
propensity to tip. Ruffle (1999) presents a theoretical model about gift
giving and discusses briefly how the model can be applied to tipping as
well. Azar (2004a) presents a model of the evolution of social norms.
When a norm is costly to follow and people do not derive benefits from
following it, except for avoiding social disapproval, the norm erodes
over time. Tip percentages, however, increased over the years,
suggesting that people derive benefits from tipping, such as impressing
others and improving their self-image as being generous and kind.
In this article, I analyze the optimal choice of monitoring and
incentives by the firm when the worker faces external incentives that
encourage him to do what the firm also wants to achieve. The theoretical
analysis suggests that firms benefit from higher sensitivity of tips to
service quality because it enables them to reduce the cost of
monitoring. This implies that firms should encourage customers to tip
badly (or not at all) for bad service, rather than to always tip. In
addition, as long as tips are positively correlated with service
quality, firms benefit from the existence of tipping. This result is
consistent with historical evidence that suggests that U.S. firms
promoted the custom of tipping in the late 19th century, despite
attempts of several consumer groups, and even workers, to abolish the
custom (Segrave 1998; Azar 2004b). This result, however, also suggests
that numerous European firms that replaced tips with service charges
possibly made a costly mistake. I discuss, however, why this might not
be a mistake after all. The model also implies that in countries in
which tipping is not prevalent, for example in Japan, Australia, and the
Scandinavian countries, firms may do better by trying to promote the
custom of tipping.
The previous discussion suggests that the main contributions of
this article can be categorized as follows: First, it addresses the
issue of optimal monitoring in the presence of external incentives.
Tips, intrinsic motivation, and reputation building are a few examples
of such incentives. Second, the article contributes to the literature
about tipping, analyzing the relationship between tipping and monitoring
by the firm. Finally, the article compares the theoretical predictions
to the behavior of firms in the United States and Europe and offers a
potential explanation to the puzzle regarding the choices of European
firms.
2. The Model
The game involves two players (a firm and a worker) and two stages.
In the first stage, the firm chooses how intensely to monitor the
waiter, which in turn determines also the incentives to provide good
service that the waiter faces. In the second stage, the waiter chooses
the service quality to provide, and then receives both his tip and the
incentives from the firm according to the service quality chosen. The
tip is potentially increasing with the service quality provided. This
may follow from the social norm being that better service should be
rewarded by a higher tip. Alternatively, it may follow from the customer
trying to discipline the waiter in a repeated-interaction scenario: The
customer gives better tips for better service in order to motivate the
waiter to give good service in future encounters. The task that the
waiter has to perform is to serve a single customer. Serving a table of
four can be considered as having four identical tasks; the effort and
incentives are simply four times those for serving a single customer. I
assume for simplicity that the bill size per customer is constant.
Service Quality
Let us denote service quality by s and define s = 0 to be the
service quality that minimizes the waiter's effort. The assumption
that such quality exists follows from the observation that below some
quality level, reducing quality is in fact costly for the waiter. For
example, being too slow and bringing the food cold may result in a
requirement to heat the food, which causes the waiter more effort than
bringing the food hot in the first place. Similarly, being rude may be
more costly than just being unfriendly.
Since service quality has no natural scale, we can scale it as we
wish. I choose to scale it in a way that makes the tip linear with
service quality. (5) That is, choose s = 1 to represent an arbitrary
quality level that is better than s = 0. Denote the tip left for s = 0
as [T.sub.0] and the tip left for s = 1 as [T.sub.0] + T. Now define s =
2 to be the quality level that results in a tip of [T.sub.0] + 2T and so
on. As a result, the tip is linear with service quality. Let [T.sub.0] +
sT be the tip in dollars given for service quality s, where [T.sub.0]
[greater than or equal to] 0 and T [greater than or equal to] 0. (6)
The Firm
Monitoring by the firm provides incentives for the waiter to give
good service, in addition to the incentives provided by tips. The firm
can punish bad service by dismissing the waiter or giving him bad
shifts, bad tables, or fewer tables to serve. On the other hand, it can
reward good service by giving the waiter more tables to serve and better
shifts and tables. Whatever the incentives are, the waiter cares about
their monetary implication. For simplicity, I assume that the monetary
value of the incentives for the waiter is linear with service quality.
In addition, the firm may have to pay the waiter a wage regardless of
service quality and his tip income, for example, because of minimum wage
laws. (7)
From the waiter's perspective, this means that the wage and
the incentives provided by the firm have a total value of w + [mu]s; w
is given exogenously (for example it may be the minimum wage), s is
chosen by the waiter, and [mu] is chosen by the firm. The value of [mu]
represents the intensity of monitoring by the firm. When the firm
monitors the waiters more closely (higher [mu]), its ability to punish
bad waiters and reward good waiters increases, and therefore the
monetary value of the incentives (from the waiters' perspective)
becomes steeper with service quality; that is, the waiters'
incentives to provide good service are increasing with [mu].
For example, a small investment in monitoring may be to dismiss
waiters whom a customer complains about. It is very cheap, but does not
provide many incentives for excellent service. Waiters would probably be
careful not to be too rude or careless (assuming that their utility is
strictly above their reservation utility, so they strictly prefer to
keep their job), but they would not try very hard to provide the best
service possible. A higher investment in monitoring can be to test the
waiters' knowledge of the menu occasionally and to employ a worker
whose job is to watch the waiters and rate their service quality. This
enables the firm to rank the performance of the waiters and, as a
result, to reward the best waiters by giving them better tables or
shifts or by other means.
The important thing to notice is that the cost of monitoring for
the firm is not equal to the monetary value of the incentives from the
worker's perspective. Although the waiter faces the compensation
scheme w + [mu]s, this is not the labor cost for the firm for two
reasons. First, some of the expenses associated with monitoring, such as
employing workers to monitor the waiters, are costly for the firm but
are not an income for the waiters. Second, some of the incentives faced
by the waiters are not an expense for the firm, such as giving better
shifts or tables to the best waiters.
The firm also has variable costs, for example, the cost of food and
the wages of cooks and managers. I assume that the total cost of
producing a quantity q (the number of customers served) when monitoring
intensity is [mu] is equal to
cq + [delta][[mu].sup.x]q,
where c > 0, [delta] > 0, and x > 1. The costs that are
not related to monitoring or incentives, such as minimum wages for the
waiters, the cost of food, and wages of cooks and managers, are included
in cq. The cost of monitoring and providing incentives is
[dleta][[mu].sup.x]q; this cost includes, for example, the wages of
workers who monitor the waiters. Serving more customers (higher q)
requires additional waiters and, therefore, increased monitoring costs
(if monitoring intensity is to remain constant). The cost function is
based on the assumptions that total monitoring cost is proportional to q
and that the cost of monitoring is strictly convex in monitoring
intensity (therefore, x > 1).
I assume that the demand faced by the firm is continuous and
downward sloping in price. (8) In addition, the customers'
willingness to pay is strictly increasing with service quality, and I
allow the willingness to pay to be either linear or concave with service
quality. The inverse demand is therefore a function of both the quantity
sold and service quality. The inverse demand faced by the firm is
assumed to take the following form:
p(q, s) = [alpha] - [beta]q + [phi][s.sup.y],
where [beta] > 0, [phi] > 0, [alpha] > c > 0, and 0
< y [less than or equal to] 1.
As a result, the firm's profit function is
(1) [pi](q, [mu], s) = ([alpha] - [beta]q + [phi][s.sup.y] - c -
[delta][[mu].sup.x])q.
The Waiter
The waiter derives income both from tips and from the firm: His
total income is [T.sup.0] + sT+ w + [mu]s. His effort is a function of
the service quality he provides. I assume that the effort function is
strictly convex and takes a quadratic form, e(s) = [E.sub.0] +
[E.sub.1]s + [E.sub.2][s.sup.2]. Because we defined s = 0 to be the
service quality that minimizes effort, it follows that [E.sub.1] = 0.
Strict convexity of e implies [E.sub.2] > 0. Assuming that the
waiter's utility function is quasilinear with money, his utility is
equal to (9)
v(s) = [T.sub.0] + sT + w + [mu]s - [E.sub.0] - [E.sub.2][s.sup.2].
The waiter chooses s to maximize his utility and takes To, T, w,
and 11 as given. To ensure that the individual rationality constraint (IRC) is satisfied in equilibrium (so the waiter prefers to work as a
waiter rather than to quit and find another job), a sufficient condition
is that working and providing zero service quality is better for the
waiter than his outside option. If in equilibrium he chooses to provide
a strictly positive service quality, it means that his utility from
doing so is at least the utility from choosing zero service quality and,
therefore, the IRC is satisfied. If we denote the waiter's
reservation utility by v0, then the following assumption gives a
sufficient condition for the IRC to hold:
ASSUMPTION 1. [T.sub.0] + w - [E.sub.0] [greater than or equal to]
[v.sub.0].
3. The Equilibrium
The equilibrium can be solved by using backward induction. In the
second stage, the waiter chooses which service quality to provide, given
the tip he expects and the incentives provided by the firm. The
following proposition describes his optimal choice: (10)
PROPOSITION 1. Service quality in equilibrium is s = (T +
[mu])/2[E.sub.2].
Thus, service quality is strictly increasing with both tips (7) and
monitoring intensity ([mu]); it is strictly decreasing with [E.sub.2]
because a higher [E.sub.2] corresponds to a higher marginal cost of
increasing service quality. Given the choice of service quality by the
waiter, the firm chooses the quantity it wants to sell and the intensity
of monitoring. The following proposition characterizes its optimal
choices:
PROPOSITION 2. (a) The firm's optimal choice of monitoring
intensity is given by the value of g that solves [phi]y[(T +
[mu]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y][delta]x[[mu].sup.x-1] = 0. Denote
this value by [[mu].sup.*]. There exists a unique value of [[mu].sup.*]
that is strictly positive.
(b) Optimal q is given by [q.sup.*] = [[alpha] - c -
[delta][([[mu].sup.*]).sup.y] + [phi][(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y]]/2[beta], and [q.sup.*] >
0.
The condition [phi]y[(T + [mu]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] -
[delta]x[([mu]).sup.x-1] = 0 that defines the optimal value of [mu] may
seem complicated, but is in fact intuitive. The marginal benefit from
increasing g is the increase in price that results from the improved
service quality times the quantity sold. This equals [q.sup.*][phi]y[(T
+ [mu]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y]. The marginal cost of increasing
[mu] is [q.sup.*][dleta]x[[mu].sup.x-1]. The condition above equates the
marginal benefit and the marginal cost of increasing it. How do the
monitoring intensity chosen by the firm and equilibrium service quality
depend on the tipping function of the customer? Corollary 1 provides the
answer:
COROLLARY 1. (a) [differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T =
[[mu].sup.*](1 - y)/[(x - 1) (T+ [[mu].sup.*]) + [[mu].sup.*](1 - y)].
It follows that if y = 1 then [differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T
= 0, otherwise -1 < [differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T <
0.
(b) Let [s.sup.*] be the service quality chosen by the waiter; then
[differential][s.sup.*]/[differential]T = (1 +
[differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T)/2[E.sub.2] > 0.
Part (a) of Corollary 1 suggests that when tips are more sensitive
to service quality (higher T), the firm chooses to reduce monitoring
intensity (strictly if y < 1). The increase in the incentives
provided by the customer when T goes up exceeds the effect of the
reduced monitoring, so that, in total, the waiter faces more incentives
to provide good service. This is the reason for part (b) of the
corollary, which suggests that service quality increases when T goes up,
despite the reduction in the monitoring intensity.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal choice of p (the figure
corresponds to y < 1). The increasing curve is the marginal cost (MC)
of increasing [mu], per unit of output. It starts at the origin and
increases without bound. It is strictly concave if 1 < x < 2 and
strictly convex if x > 2; the figure corresponds to x < 2, but the
only important thing for the analysis below is that MC is increasing
with [mu]. M[B.sup.0] is the marginal benefit per unit of output from
increasing p, when T = [T.sup.0]. It is equal to the increase in the
price (holding the quantity sold unchanged) that results from increasing
[mu] by one unit (the increase in price is a result of the higher
service quality chosen by the waiter when [mu] is higher). M[B.sup.1] is
the corresponding graph for T = [T.sup.1], where [T.sup.1] >
[T.sup.0]. Since y < 1, M[B.sup.1] is below M[B.sup.0]. Notice that
MB is strictly positive when [mu] = 0. In addition, when y < 1, MB is
strictly decreasing with [mu] and it approaches zero as [mu] approaches
infinity (when y = 1, MB = [phi]/2[E.sub.2] for all values of [mu]).
Since MC is strictly increasing, MB is nonincreasing, and MB is higher
than MC for [mu] = 0, there is a unique intersection between MB and MC
at a strictly positive value of [mu] (defined as [MATHEMATICAL
EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] for [T.sup.0] and [MATHEMATICAL
EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] for [T.sup.1]), which is the
optimal value of [mu]. Figure 1 illustrates that when T increases,
[[mu].sup.*] decreases (for y < 1), as suggested by Corollary 1.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
How does a change in T affect the equilibrium quantity and price?
The following corollary provides the answers:
COROLLARY 2. (a) Equilibrium quantity is strictly increasing with
T: [differential][q.sup.*]/[differential]T =
[delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1]/2[beta] > 0.
(b) [differential][p.sup.*]/[differential]T = [(1 +
2[differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T)
[delta]x([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1]]/2, which can be either positive or
negative.
How does T affect profits? The following proposition suggests that
profits are unambiguously increasing with T:
PROPOSITION 3. Equilibrium profits are strictly increasing with T.
4. Discussion
It follows from Proposition 3 that the firm wants T to be as high
as possible. This means that the firm should encourage customers to tip
badly for poor service rather than to always tip generously. Moreover,
any strictly positive T yields higher profits than T = 0. Assuming that
people tip more for good service (which is supported by empirical
evidence, see Lynn and McCall 2000b), this implies that if the firm has
the option whether to implement tipping or not, it should choose to use
tips. (11) The reason is twofold: First, tipping provides incentives to
the waiters and enables the firm to reduce its costly monitoring of
them. Second, even after the firm reduces its monitoring intensity, the
incentives faced by the waiters are higher than without tips, as
suggested by Corollary I. As a result, equilibrium service quality is
higher when tipping exists, increasing the consumers' willingness
to pay and the firm's profits.
This observation is consistent with evidence from the history of
tipping. In the late 19th century, when tipping began to be established
in the United States, the owners of restaurants and hotels were often
blamed (by those who disliked tipping) as the ones who promoted the
custom (Segrave 1998). An editorial on page 6 of the New York Times in
1899, for example, claimed that the tipping practice is a wretched
system that was originated and perpetuated
not by its victims, the men who give and take tips, but by those who
profit by it every year to the extent of millions more than a few.
The real takers of tips are the hotel and restaurant proprietors,
the owners of steamships, the offices and stock-holders of railways,
and a dozen other classes of employers ... every tip saves the
payment of wages to an equal amount ... This throws a flood of light
on the frequent assertions that the abolition of the tipping system
is impossible. (12)
Indeed, the evidence in several industries implies that where
tipping became common, wages were reduced to reflect the presence of
tipping, although it is not clear whether the reduction in wages was the
same amount as the tips (Segrave 1998). (13) But even if the claim that
wages were driven down by the amount of tips is true, this still does
not explain why restaurants, hotels, and others bad an incentive to
implement tipping. For the customer, having to add a tip is the same as
an increased price (when the increase is by the same amount as the tip).
(14) Consequently, the owner could increase prices instead of
encouraging people to tip and get the increased revenues directly rather
than by reducing the workers' wages. The analysis in this article
suggests that the reason why firms chose to support tipping rather than
to increase prices may be that they realized that tipping provides
incentives for good service, resulting in better service quality and
reduced monitoring costs. (15)
The model may also provide the explanation for another puzzle.
Waiters often earn income (tips and wages) that exceeds their
reservation wages. The reason is that usually the firm cannot take the
tips away from the waiters, and wages are often required by law to be
above a certain minimum. The firm can increase its profits if it can
take this economic rent from the waiters. Different firms tried
different methods to extract this economic rent: In some cases, waiters
paid for the privilege to work and receive tips (Segrave 1998; Seligman
1998).
Today, many restaurants require that the waiters split the tips
with other workers, for example, with the busboys. This enables the
restaurant to pay lower wages to the busboys and is a way of extracting
some of the economic rent from the waiters. In the United States,
however, these arrangements, called "tip outs," are limited by
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Tipped employees cannot be forced by
employers to share tips with employees who do not ordinarily participate
in tip-pooling arrangements (such as janitors and dishwashers). In
addition, if tip-pooling exceeds 15% of the tips, the Department of
Labor will investigate to ensure that the pooling agreement is
"customary and reasonable" (Wessels 1997).
Similarly, the firm can reduce the waiters' economic rent by
giving each waiter fewer tables to serve or requiring him to do
nontipped activities as well. Giving waiters only a few tables, however,
does not contribute to the restaurant's profits beyond a certain
point, so it reduces the waiters' economic rents but does not
transfer them to the restaurant (instead, it simply reduces efficiency).
Similarly, asking a skilled waiter to either perform tasks that can be
done by cheaper labor (e.g., clean tables or dishes) or that require
different skills (e.g., being responsible for purchasing and inventory)
is inefficient and, therefore, can transfer the economic rents of the
waiters to the restaurant only partially.
There is a simpler way, however, to extract all the rent: Add a 15%
service charge to the bill (that replaces the tip), pay the waiters
their reservation wages, and keep the rest (or, alternatively, increase
prices by 15% and declare that the restaurant has a policy of no
tipping). Why do U.S. restaurants retain tipping and do not use this
method? The answer may be that they are aware of the incentives that
tips provide for good service, and they realize that tipping saves
costly monitoring. Customers, at least, seem to be aware of the positive
effect of tips on service quality; most of them want to retain their
freedom in choosing how much to reward the waiter and oppose replacing
tipping with service charges. (16)
In Europe, however, the situation is different. Many restaurants
impose a service charge instead of allowing the customer to choose the
tip. The model suggests that this policy increases monitoring costs and
reduces profits. Why do European restaurants adopt this policy? There
are at least five possible explanations. (17) First, European firms
might have made a mistake. Second, they may be afraid that too many
customers would act opportunistically and will not tip. (18) Third, it
seems that in Europe, pay is less linked to performance than in the
United States more generally, possibly reflecting differences in values
and attitudes. This might be another reason why tipping is more popular
in the United States than in Europe. (19) Fourth, tipping is often
thought to create different classes (see, e.g., Segrave 1998); European
countries may have more resistance to this because of different values.
(20) Lynn, Zinkhan, and Harris (1993), for example, found that tipping
was less prevalent in countries with a low tolerance for status and
power differences between people.
Finally, the reason for implementing service charges in European
restaurants may be to extract an economic rent enjoyed by the waiters
when they receive tips. This reason is more likely if the firm is
obligated to pay minimum wages regardless of tips because then the
waiter's income (and therefore the potential economic rent) is much
higher. Indeed, in Israel, when a court decided that waiters should
receive minimum wages in addition to tips, many restaurants replaced
tipping with service charges (Sinay 2001). Whether minimum wage laws are
indeed the reason for the differences between the tipping practices in
the United States and in Europe, however, remains a topic for future
research. (21)
5. Conclusion
The article explores how the optimal choice of monitoring by the
firm is affected by external incentives that the worker faces. The
theoretical model uses the example of tipping, but it also applies in
other contexts. One such context is the satisfaction workers derive from
working well (known as intrinsic motivation). Another context is when
workers want to build reputation in order to increase their value in the
job market.
The analysis suggests that tips have the potential to motivate
workers to provide good service quality, and, by doing so, also to
reduce the need for costly monitoring of workers by the firm. The extent
to which tips realize this potential depends on the sensitivity of tips
to service quality. The higher this sensitivity is, the more motivation
tips provide for the workers, and the more the firm can reduce its
costly monitoring. As a result, the firm's profits are increasing
with the sensitivity of tips to service quality, meaning that the firm
should encourage customers not to tip for bad service. In addition, the
firm's profits are higher when tips are used than when a fixed
service charge is imposed. An exception to this role occurs when tipped
workers receive income that exceeds their reservation wages. By
replacing tips with a service charge, the firm may then capture the
workers' economic rent and, in this case, a service charge may
increase the firm's profits compared to tips.
In the context of intrinsic motivation, the conclusion is that
firms should try to increase the sensitivity of the worker's
satisfaction to his performance level, for example, by providing him
more feedback about his performance. This will improve the worker's
effort, reduce the costs of monitoring, and increase profits.
The theoretical contribution in this article is a first step in a
direction that warrants future research. One interesting idea is to
examine the case of a worker who has two tasks, one of which carries
external incentives and another that does not. For example, professors
are required to teach and to do research. While research output affects
significantly the professor's reputation and, therefore, his salary
(whether he stays in the same institution or not), teaching quality does
not affect his salary significantly in most research-oriented
institutions. It would be interesting to examine what the equilibrium
and optimal monitoring of the two tasks look like in this case.
Additional interesting questions are whether professors spend too much
time on research relative to teaching because of the external incentives
mentioned and whether business schools, in which teaching quality is
considered very important, monitor teaching more carefully than other
departments. (22)
Another interesting idea for future research is to test empirically
the predictions of the model. This seems to be easier with respect to
the tipping example than with intrinsic motivation. How do monitoring
costs and service quality compare between restaurants that use tipping
and those that use service charges? (23) In a restaurant that imposes a
fixed-percentage gratuity for large parties, as is common in U.S.
restaurants, do waiters give small parties better service than they
provide to large parties?
It is also interesting to examine more closely the policy of firms
in several countries to replace tips with service charges. When did
European restaurants start to replace tips with service charges? Why do
they adopt this policy? Does it enable the restaurant to capture an
economic rent enjoyed by the waiters when they receive tips? If so, what
are the main differences that cause tipping to be prevalent in the
United States but not in Europe: Different minimum wage laws? Different
attitudes of customers toward the tipping custom? As a challenging
economic phenomenon that has hardly been explored by economists, tipping
offers many opportunities for future research; the above questions are
only a partial list (for a more complete list, see Azar 2003b).
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The waiter chooses s to maximize v(s) =
[T.sub.0] + sT + w + [mu]s - [E.sub.0] - [E.sub.2][s.sup.2]. The
first-order condition is given by T + [mu] 2[E.sub.2]s = 0, or s = (T +
[mu])/2[E.sub.2]. The second-order condition is satisfied because
[E.sub.2] > 0. QED.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Substituting s = (T + [mu])/2[E.sub.2] in
Equation 1 we get
[pi](q, [mu]) = [[alpha] - [beta]q + [phi][((T +
[mu])/2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] - c - [delta][[mu].sup.x]q.
The optimal values [[mu].sup.*] and [q.sup.*] have to satisfy the
following first-order conditions (subscripts denote partial
derivatives):
(A1) [[pi].sub.[mu]] = [q.sup.*][phi]y[(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] -
[q.sup.*][dleta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1] = 0, and
(A2) [[pi].sub.q] = [alpha] - 2[beta][q.sup.*] + [phi][(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-2]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] - c - [delta]
[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x] = 0.
The second-order sufficient conditions are
(A3) [[pi].sub.qq]([[mu].sup.*], [q.sup.*]) = 2[beta] < 0,
(A4) [[pi].sub.[mu][mu]]([q.sup.*], [[mu].sup.*]) = [q.sup.*]
[phi]y(y - 1)[(T + [[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-2]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] -
[q.sup.*][delta]x(x - 1)[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-2] < 0, and
(A5) [[pi].sub.[mu][mu]]([q.sup.*],
[[mu].sup.*])[[pi].sub.qq]([q.sup.*], [[mu].sup.*]) -
[[[[pi].sub.[mu]q]([q.sup.*], [[mu].sup.*])].sup.2] > 0.
Since [alpha] > c, the firm can always make strictly positive
profits by choosing [mu] = 0 and a small positive q; therefore,
[q.sup.*] [not equal to] 0 because choosing q = 0 yields zero profits.
Since [q.sup.*] [not equal to] 0, divide Equation A1 by [q.sup.*] to get
that Z [equivalent to] [phi]y[(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] -
[dleta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1] = 0. To see that the value of
[[mu].sup.*] that solves this equation exists and is unique and strictly
positive, notice that Z([[mu].sup.*] = 0) > 0, and as [[mu].sup.*]
approaches [infinity], Z goes to -[infinity] (recall that x > 1 and 0
< y [less than or equal to] 1). It is easy to verify that Z is
continuous and strictly decreasing with [[mu].sup.*]; it follows that
there is a unique and strictly positive value of it* for which Z = 0.
From Equation A2 it follows that [q.sup.*] = [[alpha] - c -
[delta][([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x] + [phi][(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y]]/2[beta]. Since we did not
incorporate the restriction q [greater than or equal to] 0 in the
maximization problem, we have to make sure that this value of [q.sup.*]
is not negative. Since [alpha] > c, a sufficient condition for
[q.sup.*] > 0 is [phi][(T + [[mu].sup.*]).sup.y]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y]
[greater than or equal to] [delta][([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x]. Using Equation
A1, [phi][(T + [[mu].sup.*]).sup.y]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] =
[delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1](T + [[mu].sup.*])/y. That is, the
sufficient condition becomes [delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1](T +
[[mu].sup.*])/y [greater than or equal to]
[delta][([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x]. Divide both sides by
[sdelta][([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1] to get the condition x(T +
[[mu].sup.*])/y [greater than or equal to] [[mu].sup.*]. Since x > 1
[greater than or equal to] y and T [greater than or equal to] 0, this is
satisfied.
Next, consider the second-order conditions. Notice that Equation A3
is satisfied because [beta] > 0. In addition,
[[pi].sub.[mu]q]([q.sup.*], [[mu].sup.*]) = [phi]y[(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] -
[delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1]; since [q.sup.*] [not equal to] 0, it
follows from Equation A1 that [[pi].sub.[mu]q]([q.sup.*], [[mu].sup.*])
= 0. Therefore, if Equation A4 is satisfied, the inequality in Equation
A5 follows immediately. Using Equation A1, we get that
[[pi].sub.[mu][mu]]([q.sup.*], [[mu].sup.*]) =
[q.sup.*][delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sub.x-1][(y - 1)/ (T + [[mu].sup.*]) -
(x - 1)/[[mu].sup.*]]. Therefore, the sign of
[[pi].sub.[mu][mu]]([q.sup.*], [[mu].sup.*]) is equal to the sign of [(y
- 1)/(T + [[mu].sup.*]) - (x - 1)/ [[mu].sup.*]] = [(y - 1)[[mu].sup.*]
- (x - 1)(T + [[mu].sup.*])]/[[mu].sup.*](T + [[mu].sup.*]) =
[[[mu].sup.*](y - x) - T(x - 1)]/[[mu].sup.*](T + [[mu].sup.*]) < 0,
where the last inequality follows from T [greater than or equal to] 0,
[[mu].sup.*] > 0, and x > 1 [greater than or equal to] y.
Therefore, all the second-order conditions are satisfied. This completes
the proof. QED.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. From Proposition 2 it follows that
H([[mu].sup.*], T) = [phi]y[(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] -
[delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1] = 0. Using the implicit function
theorem, [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]. Notice
that [H.sub.T] = [phi]y(y - 1) [(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-2]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] = (y -
1)[delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1]/(T + [[mu].sup.*]), using Proposition
2a. Similarly, [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.].
Substituting and simplifying we then get that [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION
NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.], which is equal to zero when y = 1 and is
between -1 and 0 (not including the endpoints) when y < 1 (recall
that x > 1). This completes part (a), Part (b) follows immediately:
[s.sup.*] = (T + [[mu].sup.*])/2[E.sub.2] implies that
[differential][s.sup.*]/[differential]T = (1 +
[differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T)/2[E.sub.2] > 0. QED.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2. (a) Recall that [s.sup.*] = [[alpha] c -
[delta][([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x] + [phi][(T + [[mu].sup.*]).sup.y]/
[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y]]/2[beta], and that la* is derived from an equation
that does not involve [q.sup.*] (see Proposition 2a). This implies that
[differential][q.sup.*]/[differential]T
= [[phi]y[(T + [[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1](1 + [differential][[mu].sup.*]/
[differential]T)/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] - [delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1]
([differenaitla][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T)]/2[beta]. Substituting
[phi]y[(T + [[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] =
[delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1]] (this equation is a simple
rearrangement of Proposition 2a), it follows that [differential]
[q.sup.*]/[differential]T = [deltaz]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1]/2[beta]
> 0.
(b) Notice that equilibrium price satisfies [p.sup.*]([q.sup.*],
[s.sup.*]) = [alpha] - [beta][q.sup.*] + [phi][([s.sup.*]).sup.y] =
[[alpha] + [phi][([s.sup.*]).sup.y] + c +
[delta][([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x]]/2. Consequently,
[delta][p.sup.*]/[differential]T =
[[phi]y[([s.sup.*]).sup.y-1][differential][s.sup.*]/[differential]T +
[delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1][differential][[mu].sup.*]/
[differential]T]/2. Substituting [s.sup.*] = (T +
[[mu].sup.*])/2[E.sub.2] and [differential][s.sup.*]/[differential]T =
(1 + [differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T)/2[E.sub.2], we get
[differential][p.sup.*]/[differential]T = [(1 +
[differential][[mu].sup.*]/ [differential]T)[phi]y[(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] +
[delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1][differential][[mu].sup.*]/
[differential]T]/2. Using again [phi]y[(T + [[mu].sup.*]).supy-1]/
[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] = [delta]x[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1] (from
Proposition 2a), we get [differential][p.sup.*]/[differential]T = [(1 +
2[differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T)[delta]x
[([[mu].sup.*]).sup.x-1]]/2. The sign of this expression is equal to the
sign of (1 + 2[differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T). Recall from
Corollary 1a that [differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T =
-[[mu].sup.*](1 - y)/[(x - 1)(T + [[mu].sup.*]) + [[mu].sup.*](1 - y)].
When y is close to 1 and x is not,
[differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T is close to zero and
[differential][p.sup.*]/[differential]T > 0. When x is close to 1 and
y is not, [differential][[mu].sup.*]/[differential]T is close to -1 and
[differential][p.sup.*]/[differential]T < 0. This completes part (b).
QED.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Recall that [pi](q, [mu]) = [[alpha] -
[beta]q + [phi][((T + [mu])/2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] - c -
[delta][[mu].sup.x]]q. Using the envelope theorem, d[[pi].sup.8]/dT =
[differential][[pi].sup.*]/[differential]T = [q.sup.*][phi]y[(T +
[[mu].sup.*]).sup.y-1]/[(2[E.sub.2]).sup.y] > 0. QED.
I thank Eddie Dekel, Jaehong Kim, James MacDonald, Robert Porter,
William Rogerson, Michael Whinston, Asher Wolinsky, participants in the
Industrial Organization Society Conference in Boston (2003), and
especially James Dana for helpful discussions and comments. I am also
grateful to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments that
helped to improve this article. Financial support from the Center for
the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University is
gratefully acknowledged.
(1) The extent of tipping has to be estimated because tips are
often unreported for tax purposes (according to Hemenway 1993, the only
income with a lower compliance rate is illegal income). Sales in the
United States in 2002 of food and alcoholic beverages to consumers in
full-service restaurants, bars and taverns, and lodging places, were
$146.7, $13.3, and $18.6 billion, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2002;
the numbers for 2002 are a projection). Summing the three numbers and
multiplying by an average tip of 15% yields annual tips of $26.8
billion.
(2) In particular, I find it more concrete to talk about a specific
tipping occasion, although the analysis and the ideas are applicable to
tipping in general. Tipping in restaurants is the natural candidate,
since it is the most common form of tipping. I therefore use firms and
restaurants interchangeably; the same applies to workers and waiters.
(3) I thank James MacDonald for this example.
(4) For an excellent review of the empirical literature on tipping
see Lynn and McCall (2000a).
(5) This is done in order to make the model traceable and to
provide a precise solution to the model. The same qualitative results,
however, hold more generally as long as the tip is weakly increasing
with service quality.
(6) When T = 0, we cannot scale the service quality according to
the tips given, because the tip is always To. In this case, I scale the
service quality according to the incentives provided by the firm for
different quality levels in such a way that these incentives are linear
in quality.
(7) In the United States the current federal law says that tipped
employees should receive at least $2.13 an hour, and their wage and tips
together should be at least equal to the minimum wage (which is
currently $5.15 an hour). Several states adopted laws that require
paying tipped workers the regular minimum wages regardless of the tips
they earn.
(8) This precludes the case of perfect competition but is
consistent with many industry structures, for example, if the firm is a
monopoly, or if the industry is an oligopoly with differentiated
products. Restaurants differ in their location, the food they serve,
their quality level, and sometimes in their opening hours, so the
assumption of product differentiation is clearly reasonable in the
restaurant industry.
(9) In the context of intrinsic motivation, s represents how well
the worker performs his task and T stands for the degree to which good
performance increases the worker's satisfaction. To is the degree
of this satisfaction when s = 0.
(10) All the proofs are in the Appendix.
(11) An exception to this rule may occur when workers enjoy
economic rents if tips are used and the firm can capture the rent by
imposing a service charge that replaces tips. More on this below.
(12) Topics of the Times, The New York Times, November 21, 1899, p.
6. The quote is adopted from Segrave (1998).
(13) One might expect prices to fall when restaurants' costs
go down due to lower wages. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any
available data on restaurant prices before and after tipping was
implemented in that restaurant. Customers' reactions to tipping
from that period, however, suggest that prices did not fall (see Scott
1916; Segrave 1998; Azar 2004b).
(14) If people exhibit bounded rationality, framing effects and
mental accounting may make tips seem less expensive than increased
prices (when the prices increase by the same amount as the tips). I
assume here that people are rational and treat tips and increased prices
in the same way.
(15) Today, another benefit for the firms of implementing tipping
is that the waiters usually do not report their entire tip income to the
tax authorities (see Hemenway 1993). Consequently, the net income of the
waiters is higher than what it would be if the firm paid them the same
amount (of the tips) as wages. The firm, in turn, can capture at least
some of this additional surplus by various means (see the discussion
below). While this reason might support tipping today, it cannot explain
why U.S. firms supported tipping in the 19th century, since income taxes
were introduced in the U.S. only in the 20th century. I thank an
anonymous referee for raising this important point.
(16) In an online poll at www.tipping.org, a website dedicated to
tipping, one of the questions posted was "Would you tolerate higher
prices at a restaurant in order to do away with tips?" On April 2,
2003, out of 1633 voters, 26% answered positively, 56% negatively, and
the rest answered "maybe" or "unsure." Service
charges and higher prices are equivalent from the customer's
perspective, since both are an expense for the customer and do not
provide incentives to the waiters.
(17) These explanations may also be the reason why other countries
in which tipping is not common (such as Japan, Australia, and the
Scandinavian countries) do not adopt tipping.
(18) This explanation is not very plausible, since it raises the
following question: Why would European customers behave so differently
from American customers, who rarely stiff according to empirical
evidence? (Bodvarsson and Gibson 1997).
(19) I owe this idea to an anonymous referee.
(20) I thank an anonymous referee for making this point. As this
referee suggests, status may also be the reason why some occupations are
tipped while others are not: Those who receive tips tend to work in
lower status jobs, and this might explain why we do not tip doctors,
lawyers, and university lecturers, among others, despite the advantages
of tipping in improving service quality and increasing the firm's
profits. A full discussion of the reasons for different tipping
practices in different occupations is very interesting but is beyond the
scope of this article; the interested reader is referred to Azar
(2003a), who discusses this topic in detail.
(21) Ideally, we would like to compare laws, court decisions (if
applicable), and actual practices regarding whether tipped employees
should receive minimum wages in addition to tips between the United
States and European countries (as well as other countries). If minimum
wages are imposed in tipped occupations, we should also consider the
relative level of minimum wages. We would then want to estimate the
total income of waiters and compare it to income in similar occupations
to see whether service charges are used in those countries in which
waiters enjoy particularly high economic rents (if tips are to be used).
In addition, it would be interesting to examine whether changes in
tipping practices followed changes in legislation about minimum wages of
tipped employees. This project is beyond the scope of the current
article and will most likely require a team of authors who have control
of all the relevant languages.
(22) I owe these interesting ideas to an anonymous referee.
(23) One should take into account, however, that the decision
whether to impose service charges or to use tips is endogenous and,
therefore, may reflect the characteristics of the restaurant in terms of
its service quality, monitoring costs, and so on.
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Ofer H. Azar, Department of Economics, Northwestern University,
2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. USA; E-mail
o-azar@northwestern.edu.
Received June 2003; accepted October 2003.