Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy.

Parsons, George R.

Somewhere along a continuum running from private to state owned property lies common property ownership, what Daniel Bromley refers to as common property regimes. A common property regime is a group of individuals that own and manage a resource collectively, typically a small community. Such regimes, common in developing countries, manage common lands, forests, water resources, and fisheries. Making the Commons Work is a collection of articles by scholars concerned with understanding how these regimes operate. How did they evolve? What are their salient characteristics? Why do some fail and others not? Is it good economic policy to always replace such regimes with private property regimes?

The collection of articles was originally presented at a conference sponsored by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. The sixteen contributing authors include economists, political scientists, geographers, and sociologists. The book is divided into three parts. Part I is a theoretical framework for analyzing common property regimes. Part II is a collection of diverse case studies. Part III is an assessment of methods used to study common property regimes and an effort toward developing a more general theory for common property institutions. The editorial work is superb. A large number of authors with diverse analytical approaches and what seem vastly different experiences have been brought together in a coherent and meaningful way. Such continuity and "tightness" is unusual for a case study collection. Perhaps I should not be surprised by a successful cooperative effort by a group studying common property.

Part I has three chapters. The first, by editor Bromley, is about concepts and misconceptions. Consider the following passage [p. 4]. "There is no such thing as a common property resource; there are only resources controlled and managed as common property, or as state property, or as private property. Or - and this is where confusion persists in the literature - there are resources over which no property rights have been recognized. We call these latter 'open-access resources'. . ." Open access resources and common property regimes are not the same as is often thought. The former institution (or noninstitution) is nearly certain to misuse a resource for well known reasons. The latter, in some circumstances, may be the most efficient institutional arrangement for managing a resource, and should be thought of as a class of property ownership.

In Chapter 2, C. Ford Runge discusses the conditions under which common property regimes arise and lays out the "comparative institutional advantages of joint-use rights." Three critical conditions are high transactions costs of privatization, variety of unpredictable natural events, and high levels of individual risk. He also cites the high opportunity cost associated with switching regimes. I found the arguments in this chapter to be the least persuasive of all the conceptual chapters and the chapter most out of balance with the rest of the book.

In Chapter 3, Ronald Oakerson lays out an impressive framework for analyzing common property regimes. Each of the succeeding case studies follows his framework. It is really the centerpiece around which the case studies are organized. I must say that this chapter goes a long way toward giving the book continuity and analytical structure. The framework calls for the description of a common property resource regime along four lines: (1) physical and technological characteristics of the resource, (2) decision-making arrangements, (3) pattern of interaction among users, and (4) outcomes. I am inclined to discourage this type of "command and control" approach to analysis but it has worked in this setting with only modest cost to creativity.

Part II is the collection of eight case studies, far too many to go into any detail here. The coverage of these studies includes common lands in Japan, common field agriculture in the Andes and Medieval England, forest resources in Niger, marine fisheries in Turkey and Brazil, irrigation in India, mountain pastures in Morocco, and common lands in India. The authors faithfully following Oakerson's framework. The chapters are largely descriptive and historical but all have analytical content.

Part III includes two conceptual pieces. In the first chapter David Feeny discusses the pros and cons of different methodologies for studying common property regimes and makes some explicit recommendations for future research. He draws, in part, from what was learned in the case studies. Here are some of his messages: (1) use case studies and historical analyses to form explicit hypotheses, (2) develop a longitudinal data base on different management regimes to test hypotheses and evaluate performance, (3) use laboratory experiments to aid in testing hypotheses and to assist in experimentation with new institutional designs, and (4) develop and monitor field experiments. He calls for a need to sharpen theory, better understand natural systems, and increase multidisciplinary work.

In the closing chapter Elinor Ostrom presents a theory of the origin, survival, and performance of common property regimes. She uses the case studies as evidence to develop her political-economic theory which draws on large body of past research. Common property regimes may originate where there is a small group of homogeneous users living near an economically important and easily delineated resource and who have an ability to exclude outside users. The regime is likely to survive if it has simple rules, enforcement carried out by "officials" and resource users, has a decision-making structure that is adaptive, includes explicit ownership rights for the users, has an ability to effectively deal with larger governmental organizations, and faces no significant population or resource changes. Performance of regimes are enhanced when the users of the resource and owners of the common property are approximately the same groups, when the allocation of resources among the owners is sensitive to variable costs and benefits within the group, and accurate information about resource characteristics and use patterns is available.

I recommend that future research involve studies that attempt to approximate controlled experiments. Identify common property and a private property regimes that involve similar users and similar resources. Evaluate the relative efficiency and equity of the regimes.

George R. Parsons University of Delaware