The Business Cycle: Theories and Evidence.
Wood, J. Stuart
One might churlishly observe the omission of the word
"Some" preceding the word "Theories." This book
consists of the texts of presentations (sometimes with substantial
changes between presentation and publication) and commentaries made at
the Sixteenth Annual Economic Policy Conference of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis in October, 1991. The framework is that of Monetarist,
Keynesian, "New-Keynesian," and "Real Business
Cycle" theories, based on aggregate economic theories. All of the
papers and comments based in the naive ignorance of Hayek's
Scientism and the Study of Society, "The Pretense of
Knowledge," and his works on business cycles. The Austrian
framework, and other theories linking monetary expansion and
malinvestment, are completely ignored.
The Bank's President Thomas C. Melzer set the tone of the
conference: ignorance and controversy regarding the nature of business
cycles and the forces that drive them cause policy actions taken by
government to have unanticipated and undesired effects. An economist
more "maverick" (in Mr. Melzer's word) or
"crackpot" (in Kenneth Arrow's word) would note that
Mises and Hayek, two writers on the business cycle whose contributions
are completely ignored in this volume, would not be surprised at all by
such contrary policy effects. All of our authors are amazed that
empirical studies of the macro-economic variables which are modeled cast
no light on the causes of business cycles. They are secure in their
ignorance of what Mises, Hayek, and Buchanan have taught us about
unintended consequences of government policy.
An uncredited Preface does a good job in a few pages of summarizing
the main points of the various presentations.
The keynote chapter is "What is a Business Cycle?" by
Victor Zarnowitz, who presents in a historical framework his thoughts
about business cycles, and attempts to reach a single definition of the
cycle by studying empirical data relating to cycles. Zarnowitz also
compares international business cycles to American cycles, providing a
very useful context. Because of its comprehensive consideration of the
analysis of empirical data regarding business cycles, this is a very
informative paper, providing a wealth of description of the symptoms of
business cycles. Zarnowitz discusses cyclical variables,
"exogenous" variables, some of the effects of money, shocks,
leads and lags, and co-movements and amplitudes. But in a bibliography
spanning six pages, he gives no mention to Mises, Hayek, Haberler, or
Rothbard, or any other writers in that tradition. In my view, this is a
devastating omission, for it denies access to what appears to some to be
the most successful and comprehensive analysis of the business cycle.
James H. Stock comments on Zarnowitz's paper, mostly complaining
about the NBER's dating chronology, which is based on different
data series, a telling criticism. Stock also suggests more intensive and
detailed study of individual cycles to ascertain changes in their
mechanisms, a very intelligent suggestion.
The second paper is by David Laidler, "The Cycle Before
New-Classical Economics." Laidler follows a historical path in this
paper, beginning with the Multiplier-Accelerator Theory (I heard Sir
John Hicks recant the accelerator model as an unfortunate mis-direction
at a conference in the late 70s), continuing through a discussion of the
Monetarist theory, to a discussion of the Phillips curve and
"sticky" prices. Laidler's chapter concludes with a
mathematical appendix providing the generic models of the
multiplier-accelerator theory and the monetarist model. Laidler lays out
the framework of what he calls "modern" business cycle theory
as predominantly reflecting real shocks to the economy. He falls to
follow up the most interesting observation of his paper, however, when
he merely mentions that Martin Bailey's National Income and the
Price Level included a chapter on "Expectations and Adjustment to
Change."
Ben S. Beranke provides commentary on Laidler's paper from the
standpoint of the contributions of monetarism to business cycle
understanding, and then compares and contrasts the monetarist criticisms
of the Keynesian view with those of the Real Business Cycle approach.
One who believes that monetary factors do have a profound influence on
the occurrence of business cycles will be gratified at this attention
which monetary factors are getting, but somewhat frustrated that the
detailed mechanism of the concatenation of individual decisions receives
so little shrift due to the emphasis on Walrasian general equilibrium
theorizing.
The third paper in the book is "For a Return to Pragmatism"
by Olivier Jean Blanchard, a somewhat different paper from what he
presented to the actual conference. Blanchard argues that what is needed
is successful policies that bring about intended effects; in the absence
of a correct theory of business cycles, of course, one cannot know in
advance which policy is going to have the desired effect, and one takes
a substantial chance of making things worse. Blanchard also takes a
historical approach in describing the theoretical changes which have
occurred in the "mainstream" approach to business cycle
analysis within the standard macro-economic paradigm. Blanchard provides
a pointed and vigorous criticism of the many useless directions of
recent research, and suggests integrating views which he thinks would
aid understanding the economic system. Since this paper was not
presented at the conference, there is no comment.
Ray C. Fair presents "The Cowles Commission Approach, Real
Business Cycle Theories, and New-Keynesian Economics." As do all
the participants, he decries the lack of empirical testing of the modern
alternative (real) models of cycles. After a description of the
"Cowles Commission Approach", which consisted of the
specification, estimation, and analysis and testing of structural
econometric models, Fair describes the transformation of macroeconomic models from research tools to business forecasting tools, which in the
view of Lucas, ruined models for the purpose of understanding and policy
research. Fair then criticizes the Real Business Cycle theories which
have resulted from Lucas's critique because they neglect the
comprehensive understanding of the economy pursued by the Cowles
Commission Approach. Fair also complains that the New-Keynesian approach
has moved macroeconomics away from its proper econometric basis.
In his comments, Arnold Zellner argues that the models used in his
analysis are superior to the Cowles-type approaches recommended by Fair.
Benjamin M. Friedman then asks, "How Does It Matter?" and
supports an activist fiscal and monetary policy on the part of
government, which he believes could have significant success in opposing
the business cycle. Friedman wants to do good, and believes that desire
to be sufficient to achieve success. Friedman
believes that "Price inflation . . . also can and does occur on
a time scale different from that which defines most business cycle
research" (a problem which causes a great deal of misunderstanding
of the causes of cycles), and, "inflation can and does arise from
causes not directly related to the business cycle." (But he does
not support this assertion, which may be incorrect). Friedman traces the
relationship between main stream business-cycle theory and economic
history. Friedman argues that the apparent differences between policy
prescriptions of supply-side versus demand-side theories really are
chimerical, depending more upon the assumptions underlying the theories
than upon differences in real effects. He thinks one stumbling block in
the successful implementation of contra-cyclical policy is the
mis-definition of "income," and he suggests that the
heterogeneity of the individual economic roles complicates policy
prescriptions. He concludes that "real business cycle"
theories are not really as helpful as has been believed. Friedman
discusses some very interesting questions from a different point of
view. He notes the problems of defining the quantities which are parts
of the theory, and notes that the difficulty in specification assures
that monetary policy cannot be neutral, so we might as well pursue it
actively. He invokes the mantra of "expectations" which he
ascribes to Keynes's General Theory; but Friedman thinks of
"expectations" as the unified single "expectation"
of the hive-mind, not the heterogeneous uncoordinated expectations of
Keynes's individual market participants. This precludes his
carrying the concept very far.
Michael Darby provides the most strenuous opposition to
Friedman's views in his comment, pointing out the utter failure of
government policies intended to stabilize the economy and concluding
that the disrepute in which counter-cyclical policy is presently held is
appropriate and beneficial, because "economists . . . are no longer
promising a cure that in actuality makes things worse."
In "Deja Vu All Over Again", Alan S. Blinder tries to
summarize the conference and the underlying debates among all the
factions in the context of his professional life. He provides a useful
summary of positions and a neat chart which doctoral students will find
invaluable.
Herschel I. Grossman comments about "Business Cycle Developments
and the Agenda for Business Cycle Research." In a
characteristically serious historical review of events and cycle
research during his lifetime, Grossman suggests that a return to the old
concept of Political Economy would prove fruitful in understanding why
business cycles occur. It is very frustrating to observe the concept of
continuing governmental expansion of the quantity of money seething unremarked under the placid surface of Grossman's analysis.
The last paper is yet another professional autobiography disguised as
a summarizing commentary, by Michael Parkin, titled "Where Do We
Stand?", which reviews the ever-changing pro- and anti-Keynesian
debates. Parkin supports the real-business-cycle approach and believes
it has been misunderstood and misrepresented. He suggests that it is not
so important "which [policy] instrument [is assigned] to which
target, with what intensities and timing" but rather, he thinks
that what is important is the details "concerning the way in which
policy makers react to the evolving economy and the ways in which
alternative institutional arrangements . . . operate to stabilize the
economy." People magazine could not have said it better.
J. Stuart Wood Loyola University, New Orleans