Gardiner C. Means: Institutionalist and Post Keynesian.
Darity, William, Jr.
Gardiner Means is the economist whose name always will be linked to
that of Adolf Berle. Berle and Means's coauthored work The Modern
Corporation and Private Property was first published in 1932--the year
before Means was awarded his Ph.D. in economics at Harvard. The Modern
Corporation was destined to become the work that popularized the notion
that separation between ownership and control of the corporation
occurring with the development of the joint stock company has profound
implications in altering our understanding of business enterprise and,
consequently, both the economic and political character of modern
society. The collectivized nature of private property and the associated
bureaucraticization of the large-scale corporation led to the emergence
of what Means called the phenomenon of "private government",
vividly described by the authors of this recent book assessing
Means's contributions, Warren Samuels and Steven Medema.
1932 also was the year in which The Holding Company: Its Public
Significance and Regulation, which Means coauthored with James C.
Bonbright, was published--another product along with The Modern
Corporation of a remarkable six-year research project centered at
Columbia Law School. Much of Means's work throughout his long
career (he lived to be 91 years old), much of it not published in
traditional professional outlets for academic economists, was of direct
relevance to legal aspects of the regulation of industry; he even argued
for the necessity of setting constitutional limitations on corporate
entities. But out of all of his work it is his collaborative study with
Berle, The Modern Corporation, that has had the most enduring impact.
In the present volume, Warren Samuels and Steven Medema place a sharp
spotlight on Means's contributions to economic theory (rather than
policy), and they seek to identify Means's ideological place in the
discipline. As the title makes transparent they locate Means as one of
the important figures in the evolution of institutionalist economics
and, more surprisingly, Post Keynesian economics. This is not primarily
a general biography of Means's life (there are no photographs of
Means, his family, and colleagues at the middle of the book); the bulk
of the biographical material is concentrated in a mere two pages. This
book is largely an intellectual biography of Means and a social history
of the response in the economics profession to Means's work. The
authors draw heavily upon the research on Means undertaken by the
economist Fred Lee, the foremost biographer of Means, who produced a
series of seven unpublished working papers on Means in the late 1980s.
Lee presumably eventually will compile the book that constitutes the
general biography of Gardiner Means's life. The authors graciously
acknowledge Lee's generosity in sharing his archival findings with
them at the outset of the volume.
Means's analysis of what he termed "the corporate
system" made a decided case for an active role for government in
supervision and regulation of the private sector, although Means
eschewed a comprehensive takeover of the private sector by the public
sector. Such supervision and regulation was essential because of the
power that the private corporation could exercise, rivaling that of the
state. In Samuels and Medema's words, "For Means . . .
necessary, pragmatic, and democratic state action was the preferred
alternative to both economic chaos and fascistic or communistic order." Later they comment, "Regarding the view of those who
found Berle and Means to have provided a rallying point for those
critical of business domination, |Bernard~ Nossiter |wrote in a 1962 New
Republic article~ that the insights of Berle and Means 'provided a
rationale for the heightened government intervention of the New Deal and
freshened the spirit of regulation then in the air'."
Whether state power would be mobilized successfully to serve as a
countervailing force against corporate power was a question that
Means' own analysis suggested was likely to be answered in the
negative. Given the nature of the political influence exercised by
corporate leadership, Samuels and Medema point to economists like Daniel
Fusfeld and J. R. Munkirs as drawing upon Means's vision of a
centrally planned private sector to argue that effective and consistent
government action to constrain the socially undesirable features of
corporate activity is unlikely.
Means's explicit opposition to the normal premises of laissez
faire and his endeavor to construct what Samuels and Medema call a
"new microeconomics" of the non-atomistic firm with the
capacity to administer prices placed him outside the discipline's
mainstream. He viewed the self-adjusting market of orthodox economics as
sheer sorcery.
His ideas and his perspective were subjected to withering attacks
from members of the Chicago school, in particular from George Stigler
and others in a 1983 special issue of the Journal of Law and Economics.
Milton Friedman is reported to have "'. . . thought
Means's views tended strongly in the direction of government
control of prices--a 'fascist' policy, perhaps by analogy with
what Hjalmar Schacht was doing in Germany'" despite
Means's clear rejection of state central planning of the economy.
Samuels and Medema further document the extent to which he was dismissed
as a "soft" economist, engaged exclusively in empirical work
with no theoretical foundations, by much of the profession, even those
who had not bothered to give his work a careful or a careless reading.
Making extensive use of interviews with Means's coauthor and
widow, the economist Caroline Ware (they published The Modern Economy in
Action in 1936), the authors show that Means was deeply conscious of and
hurt by these professional slights. He apparently was pleased finally to
be given distinguished recognition by "outcast" economists,
when he received the Veblen-Commons Award from the Association for
Evolutionary Economics in 1974.
But the attempt to suppress, subvert, or distort Means's message
was not limited to economists in the postwar era. Samuels and Medema
find that Means had to sanitize portions of his doctoral dissertation to
win committee approval at Harvard, being pressured to delete the
sections where he was most critical of the antisocial activities of the
modern corporation. There is evidence that General Motors took steps to
discourage the original publishers of The Modern Corporation and Private
Property from reissuing the volume. Ironically, the original publisher,
Commerce Clearing House, was persuaded by GM's agents not to
reissue the book but then sold the plates to Macmillan who brought out a
new edition in 1933 that received wide attention and wide publicity.
Clearly this was one instance where corporate power was effective in
attaining a near term but not a long term goal; once The Modern
Corporation was brought out by Macmillan it was on the road to its
status as a modern classic.
A substantial part of Gardiner C. Means is devoted to reports of both
the immediate and the later reaction of economists to the Berle-Means
hypotheses. We get to learn about the treatment (and mistreatment) of
his hypotheses in textbooks, both general introductory texts and
specially texts in the specific areas of industrial organization, the
theory of the firm, and microeconomic theory. In a sense, Chapter 5,
entitled "The Reception of Means' Work and the Relation of His
Work to That of Others" could be aptly retitled "How
Berle-Means Came to America."
What is most interesting to the doctrinal historian--and this arena
is, of course, Warren Samuels' forte--is the attempt to situate Means in the panoply of schools of thought in economics. For Samuels and
Medema, Means's location in the institutionalist galaxy of giants
is due more to the content of his work rather than the apparent
influences on his intellectual development. For instance, Samuels and
Medema deny that Means drew in any direct fashion from the work of
either Thorstein Veblen or John R. Commons although the themes that
concerned them were similar: "|Means's~ ideas were not mere
echoes of Thorstein Veblen, but he was concerned with the analytical
problems as were Veblen and other institutionalists, such as John R.
Commons: the organization and control of the economy; the structural
features of the economy; the working out by the firm of its identity,
organization, goals, and operation; the macroeconomic consequences of
microeconomic institutional arrangements; and, inter alia, the genesis
and development of fundamental economic institutions, especially the
corporation, private property, and the economic role of the
government."
Means himself sought to separate his perspective from Veblen's.
Drawing upon Fred Lee's archival research, Samuels and Medema
report that Means wrote the following to Jerome Frank in a June 27, 1938
letter: "'It is my impression that in discussing absentee
ownership Veblen talks about separation of ownership and management and
not the separation of ownership and control. The two conceptions are
fundamentally different and have different implications'." But
in the text of Gardiner C. Means, the authors do not attempt to compare
Means's analysis of the corporate system to Veblen's
remarkable study of the financial and productive structure of industrial
capitalism in The Theory of Business Enterprise |3~, a work that belies
Means's claim that Veblen was interested in management rather than
control of the corporation. Indeed, The Theory of Business Enterprise
possesses a historical context that treats the emergence of the modern
joint stock company and the volatile stock exchange as events with vast
social and political repercussions, as well as an analytical framework
that fully anticipates the Tobin q approach to aggregate investment. It
would be interesting to determine whether Robert Brady's intensely
energetic study Business As a System of Power |1~ owes more to Veblen or
to Means.
If one strips away Means's interest in the role of corporate
power and the prospects for government to constrain the actions of the
corporate system and if one then focuses exclusively on the narrower
structure of Means's systematic economics, one is left with the
sense that Means was more of a New Keynesian than a Post Keynesian. If
Post Keynesianism is taken to refer to those economists who seek to
extend and employ faithfully the analytical structure Keynes developed
in The General Theory, then it is not clear that Means had much of a
connection to that tradition aside from a sympathy for the policy
implications of Keynesian economics. The authors intriguingly observe
that, while "Keynes argued that people live their lives in a series
of short runs rather than in the long run |,~ Means argued that people
live their lives in a world largely organized into corporations."
But this observation refers to Means as a grand social theorist.
Means as economist--the Means who introduced concentration ratios to the
industrial organization literature, who argued for the generality of
monopoly power in the economy, who developed the view that for a
substantial number of industrial sectors prices were administered (hence
anticipating the late Hicksian view that there is a fixprice and
flexprice sector to the typical modern economy)--is an economist whose
signature is imperfect competition. In that sense, his work is much
closer in spirit to the New England New Keynesians than the Old England
Post Keynesians.
Gardiner C. Means is a provocative book, especially in its altogether
credible and fascinating analysis of the sociology of the
profession's treatment of Means and his ideas. If there is any
grand omission, it is the neglect of Means's views on monetary
policy. Ronnie Phillips |2~ has uncovered archival materials at the
Roosevelt Library that demonstrate that Means endorsed the Chicago Plan
(100 percent reserve requirements for deposit-taking institutions) for
banking reform in 1933. Phillips concludes without explanation that this
reinforces the validity of classifying Means as an institutionalist. It
would have been interesting if Samuels and Medema had taken on this
aspect of Means's thinking. But this shortcoming aside, Gardiner C.
Means is a first rate introduction to an important New Deal
economist--who long outlived the New Deal. And since the authors opt for
controversy in the positions and interpretations they advance, hopefully
their book will stimulate additional research about the major New Deal
era economists, including Means himself.
References
1. Brady, Robert. Business As A System of Power. New York: Columbia
University Press 1943.
2. Philips, Ronnie. "The 'Chicago Plan' and New Deal
Banking Reform." Working Paper No. 76, Jerome Levy Economics
Institute of Bard College, June 1992.
3. Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory of Business Enterprise. New York:
Charles Scribners Sons, 1904.