Bitcoin, the regression theorem, and the emergence of a new medium of exchange.
Davidson, Laura ; Block, Walter E.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: E59
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last couple of years, there has been much debate online,
particularly in Austro-libertarian circles, concerning the economic
nature of crypto-currencies, and in particular the origin and potential
future of the first crypto-currency to emerge; namely, bitcoin. There
are two areas in which this debate has been focused. The first asks:
"is bitcoin money? And if not, does it have the potential to become
money?" The second question is: "does bitcoin have a
direct-use value, and if not, does its obvious emergence as a medium of
exchange therefore not refute Mises's regression theorem?" To
that end, the commentators have been either searching for this value or
criticizing the theorem, depending on which side they take. A subsidiary
issue is whether or not it matters if bitcoin's direct-use value,
if it has one, is intangible.
Most commentators agree that bitcoin is a medium of exchange--that
is to say, there are at present market actors who willingly accept
bitcoins in exchange for real goods and services, and then use them to
buy other goods--but that bitcoin is not money, at least not yet,
insofar as money is usually defined. This requires that the item be a
general medium of exchange, acceptable to most people for purchases and
sales, and at least as of 2015, bitcoin has not (yet?) achieved that
status. Of course, there is a clear praxeological distinction (1) to be
made between goods that are valued as media of exchange, and those that
are valued only for their direct use Thus, we must draw a clear
distinction also between an economy where individuals rely on indirect
exchange in some capacity, and one where they rely solely on barter.
However, there is no praxeological difference between a medium of
exchange and money. For the difference here boils down merely to one of
how one defines the word "money," and to what extent the
medium in question is accepted in the market in order to meet the
definition. Menger (2009, p. 11) defines money as the "universal
medium of exchange," meaning it must be accepted by everyone, while
Mises (1998, p. 398) more reasonably maintains it must be
"generally-accepted and commonly-used," leaving some room for
the possibility that not everyone need be willing to accept it. But no
matter which definitional version one chooses, it seems fairly clear
that bitcoin has not yet reached the threshold of either of them.
Whether it can reach that tipping point at some point in the future
is not a praxeological question, and is something that will be discussed
in a later section First, in Section II we turn to the issue of bitcoin
and the regression theorem Section III considers in further detail
Mises's regression theorem. Section IV asks whether bitcoin
violates the regression theorem, and Section V asks whether bitcoin can
become money Section VI is devoted to a hypothetical: suppose bitcoin
evolved directly from barter; would this then constitute a violation of
the regression theorem? We conclude in Section VII.
II. THE PRESENT DEBATE CONCERNING BITCOIN AND THE REGRESSION
THEOREM
The debate has been framed by most commentators in the following
way: the regression theorem refers to the emergence of a medium of
exchange, where a good that was once valued only for its services in
some direct use (either in consumption or production) becomes valued for
its function in indirect exchange. According to these authors, bitcoin
fits within the broad category of a medium of exchange So its presence
in the market must either refute the theorem on the grounds that it has
never been valued directly, and certainly not as a tangible commodity
like gold; or, the theorem is intact. And this can come about in one of
two ways: (a) because bitcoin did indeed have some value prior to its
becoming a medium of exchange, and (b) because the theory allows this
value to involve an intangible good. (2)
For example, Graf (2013a, 2013b) sets out to demonstrate that
bitcoin does not violate the regression theorem on the grounds that it
does indeed have a prior direct-use value. Graf lists the reasons why he
thinks actors might have valued bitcoin prior to it becoming a medium of
exchange; for example, as a digital object for use in testing the
network, or for a game, or simply because it was seen as advancing a
cause. He contends there is no economic reason why a medium of exchange
has to start out as a physical material as opposed to an intangible
good. While Menger maintains that money has to originate as a
commodity--implying that the good must be tangible--in the modern age we
should consider all goods to be contenders for becoming a media of
exchange, whether or not they possess any physical attributes, says
Graf.
In the same vein, Tucker (2014) also searches for bitcoin's
non-monetary value, noting it has an independent direct use as a payment
system, this attribute of bitcoin being contained within the network and
the blockchain. 3 As a result of this value, Tucker is also of the
opinion that bitcoin does not invalidate the theorem.
Surda (2012, 2014) contends that if one denies that bitcoin
complies with the regression theorem, one denies the a priori character
of the theorem itself, "shooting oneself in the foot in the
process." As an a priori argument this is incontrovertible. Since
the theorem implies a medium of exchange must start out as a commodity,
and it is undeniable that bitcoin is a medium of exchange, it must
necessarily be the case that bitcoin was valued as a commodity prior to
it being used in indirect exchange. The fact that we might remain
oblivious to the motivations of the original actors, or the properties
that were (or are) valued by them, has no bearing on the issue.
Faggart (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) also supports the notion that bitcoin
must be reconciled with the regression theorem He observes nevertheless
that Surda's argument is circular: Even though the theorem is
apodictic, we cannot simply assume the chains of reasoning used to
deduce the theory are correct. Because bitcoin was designed from the
ground up to be money, and therefore did not appear to have a clearly
identifiable original direct use, it is necessary to respond to critics
who question the theorem, and we must do so by providing some kind of
empirical evidence. To satisfy them, says Faggart (2014c), we must
examine the history to identify when bitcoin went from being a
"consumer good" to being used in indirect exchange.
Murphy (2013a, 2013b, 2014) maintains that if one wishes to square
Misesean theory with bitcoin, it is quite possible to do so by
envisaging that the first actors to acquire the crypto-currency did so
for ideological reasons. We can compare this to the kind of value people
derive from contributing to a cause or to a charity Because of such
motivations, people had a framework for evaluating its purchasing power,
says Murphy. He asks if it might be possible for a medium of exchange to
emerge on the market without having any direct use at all For example,
says Murphy, consider a person who is willing to be the first to give up
something of market value in order to acquire a completely new
good--such as a bitcoin--simply because it has the potential for
becoming a medium of exchange This alone could establish its price, and
thus set the stage for its actual emergence as a medium of exchange This
assumes, of course, that the good in question has attributes that make
it especially suitable for that purpose. In this case, the new medium of
exchange, assuming it becomes one, would never be valued for anything
other than its use in indirect exchange Murphy then declares that if
this is the case, there must be a "loophole" in Mises's
argument.
Suede (2011) also embraces the idea that an object need not
necessarily be valued directly before its emergence as a medium of
exchange. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to look for
bitcoin's value as such, or for the point in time at which it
transitions from a commodity to a medium of exchange. The argument that
market participants always have to experience a good in some direct way
before they can use it as a medium of exchange is not true. All that is
needed is for them to perceive the benefits of indirect exchange in
order to invent the necessary medium According to Suede, the indirect
exchange properties of gold alone would give it value even if it never
had any other use. In a similar vein, bitcoin could emerge as a medium
of exchange without any direct-exchange value, and do so even in the
absence of an existing price network. As a consequence of these
observations, Suede suggests that Mises's whole approach to the
origin of money is erroneous.
However, what the arguments above all have in common is that they
misinterpret Mises's regression theorem. Indeed, the question of
whether or not bitcoin can be reconciled with the regression theorem
misses the point entirely. While some of the claims raised by these
commentators are very cogent, the debate has been framed in entirely the
wrong terms In order to understand why, a review of the regression
theorem is appropriate
III. MISES'S REGRESSION THEOREM
Before The Theory of Money and Credit was published in 1912, no one
had been able to employ the lessons learnt during the marginal
revolution, concerning subjective value and marginal utility theory, and
apply it to money. Goods other than money had marginal utility, which
could explain their demand and supply schedules in terms of money, but
money itself could not have marginal utility--or so it was thought. How
could it, asked the economists of the time? If marginal utility were
applicable to money, its demand schedule could only be explained by
analyzing it in terms of all the other goods on the market But if all
these goods are valued in terms of money, and yet money is valued in
terms of them, then clearly this is a circular argument, they said.
Accordingly, money was separated from praxeological theory, and from
individual action.
Mises's accomplishment was to show, without introducing a
circular argument, that the demand schedule for money can be explained
using marginal utility theory, and that it has a downward sloping curve
like any other good In addition, he demonstrated that the demand for
money is to hold for future exchanges It is comprised of an exchange
demand by those who wish to obtain money and a reservation demand by
those who already possess it Mises was able to avoid the circularity
problem by introducing a time element into the argument as follows:
Money is subjectively evaluated (in terms of other goods) not by
simultaneously, and subjectively, assessing the prices of other goods
(in terms of money), but rather by employing the objective prices that
already exist. Put another way, the subjective exchange value of money
(to hold) today takes place using as a starting point the objective
exchange values of yesterday This is the crux of the theorem. Menger had
laid the groundwork for establishing the technical features of money,
but Menger's contribution did not explain how money derived its
(subjective) value. As Mises ([1912] 1953, p. 116) states,
Neither Menger, nor any of the many investigators who have tried to
follow him, have even so much as attempted to solve the fundamental
problem of the value of money. Broadly speaking, they have occupied
themselves with checking and developing the traditional views and
here and there expounding them more correctly and precisely, but
they have not provided an answer to the question: What are the
determinants of the objective exchange-value of money?
In The Theory of Money and Credit, Mises (1912) ably disposed of
all the previous erroneous notions concerning the value of money: that
its value was tied to the cost of production, that it was dependent on
money income versus real income, or that it could be reduced to
mathematical formulae, using equations of exchange and untenable
variables such as the velocity of circulation. (4)
But there remained a problem, claimed the critics, for if the value
of money is determined in part by the array of prices that existed
yesterday, and yet those prices were derived by using a value of money
that was based upon the prices extant the day before, then does this not
lead to an infinite regress? No, said Mises, for if taken back far
enough, there comes a point at which money first emerges as a medium of
exchange out of a pure barter economy Prior to this, it is valued only
for its non-monetary uses as a commodity The demand for money is
therefore pushed back to the last day of barter, where goods are traded
only in direct exchange, and where the temporal element of the
regression theorem ends It is in this way that all charges of
circularity are obviated.
The regression theorem is first and foremost an argument based on
praxeological deductions It can be seen, however, that the theorem
involves two distinct elements. The first part is a causal-realist
explanation of the marginal utility of money, while the second is a
causal-genetic explication that deals with the origin of money. The
second element explains why there is not an infinite regress, and how an
economy transitions from a state in which there is only direct
exchange--a state of barter--to one where indirect exchange is present.
With reference to this second element, Mises ([1912] 1953, p. 110)
states:
If the objective exchange-value of money must always be linked with
a pre-existing market exchange-ratio between money and other
economic goods (since otherwise individuals would not be in a
position to estimate the value of the money), it follows that an
object cannot be used as money unless, at the moment when its use
as money begins, it already possesses an objective exchange-value
based on some other use.
It is important to emphasize that what Mises refers to in this
passage is the origin of a new money--de novo--i.e. from a pure state of
barter, where there are no existing money prices. To that end, the
second part of the regression theorem only explains the genesis of a new
money where none existed before It explicates how a barter
economy--where all economic calculation is conducted ordinally--becomes
a monetary economy in which calculation is performed cardinally It
should not be interpreted to mean that once a calculational framework in
terms of money prices is established, that all future media of exchange
(or monies) within that economy must arise from having a prior
non-monetary use. The theory therefore is not an explanation for the
origin of all monies or all media of exchange.
Indeed, Mises fully recognized that a new medium, such as a fiat
currency, can piggyback onto any existing price framework, and that in
this case, the new currency need never have been valued directly as a
commodity itself. The only requirement is that the paper money's
exchange value can be traced back in time, sequentially, to when only a
commodity money existed, and ultimately to the point when that commodity
was last used solely in barter.
From a historical perspective, fiat currencies and other paper
currencies, such as "credit money," have come into existence
by being redeemable for the commodity money. In this way, confidence is
created in the public that the new medium will be accepted in exchange.
It then becomes a money. But as Mises makes clear, a paper currency can
continue its monetary function even when it is no longer redeemable,
provided the public continues to have confidence in its acceptability.
But there is an important point to make here. The regression
theorem has nothing to say about the question of why subsequent
currencies become established, why they continue to be accepted, or why
they displace existing ones. Nor does it have anything to say about the
rate at which a new currency is exchanged with the old.
Certainly, in the case of an emergent fiat currency, its
redeem-ability at a fixed rate for the prior currency (or commodity
money) is mandated by law, initially And it might appear that this is a
necessary requirement for its adoption Moreover, it might seem that once
its connection to the prior monetary system is dropped, and it becomes a
true paper currency, it can do so only through the enforcement of
legal-tender laws But, empirically, we can observe that the initial
legal requirement for redemption and rate-fixity is not a necessary
condition for a new money to piggyback onto an existing one. Credit
money, (5) for example, can arise without any statutory stipulations
whatsoever; the redemption that it initially possesses may be based upon
a contractual agreement only Moreover, since it arises as a credit
instrument, its initial redemptory feature is certainly not
instantaneous, and not at a fixed rate. And yet despite this, and
without the benefit of any legal-tender laws, it emerges as standalone
currency and continues to do so, even when all connections to the
previous monetary regime are severed.
How is this possible? To ask this is to ask a psychological
question, because ultimately any money's acceptability, as an
exchange medium, is determined solely by the psychological impulses of
those using it Credit money is possible only because individuals have
enough confidence that others will accept it in exchange, once they have
done so themselves. The question of why the first person accepted it as
such can be answered only by delving into his mind. But even the
acceptability of a fiat currency is determined by the psychology of
individual actors. One need look no further than past hyperinflations to
see that legal-tender laws are no guarantee that fiat money always
continues to function.
The acceptability of any new currency is not a praxeological issue.
Redeemability may give market participants the confidence that the new
currency will be accepted by others such that they will demand it for
themselves, and legal tender laws give added impetus to these beliefs,
but these notions are not related to any praxeological phenomena that
govern the genesis of money Nor is it deducible from the logic of action
that once this confidence has been established, the fiat currency can
continue to function as money after the redeemability has been
eliminated Historically, these sequences of events have certainly
occurred, but because they are dependent on the confidence of the
public, they are merely psychological phenomena.
What praxeology has to say, and what matters as far as the
regression theorem is concerned, is that it is logically impossible for
any new money to emerge unless there is some sort of existing price
structure in place Without prior prices present in some form, actors
cannot calculate using the new money And, therefore, if no price ratios
have been established monetarily between the various goods and services,
they can only be obtained through a process of direct exchange in the
barter economy This is the crux of the regression theorem But there is
no praxeological necessity for the new money to be redeemable for the
old in law, or to trade at a fixed rate with it. Praxeology has nothing
to say on the sequence of events during the transition It merely
prohibits the adoption of a new money without a calculatory framework.
After The Theory of Money and Credit was published, a number of
economists criticized Mises on the grounds that the theory failed to
explain how entirely new paper currencies can replace existing fiat
monetary regimes. An example is the German Rentenmark, which was
introduced to replace the paper mark in 1923 as a result of the
hyperinflation that Germany experienced during the early 1920s. Clearly,
this new currency neither possessed an objective-exchange value based on
some other use, nor even a previous exchange value based on a commodity
money But these criticisms of Mises were misplaced, because they were
founded on a misinterpretation of the regression theorem That theorem
does not contend that a new or subsequent money must arise out of a
state of barter. Nor does it attempt to explain why new monies that have
not arisen from barter replace existing ones. It merely implies that in
order for the new money to be used in economic calculation, there must
be an existing price system in place upon which the new money can be
superimposed, which was clearly the case with the Rentenmark.
However, the establishment of the Rentenmark is an interesting
example of how the psychological factors come into play when a new
currency replaces an existing one
As Bresciani-Turoni (1968, p. 347) explains,
In October and in the first half of November [of 1923] lack of
confidence in the German legal currency was such that, as Luther
wrote, 'any piece of paper, however problematical its guarantee, on
which was written "constant value" was accepted more willingly than
the paper mark.'...
But on the basis of the simple fact that the [Rentenmark] had a
different name from the old, the public thought it was something
different from the paper mark, believed in the efficacy of the
mortgage guarantee and had confidence.
The reason the Rentenmark could be used for economic calculation
was because the memory of a price structure still existed under the
paper mark, despite the latter's hyperinflation; it was this
previous structure that enabled the Rentenmark to serve as a unit of
account, entirely in accordance with the regression theorem. But the
reason it was accepted, and thus came into general circulation, was
purely psychological.
As Parsson (2009, pp. 11-12) states, "The Rentenmark was
placed in circulation beside the devalued Reichsmark and carried no real
value of its own but the naked avowal that there would be only so many
Rentenmarks and no more."
A more recent example of paper money supplanting paper money is the
euro, which superseded a number of existing national fiat currencies
beginning in 1992. The regression theorem implies that without a price
structure under the old system, it would have been impossible for the
euro to become money However, beyond this fact, the reason the euro was
accepted by individuals as money was due to its anticipated
acceptability in exchange This involved various psychological factors,
created in the minds of the public, by legal tender laws, by various
assurances of the government, and by its redeemability (for a while)
against older currencies, that gave rise to the necessary confidence.
(6) For example, initially, the exchange rates of the national monies
were locked at fixed rates against each other, and then at an arbitrary
rate against the new euro.
It might be objected that these examples are not sufficient to
demonstrate why bitcoin does not violate the regression theorem It might
be argued, for example, that bitcoin has not been established with the
aid of legal tender laws or at a fixed rate with the prior currency But
it would be a mistake to think that because other currencies have been
established through fiat, that the praxeological argument with respect
to bitcoin is unconvincing Praxeological arguments can neither be proven
nor disproven using empirical data The examples we give above are merely
illustrations; and the intent is only to contrast the psychological
factors that can come into play with the praxeological ones The
important point to make is that psychological factors have no bearing as
far as the regression theorem is concerned.
IV. DOES BITCOIN VIOLATE THE REGRESSION THEOREM?
There are no clearly definable psychological requirements for a
medium of exchange to arise. This is in contrast to the praxeological
necessities dictated by the regression theorem From a praxeological
perspective, it is clear from the foregoing discussion there are two
separate circumstances in which a new medium of exchange can start to
function as a means of calculation and unit of account: (1) The new
medium emerges from a pure barter economy, in which case it must have
some previous direct-use value, or (2) it emerges when there is an
existing money-price structure in place, or at least the memory of one.
In this case, the new medium, whether tangible or intangible--need
not have any value as a commodity in direct use, need not necessarily be
"backed" by or redeemable for anything, and need not be
established at a fixed rate. None of this violates or invalidates the
regression theorem. Historically it is true that new media have often
incorporated some of these features as a means of creating the necessary
psychological reaction to induce its acceptance, but they are not a
praxeological necessity from the perspective of economic calculation. As
long as prices exist in terms of the old money, this is all that is
required to satisfy Mises's theorem.
What does this mean for bitcoin? Clearly, this quasi money emerged
onto the scene in the presence of an existing monetary regime.
Therefore, to ask whether or not it had any value in direct use prior to
its becoming a medium of exchange is irrelevant as far as the regression
theorem is concerned. If it was (or is) a commodity that had (or has) a
non-monetary value, then to fret over whether this good is intangible or
not, is also of no consequence to the theory Since an existing price
structure was in place, the regression theorem has nothing more to say
on the matter And it is not incumbent upon advocates of the regression
theorem to explain how the price of bitcoin in terms of the existing
currency was established in the absence of any legally-imposed
conversion process, when the theorem has nothing to say on the matter
Beyond this, what was the critical element that bitcoin needed in order
to emerge as a medium of exchange? It was for at least some actors to
have enough confidence that when it was first obtained by them for goods
they wished to sell, it could be spent for items they wished to buy It
may well be the case that the reason they had this confidence was
because bitcoin did indeed have a prior non-monetary value. But
analyzing the actors' motivations, and the factors that induced
their confidence is beyond the scope of the regression theorem or any
praxeological discussion It is nevertheless an interesting question,
because if bitcoin ultimately becomes money--i.e. a generally-accepted
medium of exchange--then it would be the first non-commodity money to
succeed in the absence of legal-tender laws, government assurances, or
some kind of institutional backing. (7)
It would not, however, be the first non-fiat medium of exchange to
arise this way For example, in Argentina during the recession and
financial crisis of the early 2000s, privately-issued media of exchange
circulated widely as a means of facilitating commercial interaction.
According to Colacelli and Blackburn (2005), approximately 7 percent of
the country's population traded with the so-called
"Credito" during 2002. It should be pointed out this medium of
exchange did not arise out of barter itself; in other words, it had no
direct-use value at all. Rather, the Credito was issued by private clubs
in the form of a paper chit. Even though it was initially pegged at a
nominal fixed rate to the existing fiat currency, it was not redeemable
for that currency. It was therefore not a money substitute, but rather a
separate monetary implement. It succeeded, at least for a time, because
users had enough confidence that it would generally be accepted within
the orbit of the particular clubs that issued it. The Credito ultimately
failed, however, as a result of counterfeiting and inflation, and
because government actions to shore up the Peso led to a greater
confidence in the regular fiat money. The Credito never had the
attributes necessary to overcome the legal protections of the Peso, or
the optimum technical properties to become a new money It nevertheless
demonstrated, before the advent of bitcoin, that privately-issued paper
media of exchange can emerge in the presence of an existing currency
This example showed that it can do so without any governmental backing
or promises of redeem-ability by the issuer; even in the face of
government opposition The question of whether or not bitcoin can
progress to being money is discussed next.
V. CAN BITCOIN BECOME MONEY?
Carl Menger laid out the necessary attributes a good must possess
in order to succeed as money; that is, to become a universal medium of
exchange It should be noted that his argument was not praxeological, in
that it did not examine money on the basis of its marginal utility. Nor
did it trace the genesis of a medium of exchange backward in time, via
the kind of analysis Mises would later provide in the regression theorem
Rather, Menger's contribution was to provide an empirical and
historical analysis of the origin of money, specifically when it arises
from a pure barter economy.
To that end, Menger concludes that the most fundamental attribute a
good must have before it can become a medium of exchange--and ultimately
the dominant medium and hence money--is its degree of saleableness
(market liquidity, marketability) in direct exchange. Market liquidity,
it will be noted, is subjective. It is not measurable. It has no
praxeological explanation, because it is a psychological phenomenon
Liquidity depends upon several factors, according to Menger: First, upon
the intensity of the demand for the commodity in question; second, upon
the purchasing power of those who demand it; third, upon the
availability of its supply; fourth, upon the divisibility of the
commodity; fifth, upon the development of the market, in particular the
level of speculation. And finally, upon the type and number of political
or social restrictions that may imposed upon it Menger then lays out the
spatial and temporal limits on its liquidity, which include the
distribution and permanence of its demand, its transportability, its
durability, and its storage costs, etc. Other important technical
aspects are its homogeneity, its recognizability, and stability in price
in terms of other goods. (8)
The greater the number and intensity of these attributes, the more
likely a good will be used in indirect exchange. When a less liquid good
is brought to market, the seller will seek to exchange it not just for
the good which he requires directly, but if this is not possible, for
the most marketable commodity he can use indirectly. This presupposes
that the actor has sufficient knowledge and confidence that the
commodity in question, which is not necessarily valued by him in its
direct use, can be resold It is this information and assurance regarding
a particular good's liquidity, among an increasing number of actors
over time, that results in the good emerging as the most commonly-used
medium As Menger ([1892] 2009, p. 45) states,
The reason why the precious metals have become the generally
current medium of exchange ... is because their saleableness is far
and away superior to that of all other commodities, and at the same
time because they are found to be specially qualified for the
concomitant and subsidiary functions of money.
Of course, Menger's analysis does not refer to the emergence
of paper money from a commodity money, or paper from paper In the case
of a fiat currency, where government mandates the money's
acceptability and hence its liquidity through legal tender laws, the
currency clearly has no direct use, even though many of the technical
factors, such as divisibility, durability, transportability, and
consistency, are still desirable.
But what about a non-fiat, non-commodity money? As discussed in the
previous section, there is no praxeological necessity for any new medium
of exchange to have a direct use unless it emerges from pure barter, and
then only because there is no existing monetary price structure in
place. But if a new medium of exchange, such as bitcoin, is set to
emerge in the presence of an existing currency, then having some
non-monetary uses undoubtedly increases its liquidity, which can aid in
its emergence, and hasten its transition to money. Saleability inspires
confidence that the new money will be accepted by others, and that the
person who purchases it as a medium of exchange will not be left holding
the bag at the end of the day Once the new medium of exchange becomes
established, and demand for its monetary use increases, then demand in
direct use becomes less important, but at least in the beginning,
non-monetary demand surely provides an important boost.
Prior to it becoming a medium of exchange, bitcoin's
non-monetary demand was clearly rather limited, but it must have had
utility in some form--perhaps as a digital object, a game, a cause, a
badge of membership etc.--because it began to be exchanged for fiat
currency during 2009. Then, on October 5, 2009, the first exchange rate
with the U.S. dollar was published. This step, and the advent of bitcoin
exchanges such as Mt. Gox, demonstrated that bitcoin could be sold for
the most liquid of all goods, the extant currency, and was therefore
gaining in liquidity itself, even though there is no record of it being
used as a medium of exchange at this point. However, given that bitcoin
was designed from the ground up to be money, with all the technical
features normally associated with a functional money (and many more
besides) it was not too long before it started to be used in indirect
exchange. According to Surda (2014), the first such documented case
occurred on May 22, 2010, when Laszlo Hanyecz purchased two pizzas for
10,000 bitcoins. Obviously, at this stage, the purchasing power of
bitcoin was relatively low, but as more and more people recognized its
liquidity, and the possibility that it might one day become money,
demand increased, primarily from speculation.
Speculation in bitcoin has at times raised its purchasing power and
its exchange rate with the dollar, and given rise to the view that the
"greater fool theory" is at play. Many expect that the market
for bitcoin represents a bubble that will ultimately crash. North (2013)
even argues that the creation of bitcoin is something akin to a Ponzi
scheme. But as Rothbard ([1962] 2004, pp. 130-136) points out,
speculation does not necessarily indicate economic error. To the
contrary, economic agents engaging in this type of behavior might well
be correct in their predictions, in which case their actions can be
viewed as beneficial, for they hasten the adjustment of the commodity
toward its equilibrium price The question therefore is this: Is the
increased speculative demand for bitcoin justified? No one can say for
sure. 9 But while bitcoin's initial liquidity was not particularly
impressive before it became a medium of exchange, it nevertheless
possesses some truly unique features that should enhance its utility,
and possibly its marketability now that it is a medium of exchange.
Graf (2013b) outlines some of the monetary attributes of bitcoin;
it is infinitely durable, it has a finite supply, it has very small
transaction costs, it cannot be counterfeited, it is apolitical, and it
has no cross-border limitations. It also has no weight and is easier to
transact with than gold. Suede (2011a) mentions that this quasi money
cannot be confiscated since the files in which it resides can be
replicated and hidden. Political restrictions might pose a problem, but
the fact that it is peer-to-peer means the government would have to shut
down the web to stop it; an unlikely prospect. Another feature is that
when it is exchanged, it is done so over a network and transmitted
electronically, but it is not a bitcoin substitute that is sent; rather,
it is these very coins themselves This, and the fact that bitcoin
obviates the need for commercial banks, means there would be no need for
money substitutes, and fiduciary media might no longer be able to be
produced. Coupled with bitcoin's finite stock, it is possible that
an added benefit would be the permanent termination of the business
cycle, (10) provided of course bitcoin became universally used, and
displaced all fiat and commodity monies. See also (Surda (2012) on this
issue.
The truly unique functions of bitcoin, as detailed by Surda (2014),
are non-monetary, and include the following: It it can act as an
effective means of notarization, it can act as "smart
property," (11) it can perform conditional transfers, (12) it
eliminates the need for intermediaries, particularly in multi-party
transactions, it can act as a form of stock ownership eliminating the
need for separate stock exchanges, it can record transactions for
auditing purposes, etc etc These factors are of course closely
associated with (but not the same as) the monetary function This raises
the interesting possibility that as bitcoin becomes more widely
exchanged, and not just hoarded for speculative purposes, these unique
features will become more apparent to more users, thereby increasing the
demand even further, in a virtuous circle where demand and liquidity
reinforce each other.
Casey (2011) takes the view that because bitcoin is not backed by
anything, it will ultimately fail. His comments are fairly typical of
those who view the market as a bubble: "bitcoins are just an
electronic abstraction. They can't be used for anything else, nor
are they made of something that can be used for anything else...."
Now it is true historically that commodity monies such as gold and
silver have had a direct use as jewelry, etc. But as Mises makes clear,
once a medium becomes generally accepted by the public, and hence money,
the underlying direct use can disappear entirely, even though the
commodity still continues to function as money Liquidity gives rise to
more liquidity as confidence in the new money increases. Thus, the cause
of the original liquidity--its direct use--becomes less and less
important. Moreover, money always functions only as long as people have
confidence in it, and this is true even if it does have a concurrent
direct use. Even if gold were once again to become the universally
accepted medium of exchange, it would not be "backed" by
something of equal value. This is because, ceteris paribus, when a
commodity becomes money, the increased exchange demand causes its price
(in terms of other goods) to become higher--typically orders of
magnitude higher--than the price it would be if used as a commodity only
Since the increased exchange demand can be said to represent
people's confidence, anticipation, expectation etc., that it will
continue to be universally accepted in indirect exchange, it must be the
case that if people's confidence were to fail, its price would
fall. If gold's ability to perform its function as money suddenly
evaporated in the minds of market participants--let us say another money
were discovered that was generally recognized as being superior--gold
money users would soon find their money was "backed" by
relatively little. (13) This of course is true also of a fiat currency,
where initial confidence is provided by government guarantees and
maintained by legal tender laws and tax policy If all confidence in the
government is lost, the underlying true very limited or non-existent
value of the paper is soon revealed.
VI. A HYPOTHETICAL
Posit that bitcoin evolved as money directly from barter; would
this then constitute a violation of the regression theorem? Before we
attempt to answer this question, we note that this supposition is
patently false. Bitcoin is a product of the twenty-first century, quite
distant from the time in which barter was the generally accepted way of
facilitating trade, if it ever even existed. Moreover, it is highly
doubtful that a digital object requiring an extremely complex
infrastructure, such as the internet, could ever develop in a pure
barter economy, where the division of labor is almost non-existent.
Why make this query then? We step out of reality in this manner so
as to make an important economic distinction. Economists do not have
controlled experiments at their disposal, and thus must be excused for
engaging in contrary to fact conditionals.
So assume bitcoin has arisen, de novo, from a pure barter economy.
If the regression theorem says that money can only arise out of a
commodity, and "commodity" means tangible good, then that
theorem is wrong. Assuming bitcoin is a money (it is not yet generally
accepted, although one day it might be) the regression theorem is wrong
because bitcoin is not, and was never, a commodity. On the other hand,
if the regression theorem says that money must arise out of something
that is of value, then the regression theorem is correct. Bitcoins were
something "of value" to at least some people even at their
inception So what does the regression theorem actually say?
How does the analysis of those analyzing the regression theorem
stack up against this criterion? Most speak of it in terms of a
commodity, not something of value.
For example, Rothbard clarifies (1963; emphasis added by present
authors):
This process: the cumulative development of a medium of exchange on
the free market--is the only way money can become established.
Money cannot originate in any other way, neither by everyone
suddenly deciding to create money out of useless material, nor by
government calling bits of paper "money." For embedded in the
demand for money is knowledge of the money-prices of the immediate
past; in contrast to directly-used consumers' or producers' goods,
money must have preexisting prices on which to ground a demand. But
the only way this can happen is by beginning with a useful
commodity under barter, and then adding demand for a medium for
exchange to the previous demand for direct use (e g , for
ornaments, in the case of gold) Thus, government is powerless to
create money for the economy; it can only be developed by the
processes of the free market.
And in the view of Mises (1912; emphasis added):
The unsatisfactory results offered by the subjective theory of
value might seem to justify the opinion that this doctrine and
especially its proposition concerning the significance of marginal
utility must necessarily fall short as a means of dealing with the
problem of money According to his argument, the objective exchange
value of money is not determined at all by the processes of the
market in which money and the other economic goods are exchanged.
If the money price of a single commodity or group of commodities is
wrongly assessed in the market, then the resulting maladjustments
of the supply and demand and the production and consumption of this
commodity or group of commodities will sooner or later bring about
the necessary correction If, on the other hand, all commodity
prices, or the average price level, should for any reason be raised
or lowered, there is no factor in the circumstances of the
commodity market that could bring about a reaction. Consequently,
if there is to be any reaction at all against a price assessment
that is either too high or too low it must in some way or other
originate outside the commodity market.
When Mises and Rothbard penned these words, there were no digital
goods in existence. For these economists, intangible goods (in the
broadest sense) were labor services, trademarks, goodwill, etc., and
various financial assets such as insurance policies, stocks and bonds.
Now it is very difficult to explain how intangible goods like these
could ever become media of exchange, let alone money For example,
suppose Smith sells a cow to Jones, in exchange for 20 hours of
Jones's labor, and then Smith, instead of asking Jones to work for
him, exchanges this labor (or some portion of it) with Green to buy,
say, a bushel of wheat It is true that Jones's labor is being used
by Smith in an indirect way to sell his cow and buy a bushel of wheat
from Green. But it is certainly very doubtful that Jones's labor
could ever become money. One immediate problem is that Jones cannot be
everywhere, and therefore there would have to be multiple Jones's,
all agreeing to use their labor as media of exchange But labor is never
completely nonspecific, so there would be no homogeneity. It could never
serve as a unit of account. This lack of homogeneity is true for all
other (non-digital) intangible assets. Therefore, it would never have
occurred to Mises and Rothbard that intangible goods could ever be used
as money. It seems absurd. It would not be unreasonable for them to
assert that de novo money must arise from a tangible good.
However, for the modern economist, the digital age changes the
notion of an intangible good Intangible digital goods can be replicated
to create identical units; they can be completely homogeneous . In an
important sense, they can be even more homogenous than any physical good
can ever be. Moreover, they can be instantly transportable over the
internet, and almost infinitely divisible and durable. Until the
development of bitcoin, digital goods would not have made a good money
However, bitcoin combines the features of an algorithm that limits
supply, with a method of verifying transactions (in the blockchain) that
limits double spending, and employs asymmetric cryptography that uses
elliptic curve functions with no solution. In this way digital objects
can be made to be extremely secure, with a supply that cannot be
counterfeited or inflated. (14) In short, there now exist intangible
goods that can have all the characteristics of money.
Let us assume that by using the word "commodity," Mises
and Rothbard meant a tangible commodity, like gold, and not an
intangible one If so, were they in error when they said that money that
arises from barter must be a "commodity?" Would it have been
more correct to say that it must have direct-use "value,"
thereby encompassing all goods, not merely tangible ones? It seems a bit
harsh to say they were wrong, knowing what we now know about digital
goods, and positing an almost impossible world where digital objects
like bitcoin emerge in a pure barter economy But strictly speaking, in
order to account for all possibilities, even unlikely ones, it would
indeed be more complete to say that the regression theorem should imply
that when money first emerges from a pure state of barter--and a
cardinal calculational framework is created for the first time--the good
in question must have prior value in direct use.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mises's regression theorem is a praxeological analysis of the
marginal utility of money It states that the subjective money prices
used in calculation, today, are based in part on the objective money
prices of yesterday For any good to be used as a medium of exchange, an
objective framework of prices must already be in existence. Because the
very first medium of exchange to emerge must have done so when there
were no money prices, it follows that this good must originally have
been valued, and bartered, in direct exchange. The regression theorem
does not say that all subsequent media of exchange must have been
exchanged directly or have a direct-use value.
Menger's earlier discussion on the origin of money is an
empirical and historical analysis. It says that because money--the
generally-accepted medium of exchange--is the most liquid good, it
follows that items with a high degree of liquidity in direct exchange
are the most likely to emerge as money in indirect exchange. But there
is no praxeological necessity that money must have a direct use in order
to be salable The marketability of money depends on the confidence of
market participants. Liquidity is a psychological phenomenon.
Those who seek to determine if bitcoin violates the regression
theorem, by asking whether or not it has been valued directly, are
barking up the wrong tree. Bitcoin does not need to have a direct-use
value in order to be a medium of exchange, because it did not emerge
from a pure barter economy This medium of exchange therefore does not
violate the theorem. Clearly, it does have such a value, because it was
directly exchanged for other goods, including the U.S. dollar. This
provided the initial liquidity, which helped it to become a medium of
exchange. Will bitcoin ever become liquid enough to become generally
accepted, and hence money? It is unique among all previous media of
exchange (15) in that it incorporates numerous novel features, many of
which offer up their services only when it is used as a medium of
exchange. This means that as it becomes more widely adopted, it is
probable its liquidity will increase, not just because more people will
accept it for its monetary uses, but also because more people recognize
the advantages of its non-monetary uses Whether or not it can ever
become money remains to be seen.
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(1) On praxeology, see Block (1973), Hoppe (1991, 1995), Hulsmann
(1999), Mises (1969, 1998), Polleit (2008, 2011), Rothbard (1951, 1957),
Selgin (1988).
(2) A smaller number of commentators maintain that the regression
theorem refers to the emergence of money rather than a mere medium of
exchange, and because bitcoin is not yet money, they claim it is not
necessary to reconcile bitcoin's presence in the market with the
theory Indeed, say these authors, the theory proves bitcoin never will
become money. However, as Murphy (2013b) points out, this argument
overlooks the fact that the regression theorem is a praxeological
theory, which does not concern itself with the question of why or when a
medium of exchange becomes money The transition to money is a process
governed solely by the liquidity of the good in question and the
psychological response of the actors, and the point at which it occurs
is determined arbitrarily according to a defined standard. In effect,
the move from an exchange medium to a money occupies a continuum. See on
this Block and Barnett (2008).
(3) "A blockchain is a transaction database shared by all
nodes participating in a system based on the bitcoin protocol. A full
copy of a currency's blockchain contains every transaction ever
executed in the currency." From https://
en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_chain.
(4) See Rothbard (2004, pp. 831-842) and (2011, pp. 685-708) for a
criticism of the equation of exchange and the notion of the velocity of
money.
(5) See Mises (1912) pp. 61-62.
(6) Also, governments announced that they would only accept this
new currency for tax purposes.
(7) Almost the very opposite is true. Bitcoin faces actual
government opposition. See
https://www.google.ca/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=EXk7VIS8Is2GoQT8xoHQDQ&gws_rd=s sl#q=government+opposes+bitcoin.
(8) Menger was certainly not the first to discuss the necessary
attributes of money, in general, or the precious metals in particular.
For example, Aristotle in Politics, Book I, Section IX discusses how
money should be transportable, divisible, and "intrinsically
useful" (having a direct use). He says, "When the inhabitants
of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they
imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money
necessarily came into use." Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations
discusses how durability and divisibility are important characteristics
of money. According to Smith ([1776] 2005, p. 26) "Metals can not
only be kept with as little loss as any other commodity, scarce any
thing being less perishable than they are, but they can likewise,
without any loss, be divided into any number of parts, as by fusion
those parts can easily be re-united again; a quality which no other
equally durable commodities possess, and which, more than any other
quality, renders them fit to be the instruments of commerce and
circulation." With respect to precious metals, Jean Baptiste Say
([1821] 1971, p. 222) lists many of the same features: Precious metals
are divisible, homogenous, resistant to friction (i.e. durable),
sufficiently rare, and capable of being stamped. John Stuart Mill
([1848] 2009, p. 338) says that the reasons precious metals became money
were that they "pleased everyone to posses," they are
transportable, easily hidden, divisible, homogeneous, and "their
purity may be ascertained and certified." And Jevons ([1875] 1898,
pp. 30-39) lists the necessary attributes of good money as follows:
utility and value, portability, indestructibility, homogeneity,
divisibility, stability of value, and cognizability.
(9) This is basically an entrepreneurial issue, not one of
praxeological economics.
(10) For the Austrian business cycle theory that supports this
contention, see Hayek (1931), Mises (1998), Rothbard (1993).
(11) Smart property is where an ownership title is contained within
the blockchain The title could be for a house, car, stocks, etc Titles
held in this way can be traded or used as collateral with very low
probability of fraud. It was first proposed by Nick Szabo (1997).
(12) Any transfer that is conditional on some action or event
occurring e g stock options, futures, gambling.
(13) But not nothing This metal would still be useful for jewelry,
false teeth, etc.
(14) Inflated beyond a finite amount; in the case of bitcoin, 21
million units.
(15) For example, Hayek's (1978) "ducat." For a
critique, see Rothbard (1992).