Right vs Left in the Tasmanian Liquor Trades Union.

Hess, Michael

In Australian labour organisations battles for control have historically been a way of life and have been subjected to considerable analysis, often in terms of power, participation and ideology. (1) The bitterness of these conflicts coloured national politics for many years precipitating the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Split which institutionalised factional politics in the labour movement. (2) The struggles for control which characterised the Tasmanian Branch of the Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees Union (FLAIEU commonly known as the Federated Liquor and Allied Trades Union) in the (1970) s involved right- and left-wing ALP influences and activity by the largely Roman Catholic anti-communist activists of the National Civic Council (NCC). (3) They also demonstrate the negative impact of factionalism on industrial effectiveness noted by labour historians as a characteristic of struggles for control in unions. (4)

This particular conflict took place in a context in which the right faction had gained ascendancy in the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council (TTLC) under the leadership of Brian Harradine. (5) Harradine had come to Tasmania as an official of the Federated Clerks Union apparently recruited for this purpose by J.P. Maynes, who as well as being Federal Secretary of the FCU was reputedly the national union campaign director of the NCC. Harradine became State Secretary of a large number of unions which, under TTLC rules giving the smallest organisations a disproportional number of delegates, created a voting block enabling him and his supporters to dominate Tasmanian unionism. (6)

In the battle for control of the FLAIEU Branch the growth of the industrial Right in Tasmania was successfully resisted. To explain this outcome, this article looks briefly at the evolution of the union in Tasmania before it attracted the attention of the anti-communist Right and then narrates their success in gaining control of it as well as the rise of a new leadership group which defeated them. The analysis offered rests on members' interest in industrial effectiveness outweighing ideological sympathy and the change to a younger set of leaders more in tune with the changing needs of the union.

The FLAIEU in Tasmania

The Federated Liquor Trade Employees Union of Australasia (also known as the Federated Liquor Trades Union of Australasia) was registered in 1910 following amalgamations of single city unions in Melbourne and Sydney. (7) As on the mainland, the early history of the FLAIEU in Tasmania was intimately related to the operation of the major breweries--Boags in Launceston and Cascade in Hobart--and their tied hotels. The breweries particularly provided secure employment and had a relatively paternalistic management style. By the 1950s, the FLAIEU Branch (the union was the Federated Liquor & Allied Trades Employees Union of Australasia from 1918 to 1958) was an accepted part of the life of this industry but was industrially quiescent. Major organisational commitments were the annual picnic and sports days held alternately near Hobart and Launceston. Another characteristic was the bitter rivalry between the State Branch, based in Hobart, and a sub-Branch based in Launceston. State and federal officials regarded the Launceston group as 'inactive' while the sub-Branch officials constantly complained to the federal organisation that they were ignored 'by Hobart'. (8) Overall, however, the FLAIEU Branch came close to Hoxie's description of 'business unionism' with low levels of participation and a comfortable relationship with dominant industry employers. (9) Unlike Hoxie's description of this type of unionism entrenching a particular leadership group, however, the Branch struggled to find anyone willing to take on its official roles. Not only did the FLAIEU lack the political glamour which might had attracted highly motivated people as officials, but the breweries paid good wages and had ample overtime work available so few employees were willing to take on either honorary or paid union roles.

In the 1960s an attempt was made to reform the FLAIEU Branch. The key figure in this was Tim Mahoney. Mahoney's father, Gerald, had been a left-wing figure in the ALP holding both the state (1931-34) and federal (1934-40) seats of Denison. Tim Mahoney had been a rank and file activist in the Waterside Workers Federation in Hobart in the late 1950s. In 1959 Mahoney's fellow WWF activist, Leo Brown, became Secretary of the Tasmanian Branch of the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union. (10) It seems likely that Mahoney thought he could do similarly in the FLAIEU Branch. George Burgess, then a shop steward at Boags but later an Organiser and Branch Secretary of the FLAIEU, recalls Mahoney telling him that he had got to know some members at the hotels at which he and other watersiders drank and that this led to 'a suggestion that he should take over running the Branch'. (11)

Mahoney recalled that, at this time, 'the Branch had been unable to develop proper strength and ... the organisational structure had collapsed'. (12) Members were 'resigning and refusing to join again' and the union's 'inability to provide a service to Members led to Award Breeches [sic] by employers on a grand scale'. (13) Mahoney had an immediate impact on the Branch and, within a few months of his becoming involved, the Federal Secretary was reporting that:

   [T]he Tasmanian Branch appears to be all right since a new
   Collector (Mahoney) has been employed on a salary and percentage
   basis. The financial position is the soundest it has been since I
   was elected to the position of Federal Secretary. (14)

Within a year Mahoney had organised a Hotels Section bringing new members into the Branch and laying the basis for growth outside the breweries. The union's federal officers saw the potential and recommended 'that a fulltime Secretary be elected' paid for from the Branch's accumulated funds. (15) At the consequent election in August 1966 Tim Mahoney was unopposed. The Branch was now in a comfortable position with a competent full-time official and a relatively easy organising task. The breweries and tied hotels had a long history with the union and the non-tied hotels could be pressured through the union's strategic position in the breweries' dispatch areas which controlled the supply of barrel beer from which the hotels made most of their profit. In 1973 when Mahoney left Tasmania to become Federal Secretary of the FLAIEU, the Branch had over 2,000 members and two full-time officials with strong backgrounds in the industry, Branch secretary David Knight, from Hobart's Cascade cordial factory and organiser George Burgess, from Launceston's Boags Brewery.

Factional warfare was, however, about to disrupt this harmonious picture. In the same year that Mahoney moved to Melbourne, the NCC boosted its Tasmanian organising strength bringing Rocky Mimmo from Melbourne to be its full-time State President. Mimmo was publicly open about his own commitment to a social agenda 'based on Catholicism' and his opposition to the ALP which he claimed 'is not interested in redistributing wealth, but in demolishing the parliamentary system instead of reforming it'. (16) Support for Brian Harradine's group, which had gained control of the TTLC, was a significant part of this agenda. The FLAIEU Branch was one of the largest affiliates to the TTLC with seven potentially crucial votes. It was also a union which was nationally led by right-wing officials. The Tasmanian Branch had opposed the growth of right-wing influence in Tasmania and was a natural target for both national and local activists of the Right.

After Mahoney's move to the federal office, he continued to support his proteges in the Tasmanian Branch despite his own increasingly prominent position within the right-dominated federal office of the union. When Dave Knight resigned as Branch Secretary in 1976 he was concerned about the possibility of a politically motivated take over of the Branch and asked that his resignation be accepted quickly 'so that George Burgess can be appointed acting Secretary and to avoid any outside interference in the running of the Union'. (17) Despite Knight's fears, there was no opposition to Burgess within the Branch or from the federal union leadership and the Branch continued to grow rapidly as Tasmania's burgeoning tourism industry drove a boom in hospitality employment.

Under Burgess and his committee, the FLAIEU Branch remained among the minority of Tasmanian unions rejecting Haradine's leadership. Harradine's move to the Senate in 1976 saw Bob Watling of the Federated Clerks Union step into the TTLC leadership. Although Watling had been Harradine's lieutenant he did not have the authority which Harradine had brought to the position. Given its votes as a large affiliate, a change in the FLAIEU Branch's alignment would have had a powerful impact. At national level any change in the Branch's faction allegiances also had a potential impact. Nationally, the FLAIEU had opposed Bob Hawke's election as ACTU Secretary. His 11 to 10 majority on ACTU's interstate executive made his continued leadership vulnerable. Harradine was one Tasmanian delegate and the other had typically come from either a left- or a non-aligned union. A change in the Tasmanian Branch of the FLAIEU would shore up right factional influence at the TTLC and open the possibility of the Right having both Tasmanian delegates on the ACTU interstate executive.

The Right Gains Control

Initial moves for a challenge were inept. In the 1976 annual election of officers, 'a Rightwing team led by Mr. Farrow was defeated in its bid for control of the committee of management'. (18) Farrow had earlier successfully appealed against being excluded from the election because he had not been a member long enough. That there was a deeper agenda behind his candidacy became plain when he told The Mercury that he was not a member of the NCC but that Rocky Mimmo had lodged his election forms for him 'acting strictly in a friendly capacity because he's a mate of mine'. (19) In any case, Burgess outpolled Farrow 685 to 357 for the position of Secretary and his committee members were re-elected by similar margins.

Late in 1977 Mimmo came into contact with David Baird, a Wrest Point employee, and asked him to lead a more concerted push into the Branch. Baird recalls that he had little interest in politics or unionism until the 1977 Medibank Strike. This was a one-day national stoppage organised by the ACTU to protest against the conservative Fraser Government's decision to change the national health insurance scheme instituted by the Whitlam Labor Government in 1974. Baird's experience of it was that 'we all lost a day's pay, and for me that was a 14 hour shift, and we gained nothing. It wasn't for any industrial purpose. It was just political'. (20) The issue was discussed at Wrest Point and one of Baird's friends hearing his views suggested that he ought to meet Rocky Mimmo. Baird says he knew Mimmo only by reputation but thought that meeting him sounded exciting and was in his own words 'a young man ready to look at anything ... I had no ideology. I was just in it because it was exciting'. (21) The excitement created by the prospect of a battle between Left and Right for control of the Branch comes through strongly in Baird's recollection of the drama of meeting Mimmo for the first time:

   It was night and it was raining. I was called out from work to meet
   these two men, Rocky Mimmo and a fellow from the Clerks Union. They
   were standing in the rain outside Wrest Point wearing dark suits
   with hats pulled down and umbrellas up. It was scary but exciting.
   (22)

In Baird's view, the NCC people chose him partly because of his strategic location. Wrest Point had a large workforce which, although unionised, had not had a substantial impact in the union leadership structure. Most of the members there 'never bothered to vote' in union elections. (23)

In the 1978 Branch committee of management elections all positions up for election were contested. Under the Branch rules George Burgess was not up for election as State Secretary but his Federal Council position was being contested. Burgess threw his weight behind an 'official team' of candidates. In an open letter to members he offered his record as a fulltime official since 1970--a period in which the membership had grown from around 2,000 to 3,500. He particularly emphasised his role in the arbitration process which, among other gains, removed the lower wages paid in Tasmania from the national Hotels Award. (24) David Baird led the opposition calling on members to 'give our union a facelift' by voting against 'continued socialist-Left influence'. (25) Federal Secretary Michael Boland, who had been elected after Tim Mahoney died in that office and who had previously been an official of the NSW Branch, urged members to support Baird and oppose 'candidates who have supported Socialist-Left power bids, like George Burgess, who openly accepts the domination of Communist Victorian (FLAIEU) Secretary Joe Goddard'. (26) The incumbent group's response identified their opponents as 'the N.C.C.-N.S.W. team' and continued to stress the experience of Burgess' leadership compared to that of the 'unknown and inexperienced candidates' of the opposition. (27)

Both the Launceston Examiner and the Hobart Mercury ran stories repeating the allegations of NCC interference and socialist influence. (28) With 30 per cent of the membership voting, the Baird team won a clear but not overwhelming victory. Baird recalls, 'we got most of the members at Wrest Point to vote', while 'George didn't get organised'. (29) Apart from George Burgess and Frank Doherty only two of the old committee members were returned. Otherwise the newly elected officials were overwhelmingly either from Baird's ticket, or like the new President, Alan Evans, prepared to work with his group.

Baird's group adopted a simple strategy: 'George didn't have the numbers so we treated him very badly in the hope that he'd resign'. (30) At its first meeting the new Committee instructed Burgess to move Doherty to Launceston from where he was to 'provide weekly reports of progress for consideration at future Committee of Management meetings'. (31) It was also claimed that there was 'a second motion already typed ... to demand that Secretary George Burgess move his home from Launceston to Hobart'. (32) Burgess tendered his resignation, as soon as the motion regarding Doherty was passed and was followed 'amid some confusion' by Doherty and the two other survivors of the old committee. (33) Burgess recalls that:

   I wasn't prepared to stay under the control of that Right wing
   committee. They were bringing in outsiders to take control of the
   union. I'd spent eight years travelling down from Launceston each
   week and I'd already had too much trouble with the Right who were
   gaining control in the Labour Council and other unions. (34)

The Committee accepted the resignations with immediate effect and filled the vacant positions from its own ranks and from activists associated with other right-aligned unions. Baird became acting Secretary/ Treasurer with one of the failed candidates of his team being appointed to a vacant position on the Committee. Dennis Shelverton and John Jones were appointed as 'collectors' in the south and the north of the state respectively. Baird told members that 'both ... are experienced industrial persons and are members of the union'. (35) Burgess claims that Jones 'was not even a union member'. (36) What is clear is that both were politically associated with the Right, holding positions in the Storeman and Packers Union and the Federated Clerks Union. The Branch's Launceston office was moved into the same premises as these right-wing unions so that Jones could run them all from one desk. Media reporting of the day was that 'moderates' of the Right had 'broken Left-wing control' of the Branch. (37) The political impacts of the leadership change were immediate. At the first committee meeting after the election, Burgess was directed to inform all existing Branch representatives in writing 'that they shall no longer be required to represent this Branch at any meeting or gathering of another body, party, association or group with which the Branch is affiliated'. (38)

General meetings in the following months saw a vigorous contest between the new leadership support by the national FLAIEU and its opponents including some newly active members. The latter came from a group of young ALP activists supported by left faction leaders. According to Denison MLA, John Green, parliament had, at his instigation, 'exposed the secretive activities' of the NCC and those sympathetic to it. (39) He was joined in these public activities by Norm Hanscome, Branch Secretary of the FMWU. Hanscome had been sent to Tasmania by the federal office of the FMWU both to strengthen the State Branch and to provide politically capable leadership for the Left. Ray Gietzelt, FMWU federal secretary and a leader of the ALP Left at the time, recalls that 'Norm was a real firebrand who did not hesitate to take it up to Harradine and the Right'. (40) Hanscome's idea was that the NCC was 'well organised, well funded and unscrupulous' and that it would extend its influence unless those opposed to it learnt some lessons from the way it operated. (41)

These Left leaders saw younger ALP members who worked in the hospitality industry as likely allies. Among these was Nick Sherry. Sherry started working at Wrest Point as a casual night auditor in 1976, and recalls that he had 'joined the union but had no interest in being deeply involved'. (42) His parents were active in ALP politics. His mother was a member of the state committee and his father had been the member for Franklin from 1969 to 1975. Nick Sherry recalls that while he also 'had ambitions in that direction I had no interest in union politics'. (43) He was studying at the University of Tasmania and the Wrest Point work was 'just a holiday job to help with the study'. (44) Sherry recalls that one of the triggers for his involvement in the FLAIEU Branch was concern that it would become a mouthpiece for the NCC. Another trigger was the process by which the leadership change had taken place. Nick Sherry had done some work 'helping George and Frank when they needed an extra pair of hands' and he felt they were being treated badly. His view was that 'George wasn't a Left radical but Tasmanian union politics was strongly NCC influenced and so everyone else was seen as Left'. (45) For the factional leaders of the Left, however, the picture looked somewhat different. Their view was that Nick Sherry 'was intelligent and he had the drive'. (46) In John Green's recollection, 'Norm [Hanscome] approached Nick and we offered some help'. (47)

A second key figure in the younger group opposing the new leadership, Christine Huxtable, also recalls the situation as one of being gradually drawn into activity because of the actions of the new leadership. She was a young mother who was working as a casual to fit in parenting with her husband's full-time day job. She was an ALP member, as were most members of her family, and what her father called 'the evils of Harradine' had been part of their lives. (48) Huxtable recalls that she had plenty of personal reasons for getting involved:

   Conditions of work were pretty shabby. I contacted the union and
   they were so involved in this struggle between the Left and the
   Right that they didn't have much time for anything else. So their
   response to my problems was weak. I realised that women were being
   badly treated in the industry--used and abused--and that the union
   was unravelling. The NCC was organised and George wasn't. I wanted
   to do something about it and getting involved was really
   interesting. (49)

A watershed occurred at a Quarterly Branch Meeting, with both Federal Secretary Michael Boland and NSW State Secretary John Morris in attendance to give support to the new leadership. Nick Sherry and Christine Huxtable succeeded in having standing orders suspended so that a series of motions could be debated. These called for all vacancies to be filled via elections of members rather than through appointments by the new committee. They also called for the reinstatement of the old leaders until this was done. (50)

The procedural key to the situation was a quorum of one per cent of membership, being 32. It seems likely that the outcome was unclear until the last moment as Baird recalls getting advice from Mimmo to 'take some members out so there wouldn't be a quorum and a vote would not be binding'. (51) The Launceston Examiner reported 'Liquor trade stalls Right wing control' presenting an account of a 'Left-moderate group' majority being able to pass most of the motions it proposed. (52) The Hobart Mercury also reported an outcome favourable to the opposition claiming that 'the appointments of ... Baird ... Shelverton ... and Jones were terminated'. (53) The minutes of the meeting, however, reported that accusations of bribery and outside interference were not supported by evidence and that 'no positive motion was put forward--nothing was clear or coherent when the vote was put forward. Then it was defeated 19 to 10'. (54) While it is likely that both groups were attempting to influence the media reports, a possible explanation for the discrepancy between the media reports and the official minutes is Baird's recollection that 'the minutes were later written up by Mimmo'. (55)

Baird's contemporary characterisation of the incident was of 'an organised few acting at the behest of the Left-wing'. (56) An anonymous 'Tasmanian L.T.U. Defence Committee' claimed that the original committee meeting at which the Burgess/ Doherty resignations had taken place was itself part of a 'pre-arranged plot'. John Green recalled this group as 'probably consisting of people like Norm Hanscome, me, Nick Sherry and some of his supporters'. (57) According to the Defence Committee, the 'plot' took advantage of the fact that non-aligned Branch President Alan Evans was ill and unable to conduct the meeting and was 'designed to force Frank and George to resign'. (58) They called on 'ordinary members' to be aware of 'the National Civic Council inspired takeover of the Tasmanian Branch of the Liquor Union'. (59) The rhetoric stated that 'Shelverton and Jones are well-known N.C.C. apparatchiks, going from union to union to bolster ... N.C.C. political control ... Assisted by power hungry N.S.W. [FLAIEU] Branch Secretary, John Morris'. (60)

David Baird's later recollection of these events bears out the claim that right-wing activists from outside the Branch were playing a significant role:

   At those meetings at the Black Buffalo we'd have Boland, Morris and
   Harradine in a car outside with a runner coming in to tell me about
   tactics. I'd never run a meeting before and Dennis [Shelverton] was
   working with them to get the numbers right. So if we looked like
   losing we'd have a walk out to remove the meeting's quorum. (61)

The Counter Attack

A court challenge by Sherry, Huxtable and Michael Aird, who had been a delegate of the Branch to the State ALP Conference under the old leadership, kept the election issue alive. Sherry argued that the union was being led by non-elected officials with an 'unhealthy close connection' with the NCC and the union's NSW Branch. (62) His legal claim was that the action of the returning officer in the 1978 Branch elections had prejudiced their outcome. Initially the returning officer, K.J. Ogle, of the Electoral Commission, had applied a new provision in the Branch rules which required 24 months continuous membership for those nominating for positions as Branch officials. This had discouraged a number of candidates from nominating including Sherry, Huxtable and Aird. Others, including Baird, nominated but had their nominations excluded by Ogle in terms of the new rule. (63) The returning officer, however, subsequently changed his mind and allowed nominations by Baird and two of his supporters under the older eligibility rule which required only one year's membership. (64) Baird's later recollection was that 'Ken Ogle in the electoral commission was influenceable'. (65) The appeal was eventually dismissed, with costs awarded to the appellants, on the ground that the actions of the returning officer had not breached the Conciliation and Arbitration Act. (66)

Following the court decision not to interfere in the election outcome, the Branch settled into a pattern of activity characterised by support for the organised rightwing unions in the TTLC and ALP, with internal opposition, in which Sherry and Huxtable were prominent. Throughout 1979 their major focus was on demands for the holding of an election. In May, Sherry wrote to Baird pointing out that 'it is now nine months since the resignations occurred' and calling for an election. (67) At the same time, his argument to the Committee of Management was more pointed claiming that Baird's assurances that an election would be held were untrue. (68) The argument received some media attention, with Sherry claiming that the incumbents were not following the union's rules and Baird saying that Sherry was 'totally irresponsible and performing on a political round'. (69) Baird seemed to indicate that the Registrar had been asked to hold elections but then suggested that the confusion over eligibility rules had to be cleared up first. Sherry responded with information from the Registrar that no formal request for an election had been received. (70) In the midst of these exchanges, Baird announced that the union would be in a position to request an election 'next month'. (71)

Amid this turmoil, little industrial activity took place. In April 1979, Baird opposed striking in support of a national log of claims. (72) He also supported the Australian Hotels Association in its opposition to the introduction of a clean glass with every drink as this would force costs up and that in any case 'nine out of ten drinkers now are quite happy with the present system'. (73) He did, however, attack the federal Minister for Tourism's suggestion that penalty rates be dropped because they were crippling the tourism industry. (74) Baird derided the proposals as showing 'a total ignorance of the penalty rate system' (75) which he pointed out was 'a just payment for working unhealthy and unsocial hours'. (76) In terms of the broader politics of the union the Baird leadership strongly supported the positions associated with the Harradine group. It used the Branch journal editorials to attack communism and its sympathisers reprinting in detail material on the 'dissident movement ... bravely and defiantly' defending workers' rights in the Soviet Union. (77) It also carried material from Senator Harradine pointing out how important 'sane trade unionism' was in the fight against communism, quoting the Senator as saying that 'Tasmania must be especially vigilant because its TLC has equal voting power with the other states. The pro-communist Left has control of three state TLCs and only needs one more'. (78)

At the same time, the organised ALP Left in Tasmania was also taking an interest in the future of the FLAIEU Branch. Christine Huxtable recalls that 'as time went on Leo Brown became a very important adviser for us'. (79) Brown was Branch Secretary of the FMWU and a major influence in the ALP Left faction. While there is no documentary record of Brown's influence on the opposition in the FLAIEU Branch, it is clear that by mid-1979 Sherry and his supporters were adopting a sophisticated approach to mounting a serious challenge to the new leadership. This may have reflected some influence from more experienced political and industrial players.

Once the election was called, Sherry declared that he would be a candidate for the position of Branch Secretary. He therefore withdrew from the contest for endorsement as the ALP's candidate for the state electorate of Franklin. The Liquor Trades Journal attacked his credibility, focusing particularly on his youth and inexperience. (80) This resulted in a letter from Sherry's lawyers seeking an undertaking that Baird cease publishing material they considered defamatory. (81) One response was a front-page article in the Liquor Trades Journal reporting that 'not content with costing the union $6000 on unfounded allegations' Sherry had now 'arranged for threatening letters to be sent to this Union by his solicitors'. (82)

Sherry's campaign argued that 'our union has been run by appointed officials, one of whom has been working for other unions, little has been done in the area of penalty rates, the members are not being visited regularly and the independence of our branch is threatened'. (83) Sherry promised that if elected he would provide 'firm leadership' for '12 hours a day, 6 or 7 days a week'. (84) Baird's response was his own action for defamation against Sherry which was launched in August seeking retraction of 'untruths, half truths and highly damaging innuendo'. (85) Sherry assembled a team which was as 'broadly representative of the different workplaces as possible'. (86) Employment had increasingly shifted to hospitality provision where women workers held less well paid and less secure positions but from which they had had little impact in terms of union representation. Each of Sherry's team wrote directly to members in their areas of work to urge them to vote and to vote for change.

Only the vacant positions of Secretary/Treasurer, one trustee and three committee members were up for election. These were the committee positions which had previously been filled by appointment. Eight other positions plus one trustee and the Federal Councillor positions filled at the previous election were not up for election. The 'Official David Baird Team' had Baird for Secretary, Shelverton for trustee and three committee nominations. The opposition had Sherry for Secretary, Huxtable for trustee and three committee nominations. There were no nominations from nonaligned members. The result was a decisive victory for Sherry and his supporters. Sherry outpolled Baird 721 to 428. Huxtable outpolled Shelverton 726 to 421 and the committee candidates on their ticket won all three positions. A majority of the committee had, however, not been up for election. Baird remained as a trustee and federal councillor, while Shelverton and Jones still held the appointed positions as collectors with the majority of the committee supporting them. This situation reported the Examiner was 'certain to increase long-running frictions within the union'. (87) Sherry's characterisation of the result as 'a shift from the Right-wing back to the centre' was premature. (88)

The incumbents were certainly in no mood to accept defeat and did all they could to prevent Sherry from operating effectively as Branch Secretary. Immediately following the election, the committee excluded Sherry from the editorial board of the Branch journal and confirmed Baird in his role as editor. It then promoted Shelverton and Jones stating that:

   This Committee of Management is satisfied that their work is of
   such a high standard that this union would be better served if
   their responsibilities were increased and acknowledged. To this end
   Dennis Shelverton and John Jones are ... appointed ... as
   Organisers of the Branch. (89)

The meeting also confirmed that Baird, Shelverton and Jones would continue to use the Branch's newly purchased Ford Falcons, while Sherry would be reimbursed for the use of his own vehicle. Sherry claimed a mandate from members observing that 'I want to reform the union and make it moderate and provide a service to members, and the committee isn't co-operating' but instead 'is putting up brick walls at every turn'. (90)

Sherry's supporters petitioned for a general meeting 'to allow Nick Sherry to place his program of reform before the membership', (91) and placed on notice motions that would have the effect of dismissing the appointed organisers and placing power over the day to day affairs of the union in the hands of the Branch Secretary. (92) Before the meeting took place a two page circular 'from elected members on your committee of management' was sent to members. (93) It attacked Sherry claiming that 'for too long we have sat silent while this political opportunist attempts by lies and deceit to take over your union'. (94) It presented 'a few facts on Sherry' including that he was supported by communists, was constantly in touch with 'Left-wing union secretaries' and himself supported the Left in the ALP. The pamphlet also raised allegations about Sherry's conduct when he was Secretary of the University Union and asked members to consider: 'Is Sherry working for their interests or his own?' (95)

The Special General Meeting was held at the Westside Motor Inn on 27 November 1979. (96) It opened with procedural fencing in which the Sherry supporters carried every vote narrowly. The substantive motion giving control of the day-to-day running of the Branch to the Secretary was recorded as carried 55 to 54. The next motion proposing a new set of TTLC delegates was carried 57 to 11. The final motion condemning the committee for putting de facto control of the Branch in the hands of unelected officials, expressing no confidence in the committee and demanding their resignation was recorded as carried on the voices. The explanation seems to have been that '20 or 30' supporters of the committee, in the words of one of them 'became incensed ... and walked out' at least as far as the bar. (97) Press reports of the time quoted Sherry claiming the result in terms of 'overwhelming support'. (98) Branch President Alan Evans, however, was saying that that this was 'totally false' as the petitioners' motions were carried by only one vote. (99)

The response of the Committee of Management was to hold a special meeting the next day. This directed David Baird 'to take immediate legal steps at union expense to challenge the legality of the Special General Meeting'. It also instructed Sherry 'not to enforce any of the decisions arising from the Special General Meeting' and threatened that if Sherry 'continues to defy the proper decisions of this body ... [ie the Committee of Management] we shall have no option ... but to move for his dismissal from office'. (100) Publicly the committee 'confirmed that Mr Jones and Mr Shelverton were "still empowered to act on behalf of the union"'. (101) Whatever the moral force of the general meeting, the rules were on the side of the Committee of Management.

Some of the bitterness and chicanery more typical of mainland union battles was evident in December 1979, when sensational allegations were made in the press (102) and parliament of 'the infiltration into the Liquor Trades Union by drug pushers', (103) referring to the public reputation of people supporting Baird at the Quarterly General Meeting. Police investigations, however, concluded that 'the intentions of the people [in question] ... were legitimate'. (104) More substantially, two days of legal argument in the Federal Court in February 1980 resulted in findings that the general meeting did not have the power to remove appointed officials even though the Court found that they had been appointed invalidly. (105) It also found that determining TTLC representation was a matter within the power of the Committee of Management rather than any members' meeting.

The 'Trade Union Defence Committee' circulating a four-page pamphlet placing the 'take over of the Liquor Trades Union' in the context of an NCC plot extending over several years and several states. (106) A document which may have been part of such a conspiracy is an unsigned letter to Baird dated April 22, 1980 offering three suggestions:

   that Baird hold 'a caucus prior to every Committee of Management
   meeting between favourable persons on that body'; that the
   Committee 'direct the Secretary to produce evidence' for all
   expenditure; and

   that the Committee give Sherry specific instructions because
   refusal to carry out its instructions would constitute 'defiance of
   a specific Committee of Management decision ... which warrants
   dismissal'. (107)

Minutes of Committee of Management meetings show all three points being acted on. However, if it was a trap, Sherry seems to have avoided falling into it.

In some ways it was like the strategy employed against George Burgess of using the numbers on the committee to make life difficult for him. There were two differences. The first was that this approach now had the support of a legal judgement. The second was that Sherry did not resign but simply stuck it out until the 1981 elections were called. Then he headed a 'unity team' under the slogan 'strength with moderation', calling for the election of 'a moderate and responsible committee of management that is prepared to co-operate with the elected Secretary'. (108) The four page pamphlet he circulated included recent media reports of industrial successes, including a general wage rise of eight dollars per week which had been gained after threats of stop work action. (109) This was followed up by 'a personal message from Nick Sherry' to all members outlining the differences between him and the committee. Sherry claimed: 'this is a ridiculous situation, the committee if it is to work properly, must support the Secretary who has been elected by the rank and file, not work against him. The union must have unity at the top'. (110)

David Baird and his supporters presented their view of the situation under the headline 'Stop the rot'. They focused personally on Sherry and claimed that since his election a balance of $25,000 in the union account had been turned into a deficit of $25,000. Their manifesto declared that 'the truth is that our union cannot afford the spendthrift ways of Nick Sherry' whom it described as 'the employer's candidate' stating that as Secretary Sherry had 'attempted to have one-man rule, spend union money as if he owned it, refused to abide by democratic decisions of the committee and continues to flirt with the Left wing of the Labo[u]r movement'. (111)

Both groups nominated a full ticket. The majority members of the committee campaigned as the 'experienced team'. Their platform, however, was a list of things they had had ample opportunity to implement such as 'expand the union's services' and 'exercise financial responsibility'. (112) Sherry's literature focused on the need for unity and for taking action in industrial areas which it claimed the current leadership had been neglecting.

Sherry's ticket was completely successful, taking around 65 per cent of the vote and winning all positions. (113) Sherry recorded a personal vote of around 75 per cent. Neville Richardson and Rupert Cope, who had topped the poll for committee members in 1979 and had supported Sherry in the minority on the committee for the last two years, were overwhelmingly elected President and Vice President. It is also noteworthy that 6 of the 8 Sherry 'unity team' candidates for the Committee of Management were women, reversing the previous gender balance. It was, Sherry told the local press, a victory for the moderates and 'a blow to both the extreme Left wing and Right wing factions in the union'. (114)

Sherry recalls the period of turmoil in terms of 'two years of personal vendetta which really paralysed the union through public and internal conflict'. (115) He continues to maintain that the union had been mismanaged: 'the committee had bought themselves cars and used union assets. They'd imported organisers who were politically sympathetic but had not being doing the job industrially'. (116) Baird still sees the conflict in terms of Sherry's personal ambitions: 'he traded on his father's name and was always using the union for politics'. (117) He also sees the election in largely political terms recalling that 'the Left lined up against us. People like Norm Hanscome from the Missos and John Green in parliament ... but it was really the drug allegations which created a lot of bad noise for us and that was a big factor in getting us out'. (118)

With the election over and Sherry in control, Baird felt there was no future for him in the union. For him the period had been:

   really full on. There were threats and abuse and the pressure was
   really great. The NCC was losing influence and they didn't push me
   to stay. Boland asked me to think about a federal position but I'd
   had enough. Sherry wanted me out and I didn't have the ideology or
   the ambition for politics to fight it out. I asked him to pay me
   out and we walked to the bank together and cashed the cheque and
   that was that. (119)

It was a calm ending to a turbulent period. Baird walked away. Sherry remained Branch Secretary and Huxtable joined him as a long-serving Branch official. Sherry realised his original ambition of a parliamentary career entering the Australian Senate in 1990. Huxtable remained with the Branch until the FLAIEU amalgamated with the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union to form the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union in 1993.

Conclusion

Conceptual frameworks for understanding conflict in Australian unions have focused on issues of control and influence in the labour market and in political life. In this account of the conflict in the Tasmanian Branch of the FLAIEU there are elements which fit the model of a Left vs Right squabble for control and influence. Labour historians have provided numerous examples of the ways in which factionalism leads to organisational inefficiency, and this may be regarded as a case in point. (120) It is also a case in which--again as many studies have noted--union members were able to remedy the deficiencies of their own organisations through sustained and focused activism.

Organisational renewal was a significant theme of this leadership conflict. The ideological anti-communism of the NCC may have found sympathy in the socially conservative Tasmanian environment. However, it did not attract sustained member support in the FLAIEU. The industrial focus of the Sherry / Huxtable group acknowledged the changes taking place in the industry and this resonated with members. While this approach was not devoid of ideology it did not focus on the politics of factionalism. Rather, the young activists were interested in how the union needed to change to fit with the changing industrial environment created by the growth of the local hospitality industry and the increase in less secure employment, particularly of women, in its areas of coverage. In this sense the FLAIEU Tasmanian Branch conflict is a story of generational change in which an underperforming organisation was reinvigorated by a new wave of activists better suited to provide leadership in the contemporary environment.

The fact that this conflict resulted in generational change in the union leadership is also significant. David Baird was a generation removed from the former leadership and from his NCC mentors. Nick Sherry, Christine Huxtable and many of those who supported them were literally young enough to be the children of the NCC activists who sought to influence the outcome from outside the union. It is also significant that the younger leadership which emerged from the conflict went on to play important roles in this union Branch and in the broader labour movement. Leaders such as George Burgess and Frank Doherty, who had been shop stewards in the breweries, were the face of the old liquor industry. They were also the face of traditional Tasmanian unionism coming from a predominantly male workforce doing gendered jobs such as manufacturing beer. For this generation of unionists, support for state ALP Governments, which were almost always in power, was taken for granted. It was a partisan but not a consciously ideological commitment. Their industrial approach was based on a reasonable relationship with the large employers and the use of the industrial tribunals to force recalcitrant, and usually smaller, employers into line with industry standards. Those who challenged them were motivated by an overtly political, anti-communist ideology and were strongly influence by the protagonists of this view from outside the union. Their activity, once in power, had more to do with supporting this political viewpoint than with industrial matters. The younger employees who eventually emerged victorious from the leadership conflict were different from both of these two groups. The two leading individuals in the new leadership encapsulate that difference. Nick Sherry was a casual employee in the hospitality side of the industry. He was also a university student with political ambitions. Christine Huxtable was young mother working in hospitality to supplement the family income. Both came from politicised families. This combination of political interest and focus on the new realities of a changing industry were the leadership characteristics the FLAIEU Branch needed to modernise its operations.

Neither the traditional style organising of the old leadership nor the anachronistic anti-communist rhetoric of the NCC-aligned activists would enable the Branch to move forward. In this sense what looks like a factional conflict in which the Right was defeated was, at the same time, the midwife of history producing a leadership more in tune with the times and needs of the industry.

Michael Hess *

Endnotes

* The author gratefully acknowledges the role of the criticism of the two anonymous referees in improving the clarity and analysis of this material.

(1.) On power, see R. Murray, The Split: Australian Labour in the Fifties, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1970; on participation, see T. Sheridan, 'Opposition, factions and candidates in AEU elections in Australia, 1907-1972', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 22, no. 3, September 1980, pp. 293-311; on ideology, see B. Ellem, 'Ideology and union purpose: the Federated Clerks Union in New South Wales, 1946-58', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 43, no.3, 1997, pp. 344-60; and on the period overall, see T. Sheridan, Division of Labour: Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years, 1945-1949, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1989.

(2.) B. Costar, P. Love and P. Strangio (eds), The Great Labor Schism: a retrospective, Scribe Publications, Carlton North, 2005, provides a series of recent studies on different aspects of the Split; Ellem, 'Ideology and union purpose', p. 344, and Sheridan, 'Opposition, factions and candidates', p. 297, focus on its impact on factionalising union politics.

(3.) This article is a product of a larger project on the history of the LHMU in Tasmania. Primary sources for this history include holdings of FLAIEU national records by the Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University (hereafter NBAC) and documents held in storage by the Tasmanian Branch of the LHMU. As part of the project, the latter are being sorted and those of historical significance are being transferred to NBAC.

(4.) R. Cooper and G. Patmore, 'Trade union organising and labour history', Labour History, no. 83, November 2002, pp. 3-18.

(5.) The role and significance of peak union bodies with particular reference to Australia is explored fully in B. Ellem, R. Markey and J. Shields (eds), Peak Unions in Australia: Origins, Purpose, Power, Agency, Federation Press, Annandale, NSW, 2004.

(6.) R. Davis, Eighty Years' Labor, 1903-1983, Sassafras Books and the History Department, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 1983, p. 71 lists Harradine's secretaryships as including: the Shop Assistants, the Marine and Harbour Trust Employees Union, the Theatrical Employees Union, the Furnishing Trades Union, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the Federated Ironworkers Union, the Baking Trades Union, the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, the Fire Fighters Union, the Storeman and Packers Union, the Operative Painters and Decorators Union, the Hospital Employees Federation (no. 1 Branch), the Flourmillers Union, the Vehicle Builders Union, the Boot Employees Union, the Dental Mechanics Union and the Australian Workers Union.

(7.) For a history of the Victorian Branch of the FLAIEU, see A. Best, Unity Service Hospitality: A Great Tradition: The History of the Liquor Trades Union in Victoria, FLAIEU, Melbourne, 1990.

(8.) The FLAIEU Tasmanian Branch correspondence and some other records are held in NBAC. Correspondence referred to here is held in Box Reference No. E126.

(9.) R. F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States, Appleton, New York, 1924, pp. 44ff.

(10.) M. Hess, 'Against the odds: establishing the Miscellaneous Workers Union in Tasmania, 1949-59', Labour History, no. 96, May 2009, pp. 101-16.

(11.) Interview with George Burgess, former northern organiser and Tasmanian Branch Secretary, FLAIEU, Launceston, 10 February 2006.

(12.) FLAIEU, 'Special Tasmanian Branch Reporf, n.d., Jim Mahoney.

(13.) 'Special Tasmanian Branch Report'.

(14.) FLAIEU, 'Federal Secretary's Report, 1 June 1962-31 January 1963', Federal Council, 1963.

(15.) FLAIEU, 'Special Tasmanian Branch Reporf, n.d., Federal Office FLAIEU, Melbourne.

(16.) The Examiner, 31 March 1977.

(17.) Letter from David Knight to F. Clark, 21 May 1976.

(18.) The Mercury, 21 December 1976.

(19.) Ibid.

(20.) Interview with David Baird, former organiser and Tasmanian Branch Secretary FLAIEU, Hobart, 27 June 2006.

(21.) Ibid.

(22.) Ibid.

(23.) Ibid.

(24.) Letter from George Burgess to members of the Tasmanian Branch of the FLAIEU, n.d.

(25.) FLAIEU, 'Don't let it slip your mind', election flyer authorised by David Baird and others, n.d.

(26.) FLAIEU, 'A Special Message to all members', authorised by Michael Boland, n.d.

(27.) FLAIEU, 'Remember' election flyer, authorised by F. Doherty and F. Clarke, n.d.

(28.) The Examiner, 15 June 1978; The Mercury, 16 June 1978.

(29.) Interview with David Baird, Hobart, 27 June 2006.

(30.) Ibid.

(31.) FLAIEU, 'Special Newsletter', 26 July 1978.

(32.) FLAIEU, 'Minutes of the Quarterly Branch Meeting', Black Buffalo Hotel, 2 August 1978.

(33.) FLAIEU, 'Special Newsletter', 26 July 1978.

(34.) Interview with George Burgess, Launceston, 10 February 2006.

(35.) FLAIEU, 'Special Newsletter', 26 July 1978.

(36.) Interview with George Burgess, Launceston, 10 February 2006.

(37.) The Mercury, 16 July 1978, 21 July 1978; The Examiner, 15 July 1978.

(38.) FLAIEU, Minutes, Committee of Management, 19 July 1978.

(39.) Parliament of Tasmania, House of Assembly, Hansard, 16 February 1977.

(40.) Interview with Ray Gietzelt, General Secretary FMWU (1955-84), Sylvania Heights, 9 September 2005.

(41.) Interview with Norm Hanscome, Tasmanian Branch Secretary FMWU (1976-83), Haymarket, NSW, 9 September 2005.

(42.) Nick Sherry, former Tasmanian Branch Secretary FLAIEU, Canberra, 12 September 2005.

(43.) Ibid.

(44.) Ibid.

(45.) Ibid.

(46.) Interview with John Green, former member of the Tasmanian parliament, Moonah, 7 March 2008.

(47.) Ibid.

(48.) Interview with Christine Huxtable, former organiser/collector and Branch Secretary FLAIEU and Branch Secretary LHMU, Hobart, 30 July 2006.

(49.) Ibid.

(50.) FLAIEU, 'Minutes of the Quarterly Branch Meeting', Black Buffalo Hotel, 2 August 1978.

(51.) Interview with David Baird, 27 June 2006.

(52.) The Examiner, 2 August 1978.

(53.) The Mercury, 4 August 1978.

(54.) FLAIEU, 'Minutes of the Quarterly Branch Meeting', Black Buffalo Hotel, 2 August 1978.

(55.) Interview with David Baird, Hobart, 27 June 2006.

(56.) FLAIEU, Liquor Trade Union Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, August 1978.

(57.) Interview with John Green, 7 March 2008.

(58.) 'Urgent: Liquor Trades Union Members, Tasmanian Branch', Tasmanian L.T.U. Defence Committee, n.d.

(59.) Ibid.

(60.) Ibid.

(61.) Interview with David Baird, 27 June 2006.

(62.) The Mercury, 15 February 1979.

(63.) Letter from Ogle to David Baird, 16 May 1978.

(64.) Affidavit, 19 November 1978.

(65.) Interview with David Baird, 27 June 2006.

(66.) The Examiner, 4 April 1979.

(67.) Letter from Nick Sherry to David Baird, 4 May 1979.

(68.) Letter from Nick Sherry to Committee of Management, 6 May 1979.

(69.) The Examiner, 3 May 1979.

(70.) The Examiner, 4 May 1979, 5 May 1979.

(71.) The Examiner, 5 May 1979.

(72.) The Mercury, 28 April 1979.

(73.) The Examiner, 15 May 1979.

(74.) The Examiner, 11 November 1978.

(75.) The Mercury, 11 September 1979.

(76.) The Examiner, 12 September 1979.

(77.) Liquor Trade Union Journal, Tasmanian Branch, March/April 1979, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 5.

(78.) Liquor Trade Union Journal, Tasmanian Branch, July/August 1979, vol. 1, no. 5, p. 2.

(79.) Interview with Christine Huxtable, Hobart, 21 August 2006.

(80.) Liquor Trade Union Journal, Tasmanian Branch, May/June 1979, vol. 1, no. 4.

(81.) Letter from Dobson, Mitchell and Allport to Baird, 3 August 1979.

(82.) Liquor Trade Union Journal, Tasmanian Branch, May/June 1979, vol. 1, no. 4.

(83.) 'A Personal Message from Nick Sherry', FLAIEU election letter, n.d.

(84.) Ibid.

(85.) Letter from Piggott, Wood and Baker to Sherry, 30 August 1979.

(86.) Interview with Nick Sherry, 12 September 2005.

(87.) The Examiner, 4 October 1979.

(88.) Ibid.

(89.) Minutes, Special Branch Committee Meeting, 16 January 1979.

(90.) The Mercury, 19 October 1979.

(91.) FLAIEU, Petition signed by over 200 members, n.d.

(92.) FLAIEU, Motions and Members' Petition, n.d.

(93.) 'Liquor Trades Union Members from elected members on your committee of management1, open letter, n.d.

(94.) Ibid.

(95.) Ibid.

(96.) Minutes of the Special General Meeting, 27 November 1979.

(97.) The Mercury, 7 December 1979.

(98.) The Mercury, 29 November 1979.

(99.) The Mercury, 30 November 1979.

(100.) Minutes of Special Committee Meeting, 28 November 1979.

(101.) The Mercury, 30 November 1979.

(102.) The Examiner, 6 December 1979.

(103.) Parliament of Tasmania, Hansard, 5 December 1979.

(104.) The Advocate, 22 December 1979.

(105.) Federal Court of Australia, Transcript of Proceedings at Hobart, 7 February 1980 and 26 February 1980.

(106.) 'These Men Conspired to take over the Liquor Trades Union', Trade Union Defence Committee, n.d.

(107.) Unsigned letter to David Baird, 22 April 1980.

(108.) 'Liquor Trades Union: Union Needs Unity' FLAIEU election pamphlet, authorised and paid for by Nick Sherry, n.d.

(109.) Ibid.

(110.) Letter from Sherry to members, n.d.

(111.) 'Liquor Trades Union Members Stop the Rot', FLAIEU election pamphlet authorised by D. Baird.

(112.) Ibid.

(113.) The Mercury, 1 July 1981.

(114.) The Examiner, 1 July 1981.

(115.) Interview with Nick Sherry, 8 December 2005.

(116.) Ibid., 12 September 2005.

(117.) Interview with David Baird, 27 June 2006.

(118.) Ibid.

(119.) Ibid.

(120.) Cooper and Patmore, 'Trade union organising and labour history'.

Michael Hess is Head of the School of Business in the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He has previously held teaching and research positions at the University of Papua New Guinea, the University of New South Wales, the University of Western Australia, the Australian National University and the University of Tasmania. Outside the field of labour history, his current research interests are on: the interface between government, business and communities with a particular focus on the locality drivers of economic growth and social wellbeing; and the management of interventions in fragile states. <M.Hess@adfa.edu.au>