Business mobilisation, the new right and Australian labor governments in the 1980s.

Cahill, Damien

A perennial problem for organised labour in capitalist societies is its relationship with business interests. On the one hand, business interests constitute the forces, organisations and individuals against which organised labour has historically mobilised and sought to defend its membership. On the other hand, business interests form the dominant class of the society that the political wing of organised labour seeks to govern. As such, business interests, and the relationships between social democratic parties and business, should be obvious subjects of study for labour historians. However, these topics have received little attention from Australian labour historians--certainly far less attention than the institutions and practices of the labour movement.

This article makes a contribution to this neglected area of study. It explores the relationship between social democratic parties and business through an examination of the political strategies deployed by employer associations in Australia during the 1980s and the responses to these strategies by the federal Labor Government. The specific focus is on those employer associations which mobilised politically with the aim of transforming the Australian state and economy, particularly the arena of industrial relations, according to what are now recognised as neo-liberal principles of regulation. Two broad strategies were pursued by employer associations: a strategy of militant confrontation and a strategy of pragmatism and engagement. As such, this article is part labour history, as traditionally conceived, but also part 'capital history', which Andrew Moore (drawing on the earlier work of Humphrey McQueen) describes as:

   a response to traditional labour history's concentration on the
   institutions and individuals of the working class, a political
   intervention to turn the preoccupation with labour biography and
   trade union history into a critical historical analysis of the
   Australian ruling class and the institutions and structures which
   has sustained its dominance. (1)

However, a notable feature of the business mobilisation during the period under examination, and one that forms part of this study, was the support provided by business to neo-liberal think-tanks and similar organisations. Together, these organisations came to be known as the New Right, and were defined by their hostility to organised labour and the institutions of arbitration that had developed in Australia throughout the twentieth century. Therefore, this is also, in part, a study in 'anti-labour history'. (2)

After summarising the historical context within which these events took place, the article examines the strategies pursued by different employer groups in the 1980s. It then turns to discussion of the New Right think-tanks before consideration of how Labor responded to these strategies and the extent to which such strategies were effective. Finally, some conclusions are drawn about the significance of this episode for an understanding of the more general relationships between social democratic parties and business.

Context

The election of the Hawke Labor government in 1983 marked the beginning of the longest continuous period of social democratic governance in Australia's history. This period was also one of significant restructuring of both the Australian economy and its regulation by the state. Successive Labor governments pursued an extensive program of deregulation, privatisation, and corporatisation, all of which led to a profound neo-liberal transformation of the Australian state and economy. Former adviser to Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating, and now HSBC Chief Economist, John Edwards, describes this period as 'the most dramatic period of economic reform since the World War II Curtin government, and it fundamentally changed the framework of the Australian economy'. (3)

Labor governed during a period of persistent economic crisis and instability. These had been features of the local and global economies since the onset of stagflation in the early 1970s which had effectively ended the long post-World War II economic boom. As several commentators have noted, the process of neo-liberalisation facilitated conditions for the restoration of business profitability in the wake of this crisis. (4) Yet, concurrently, Labor's traditional electoral support base suffered materially during this period. Market-based inequality increased between labour and capital, and between low and high income earners. (5) The industrial strength of organised labour was also weakened, through falling membership density, restrictions upon the right to strike, and the decentralisation of industrial bargaining. (6)

That all of this occurred during the electoral high point of Labor federally, and during a period in which the leadership of organised labour had excellent access to the government via the Prices and Incomes Accord (or simply, 'the Accord'), is somewhat paradoxical. However, it is the contention of this article that this apparent paradox was a product of the unique tensions pertaining to social democratic governments and labour movements--tensions that can be teased out through an examination of the relationship between employer associations and federal Labor Governments during the 1980s. While some might argue that Labor's embrace of neoliberalism during the 1980s undermines the legitimacy of calling it a social democratic party, it was as a social democratic party that Labor viewed itself throughout this period. Furthermore, although the rise to dominance of neoliberalism no doubt reshaped the Labor Party and in some respects, broke with Labor tradition, in other respects Labor was following in the broader Australian social democratic tradition of managing capitalism by supporting the profitability of privately owned capital. As Carol Johnson argued at the time:

   In this, as in many other respects, the Hawke government is a
   logical successor to the Curtin, Chifley and Whitlam governments.
   However, it is not a successor that any of those earlier
   governments would have been eager to claim. (7)

Neo-Liberal Mobilisation by Business Interests

The economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s provided the impetus for a political mobilisation by business interests in pursuit of what is now known as a neoliberalisation of the Australian economy. This mobilisation was initiated by what Stephen Bell calls a 'neo-liberal coalition', and what Kaptein describes as a 'neoliberal power bloc', which set out to construct new state-economy relations out of the ashes of the post-war regulatory order. (8) Despite mobilising to bring about broadly consonant objectives, different employer associations used various means to pursue these goals: a strategy of militant confrontation, and a strategy of pragmatism and engagement. Each will be examined in turn.

Neoliberal Political Mobilisation 1: Militant Confrontation

The major employer associations that pursued a strategy of militant confrontation with the Hawke Labor government and its allies were the National Farmers Federation (NFF), the Australian Federation of Employers (AFE) and a number of small business groups including the Australian Chamber of Commerce (ACC), the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce and the Council of Small Business Organisations Australia (COSBOA). The economic foundations of these organisations were partly sectoral (the pastoral industry as represented by the NFF) and partly based upon the size and numbers of employees of the firms represented by the associations (small businesses and small business associations formed the core constituency of the ACC, AFE and COSBOA).

During the 1980s, these associations organised various forms of collective action against individual trade unions, the system of centralised arbitration, and the taxation and tariff policies of the Labor government. The policy alternatives put forward were uncompromisingly neo-liberal in character. Through such collective action there developed a small, but close network of leading individuals from the various associations, thus facilitating the coordination of efforts across sectors and organisations. (9)

Three broad forms of activism highlight the strategy of militant confrontation pursued by these employer associations. First, some of these employer associations supported direct confrontations with trade unions. For example, the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce supported employer action against trade unions in the Dollar Sweets dispute, while the NFF was involved in the Mudginberri, live sheep export and wide comb disputes. (10) In the Dollar Sweets and Mudginberri disputes, legal action was taken against trade unions and the costs to the employers were underwritten by employer associations. This constituted an indirect confrontation with Labor because it challenged the legitimacy of the consensus-based approach to industrial relations articulated by the Hawke government, and it challenged the power and practices of the trade unions, Labor's major support base. For the militant employer associations, the wider significance of these disputes was that they challenged the hegemony of the arbitration system. As part of their campaign to dismantle the arbitration system, the militant employer associations urged other employers to adopt similar tactics to those used at Dollar Sweets and Mudginberri.

The second activity that highlights the strategy of militant confrontation is the organisation and support by employer associations of direct actions and rallies against Federal and State Labor governments. In February 1986, the NFF initiated a Direct Action Strategy Group which contracted a former Army Brigadier, Peter Badman, to advise on the merits of various types of direct actions. (11) The Group planned a number of actions for 1986, including blockades, picket breaking, the targeting of Members of Parliament (MPs) in marginal seats, phone-ins to, and harassment of, MPs and public servants, as well as the refusal to make compulsory superannuation payments to superannuation trusts with trade union representation. (12) At a fund-raising dinner in Toowoomba in 1986, Ian McLachlan outlined the NFF's direct action strategy, saying 'civil disobedience will be the key'. (13)

The direct action strategies undertaken by the NFF were well organised. Through its affiliates, the NFF tapped into large networks of farmers willing to vent their anger against the Labor government, trade unions and public servants. During 'Operation Canberra Phone In', for example, which targeted federal politicians and bureaucrats over the issue of high interest rates, the NFF provided farmers with extensive lists of contact numbers for public servants and MPs in marginal seats as well as possible 'one liners' that could be used by farmers to register their protest. (14) A measure of how successful this mobilisation was is evident from an NFF press release claiming Telecom reported approximately 83,000 calls above the average to Canberra during the two-and-a-half days of the protest. (15)

During 1985 and 1986, the NFF also supported and helped organise a number of 'farm rallies' in rural areas and Canberra. To coincide with the tax summit the NFF organised an estimated 30,000 strong rally outside Parliament House, Canberra on 1 July 1985.16 At the Canberra rally, NFF president, Ian McLachlan, said farmers would 'fight to the death' on the capital gains tax and that 'We will never give in. If the government wants to legislate on these subjects then let them do it and bear the political consequences'. (17)

Small business groups also organised direct action during this period. As part of his attempts to build support for the formation of the Australian Federation of Employers (discussed later), John Leard organised a series of 'Business Survival Rallies' in early 1986, aimed at attracting small business owners. (18) The Small Business Association (NSW) also organised a series of rallies in regional centres in early 1986. (19) Small business was also active around elections. In the 1985 Victorian State election, businessmen Frank Penhalluriak and Bob Wolstenholme, both of whom had been prosecuted for opening their stores on weekends, stood for the Weekend Trading Party. (20) Around the same time, Small Business People (SBP) was formed, standing a candidate against NSW Premier Barrie Unsworth in the Rockdale by-election in 1986 (which Unsworth narrowly won by 27 votes) and supporting independent candidates in by-elections in the seats of Heathcote and Bankstown. (21) SBP saw itself as the 'activist wing' of the small business movement and, under its accountant president, Paul Greenwood, claimed to have 'nearly 30 "incorporated" branches in NSW'. (22) Its activist orientation was reflected in its rhetoric, such as the following description of its origins:

   SBP grew out of the need for small business people to actually get
   down to the "coal face" of political activism and fight for the
   survival of Small Business. (23)

Led by Bruce Shepherd, a small cadre of doctors, would also adopt militant tactics during the mid-1980s in defence of private health care and in opposition to Labor's Medicare proposals. These doctors were at odds with the Australian Medical Association (AMA) and organised primarily outside of it. Peter Catts of the Australian Association of Surgeons described militant doctors as 'in the vanguard of a new movement' for the full privatisation of health care. (24) From 1983 to 1985, the General Practitioners Society in Australia (GPSA) campaigned vigorously against Medicare. Its journals were strident, militant and ideological in rhetoric, referring to Medicare as the 'Sovietization of Medical Care in Australia' (25) and telling its members that the 'health and welfare of your patients, and of your family, will soon be sacrificed to socialist ideology'. (26) The GPSA gave advice to doctors on how to conduct an active campaign against Medicare, (27) set up a fighting fund 'to defray expenses incurred by the society in combating Medicare' (28) and urged its members to engage in tactics of civil disobedience, including avoidance of bulk-billing and non-compliance with health department directives. (29) Its members-only journal sounded a call to action:

   The General Practitioners' Society in Australia calls on the people
   to rally to the cause of freedom in medical care by opposing in
   every way the advent of government monopoly in medical insurance,
   and ultimately, medical care. (30)

The Society later changed its name to Private Doctors of Australia in order to represent all those doctors committed to a market-based system of health care. Although justifying their stance with appeals to freedom, their primary self-interested motivation was clear from interviews with activists: 'They (the government) took away the means test; they offered "free" hospitalisation for all--if the situation had continued we would all have ended up on salaries'. (31) Bruce Shepherd, perhaps the most prominent public representative of the militant doctors, defended, the six-figure incomes of doctors: 'If the community wants doctors they have to pay for them'. (32)

The third aspect of the strategy of militant confrontation was the formation of a new employer association: the Australian Federation of Employers (AFE). The formation of this group was intended to destabilise, undermine and challenge the arbitration system and the groups wedded to it. Thus, it constituted a challenge to the legitimacy of the industrial relations system promoted by Labor.

The AFE was not the only rogue collective body formed during this period to challenge the perceived power of the 'industrial relations club'. In the South East Queensland Electricity Board dispute, for example, Wayne Gilbert helped establish the Queensland Power Workers Association, the purpose of which, according to Simmons and Bramble, was to 'marginalise the Electrical Trades Union [ETU]'. (33) According to Gilbert, 400 workers joined, 'many of whom were by this time solidly hostile to the union [the ETU]'. (34) In 1986, the National Transport Federation (NTF) was formed to challenge the dominance of the Australian Road Transport Federation (ARTF) and the Australian Road Transport Industrial Organisation (ARTIO) within the transport industry. Paul Gaynor, a protagonist from the Dollar Sweets dispute, was its first CEO, and the group adopted a militant industrial relations ideology. Along with the Long Distance Road Transport Association (LDRTA), they mobilised owner drivers and small fleet owners to undermine the leading employer associations within the transport industry. (35)

Nonetheless, the AFE was, during its brief life, the most important new body. Formed in early 1986, the membership of the AFE was primarily based around small business and franchise-based employer groups, and the National Farmers Federation was one its major financial supporters. The major activists within the organisation--as reflected by its official leadership--were drawn from the NFF, the Australian Small Business Association, the ACC, the Housing Industry Association, Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, State Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Victoria), Australian Society of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Life Underwriters Association of Australia, Australian Tourism Industry Association, Australian Petroleum Agents and Distributors Association, Real Estate Institute of Queensland and the Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce. (36)

From the outset the AFE had a clear ideological character. At meetings of business representatives in February 1986 where the initial proposal for the establishment of the AFE was put, the role of the body was suggested as being for the 'Preservation and development of the Private Enterprise ethic in Australia'. (37) Delegates at this meeting were informed that: 'Australians need to be reminded that as Private Enterprise and Democracy go hand in hand, so too does Socialism and Servitude'. (38) Promotional leaflets described the AFE's objectives 'To unite and nationally voice the concerns of supporters of Private Enterprise in Australia'. (39) Such strident ideological polemic was mirrored in the AFE's combative press statements. The March 1987 National Wage Case Decision was described by leading AFE activist, Andrew Hay, as 'a sell-out to the trade union movement' and the Arbitration Commission as 'living in a fool's paradise, oblivious to Australia's rapidly increasing spending'. (40) Acting AFE chairman, Peter Boyle, sounded a call for business to unite against the Labor government's proposed industrial relations legislation:

   Business people and farmers who have fought hard to defend the
   legal rights of business are not going to take the government's
   actions lying down. We intend to fight this issue out in the
   electorate and make sure that ordinary men and women realise the
   gravity of the government's sell-out to the vested interests of the
   union movement. (41)

A number of tactics were employed by the AFE to further its aims. Its initial 'Profile of Organisation' described the AFE as 'an action organisation, not simply a reaction group' and stated that the leader of the organisation 'will develop attack strategies to deal with the immediate areas of concern'. (42) Initial momentum and support for the group was generated through a series of public rallies in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne which attracted 2,000, 1,000, and 700 people respectively. (43) As the 'Profile of Organisation' suggests, confrontational, activist tactics were not eschewed by the AFE. A campaign against the Hawke government's proposed Fringe Benefits Tax was organised as well as the 'Canberra Business Summit' to coincide with and challenge the Labor government's Tax Summit.

The AFE did not confine its activities or public statements to industrial relations. Rather, it set out to articulate neo-liberal alternatives to policies being put forward by the Labor government, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the 'Wets' inside the Liberal Party and those employer associations tied to the institutions and processes of arbitration. In press releases the AFE outlined means for slashing government expenditure by $3-$4 billion through the restoration of 'incentives to work'. (44) Such 'incentives' included the restriction of social security payments to 'a maximum of 10 weeks in any one year' and the cessation of family allowance payments for a family with two children once the family income reached $25,000. Other neo-liberal policy proposals advocated by the AFE included the reintroduction of higher education fees and the abolition of Medicare. (45) Its rhetoric mirrored that of the ACC (particularly under the presidency of Andrew Hay) and NFF which mobilised the language and arguments of neo-liberal think-tanks, making use of terms such as the 'Industrial Relations Club' and the 'Welfare Industry'. (46) During its brief lifetime, the ACC Review (the official journal of the Australian Chamber of Commerce between April/May 1986 and July 1987) was characterised by a quite aggressive and polemical neo-liberal stance.

Why were such tactics adopted by these employer associations? The rationale of the militant wing of the employers' neo-liberal mobilisation was to shift political debate in Australia further to the right and to undermine the power of trade unions and the legitimacy of the institutions of arbitration. Rick Farley, former Executive Director of the NFF, more recently outlined how the NFF attempted to do this. He said that:

   the position that NFF deliberately took in those days was to be
   further to the Right and therefore draw the debate to the Right and
   create a new centre. (47)

By making radical and provocative statements, by creating public spectacles and by claiming a support base for such statements and spectacles, the militant employer associations helped to create a climate of opinion in which previously radical ideas seemed reasonable. Andrew Hay explained this strategy in similar terms:

   It's a question of climate of opinion. Therefore, if Andrew Hay and
   others are at the extreme edge of the debate and the Labor Party
   were at the other end, then they [Labor] could quite comfortably
   move into the middle--the middle prior would have been the end of
   the spectrum. So, it's shifted the whole spectrum and allowed them
   [Labor] to do things, while still saying that there are dangerous
   right wing ideologues out on the boundary of the debate. (48)

For example, in the industrial disputes at Mudginberri and Dollar Sweets, by agreeing to underwrite the employers' costs in key industrial disputes, organisations such as the NFF and the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce were not merely protecting the interests of their own members, they were actively trying to reshape the Australian political landscape and core institutions of the Australian state. They hoped that by sponsoring confrontation against 'repressive behaviour by unions', (49) other employers would be emboldened to do the same. Furthermore, by working outside of the institutions of arbitration, they hoped to undermine the authority of the arbitration system as a whole and put issues of trade union power and 'restrictive work practices' on the public and political agendas.

This strategy can also be seen as informing the establishment of the NFF's 'Fighting Fund'. The Fighting Fund was a pool of money the NFF set aside and which received additional private donations. It was to be used for a 'conscious positioning out to the Right to draw the [political] debate more to the Right'. (50) As NFF Executive Director, Andrew Robb, exhorted Australian business leaders: 'We need money to change attitudes and win issues'. (51) In 1985, Andrew Robb claimed that the fighting fund stood at over $1 million (52) and the plan was to increase that to $10 million. (53) In addition to underwriting the costs of the Mudginberri dispute, the fighting fund was used to fund other industrial disputes that the NFF was supporting. (54)

What led these employer associations to adopt such strategies? Part of the answer to this question was the ideological orientation of the leadership of these employer groups at the time. Both Andrew Robb and Ian McLachlan of the NFF would later hold front bench positions within the federal Liberal Parliamentary party. McLachlan sat for a time on the Board of the neo-liberal think-tank, the Institute of Public Affairs and Andrew Hay was involved in the neo-liberal organisations, the Australian Institute of Public Policy and the Crossroads Group. However, the material interests and circumstances of the membership bases of these associations also provide an answer. Doug McEachern's analysis of mining and pastoral capital is telling:

   The mining and farming sectors share a number of economic features.
   Both are heavily involved in exports, both use expensive imported
   manufacturing equipment, both use relatively small quantities of
   labour but are angry about the role of unions especially in
   transport and the docks, both have been involved in significant
   confrontations with trade unions. (55)

These factors aligned mining and pastoral capital against both manufacturing capital and the broad trade union movement over the issues of protection and arbitration.

McEachern also points out that wages tend to form a large portion of the expenditure of many small businesses (56) while Boris Frankel notes they are less able than large corporations to 'absorb higher wage costs and taxes'. (57) Small business thus had a direct interest in opposing the institutions of arbitration, which tended to pass on the benefits--in terms of wage rises and improvements in conditions to all workers in an industry. When this is considered alongside the fact that small businesses often have little direct experience of negotiating with trade unions, then it is clear that the small business sector was subject to material conditions which would predispose them to antipathy to the institutions of arbitration. (58) Added to these antagonisms was the more immediate economic crisis that both Australian and global capitalism had been experiencing since the mid-1970s. The crisis threatened the profitability of Australian-based capital and provided the context for the political mobilisation of the militant employer groups. Therefore, both immediate and longer term interests were served by the political strategies of these associations. On the one hand, there was an immediate interest in reducing business costs through opposition to various government measures. On the other hand, there was a longer-term interest in reducing costs and increasing managerial prerogatives through a dismantling of the arbitration system and a weakening of the trade union movement.

Neoliberal Political Mobilisation 2: Pragmatism And Engagement

In contrast to the strategies pursued by militant employer associations during the 1980s, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) adopted a strategy of pragmatism and engagement with respect to the Labor Government in pursuit of its broad neo-liberal policy agenda.

Formed in 1983, and comprised of Chief Executive Officers of Australia's largest companies, the BCA had similar broad policy goals to those of the militant employers, but differed fundamentally on tactics. As Stephen Bell notes, 'during its first few years of operation the BCA worked to define a distinctive strategy of political engagement'. (59) Its advocacy efforts were focused primarily, although not exclusively, upon industrial relations. (60) The BCA's strategy had two major, and related, components: 'research-based advocacy' (61) and 'a broad leadership role on key "national issues"'. (62) To achieve this, well-articulated policy analysis, research papers, and newsletters were produced, (63) with the research conducted either in-house or contracted to organisations such as Access Economics, McKinsey, and the Australian Graduate School of Management. Such research was conducted with 'a medium term strategic approach' (64) in mind. Although its broad philosophy and policy goals were neo-liberal, the BCA was willing to adopt a piecemeal and incremental approach to policy in order to achieve its medium-term goals. According to Geoff Allen, Executive Director of the BCA in its early years:

   We are conscious that a number of key strategies cannot be resolved
   quickly and in many areas, major vested interests and entrenched
   attitudes and practices--even sacred cows--will have to be tackled
   and changed over time. An approach however which puts "a light on
   the hill" for guidance and direction is overdue and essential. In
   this way, when we deal, as we must constantly do, with the
   relatively trivial, short-term, ad-hoc and incremental, we are
   working consistently along a desired path. (65)

It was by doing this that the BCA was able to pursue an effective strategy of engagement with the Hawke Labor government. As Geoff Allen notes, 'basically we looked to find things where there was good alignment between what we needed and what government needed'. (66) In contrast to the militant employer associations, the BCA 'never set out to influence public opinion, it set out to influence leader opinion'. (67) The BCA was formed in order to give big business in Australia a coherent political voice and to give it access to state actors at a time of formally close relations between government and unions. Despite the Hawke government's preference for a 'consensus' approach, as Bell notes, the BCA's strategy was one of advocacy and engagement as opposed to 'corporatist collaborator'. (68)

This strategy is perhaps clearest on the issue of industrial relations. During the 1980s, the BCA moved toward advocacy of enterprise bargaining. As John O'Brien has demonstrated, the BCA turned to Fred Hilmer and the McKinsey company for research and advice. (69) What eventuated was advocacy of a position that called for a dismantling of centralised arbitration, but with the potential for a continuing role for the traditional institutions of arbitration, including unions and commissions. It called for deregulation, but not complete destruction. Thus, it distinguished itself from the more militant employer associations by advocating a policy that had a realistic chance of implementation under Labor. However, this short term goal was also a step on the path toward a much more radical neo-liberal transformation of the Australian industrial relations system, something the BCA advocated years later when it called for the extension of the Howard government's Workplace Relations Act. In the words of the BCA: 'The Council's policy approach is evolutionary, but radical in the longer term'. (70)

The reasons for the BCA's adoption of such tactics were three fold. First. its members had the same general interest as the majority of Australian-based capital in a neo-liberalisation of the Australian economy. Second, the BCA represented an assertion of the political interests of the largest private economic units in Australia, at a time when there was dissatisfaction with the representation employers were receiving in dealing with the Labor Government. These two reasons speak to the broad neo-liberal agenda of the BCA and its nature as an elite organisation representing only the largest firms. To explain why it adopted a strategy of engagement with Labor it is necessary to consider its internal and external environment. Internally, the BCA was comprised of firms with sometimes competing sectoral interests. The piecemeal strategy, tied to broader, medium-term goals, enabled such competing priorities to be reconciled. As Sheldon and Thornthwaite argue, 'The Council's avoidance of contentious issues was a tactic to promote greater unity, with member firms pursuing more contentious or immediate issues themselves or through more specific sectoral associations'. (71) In terms of the external environment, the BCA faced a Government allied to the trade union movement. In such a context, it was unlikely that a rapid and radical neo-liberal transformation of the Australian state would occur, particularly one that destroyed the very institutions most dear to the unions. The BCA's approach allowed it to work within and extend the boundaries of political reality. Therefore the BCA's strategy of engagement with the Labor government represented a pragmatic compromise. To a significant degree, the attention to the dynamics of its internal environment enabled it to shape a policy strategy appropriate to its external environment.

Think-Tanks and the New Right

A further important feature of Australian capital's neo-liberal mobilisation was the support provided by business to neo-liberal think-tanks. During the 1980s, neoliberal think-tanks and similar organisations, such as the Centre for Independent Studies, the Institute of Public Affairs, the H.R. Nicholls Society, the Australian Institute for Public Policy, Centre 2000, and the National Priorities Project, rose to public prominence as manifestations of what became known as the New Right. One of the main reasons they were able to sustain their activities was the ongoing financial and in-kind support they received from private sector capital. (72) The think-tanks articulated an uncompromising and radical neo-liberal policy agenda. In doing so, they often made virulent attacks upon the Labor Government and trade unions for being part of the 'industrial relations club' and for favouring 'special interests'. Furthermore, while all were officially non-partisan, many of the key activists from these organisations had close links to the Liberal Party. (73)

While support for neo-liberal think-tanks was part of the political mobilisation by business during the 1980s, such support tended to come from individuals and firms rather than from employer associations. Based upon the information that is publically available, the National Priorities Project (NPP) was one of the only think-tanks sponsored by employer associations, as opposed to individual employers or firms. During its brief life (1986-91) the NPP was sponsored by a host of employer associations, with the following listed as 'Initial Sponsoring Bodies': Australian Chamber of Commerce, Australian Federation of Employers, Business Council of Australia, Confederation of Australian Industry, Council of Small Business Organisations Australia, and the National Farmers Federation. (74)

It is apparent that most of the employer associations already discussed funded and directed the National Priorities Project. Otherwise, it was key individuals and firms involved in these employer associations that gave direct support to the think-tanks. For example, both Andrew Hay (ACC, AFE and Melbourne Chamber of Commerce) and Hugh Morgan (BCA) were important in brokering funding from employers to think-tanks as well as playing a direct role in the operation of think-tanks. Hay explains the importance of this brokerage function:

   to get these things underway one needs funds--and academics are
   notoriously bad at being able to accumulate funds for these sorts
   of purposes--so therefore business organisations and particularly
   the Chamber of Commerce style of organisations, which had large
   memberships, were able to attract funds. We were able to assist a
   lot of these individuals in forming linkages with individual
   businesses and businessmen who were philosophically persuaded in
   a market-based direction. (75)

While corporations and some prominent owners were crucial to the success of the neo-liberal think-tanks, the employer associations of which these individuals and corporations were central players had a much less important role. One plausible explanation for this is that employer associations were reluctant to fund organisations and projects they could not directly control. Employer associations or their representatives had direct control over the NPP, but such would not have applied to other think-tanks.

In the case of the BCA, other reasons may have been important. Generally, the BCA as an organisation had little to do with the neo-liberal think-tanks, at least publicly. This is despite the fact that some prominent BCA members were also involved with think-tanks (for example, Hugh Morgan, Arvi Parbo, Will Bailey, Peter Ritchie) and despite neo-liberal activists John Freebairn and Tim Duncan working briefly for the Council. (76) Presumably, many BCA members had some contact and sympathy with the think-tanks because many of Australia's largest corporations were, by the 1990s, providing them with financial support. Although large Australian-based capital strongly supported the think-tanks, its major representative organisation, the BCA, tended to keep its distance from the radical neo-liberals.

An examination of the Council's regular journal, the Business Council Bulletin, reveals only occasional articles by think-tank activists. One reason for this is that the neo-liberal think-tanks rarely had the resources or expertise to conduct detailed economic modelling. However the main reason for the BCA's reluctance to engage research consultancy from the neo-liberal think-tanks probably has more to do with the Council's pragmatic political strategy already outlined. First, the BCA was loathe to alienate the Labor government by allying itself too closely with the neo-liberal think-tanks which had been identified by the trade union movement and by many within the Labor caucus as a threat to the labour movement. Second, given the strident ideological nature of most of the output of the neo-liberal think-tanks, it is unlikely that they would have produced research and policy recommendations that fell within the bounds of what was considered to be politically realistic under a federal Labor government. Furthermore, the strident ideological outpourings of the neo-liberal think-tanks were quite removed from the official position of the BCA on several issues. For example, the BCA had a much more realistic appreciation of the relationship between state and economy than did the think-tanks:

   Recent debate in Australia has centred on the degree to which
   government should 'intervene' in the market and the degree to which
   government should 'get out of the road'. Those who advocate minimal
   government in favour of an uninhibited market fail to recognise the
   way in which government is woven into every aspect of our lives.
   Good government is not peripheral to the market: it is an essential
   prerequisite which allows any market to function. (77)

By funding think-tanks, therefore, employers from the BCA could nurture and sustain political viewpoints that were too radical to be articulated by their own representative organisation, but nonetheless in keeping with its longer term aims. It allowed them to facilitate a radicalisation of public political debate without getting their own hands dirty. That many of the funding sources of the think-tanks remained anonymous during the 1980s enabled corporations to support radical ideas without themselves being publicly associated with such ideas. For some of those companies and CEOs involved in the BCA, the think-tanks acted as a surrogate for their political and economic interests.

Labor, Business and Neo-Liberalism

What was the political significance of the tactics employed by Australian businesses and their representative associations and the relationships pursued with Labor? In summary, the Business Council's strategy of engagement and pragmatic research-based advocacy gave it access to the Labor government and helped it shape federal policy along neo-liberal lines, particularly with respect to industrial relations. The context for such shaping was, at least in part, provided by the strategy of confrontation pursued by small business associations and the NFF, as well as by the strident rhetoric of the New Right, which had the support of individuals and firms from both the pragmatic and militant employer associations.

As several analyses have noted, the BCA enjoyed a considerable degree of success in shifting the federal Government's industrial relations policy down a more neo-liberal path. Partly this was facilitated by its pragmatic strategy of engagement with Labor. As Sheldon and Thornthwaite argue, 'by 1984 the Council had already become part of the Labor Government's decision making processes'. (78) This achievement provided the pre-conditions for the BCA's campaign in favour of enterprise bargaining, as a result of which 'policy discourse was successfully shifted from discussions about Australia's traditional centralised IR system towards a new decentralised, "enterprise bargaining" framework'. (79) However, a crucial context for this success was also provided by the militant capitalist campaign of direct action, as well as the radical neo-liberal proposals of the New Right with which these employer groups were often associated in the public mind.

Awareness of the New Right reached a new high with the 1986 Robe River dispute during which Peko-Wallsend CEO, Charles Copeman, used common law suits against striking workers in the Pilbara. It did not take long for the media to draw links between the tactics used at Robe River and those used in other disputes, such as Dollar Sweets, supported by the militant employer associations. Links were also drawn between the individuals involved. A network of radical neo-liberal think-tanks, intellectuals and businessmen was identified as part of a New Right. This network was said to include not only neo-liberal think-tanks and organisations such as the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA), the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) and H.R. Nicholls Society, but also the NFF and Andrew Hay, leading figure in the Chambers of Commerce and the AFE. Thus the militant employers and the neo-liberal think-tanks came to be grouped together in the public mind under the umbrella of the New Right.

Attribution of a common pejorative label, combined with the direct action and uncompromising demands of the militant employer associations and the strident ideological rhetoric of the neo-liberal think-tanks, enabled the Labor leadership to use the New Right as a threat against those within their own party who opposed, or were wary of, the neo-liberal policy path being charted by Hawke and Keating. As former caucus member, Stephen Martin, argues, the Labor leadership attempted to portray the New Right as a 'bogey'. (80) The significance of this is that it allowed the leadership of the Party to use the threat of the New Right to draw the Party further to the right and discipline the Party's left-wing factions.

The public reaction of the federal Labor government to the radical neo-liberals was to attack them stridently. Prime Minister Hawke labelled the H.R. Nicholls Society 'troglodytes and lunatics'. (81) John Dawkins described the New Right as 'treasonous'. (82) Stephen Martin recalls that:

   [A]t different times ministers in the parliament would refer to
   comments made by people associated with those different [New Right]
   organisations and use it to make political points about where they
   were wrong. And in debates you would often hear MPs refer to
   individuals associated with those organisations and declare where
   they thought the organisations and their philosophies were wrong. I
   mean H. R. Nicholls Society was always a great one for kicking
   around. (83)

Such responses did much more than simply defend the interests of the organisations which constituted the major source of funds for the Labor party--trade unions. They also served to conjure the image of a brutish and ideologically motivated minority which was antithetical to, and threatened, not only the values of the labour movement, but the values of mainstream Australia. This minority could be portrayed as inimical to the inclusive image Labor fostered. The Labor leadership was then able to position itself in opposition to this threat.

By promoting the New Right as a very real threat, the right-wing and moderate Labor leadership had extra evidence with which to persuade the Left-Labor factions to acquiesce to a less radical, but nonetheless neo-liberal, policy agenda. Australian Labor Party (ALP) National President and Special Minister for State, Mick Young, employed such a tactic in 1986 when he implored the party to put aside its differences and unite against the common enemy in the form of the New Right. (84) Young claimed the New Right stood for 'busting the unions and busting the welfare net'. (85) That is, if the New Right agenda was implemented, it would destroy those egalitarian institutions at the core of Labor's commitments. This strategy of using the New Right 'bogey' to neutralise internal opposition to Labor's own version of neo-liberalism was recognised at the time in a Sydney Morning Herald editorial. On the advantages to the ALP leadership in portraying the New Right as a radical threat, the editorial argues:

   [T]hey may galvanise those ALP members disenchanted both with the
   Government's economic policies and now with its decision to resume
   uranium sales to France. For many ALP members and supporters the
   distinction between Labor the [sic] Coalition has been blurred by
   the floating dollar, the cuts in real wages and the stringent
   1986-87 Budget ... What Mr Young, the Special Minister of State,
   and President of the ALP, plainly believes, is that the threat of
   the radical Right can be used to bring together a divided and
   demoralised party. From Mr Young's point of view, the more radical
   and threatening the Right appears, the better.

   The same, no doubt, is true so far as [ACTU leaders] Messrs Crean
   and Kelty are concerned. For them the issue is the preservation of
   the Accord through a period of further real wage cuts and little or
   no progress on the unions' superannuation claim ... For those
   unions tempted to desert the Accord, the ACTU leaders have a
   frightening answer: the alternative to the Accord and wage
   restraint is a Coalition government determined to roll back union
   power. (86)

In the case of enterprise bargaining, as Bell argues:

   the union movement as a whole, led by the ACTU, also thought it
   better to move in this direction [enterprise bargaining] under a
   Labor government than have a more draconian system imposed (as
   would have been the case) when the conservative government finally
   won power. (87)

Former ACTU President, Jennie George, suggests that the trade union leadership took the threat from the New Right seriously: 'it was well known within the union movement that there was this conservative world view about industrial relations that we had to contend with, and of course it came at a time of declining union membership, so it made the future more problematic'. (88) The BCA's agenda of enterprise bargaining was thus assisted by the Labor leadership's ability to point to the far worse option that people would face under the New Right-influenced Coalition. Sheldon and Thornthwaite are therefore right to argue that the New Right created 'a favourable intellectual climate for the Council's ideas'. (89) This favourable climate was partly the result of a different set of relationships between Labor and other employer associations than those enjoyed by the BCA. Partly also it was the result of the support given by BCA members to neo-liberal think-tanks outside of the formal apparatuses of the Council.

Conclusion

This article draws attention to broader factors beyond the specifics of political mobilisations by business interests and the responses to these by the federal Labor Government in Australia during the 1980s. These are relevant to an understanding of the relationship between business and social democratic parties more generally. First, this study highlights the particular tensions that pertain to social democratic parties in government that do not pertain to conservative parties. On the one hand, social democratic parties, like other parties that seek to govern in a capitalist society, must provide the conditions under which capital accumulation and the profitability of private sector capital can be realised. On the other hand, they must maintain the support of their core constituencies of trade unions and working-class electorates. These conditions are often contradictory and the former condition creates inevitable dilemmas for trade unions and Labor parliamentarians. Should the goal of securing the conditions for capital accumulation be put ahead of the interests of workers and unions? Should unions subordinate the immediate economic interests of their members in order to secure conditions for private sector profits in the hope that this will prolong the electoral fortunes of a social democratic government? Answers in the affirmative necessarily grant significant structural power to business. As was evident in Australia during the 1980s, however, the outcome and significance of these dynamics will vary according to the particular political and sectoral alliances and conflicts formed within and between classes in any specific temporal and spatial context.

This leads to the second broad conclusion, that class analysis of capital should be sensitive to the existence of fractions of capital and the associational power of employer groups, not merely their class unity and structural power. Such sensitivity enables an appreciation of the complexities and shifting dynamics of class conflict and power. In doing so, it allows for a reinvigoration of class analysis.

Finally, and following from the previous point, this article highlights the relevance of capital history within the broader project of labour history. Labour history as an intellectual project is only coherent when it is framed in terms of the social relations of production that underpin capitalism. Otherwise labour history, the study of a historically specific social phenomenon, is reduced to the history of work, the study of a universal human phenomenon. As such, capital history is a crucial component of labour history because of its focus upon the history of the experiences, power, capabilities and dynamics of the people and organisations that constitute 'the other' of labour in the social relationships that underpin capitalist production.

Endnotes

* The author wishes to thank the two anonymous referees who reviewed this article for their constructive criticisms.

(1.) Andrew Moore, 'The Montagues and the Capulets? Labour history, capital history and a case study of ruling-class mobilisation during the 1930s Depression', Teaching History, vol. 23, no. 3, 1989, p. 4. For other discussions and applications of capital history, see Drew Cottle (ed.), Capital Essays: Selected Papers from the General Studies Conference on Australian Capital History, University of New South Wales, July 1983, Drew Cottle, Sydney, 1984; and Drew Cottle, 'The Brisbane Line: an episode in capital history', Journal of Australian Studies 69 and Australian Cultural History, no. 20 (Joint Issue), 2001, pp. 113-121.

(2.) Andrew Moore, 'Writing about the extreme Right in Australia', Labour History, no. 89, November 2005, pp. 1-14.

(3.) John Edwards, Quiet Boom: How the Long Economic Upswing is Changing Australia and its Place in the World, Longueville Media, Lowy Institute, Double Bay, 2006, p. 26.

(4.) See for example, David Harvey, A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005; Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neo-liberal Revolution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004.

(5.) Frank Stilwell and Kirrily Jordan, WWho Gets WWhat? Analysing Economic Inequality in Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2007.

(6.) Damien Cahill, 'Labo(u)r, the boom and the prospects for an alternative to neo-liberalism', Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 61, June 2008, pp. 321-336.

(7.) Carol Johnson, The Labor Legacy: Curtin, Chifley, WWhitlam, Hawke, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1989, p. 108.

(8.) Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy: The Political Economy of Australian Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, pp. 81, 116-117; Ed Kaptein, 'Neo-liberalism and the dismantling of corporatism in Australia' in Henk Overbeek (ed.), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 103.

(9.) Andrew Hay says 'a great deal of coordination' occurred. Andrew Hay, interview with the author, 16 May 2001.

(10.) On the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce's involvement in the Dollar Sweets dispute, see Anon., 'You can't get us we're part of the union', The Optimist, November-December 1985, p. 5. For the NFF's involvement is other disputes see Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: Power, Politics and Business in Australia, 2nd edition, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1994, pp. 255-7. For an analysis of the Mudginberri dispute see Bernie Brian, 'The Mudginberri Abattoir Dispute of 1985', Labour History, no. 76, May 1999, pp. 107-124.

(11.) Andrew Robb, Memo to NFF Executive, 24 February 1986, Noel Butlin Archives Centre (hereafter NBAC), N143/35.

(12.) Robb, Memo to NFF Executive.

(13.) Anon., Speech notes for National Farmers Federation President, Mr Ian McLachlan, Fund Raising Dinner, Toowoomba, Queensland, 21 February, 1986, NBAC, N143/35.

(14.) Andrew Robb, Memo to NFF Chief Executives and Member Organisations, 11 March 1986, NBAC, N143/35.

(15.) NFF, 'Farmers phone-in protest clear message to federal governments, Press Release, 20 March, 1986, NBAC, N143/35.

(16.) Michael Lawrence, 'Farmers set for battle over costs and taxes', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 July, 1985, p. 5, Don Wilkinson, 'Farmers Rally Against Government Policies', The Optimist, November-December, 1985, pp. 6-7. Wilkinson estimated the size of the rally to be 50 000 people.

(17.) Lawrence, 'Farmers set for battle over costs and taxes', p. 5.

(18.) David Plowman, 'Economic forces and the New Right: employer matters in 1986', Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1987, vol. 29, no. 1, p. 85.

(19.) Anon., 'The Right agenda', The Optimist, January-February, 1986, back cover; Anon., 'Small business people, The Optimist, July-August, 1987, p. 4.

(20.) The Optimist, March-April, 1985, p. 17.

(21.) Mark Coultan, 'The little capitalists worry the ALP', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January, 1987, p. 4; Anon., 'Small business people', The Optimist, July-August, 1987, p. 4.

(22.) Anon., 'Small business people', p. 4.

(23.) Ibid., p. 4.

(24.) Anon., 'Doctors in the vanguard', The Optimist, November-December, 1985, p. 9.

(25.) GP Society News, no. 96, September, 1983.

(26.) 'Editorial', The Australian GP, vol. 16, no. 7, November-December, 1983, p. 1.

(27.) GP Society News, no. 96, September, 1983.

(28.) GPSA Membership Form, The Australian GP, vol. 17, no. 1, January-February, 1984.

(29.) The Australian GP, vol. 16, no. 7, November-December, 1983, p. 2.

(30.) GP Society News, no. 96, September, 1983.

(31.) 'Doctors in the vanguard', p. 9.

(32.) Tony Wheeler, Doctors (video recording), Production Division of the Australian Film Commission, Australia, 1986.

(33.) David Simmons and Thomas Bramble, 'Workplace reform at the South East Queensland Electricity Board, 1984-1994', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 38, no. 2, June 1996, p. 222.

(34.) Ibid., p. 222.

(35.) Bradley Bowden, 'Employer associations in road transports, in Peter Sheldon and Louise Thornthwaite, Employer Associations and Industrial Relations Change: Catalysts or Captives?, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1999, pp. 102-103.

(36.) AFE Steering Committee, Minutes of meeting held on 11 April 1986, NBAC, N143/286-288; Alex Brown (Executive Director, Australian Automobile Dealers Association) Memorandum to Members of Executive Committee and Secretaries of State Divisions, 27 March, 1986, NBAC, Z383/4; Minutes of the AFE Annual General Meeting, 20 May 1987, NBAC, N143/286-288.

(37.) Anon., Australian Federation of Employers: Profile of Organisation, Australian Federation of Employers National Conference Agenda Papers, 27 February, 1986, NBAC, Z383/4.

(38.) Ibid. Emphasis in original.

(39.) AFE, Leaflet, NBAC, N143/286-288.

(40.) AFE, National wage case decision, Press Release, 10 March, 1987, NBAC, N143/286-288.

(41.) Peter Boyle, Australian Small Business Association, condemns industrial legislation, Press Release, 14 May, 1987, NBAC, N143/286-288.

(42.) Anon., Australian Federation of Employers: Profile of Organisation. Emphasis in original.

(43.) Alex Brown, Memorandum to Members of Executive Committee and Secretaries of State Divisions, 27 March, 1986, NBAC, Z383/4.

(44.) AFE, Public statement by Canberra Business Summit, 4 June, 1986, NBAC, N143/286-288.

(45.) Peter Boyle, ASBA condemns mini budget, Press Release, 13 May 1987, NBAC, N143/286-288.

(46.) ACC, Poll confirms accord failure, Press Release No. 8601, 14 October, 1986, NBAC, Z196/153; ACC, Social welfare should not be immune from spending cuts, Press Release No. 8661, 23 July, 1986, NBAC, Z196/153.

(47.) Rick Farley, interview with the author, 9 March 2001.

(48.) Andrew Hay, interview with the author.

(49.) Ibid.

(50.) Farley, interview with the author.

(51.) Andrew Robb, The Rural Economy: Discontents and Remedies, Speech Notes for Address to CEDA [Committee for Economic Development of Australia] National Issues Seminar, 3 June, 1986, NBAC, N143/51.

(52.) Andrew Robb, Address to Gympie Farm Community Rally, 25 October, 1985, NBAC, N143/51.

(53.) Andrew Robb, Memo to NFF Executive, 24 February, 1986, NBAC, N143/35.

(54.) Andrew Robb, Address to the Cattlemen's Union Annual Convention, Brisbane, 5 August, 1987, NBAC, N143/51. For a discussion of the fighting fund see Kelly, The End of Certainty, pp. 254-7.

(55.) Doug McEachern, 'Political parties of business: liberal and national' in Stephen Bell and John Wanna (eds), Business-Government Relations in Australia, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Sydney, 1992, pp. 88-89. See also McEachern's analysis in Doug McEachern, Business Mates: The Power and Politics of the Hawke Era, Prentice Hall, Sydney, 1991, p. 52.

(56.) McEachern, Business Mates, p. 52.

(57.) Boris Frankel, When the Boat Comes in: Transforming Australia in the Age of Globalisation, Pluto Press, Annandale, 2001, p. 46.

(58.) McEachern, Business Mates, p. 52; Frankel, When the Boat Comes in, pp. 46, 60.

(59.) Stephen Bell, 'Institutional influences on business power: how 'privileged' is the Business Council of Australia?', Journal of Public Affairs, vol. 6, 2006, p. 158.

(60.) Peter Sheldon and Louise Thornthwaite, 'The Business Council of Australia', in Peter Sheldon and Louise Thornthwaite, Employer Associations and Industrial Relations Change: Catalysts or Captives?, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1999, p. 50.

(61.) Bell, 'Institutional influences', p. 158.

(62.) Ibid., p. 159.

(63.) Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 'The Business Council of Australia', p. 50.

(64.) Bell, 'Institutional influences', p. 159.

(65.) Allen quoted in Peter Sheldon and Louise Thornthwaite, 'Ex Parte Accord: The Business Council of Australia and Industrial Relations Change', International Journal of Business Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, October, 1993, p. 43.

(66.) Geoff Allen quoted in Bell, 'Institutional influences', p. 161.

(67.) Unnamed BCA Secretariat member, quoted in Stephen Bell, 'A victim of its own success: internationalization, neo-liberalism, and organisational involution at the Business Council of Australia', Politics and Society, vol. 34, no. 4, 2006, p. 548.

(68.) Bell, 'Institutional influences', p. 159.

(69.) John O'Brien, 'McKinsey, Hilmer and the BCA: The 'New Management' model of labour market reform', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 36, December 1994, pp. 468-490.

(70.) BCA quoted in Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 'The Business Council of Australia', p. 54.

(71.) Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 'The Business Council of Australia', p. 50.

(72.) Sharon Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism, Scribe, Melbourne, 2000; Damien Cahill, 'Funding the Ideological Struggle', Overland 168, Spring, 2002, pp. 21-26.

(73.) Damien Cahill, 'The radical neo-liberal movement and its impact upon Australian politics', Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Adelaide, 2004, p. 23.

(74.) Anon., National Priorities Project: Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting, Friday 29 August 1986, in Daryl S. George, Chief Executive, CAI, Letter, 10 September 1986, NBAC, N143/289-90

(75.) Hay, interview with the author.

(76.) Duncan was a policy adviser for the BCA, see: http://www.brisinst.org.au/people/duncan_tim. html. Accessed 20 March 2004. Freebairn was Research Director for the BCA from 1984-86, see Profile of Professor John Freebairn: http://melecon.unimelb.edu.au/staffprofile/jfreebairn/home. html. Accessed 20 March 2004

(77.) Paul Anderson (ed.), Australia 2010: Creating the Future Australia, BCA, Melbourne, 1993, p. 64.

(78.) Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 'The Business Council of Australia', p. 53.

(79.) Bell, 'Institutional influences on business power', p. 161.

(80.) Stephen Martin, interview with the author, 10 June 2003.

(81.) Mike Taylor and Jenni Hewett, 'Hawke wades into Peko row', Australian Financial Re-view, 29 August. 1986, p. 1.

(82.) Gregory Hywood and Mike Taylor, 'ALP unites against fragmented New Right', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 September, 1986, p. 4.

(83.) Martin, interview with the author.

(84.) Mike Taylor, 'New push for labour deregulation', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 September, 1986, p. 1.

(85.) Mike Steketee, 'Young's call to ALP: fight the New Right', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 September, 1986, p. 1.

(86.) Editorial, 'Both sides play the Right', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 September 1986, p. 10.

(87.) Bell, 'A victim of its own success', p. 549.

(88.) Jennie George, interview with the author, 17 February 2003.

(89.) Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 'The Business Council of Australia', p. 56.

Damien Cahill *

Damien Cahill is a Lecturer in Political Economy at the University of Sydney. His research interests include neoliberalism, think tanks, class and the social foundations of economic activity.

<damien.cahill@sydney.edu.au>