Prospects for the UK economy.
Kirby, Simon ; Carreras, Oriol ; Meaning, Jack 等
The production of this forecast is supported by the
Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, Mizuho
Research Institute Ltd, Office for National Statistics, Santander (UK)
plc and by the members of the NiGEM users group.
Introduction
The sharp fall in the price of oil over the past few months has led
financial markets to re-assess when the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
of the Bank of England is first expected to raise the Bank Rate. Markets
view the middle of 2016 rather than the middle of this year as the point
at which the majority will now vote for the rise. Our assessment of the
outlook for the UK economy, discussed in detail below, suggests to us
that the start of 2016 is a more likely candidate for the first, and
largely symbolic, 25 basis point move. Nevertheless, this still
represents a half-year delay compared to our expectations in the
November 2014 Review.
At first glance, the UK economy ended 2014 on a marginally more
subdued note than had been expected: the Office for National
Statistics' (ONS) Preliminary Estimate of GDP, suggests the economy
expanded by 0.5 per cent in the final quarter of last year (see figure
1), in comparison to our monthly GDP estimate of 0.6 per cent per
quarter. Such differences are statistically insignificant, even more so
when viewed in the context of the impact of recent ONS revisions, as
discussed in the Demand section of this chapter.
Revisions to historical GDP estimates are technical issues that
forecasters must address on a near continual basis, a point neatly
summarised in the fan charts around historical data presented by the
Bank of England in every Inflation Report. The important question is:
have these recent ONS revisions changed our view of the outlook for the
UK? They have not. What has changed our view of the outlook (see figure
2) are recent oil price developments.
The average of Brent and Dubai crude spot prices has fallen by
around 45 US$ per barrel relative to our last forecast. For a net oil
importer such as the UK this helps to boost consumer spending via a
positive terms of trade effect, and may translate into an improvement in
the trade balance. We have raised our forecast for consumer spending for
2015 by around 3/4 percentage point to almost 3 1/2 per cent per annum
as a consequence of the on-going oil price shock. This is the major
factor behind our 0.4 percentage point upward revision to GDP growth for
this year (see figure 2), with much of it concentrated in the first half
of this year (see figure 1 for the quarterly profile of GDP growth).
Looking further ahead, our modal forecast is for GDP growth rates in
excess of the 2 per cent per annum pace of economic potential, closing
the negative output gap over a sustained period.
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[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
The short-term outlook for the global economy is more subdued, as
discussed in the World chapter of this Review. The exceptions to this
are the outlooks for the US and the UK. In both instances we have raised
our forecast for GDP growth in 2015 on the back of oil price
developments and the impact on their respective domestic economies, in
particular consumer spending growth. (1)
We are more pessimistic about the outlook for some major emerging
markets, notably Brazil and Russia. Our expectations for short-term
economic performance in the Euro Area remain subdued. These are expected
to inhibit the performance of our external sector, where deficient
demand in export markets is the key to the contribution of net trade
remaining a drag on UK economic growth this year and next.
The growth enhancing effects from the recent oil price shock are
expected to dissipate by 2017. This is only partially behind the
expected softening of domestic demand growth. Households improving their
balance sheets, further fiscal consolidation and business investment
growth decelerating as the capital stock approaches its equilibrium
level are all factors in this. That this translates into a more subdued
period of import growth is no surprise, although recovery in demand in
the Euro Area is still a necessity if we are to see a positive
contribution from net trade from 2017 onwards, as we expect.
The near-term effects of the oil price shock are most acutely
observed in consumer price developments. The annual rate of inflation
has already dropped to a 14-year low of 0.5 per cent in December 2014,
and we expect it to remain at about this level, on average, throughout
2015. There is considerable uncertainty around any economic forecast,
and our projections published here are no different. Figure 3 presents
our modal forecast for CPI inflation through to the end of 2019,
embedded within a series of confidence intervals derived from stochastic
simulations on our latest baseline. While we expect the impact on the
rate of inflation from oil price developments to be only temporary, the
magnitude and speed of pass-through are uncertain. The distribution of
potential forecast outcomes is skewed below the Bank of England's 2
per cent target in the near term. We attach a 1 in 10 chance that the
price level will report an outright fall this year. Similar
probabilities exist for the later years of our forecast horizon, but
this relates more to the spread of the distribution, given that the rate
of inflation is close to target in 2018 and 2019.
Headline figures for the labour market remain buoyant. Overall
employment continues to expand at a relatively rapid pace, while the
unemployment rate continues its downward march. In the final quarter of
this year, the unemployment rate reached 5.6 per cent of the 16+ labour
force. We expect the rate of unemployment to fall further in the near
term (figure 4), reaching 5.2 per cent by the end of this year.
As we have noted in previous Reviews, the corollary to this robust
employment growth and, until recently, weak aggregate demand growth, has
been the absence of any persistent productivity growth. We assume that
productivity growth returns gradually and that this will drive future
increases in real consumer wage growth and the living standards of the
UK population. In the near term, real consumer wages bounce back to
growth of around 1 per cent per annum this year due to the
disinflationary effect of the oil price shock: the terms of trade
adjustment allows a greater increase in real consumer wages than would
otherwise have been the case. Beyond this year and next, it is the
performance of productivity that is the key determinant of sustained
real consumer wage growth, and is also the most significant domestic
risk to the UK economy.
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If the recent poor productivity performance is a structural rather
than an assumed cyclical phenomenon, then this has serious implications
for economic policy. The Coalition government's fiscal
consolidation programme is expected to move the public sector into an
absolute surplus towards the end of the next parliamentary term. A
structural productivity problem would mean that far more of current
borrowing is structural rather than cyclical.
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) has left their estimates
of the magnitude and profile of the output gap broadly unchanged. The
Autumn Statement of December 2014 was fiscally neutral, moving the
OBR's forecasts by little. In the near term we have marginally
revised up the magnitude of public sector net borrowing, due to the
treatment of payments in the EU Budget. Over the next parliamentary
term, the paths for the fiscal aggregates are broadly unchanged. We
expect the public sector to reach an absolute surplus in fiscal year
2018-19, while public net debt, as a per cent of GDP, is expected to
peak at almost 83 per cent of GDP in 2015-16. These projections suggest
the new targets of the Fiscal Mandate, published in December 2014, are
met.
Of course, we are fast approaching a General Election, which could
well see a government elected with a different view about the
implementation of fiscal policy, alongside a different set of fiscal
rules. The Commentary, in this Review, illustrates the impact on the
macroeconomy from some plausible paths for fiscal instruments given the
pronouncements of the main political parties, to date. This pivots the
forecast published here into a rather odd situation, that would not have
occurred were the government seeking re-election not a coalition: the
modal forecast is based on a set of fiscal policy assumptions that are
clearly not modal beyond 2015-16. However, as the Commentary highlights,
the impact on the wider economy from plausible alternatives would be
relatively small.
Monetary conditions
Increasing interest rates now seems a more distant prospect than it
did in November. The dramatic fall in annual CPI inflation to 1/2 a per
cent in December, from an already low 1 per cent a month earlier,
appears to have been enough to persuade the two previously dissenting
voters to re-join the consensus view and vote to maintain the status
quo.
Markets appear to have pushed back their expectation of the first
rate rise to the middle of 2016, which is now later than they price in
the first tightening by the Federal Reserve's Open Market
Committee. It is worth noting here that just six months ago the central
expectation of markets was that the MPC would have already tightened
rates in time for the February Inflation Report.
Our own view is that markets are currently exaggerating the change
in policy stance that has occurred in the past three months (see figure
5). Nonetheless, there is increased uncertainty surrounding both the
outlook for prices and the potential reaction function of the MPC, and
we have therefore pushed back our own estimate of when they will begin
to tighten compared with our previous forecast, published in November
2014. The path of Bank Rate which underpins our current forecast assumes
that rates will begin to rise gradually in the first quarter of 2016,
reaching 1 per cent by the end of that year and 1.5 per cent the year
after.
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
There are uncertainties to both sides of this projection, and it
should be stressed that this represents the most likely path for what
the MPC will do. It does not address the more complex issue of what they
should do. That question is key to understanding the risks around our
forecast and at its heart is the nature of the disinflationary pressure
the UK is currently experiencing.
If this pressure derives purely from a temporary oil shock, of
short duration, which leaves medium-term inflation expectations well
anchored, then the correct thing to do, as noted in the previous Review,
would be to leave the stance of policy unchanged and look through the
current low inflation, just as the MPC looked through the above target
inflation in 2010-12. If this is the driver, then the now expected delay
to raising rates could lead to too loose a policy stance and thus a
build-up of underlying inflationary pressure, albeit masked by temporary
disinflationary factors. This would mean that rates would have to rise
more sharply in the first half of 2016 than we currently expect as
inflation snaps back aggressively.
Should it transpire that factors beyond the oil price movement,
such as increased disinflationary pressure in the Euro Area or increased
uncertainty about the future of that monetary union, are weighing on
demand and contributing to below target inflation, then the expectation
of delayed interest rate increases seems justified. Were persistent
deflation to take hold in the Euro Area, then it would be appropriate
for the MPC to delay an increase in rates even further.
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There is also a risk that persistent weak inflation outturns, be
they caused by the oil price movement, a general malaise of prices or
weakening demand in our trading partners, will de-anchor inflation
expectations. This in turn would be expected to feed back into weaker
wage and price growth. The latest minutes of the MPC meeting, held in
January 2015, highlight the need to watch for this possibility, and even
the threat of it may be justification enough for delaying a rate rise
until 2016.
Currently, the low level of core inflation suggests that there is
more to price weakness than can be explained just by the reduction in
the cost of crude oil. The change in policy stance of the MPC, although
minor, suggests they are at least cautiously aware of this, since they
have persistently communicated to markets that they plan to look through
the oil price shock and focus on underlying inflationary pressures.
On balance, given the asymmetry of the nominal zero lower bound for
monetary policy, it is our judgement that the risks to the real economy
associated with tightening too early outweigh those from delaying the
turning point of policy by a few more months, both in likelihood and
magnitude of outcome. Thus the marginal loosening of policy would appear
appropriate, at least for now.
One implication of the lower inflation profile is that short-term
real rates have increased compared to where we envisioned them in our
last forecast. Consequently, policy has already effectively tightened
somewhat and, all else equal, would be expected to be tighter over the
next twelve months. Potentially, this could partially stymie the
increased economic activity from the improvements in the purchasing
power of consumers by making saving relatively more attractive in real
terms. However, figure 6 shows how this has been offset by the fall-back
in our expectations of the future path of nominal rates; thus we expect
the impact on longer-term rates to be negligible and the current real
monetary stance to be little changed.
Prices and earnings
The near-term outlook for prices in the UK has moved considerably
from our forecast published in the November 2014 Review. Headline
12-month CPI inflation fell to just Vi a per cent in December from 1 per
cent a month earlier. This requires a written response from Governor
Carney to the Chancellor, who himself publicly welcomed the fall for the
boost it would provide to household purchasing power.
Much of the disinflationary pressure has been attributed to the
reduction in oil prices. Our November forecast priced in a fall of $10 a
barrel between the third and fourth quarter of 2014. The actual fall was
over $25 and prices have fallen a further $25 already this year to less
than $50 a barrel. The Energy Information Administration (EIA)
projections which underpin our forecast expect oil prices to have
reached their trough in the first quarter of this year, returning to $75
a barrel, on average, in 2016, but remaining below $83 for the rest of
our forecast period.
The direct effects of the sharp drop in oil prices have started to
become apparent: average pump prices for unleaded petrol were 108.9
pence a litre in December compared with 131.2 pence a year earlier.
Wholesale energy prices have eased to varying degrees. A number of
domestic energy suppliers have announced price cuts of between 1.5 and
5.1 per cent that will be introduced over the next twelve months.
However, the cost prices faced by energy firms have fallen by
considerably more than this. As many energy suppliers link the price
they pay for gas to the global oil price, the wholesale gas price has
fallen around 20 per cent since the beginning of December 2014. Lower
energy input costs mean that energy firms' profit margins are
expected to increase this year, an assumption supported by the recent
supply market indicator from OfGEM. (2)
Given that energy and fuel expenditure make up approximately 8 per
cent of the CPI basket there is a clear direct effect from oil on the
most recent CPI figure. There is also a more indirect impact which will
continue to pass through over the next year or so as lower oil prices
lead to lower input prices for producers and they in turn pass these on,
at least partially, to lower factory gate prices and eventually
consumers. In the twelve months to December 2014 producer input prices
fell by 10.7 per cent per annum, much of which came from energy input
prices which fell more than 35 per cent. Factory gate prices (producer
output) fell 0.8 per cent over the same period.
There are at least two important caveats to the oil price narrative
in explaining low inflation. The first, as mentioned in our November
Review, is that exchange rate movements have acted to partially offset
some of the impact on the sterling price of oil. Sterling moved more
than 5 per cent against the dollar between November and January and,
based on amended views of the future paths of monetary policy, our
forecast for the average bilateral dollar rate has been revised by down
5.5 percent from 1.59 to 1.5 $/[pounds sterling] in 2015. Over the
remainder of the forecast horizon Sterling stays an average of 5 per
cent lower against the dollar than it was in our November publication,
dampening the downward revisions in the oil price.
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Secondly, a look beyond the headline CPI figure shows that the
easing of inflation is a broader phenomenon than just direct oil price
effects. Twelve-month consumer price inflation less energy was still
barely above 1 per cent in December 2014, and the more commonly used
'core' inflation was 1.3 per cent (see figure 7), considerably
below the Bank of England's target of 2 per cent per annum.
Import prices were also weak, contracting roughly 1.2 per cent in
the third quarter of 2014, predating the oil price collapse, as subdued
wage costs and deflation in the Euro Area weigh down on price growth.
Recent work by the ONS shows that it is the segments of the consumer
basket which are most intensively sourced from abroad which are weighing
down most heavily on current CPI inflation. This is forecast to
intensify throughout 2015 and will continue to detract from UK price
growth until inflationary momentum can be sustained in Europe.
We have revised down our central forecast for 12-month consumer
price inflation for 2016 by 0.2 percentage point to 1.6 per cent as the
effect of oil price falls passes through to consumer prices (see figure
9). Once the oil price shock passes out of the annual calculation, our
forecast is for consumer price inflation to return to levels more
consistent with the Bank of England's target. This leaves our
projection for subsequent years broadly unchanged. This is predicated on
an assumption that inflation expectations remain anchored. There is some
tentative evidence from inflation swap rates and surveys that
expectations have eased in recent months. YouGov/Citigroup's
monthly survey of households' expectations of inflation over the
next twelve months hit just 1.2 per cent in January, down from 1.5 per
cent in December and the lowest outturn for six years. Were this to
become entrenched, it would represent a significant downside risk to our
forecast, especially as the ability of the MPC to respond effectively to
deflationary shocks is complicated by the lower bound on policy.
[FIGURE 9 OMITTED]
In January 2015 the Johnson Review into consumer prices reported
its findings. It made two key recommendations. The first is that a move
is made to use CPI-H, the consumer price index which takes account of
housing costs as the main measure of inflation. This presents little
difference to the outlook for inflation in the UK as the two series
follow each other closely (figure 8). The more significant suggestion
was that the government and regulators should abandon their use of RPI,
which has not been an officially recognised statistic in the UK since
2013. Whilst this has far-reaching implications for government debt,
interest rates and many welfare payments, it also represents a downside
risk to our inflation forecast. Currently, a number of industries tie
annual price increases to RPI, which has been higher than CPI inflation
in every year since the latter was introduced in 1997, excepting 2009,
and is expected to remain so over our forecast horizon by an average of
1.2 per cent per annum. This difference stems in large part from
RPI's underlying Carli formula, which has been shown to overstate
prices during periods of inflation. A switch to basing off CPI or CPI-H
would thus slow the pace of inflation in these sectors and lower CPI
relative to our published forecast. An interesting outcome would be that
parts of the consumer basket which are not priced off an index would
have to inflate by more on average than previously if the 2 per cent
inflation target is to be maintained.
Despite the recent depreciation against the dollar, the broad
effective sterling exchange rate consistent with our forecast actually
appreciated by just over 1 per cent between November and January. This
was driven by a 4 per cent appreciation against the Euro which, due to a
stronger trade-weighting, dominated the dollar losses. As expectations
of monetary policy cycles evolve and diverge, it will be these two
forces, where the UK is in relation to the US and the Euro Area, which
will determine the path of the exchange rate. Given the significant
loosening of policy in the Euro Area announced in recent months, and the
current outlook for prices and the macroeconomy, we feel that the Euro
Area will loosen relative to the UK more than the US tightens and thus
we have revised our forecast for the effective exchange rate in 2015
from a mild depreciation to an appreciation of around 1 1/2 per cent. As
noted in Kirby and Meaning (2014), exchange rate movements are likely to
have a pass-through impact on domestic prices, and a continuing
appreciation will further exacerbate the disinflationary pressure caused
by the significant rise seen since the start of 2013.
Nominal wage growth remains weak by historical standards but
strengthened somewhat in the final quarter of 2014. Regular average
weekly earnings increased by 1.7 per cent when comparing November 2014
against the same month a year earlier. This was down slightly from 1.9
per cent in October but marked the third consecutive month in which it
was noticeably above the rate of consumer price inflation. This follows
a prolonged period where real wages contracted. Real consumer wages are
now around 5 3/4 per cent lower than they were at their previous peak in
the third quarter of 2007. Despite our forecast that nominal earnings
will persistently outstrip inflation over the forecast horizon,
averaging 2 per cent per annum this year and 2.9 per cent next year as
productivity growth resumes and the labour market tightens further, it
will not be until early 2020 that this previous peak is regained.
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The components of demand
The ONS' Preliminary Estimate of GDP suggests the economy
expanded by 0.5 per cent per quarter in the fourth quarter of 2014. This
places economic growth, for 2014 as a whole, at 2.6 per cent, in line
with our December Monthly GDP estimates. The ONS estimates were revised
down for the first two quarters of 2014 by 0.1 per cent each; in both
cases investment and exports were both weaker than previously thought.
We have revised up our forecasts of GDP from 2.5 to 2.9 per cent
per annum in 2015. This is primarily due to higher consumption,
supported by the real income gains from the positive effect on the
purchasing power of wages that is the consequence of the fall in global
crude oil prices, as well as a relatively benign inflationary
environment, as suggested by current rates of core inflation (see figure
7). The appreciation of sterling against the euro, which began in March
2013, continued with further gains in the middle of December through to
the end of January on the back of ECB monetary policy announcements.
This will reduce import prices further, helping to support consumption
growth. Consequently consumption is expected to contribute around 2.2
per cent towards GDP growth in 2015. The increase in consumption growth
is a temporary phenomenon, as oil prices are assumed to rebound
partially in 2016, when consumption growth slows and contributes a
smaller percentage towards GDP--around 1 1/2 per cent per annum from
2016 through to the end of our forecast period. Underlying our forecast
is the assumption that productivity growth, which has so far remained
stagnant throughout the recovery, picks up from 2016 onwards and this
supports real wage growth. Should productivity growth remain stagnant,
increases in living standards will not be realised, representing a
downside risk to our forecast.
Our projections for the volume of general government consumption
are based on those published in the OBR's latest Economic and
Fiscal Outlook. In 2014 government consumption provided a positive
contribution to GDP growth of 0.3 percentage points; we expect a further
positive contribution in 2015 before fiscal consolidation efforts
actually lead to contractions in real government spending.
Figure 10 shows the one year ahead forecast errors of the real and
nominal government consumption forecasts produced by the OBR, for three
years beginning in 2011. The forecasts for the volume series appear to
show a negative bias. Many of the projected 'cuts' to
departmental spending in the coalition government's fiscal
consolidation plan were expected to affect real government consumption.
Due to the method of measurement, government consolidation appears in
the data mostly as a nominal phenomenon. To elaborate, around 64 per
cent of government consumption is measured on an output only basis
(Pope, 2013), for example, the number of pupils taught or the number of
operations undertaken. (3) As a result, if the amount of goods and
services the government supplies rises, the volume of government
consumption will also rise. Therefore, if government employment or the
wage bill is reduced, this will impact on the deflator for government
consumption rather than depress the volume. In the most recent
projections from the OBR, this has been explicitly taken into account.
As a result the forecast for the level of government consumption in
volume terms has been revised upwards. Nevertheless, it remains
contractionary over the medium term.
Despite the upward revisions, current projections would still imply
a strong contraction of around 1.5 per cent per capita in 2016 and 2017
and a further 1 per cent per capita in 2018, the largest since 1997.
There would be an upside risk to our forecast should government
consumption not be reduced so significantly.
For the external sector both import and export growth are expected
to pick up in 2015, due to the improvement in purchasing power in both
the domestic and foreign markets as a result of the dramatic fall in the
global oil price. In 2015 we project that imports will grow by 6.5 per
cent per annum while exports will grow slightly slower, by 6.1 per cent
per annum. That exports growth is not higher is primarily due to
relatively weak Euro Area demand, as, despite the recent 4 per cent
appreciation in the sterling-euro exchange rate between November and
January, UK exporters in 2015 are expected to gain price competitiveness
when compared to 2014. In the medium term we expect that import growth
will slow as consumption moderates; between 2017 and 2019 imports are
forecast to grow around 3 to 3.5 per cent per annum. Export growth is
also projected to moderate slightly. However, the rebounding of the
global oil price coincides with a recovery in the Euro Area. After 2015
we expect exports to grow by between 5 and 5.5 per cent per annum
through our forecast period.
For 2014 the trade deficit was 2.1 per cent of GDP, at around the
level of the past five years, and significantly higher than before the
crisis. Between 2001 and 2008 the trade deficit, 2.6 per cent of GDP. As
the UK is a net importer of oil, the recent fall in the global oil price
should provide a positive impact on the trade balance. In November the
deficit on the balance of trade in oil and related products was around
1100 million [pounds sterling] smaller than when compared to September.
Since 2011, on average the balance on trade in oil and related products
contributed 38 per cent to the overall balance on goods and services and
the overall effects of the fall in the global price of oil should cause
an improvement in the trade balance, all else equal. We therefore expect
the trade deficit to narrow in 2015 to around 1.6 per cent of GDP, with
little improvement in the outlook for the global economy. In our
forecast published in November 2014 we had expected a deterioration in
the trade balance. We project that by 2019, the trade deficit will be
between 1/2 and 1 per cent of GDP. This path is conditioned on a gradual
recovery of the Euro Area. Should the recovery occur more slowly than
implied, the deficit of the trade balance could be significantly larger;
this represents a downside risk to our forecast.
Household sector
Household consumption remains one of the main drivers of growth,
contributing 1.5 out of 2.6 percentage points to output growth in 2014.
The increase in household expenditure for 2014 was driven by services
and durable goods, the latter reflecting households' improved
confidence with regard to future developments. Purchases of durable
goods grew, according to the seasonally adjusted chained volume measure,
by 8.8 per cent on a 12-month basis in the third quarter of 2014. Within
durables, expenditure on recreation and culture goods--which include
audiovisual and information processing goods--and motor cars are the
ones that displayed the highest growth rates, contributing 3.9 and 2.8
percentage points to the total, respectively; a very stable pattern for
the past two years. In line with our upward revision of output growth,
we expect consumer durables to remain a significant contributor to
growth this year. Prospects for household expenditure remain optimistic
based on our expectations of real consumer wage and employment growth
over 2015, where we forecast a contribution of household expenditure to
total output growth of 2.2 percentage points.
[FIGURE 11 OMITTED]
We estimate real disposable income grew by 1.6 per cent during
2014, and expect growth to pick up in 2015. We have revised our forecast
up to 3.6 per cent from 2.9 per cent. The acceleration we forecast for
2015 in our previous Review was driven by an increase in total nominal
income growth, explained by an increase in wages as well as an increase
in employment. The upward revision we have introduced in this Review is
almost exclusively derived from a sharp deceleration in projected
inflation this year (see figure 11). We expect real disposable income
growth will moderate from 2016 onwards as inflation picks up and
unemployment stabilises under 5 1/2 per cent, at which point it will
rely on real consumer wage growth which will be driven by productivity
increases. Our projections of real disposable income growth, together
with our population growth assumptions, imply a per capita growth rate
of around 2 per cent over the medium term.
The strength of real disposable income growth in 2015 is reflected
in the behaviour of the saving ratio which we forecast to increase from
6.8 per cent in 2014 to 7.1 per cent in 2015. We then expect it to
remain fairly constant until 2016, as real disposable income growth
flattens before increasing from then on. This view regarding the future
saving rate path conforms to our expectation of household expenditure
growth remaining subdued, relative to pre-crisis trends, over the medium
term. The saving rate is currently below the average pre-crises level,
but, following a peak of an average rate of 9.5 per cent between 2009
and 2011, it may just be that households are now gradually implementing
all the spending plans they had postponed when the recession started,
which could also explain the importance of the contribution of durables
to total consumer spending in recent years.
The Bank of England's December Money and Credit report
suggests mortgage approvals for new purchases increased in December, by
2.2 per cent compared to the previous month, after falling for six
months in a row since June. HMRC data show that property transactions,
which lag mortgage approvals, have declined modestly since February
2014; the latest December figure displays a year-on-year decline of 0.4
per cent. We interpret the six-month fall in mortgage approvals and the
downward trend in property transactions as a sign of a cooling housing
market. The rebound in mortgage approvals observed in December could be
the consequence of the modification, introduced in the Autumn Statement
2014, of residential stamp duty, which has made transactions costs
cheaper for 98 per cent of properties with a value below 1 million
[pounds sterling] according to an OBR estimate.
Most recent house price data support the view of a softening
housing market. House price inflation is gradually decelerating.
According to our preferred measure of house prices, the seasonally and
mix-adjusted index from the ONS, prices in the UK have increased 9.9 per
cent on November 2014 compared to twelve months earlier; the equivalent
September and October figures were 12.1 and 10.3, respectively. The
Nationwide house price index, which acts as one of the leading
indicators for the ONS measure as it is derived earlier in the house
purchase process, provides a similar picture: on a 12-month basis, house
prices in January 2015 are still rising in most, but not all, of the UK,
albeit at a slowing pace. The Halifax house price index for the same
period contradicts this national level picture somewhat, reporting a
modest acceleration in prices.
According to the Halifax, Nationwide, and our own database the
price to earnings ratio is close to historically high levels; we project
a peak in 2015. Mortgages are still 'affordable' due to the
Bank of England's low interest rate policy (see the income gearing
profile in figure A5), but, with household debt levels hovering around
136 per cent of income, the exposure of households to interest rate
hikes remains significant. For instance, the Bank of England's
December Financial Stability Report estimates that around 40 per cent of
households with a mortgage would have to curtail spending in the event
of a 2 percentage point increase in interest rates. From this
perspective, and consistent with our forecast of interest rates rising
from 2016 onwards, we maintain the view that real house price growth
will moderate further, where it is expected to be below the rate of
growth in per capita real disposable incomes.
Supply conditions
Business investment has shown robust growth recently and was
estimated by the ONS (2014) to be 44.4 billion [pounds sterling] in the
third quarter of 2014, 2.4 billion [pounds sterling] higher than its
recent peak in the second quarter of 2008. This represents a growth rate
of 5.2 per cent compared to the same quarter a year ago, but a fall of
1.4 per cent compared to the previous quarter. This fall in growth in
the third quarter, combined with the ONS downward revision to business
investment in the third quarter of 2014, has led us to revise our
forecast for 2014 down by 2.8 percentage points to 6.5 per cent. Our
forecast for business investment in 2015 has been revised downwards by
0.9 percentage point to 7.3 per cent due to some uncertainty about
future demand given external risks. We still expect business investment
growth to remain relatively strong throughout 2015 and 2016, followed by
a slowdown in the pace of growth as business investment
'catch-up' comes to an end. According to the most recent Bank
of England Credit Conditions Survey, lenders reported that the overall
availability of credit to the corporate sector was unchanged in the
fourth quarter of 2014 and expected to remain unchanged in the first
quarter of 2015.
In constructing our forecast we assume that the general government
investment evolves broadly as spelled out by the current
government's fiscal plans. On this basis, we expect the volume of
general government investment to grow by around 4.4 per cent in 2015,
following three years of contraction between 2011 and 2013. Growth is
expected to slow in subsequent years, reaching around 2 per cent per
annum between 2016 and 2019.
Housing investment continued to increase in 2014, expanding by 10.4
per cent, year-on-year. As of the third quarter of 2013, total housing
investment has remained around a third lower than its pre-crisis peak in
the second quarter of 2007, however much of this decline is due to a
reduction in transfer of non-producer asset costs which fell by 86 per
cent between the second quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009.
Transfer costs of non-producer assets, which are comprised of transport
and installation costs as well as administrative expenses including
lawyers' fees and taxes related to the transfer of ownership, have
declined sharply as a proportion of total housing investment after the
onset of the Great Recession from a peak of 47 per cent in the second
quarter of 2007 to 13 per cent in the first quarter of 2009, before
rising to 21 per cent in the third quarter of 2014 (see figure 12). We
expect housing investment to expand by between 6 and 10 per cent per
annum over the period 2015 to 2019. This expansion is expected to be
dominated by the construction of new housing and improvements to
existing dwellings. Subdued housing market activity suggests a more
modest contribution from the transfer cost of non-produced assets.
However, this slowdown in the housing market poses a risk to the outlook
to our overall housing investment forecast via weaker new builds.
[FIGURE 12 OMITTED]
We estimate that the unemployment rate reached 5.6 per cent in the
last quarter of 2014, down from 6 per cent in the preceding quarter.
This represents an almost 1 1/2 percentage point fall since the end of
2013 and a 2.4 percentage point improvement from the peak at the end of
2011. It is now at its lowest level since the onset of the Great
Recession, at the start of 2008. ONS data shows that recent falls in
unemployment have been concentrated amongst the longer-term unemployed,
with the number of people who have been unemployed for twelve months or
more falling by 22.2 per cent between the three months to November 2013
and the same period one year later, compared to a fall of 17.9 per cent
in the total number of unemployed people over the same time period. The
unemployment rate of 18-24 year-olds fell by 2.9 percentage points
between the three months to November 2013 and the three months to
November 2014 to 15.1 per cent, down from a peak of 20.3 per cent in the
three months to November 2011. The fall in the unemployment rate has
been largely driven by rapid employment growth, which accelerated
throughout 2014. We estimate that employment expanded by 2.3 per cent in
2014, following growth of 1.2 per cent in 2013. Growth in
self-employment has been expanding at approximately four times the rate
of growth of employees in the first three quarters of 2014, continuing a
pattern seen over much of the post-recession period. The outcome of this
is an increase in the share of self-employment in overall employment.
This does not necessarily translate into self-employment as the main
determinant of employment growth. As figure xx shows, self-employment
was the largest positive contributor to net employment change over the
period 2009 to 2011, but even as self-employment continued to expand
rapidly over the period 2012 to 2014, it was the resumption of positive
net changes in employment that underpinned overall employment growth.
ONS estimates suggest temporary workers accounted for 6.4 per cent
of total employees in the three months to November 2014. This represents
a slight fall from the previous year but is significantly higher than
the pre-recession nadir of 5.4 per cent in the three months to July
2008. The total number of temporary employees increased by 4.9 per cent
between September-November 2013 and the same period in 2014, with the
increase coming mostly from employees who did not want a permanent job
rather than those who could not find a permanent job. The increased
availability of permanent jobs may be due to less uncertainty weighing
on firms' hiring decisions than had previously been the case.
Similarly, the 1.5 per cent increase in the number of part-time
employees came from a 5.1 per cent increase in the number of employees
who did not want a full-time job, while the number of part-time
employees who were unable to find a full-time job fell by 8.7 per cent.
This could be because the matching process has improved for those
searching for full-time employment. As figure A10 highlights, labour
market matching continues to improve. The relaxation of household budget
constraints due to rising wages may have eased the search for fulltime
employment by part-time workers. The latter hypothesis may become more
apparent if real consumer wages continue to rise. Whatever the
mechanism, part-time employment as a proportion of total employment has
fallen throughout 2014 to 26.9 per cent, but remains higher than its
level before the Great Recession, when it was stable at just over 25 per
cent.
[FIGURE 13 OMITTED]
We forecast that employment will continue to expand, by 1.3 per
cent in 2015 and then slowing to around 0.8 per cent per annum between
2016 and 2019. We expect the unemployment rate to fall to 5.3 per cent
in 2015 before rising to around 5 1/2 per cent between 2016 and 2019.
Labour productivity growth has been very weak since the onset of
the recession with whole economy output per hour remaining around 16 per
cent lower than the level implied by its pre-recession trend. Barnett et
al. (2014) conclude that there is little evidence that this is due to
firm-level spare capacity and other cyclical factors relating to demand
conditions and instead is likely to be due to more persistent factors
such as reduced capital investment and suboptimal resource allocation.
Another possibility suggested by Carney (2014) is that more workers have
accepted employment at real wages below their pre-crisis levels,
effectively a positive labour supply shock, leading to firms hiring more
workers at lower wages instead of investing in capital. We forecast low
but accelerating labour productivity growth in the next few years,
rising from 1.3 per cent per annum in 2015 to 1.8 per cent in 2019. This
is due to a gradual return of productivity growth as demand picks up,
together with an assumed increase in higher productivity employment. We
assume that some in low-productivity employment will flow to
higher-productivity jobs as they become available, reversing some of the
recent rapid self-employment growth. This should translate into higher
average productivity and wages. At the same time further falls in
unemployment should push up wages via the wage bargaining process in a
tighter labour market.
Public finances
December 2014 saw the Chancellor deliver his final Autumn Statement
before May's General Election. A number of discretionary policy
changes were announced, the most significant of which were an increase
in the already planned rise in the personal income tax allowance from
10,000 [pounds sterling] to 10,500 [pounds sterling] by an additional
100 [pounds sterling] to 10,600 [pounds sterling], and reform of how
Stamp Duty Land Tax rates are determined. These are both expected to
lower Exchequer revenues in the near term, according to the OBR around
0.5bn [pounds sterling] and 0.4bn [pounds sterling] respectively this
year, though if the latter can generate a higher volume of transactions
in the housing market then there may be medium-term benefits. Taken in
their entirety though, the policy changes proposed are broadly neutral
in their implications for the fiscal outlook.
Central government receipts in the fiscal year to December grew at
a lower rate than consistent with the OBR's expectation for the
year as a whole. This mostly related to lower income tax receipts
through PAYE caused by weak wage growth and compositional effects in the
labour market such as a shift to traditionally lower paid jobs and an
increased incidence of self-employment. Receipts from self-assessment
income tax payers are likely to be strong in January, making up some,
but probably not all of the ground lost in the year so far. In his Royal
Economics Society lecture in January 2015, the Chancellor intimated that
the lower than forecast tax intake was not only expected, but the result
of a deliberate decision to allow the automatic stabilisers to operate
whilst keeping course with spending cuts (Osborne, 2015). This is
consistent with the idea that tax receipts should begin to provide a
more substantial contribution to the fiscal position once conditions in
the labour market improve, but it also implies that the automatic
stabilisers have had to work harder than was originally anticipated,
slowing the pace of deficit reduction.
The fall in the oil price is likely to significantly affect tax
receipts from the UK's oil extraction industry, but not the overall
fiscal position. Given the outlook for oil prices (based on the
EIA's current projections), we expect tax revenues to the
government from oil companies in 2015-16 to be around 2bn [pounds
sterling], roughly half the amount we forecast in the November 2014
Review. However, in the context of a forecast for total receipts of over
660bn [pounds sterling] this is little more than a rounding error; for
instance in December, data for central government current receipts for
the period April to November were revised up by the ONS by an average of
1.7bn [pounds sterling] compared with the November release. What is
more, even this relatively small loss is likely to be attenuated by the
positive fiscal impact of second-round macroeconomic effects from the
decline in the oil price, such as higher VAT receipts induced from
increased spending and the positive supply-side shock feeding in to
firms' taxable profits. OBR (2010) analyses the fiscal impact of
both a permanent and temporary $10 increase in the oil price. It
concluded that macroeconomic effects were likely to nullify the direct
boon from higher oil duties in the first year, before dominating them
over the more medium term, worsening the fiscal position. Assuming
symmetry and linearity this would imply a modest net contribution from
the current fall in the oil price over our forecast horizon.
[FIGURE 14 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 15 OMITTED]
Our forecast for tax receipts is based on the growth of money GDP
and assumptions about effective tax rates. Tax receipts grow in line
with the tax base after adjusting for discretionary policies announced
in previous Budgets and Autumn Statements. Our current forecast for
2014-15 is, in essence, unchanged from November at around 638bn [pounds
sterling], but weaker in 2015-16 by around 4bn [pounds sterling],
largely due to lower receipts from taxes on expenditure.
In forecasting spending we assume current government plans for
spending on goods and services are broadly met, but allow for spending
on government interest payments to be endogenously determined by the
evolution of the debt stock and market interest rates. Our forecast for
expenditure this fiscal year has been revised up by around 4bn [pounds
sterling] to 674bn [pounds sterling]. This is in part due to the
additional 2.7 billion [pounds sterling] which was added to government
spending in the final quarter of 2014 as a result of additional payments
to the EU Budget, around 2bn [pounds sterling] of which was not factored
into our November forecast.
The revisions to spending and receipts have pushed up our forecast
for public sector net borrowing this fiscal year by just over 2bn
[pounds sterling], to 99.2bn [pounds sterling]. Coupled with revisions
to the historical series which have changed the PSNB figure for 2013-14
this means that net borrowing is now increasing between 2013-14 and
2014-15 rather than falling as we expected in our November forecast,
though as a percentage of GDP it is flat at 5.5 per cent in both years.
This reduces each year of our forecast until the government becomes a
net lender in 2018-19. Given our forecast of economic growth, net debt
as a percentage of GDP begins to fall two years earlier than this in
2016-17. It peaks at just below 83 per cent of GDP next fiscal year
before falling to just 72 per cent of GDP by 2019-20. This is broadly in
line with the profile expected by the OBR in its December Economic and
Fiscal Outlook where net debt peaks slightly lower in 2015-16 at just
over 81 per cent of GDP, mainly due to their forecast for more robust
GDP growth, but still reaches 72.8 per cent of GDP in 2019-20.
Government interest payments are currently the equivalent of around 2
per cent of GDP (figure 15). This is broadly in line with where it has
been since the turn of this century, but given the larger stock of debt
currently in issue it is lower than one might expect. UK government bond
yields are close to record lows. Bond yields are determined by a number
of factors. However, the current figures are further flattered by the
recent consolidation of interest payments between the government and the
Bank of England's Asset Purchase Facility (APF). Absenting this,
the government interest burden would be approximately one percentage
point of GDP higher, much more in line with the levels seen in the
mid-1990s.
This accounting protocol will continue to reduce the
government's interest payments all the time the APF holds the
current stock of gilts at a stable level. In our forecast we assume the
Bank of England maintains the size of the APF at 375bn [pounds sterling]
until Bank Rate reaches 2 per cent per annum in 2019, requiring it to
reinvest around 77bn [pounds sterling] of principal payments as the
existing holdings mature. Over this period there will be a direct effect
on the government's net borrowing and net cash requirements
equating to about 0.6 per cent of GDP each year (see table 2).
Cumulatively, this leads to a significant reduction in the net debt
stock. On our calculations, by the end of 2014-15 this will already mean
public sector net debt is 3.3 per cent of GDP lower than it would have
been in the absence of a consolidation of the APF flows. By 2019-20 we
expect this figure to have risen to the equivalent of 5.7 per cent of
GDP. At this point we assume the Bank of England no longer reinvests
principals from maturing gilts and the APF is unwound passively through
the roll-off scenario outlined in the August 2014 Review. As the stock
of debt held on the APF shrinks, this will increase the fraction of debt
in the market on which the government has to pay interest, putting
additional upward pressure on government interest payments. In our
forecast this happens at a time of tightening monetary policy which
compounds the effect, but the two influences are expected to be broadly
countered by economic growth, so interest payments stay at a stable
percentage of GDP.
Saving and investment
In table A9 we present data and our forecast for the current
account of the balance of payments for the saving and investment
positions of the three broad sectors of the economy: household,
corporate and general government. For each sector, if saving is greater
than investment then this sector is a net lender to the rest of the
economy and vice-versa. The difference between aggregate saving and
investment of these sectors provides the current account of the balance
of payments for the entire economy. Investment greater than saving
results in a deficit that must be externally financed. No inference
about optimality of investment and saving can be drawn from these
figures, rather they present a guide to the immediate funding
requirements of the economy.
Following the Great Recession, household saving peaked at 7.9 per
cent of GDP in 2010. Subsequently, the household saving rate dropped as
consumer spending outstripped income growth, almost halving to 4.4 per
cent in 2013. Our estimates suggest a modest pick-up to 4.7 per cent of
GDP in 2014. This puts household saving rates at around the same levels
as in the years immediately preceding the financial crisis and Great
Recession. We expect the saving rate to pick up gradually from its
current levels; however, in the short term the marked decline in oil
prices complicates the picture as it provides two offsetting dynamics
for the saving rate. Firstly we expect consumption growth to increase as
a result of the improved purchasing power of consumers. At the same
time, the subdued inflationary environment should lead to improvements
in real disposable income growth as real consumer wages increase despite
relatively weak nominal wage growth. On balance we do not expect all of
the real income gains from the decline in oil prices to translate
through to increased spending, even though we expect the volume of
consumer spending growth to reach almost 3 1/2 per cent annum this year.
The household saving rate is expected to rise throughout our forecast
period, reaching between 6.25 and 6.5 per cent of GDP by 2019.
Housing investment was 4.9 per cent of GDP in 2014, implying that
the net financing position of households was broadly neutral. We
forecast housing investment to grow throughout our forecast period as
the stock of housing remains well below desired levels. The gap between
desired and realised housing capital has been a persistent feature of
the UK economy, caused by factors such as strict planning regulations
depressing supply, while demographic changes such as the increase in
single occupancy residence have increased the demand for housing
(Barker, 2004). Holmans (2013) estimates that for England, 240,000 new
builds per annum until 2031 are needed in order to satisfy future
demand. Currently the number of new starts is significantly below this
number, with 139,500 commenced in England in the twelve months up to
September 2014. This indicates that a significant amount of housing
investment remains for the stock of housing to close the gap towards
optimal levels, which implies household investment as a proportion of
GDP will increase across our forecast period, reaching between 6 1/4 and
6 1/2 per cent by 2019.
The households' net position is expected to be broadly neutral
over our forecast period, with the exception of 2016 and 2017 when
household investment is expected be in excess of household saving. In
each of these years households are expected to require funding of around
1/2 per cent of GDP from the rest of the economy.
In the past two years corporate savings have reduced slightly, as a
share of GDP. In 2014 they reached 10.9 per cent of GDP, below the
average of 11.7 per cent achieved between the years 2003-11. We project
that in 2015 corporate saving will increase to around 11.7 per cent as
the improvement in domestic demand leads to a larger increase in
retained profits. We expect this increase to be transitory. As domestic
demand begins to moderate in 2016, corporate saving eases to 10.6 per
cent of GDP, and this downward trajectory continues through our forecast
period. By 2019 we expect corporate saving to be around 8 per cent of
GDP. Corporate investment reached 10.9 per cent of GDP in 2014, its
highest level since 2002, continuing the general upward trend seen in
recent years. As uncertainty around domestic demand diminished, firms
began the process of recapitalising; we expect this process of catch-up
to continue in the near term with further increases in corporate
investment to 11.1 and 11.5 per cent of GDP in 2015 and 2016,
respectively. We project that business investment growth will slow in
2017 as firms approach their optimal levels of capital. Thus corporate
investment will gradually reduce as a proportion of GDP, to about 11.2
per cent by 2019. Should data outturns be realised as implied by our
forecast, the corporate sector will be a net lender to the economy in
2015. From 2016 this position will be reversed as the corporate sector
becomes increasingly a net borrower requiring around 3 per cent of GDP
by 2019.
[FIGURE 16 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 17 OMITTED]
As a proportion of GDP, general government dis-saving was stable
between 2013 and 2014 at around 3 per cent. However, the level of
dis-saving has almost halved from 5.7 per cent in 2009. We expect
further decreases in government dis-saving throughout the forecast
period. If fiscal consolidation is implemented as the planned broad
spending envelopes imply, then the general government will return to a
positive saving rate by 2017. Over our forecast period nominal general
government investment grows at around the same rate as nominal GDP, thus
implying that the government will become a net lender to the rest of the
economy by around 2018. This is consistent with the Conservative
Party's current ambition for the public sector to achieve an
'absolute surplus'.
Since 2011 the current account deficit has widened dramatically
from 0.2 per cent of GDP to 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2014. This is
principally due to the deterioration of the balance of the primary
income account (see chart 16), caused by a large fall in net income
earned on direct investment (see chart 17). A sharp reduction in the
income earned by UK companies abroad, rather than an increase in foreign
companies earnings in the UK, was behind the 2.1 per cent of GDP decline
in net income between 2011 and 2013. Over this period, rates of return
on direct income from abroad have remained relatively stable, suggesting
this fall might be a result of returns from a reduced stock of foreign
assets. That this is a temporary phenomenon is a key assumption for our
forecast. Net factor income returns to surplus in our forecast by 2018.
If this transpires to be a structural change and direct income on
investment abroad remains subdued, a significantly larger current
account deficit would be expected. We expect the economy to remain a net
borrower from the rest of the world, although we project a continued
reduction in the amount of external financing required. From a trough of
5 1/2 per cent in 2014, we expect the current account deficit to narrow
gradually, reaching almost 1 per cent of GDP by 2019. A narrowing of the
trade balance, partially via the fall in the price of oil, supports some
of this transition, but it is the return of net factor income to surplus
that is essential for this projection to be realised.
The medium term
Table A10 presents our view of the medium-term outlook for the
economy. This period is dominated by a gradual movement away from its
current disequilibrium. This is a process whereby growth rates in excess
of the long-run potential are required in order for the negative output
gap to close. The growth rates reported therefore do not represent our
view of the potential growth rate of the economy, a rate that our
estimates suggest is much closer to 2 per cent per annum.
The future path of the economy is uncertain as future shocks, which
are inherently unpredictable, move the economy away from the growth path
presented in table A10. To depict this uncertainty we use fan charts
(see figure 18). We predict that there is a 10 per cent chance that, by
2019, GDP growth could be greater than 4.9 per cent per annum, while
there is a one in five chance that the economy will be growing by less
than 0.9 per cent per annum.
A key assumption underlying our economic projections is the return
of meaningful productivity growth. We expect productivity growth to
resume in a gradual fashion, from 2015 onwards. By 2020-24 economy-wide
productivity growth is forecast to average 2.1 per cent per annum. While
the exact timing as to when this might occur remains difficult to
predict, this underpins our projections for per capita GDP and real
consumer wage growth. As with the period of sustained above-potential
output growth, these productivity rates are consistent with a temporary
period of productivity catch-up, rather than our view of trend
productivity growth, which is assumed to be below 2 per cent per annum
over the medium to long-run.
[FIGURE 18 OMITTED]
Alongside improvements in productivity growth, we expect the growth
of the labour input to ease to around 0.6 per cent per annum by 2020-24
from a projected peak of 2.6 per cent per annum in 2015. This is mainly
driven by average hours falling as household incomes improve, consistent
with the historical trend before the financial crisis. The participation
rate is expected to remain stable throughout our forecast period (at
around 81 per cent of the working age population) supporting growth of
the labour input. As described in the Bank of England's November
Inflation Report, despite the aging profile of the UK population, an
increase in the participation of women and older people in the labour
market has more than offset the demographic effects. Whether these
changes are attempts to offset depressed incomes following the financial
crisis, will be key in determining the growth of the labour input. The
sharp falls in the unemployment rate witnessed through 2014 are expected
to slow as the economy approaches the NAIRU, which we estimate to be
close to levels seen before the onset of the financial crisis and Great
Recession. For the period 2020-24 we forecast an average unemployment
rate of 5.2 per cent of the labour force aged 16+.
PSNB is predicted to fall throughout our forecast period; by
2020-24, this is expected to have returned to a surplus of around 1.2
per cent of GDP, meaning the government will not have to finance public
investment via borrowing. With the return of the public sector's
accounts to a surplus, the public sector net debt stock is projected to
fall sharply, to an average of 61.5 per cent of GDP in the medium term.
This is from a projected peak of 83 per cent of GDP at the end of 2016.
We know that the fiscal policy projections are unlikely to evolve
as we predict. As the General Election approaches, the three major
political parties have outlined broad fiscal positions for the next
Parliamentary term. As we discuss in the Commentary in this Review, all
three parties' positions differ from the coalition's announced
fiscal plan. However, we do know that the next term of government will
contain a further period of fiscal consolidation, the main differences
being its magnitude and pace. This will not only affect the size of PSNB
and the public sector net debt stock but also have implications for the
rest of the economy, such as the pace of economic growth.
The current account deficit on the balance of payments is expected
to narrow throughout our forecast period, averaging around zero over the
period 2020-24. This forecast is the outcome of a general improvement in
the trade balance as well as the return of net factor income to surplus.
If recent weakness in the Euro Area persists, or the recent deficit in
net factor incomes represents a structural rather than temporary shift,
then the deficit on the current account will be expected to be much
greater.
Conditioning our forecasts is a gradual tightening of monetary
policy as the economy returns back towards its equilibrium; we expect
Bank Rate to have reached 2.2 per cent, on average, in 2019. The speed
and timing of tightening is dependent on how quickly the output gap
closes, and also the future rates of inflation expected by the MPC. We
expect a low inflation environment in the short term, influenced by the
sharp decline in oil prices and the weakness of price growth in the Euro
Area. Looking further ahead, we expect the rate of inflation to be close
to target, averaging 1.9 per cent per annum between 2020 and 2024.
Risks to our forecast are apparent on either side of the
distribution. On the downside, should the expected near-term low
inflationary environment lead to a decoupling of inflation expectations
from the Bank of England's target, then this would add
disinflationary pressure and subsequently the path of monetary
tightening would be slower. On the upside, the negative output gap
closing faster than we expect would lead to upward pressure on prices
and a policy response via a more aggressive monetary tightening.
In the medium term the effective exchange rate is expected to
appreciate a further 1.1 per cent from its 2015 level. As monetary
tightening in the UK starts before that of the Euro Area this represents
a permanent appreciation from the levels seen in 2013. The future path
of exchange rates is especially uncertain, depending not just on
domestic but also on external policy choices. For instance, should the
path of interest rates set by the European Central Bank, or the US
Federal Reserve deviate from the path we have assumed in our forecast,
then the path of exchange rates would evolve differently from our
current expectation.
Appendix--Forecast details
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Table A1. Exchange rates and interest rates
UK exchange rates FTSE
All-share
Effective Dollar Euro index
2011 = 100
2009 100.50 1.57 1.12 2040.8
2010 100.12 1.55 1.17 2472.7
2011 100.00 1.60 1.15 2587.6
2012 104.21 1.59 1.23 2617.7
2013 102.92 1.56 1.18 3006.2
2014 111.01 1.65 1.24 3136.6
2015 112.68 1.50 1.31 3086.2
2016 112.88 1.51 1.31 3182.9
2017 113.06 1.52 1.30 3332.9
2018 113.34 1.55 1.29 3517.2
2019 113.64 1.57 1.27 3698.9
2014 Q1 109.11 1.66 1.21 3148.9
2014 Q2 110.66 1.68 1.23 3171.0
2014 Q3 112.39 1.67 1.26 3161.3
2014 Q4 111.90 1.58 1.27 3065.3
2015 Q1 112.42 1.51 1.30 3066.6
2015 Q2 112.78 1.50 1.32 3083.5
2015 Q3 112.75 1.50 1.32 3090.7
2015 Q4 112.77 1.50 1.32 3104.1
2016 Q1 112.82 1.50 1.32 3136.7
2016 Q2 112.85 1.50 1.32 3163.5
2016 Q3 112.90 1.51 1.31 3193.8
2016 Q4 112.94 1.51 1.31 3237.4
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -10.4 -15.5 -10.6 -14.7
2010/2009 -0.4 -1.2 3.8 21.2
2011/2010 -0.1 3.7 -1.2 4.6
2012/2011 4.2 -1.1 7.0 1.2
2013/2012 -1.2 -1.3 -4.5 14.8
2014/2013 7.9 5.3 5.4 4.3
2015/2014 1.5 -8.7 6.0 -1.6
2016/2015 0.2 0.1 -0.1 3.1
2017/2016 0.2 1.1 -0.9 4.7
2018/2017 0.2 1.7 -1.1 5.5
2019/2018 0.3 1.6 -1.1 5.2
2014Q4/20/3Q4 5.3 -2.3 6.5 -1.0
2015Q4/20/4Q4 0.8 -5.1 4.1 1.3
2016Q4/20/5Q4 0.1 0.6 -0.7 4.3
Interest rates
3-month Mortgage 10-year World (a) Bank
rates interest gilts Rate (b)
2009 1.2 4.0 3.7 2.0 0.50
2010 0.7 4.0 3.6 1.6 0.50
2011 0.9 4.1 3.1 1.8 0.50
2012 0.8 4.2 1.8 1.6 0.50
2013 0.5 4.4 2.4 1.3 0.50
2014 0.5 4.4 2.5 1.0 0.50
2015 0.6 4.4 1.8 0.9 0.50
2016 1.0 4.6 2.4 1.4 1.00
2017 1.5 4.8 2.9 2.0 1.50
2018 2.0 5.0 3.3 2.5 2.00
2019 2.4 5.3 3.5 2.8 2.50
2014 Q1 0.5 4.4 2.8 1.3 0.50
2014 Q2 0.5 4.4 2.7 0.9 0.50
2014 Q3 0.6 4.5 2.6 0.8 0.50
2014 Q4 0.6 4.5 2.1 0.8 0.50
2015 Q1 0.6 4.5 1.6 0.8 0.50
2015 Q2 0.6 4.4 1.8 0.8 0.50
2015 Q3 0.6 4.4 1.9 0.9 0.50
2015 Q4 0.6 4.4 2.1 1.0 0.50
2016 Q1 0.8 4.5 2.2 1.1 0.75
2016 Q2 0.9 4.6 2.4 1.3 0.75
2016 Q3 1.1 4.7 2.5 1.4 1.00
2016 Q4 1.2 4.7 2.6 1.6 1.00
Percentage changes
2009/2008
2010/2009
2011/2010
2012/2011
2013/2012
2014/2013
2015/2014
2016/2015
2017/2016
2018/2017
2019/2018
2014Q4/20/3Q4
2015Q4/20/4Q4
2016Q4/20/5Q4
Notes: We assume that bilateral exchange rates for the first quarter
of this year are the average of information available to 23 January
2015. We then assume that bilateral rates remain constant for the
following two quarters before moving in-line with the path implied by
the backward-looking uncovered interest rate parity condition based
on interest rate differentials relative to the US. (a) Weighted
average of central bank intervention rates in OECD economies, (b) End
of period.
Table A2. Price indices
2011=100
Unit Imports Exports Whole- World
labour deflator deflator sale price oil price
costs index (a) ($) (b)
2009 99.1 89.9 89.9 95.8 61.8
2010 100.3 93.4 94.5 97.3 78.8
2011 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 108.5
2012 101.9 99.2 99.6 101.1 110.4
2013 103.4 100.4 101.1 101.9 107.1
2014 104.0 96.8 98.2 102.9 97.8
2015 105.0 92.5 95.8 102.3 56.9
2016 106.7 95.3 98.6 102.2 74.6
2017 108.4 98.1 100.8 103.8 75.8
2018 110.0 100.1 102.6 105.8 77.4
2019 111.5 101.6 104.2 107.7 78.9
Percentage changes
2009/2008 4.4 1.9 3.6 1.4 -35.4
2010/2009 1.2 3.9 5.1 1.5 27.6
2011/2010 -0.3 7.1 5.8 2.8 37.6
2012/2011 1.9 -0.8 -0.4 1.1 1.8
2013/2012 1.4 1.2 1.5 0.8 -3.0
2014/2013 0.6 -3.6 -2.9 0.9 -8.7
2015/2014 1.0 -4.4 -2.5 -0.6 -41.8
2016/2015 1.6 3.0 3.0 0.0 31.1
2017/2016 1.6 3.0 2.2 1.5 1.7
2018/2017 1.5 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0
2019/2018 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0
2014Q4/13Q4 1.4 -3.3 -3.9 0.8 -30.3
2015Q4/14Q4 0.4 -2.9 -0.1 -0.9 -11.4
2016Q4/15Q4 1.7 3.7 2.7 0.7 12.3
Retail price
index
Consump- GDP All Excluding Consumer
tion deflator items mortgage prices
deflator (market interest index
prices)
2009 92.6 94.9 90.9 90.7 92.7
2010 96.7 97.9 95.1 95.0 95.7
2011 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2012 102.1 101.7 103.2 103.2 102.8
2013 104.0 103.5 106.4 106.4 105.5
2014 105.5 105.4 108.9 109.0 107.0
2015 106.4 107.4 109.9 110.5 107.6
2016 108.3 109.2 112.7 112.9 109.3
2017 110.6 111.3 116.7 115.8 111.6
2018 113.0 113.6 120.9 118.7 113.9
2019 115.2 115.9 124.9 121.4 116.0
Percentage changes
2009/2008 1.6 2.0 -0.5 2.0 2.2
2010/2009 4.4 3.2 4.6 4.8 3.3
2011/2010 3.4 2.1 5.2 5.3 4.5
2012/2011 2.1 1.7 3.2 3.2 2.8
2013/2012 1.9 1.8 3.0 3.1 2.6
2014/2013 1.5 1.9 2.4 2.4 1.4
2015/2014 0.9 1.9 0.9 1.4 0.6
2016/2015 1.7 1.7 2.6 2.1 1.6
2017/2016 2.2 1.9 3.5 2.6 2.1
2018/2017 2.1 2.1 3.6 2.5 2.0
2019/2018 2.0 2.0 3.3 2.3 1.9
2014Q4/13Q4 0.9 1.7 2.0 2.0 0.9
2015Q4/14Q4 0.9 1.9 0.9 1.5 0.8
2016Q4/15Q4 2.0 1.6 3.3 2.4 1.9
Notes: (a) Excluding food, beverages, tobacco and petroleum products,
(b) Per barrel, average of Dubai and Brent spot prices.
Table A3. Gross domestic product and components of expenditure
billion [pounds sterling], 2011 prices
Final consumption Gross capital
expenditure formation
Households General Gross Changes in
& NPISH (a) govt. fixed inventories (b)
investment
2009 1034.6 337.1 240.6 -16.0
2010 1038.3 337.2 254.9 5.7
2011 1039.1 337.3 260.8 4.3
2012 1050.8 345.2 262.7 6.5
2013 1068.5 344.2 271.6 10.2
2014 1092.9 349.2 290.7 13.7
2015 1129.6 351.3 310.4 11.1
2016 1157.7 348.7 330.1 12.0
2017 1180.0 345.6 343.6 12.0
2018 1204.4 344.6 354.2 12.0
2019 1232.4 344.7 362.8 12.0
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -3.1 1.2 -14.4
2010/2009 0.4 0.0 5.9
2011/2010 0.1 0.0 2.3
2012/2011 1.1 2.3 0.7
2013/2012 1.7 -0.3 3.4
2014/2013 2.3 1.5 7.0
2015/2014 3.4 0.6 6.8
2016/2015 2.5 -0.7 6.3
2017/2016 1.9 -0.9 4.1
2018/2017 2.1 -0.3 3.1
2019/2018 2.3 0.0 2.4
Decomposition of growth in GDP
2009 -2.0 0.2 -2.5 -0.3
2010 0.2 0.0 0.9 1.4
2011 0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.1
2012 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1
2013 1.1 -0.1 0.5 0.2
2014 1.5 0.3 1.2 0.2
2015 2.2 0.1 1.2 -0.2
2016 1.6 -0.1 1.1 0.1
2017 1.2 -0.2 0.8 0.0
2018 1.3 -0.1 0.6 0.0
2019 1.5 0.0 0.5 0.0
Domestic Total Total
demand exports (c) final
expenditure
2009 1593.2 445.1 2039.4
2010 1636.1 472.8 2109.6
2011 1641.5 499.5 2141.0
2012 1665.1 502.8 2167.9
2013 1694.5 510.2 2204.7
2014 1746.5 506.2 2252.7
2015 1802.3 536.9 2339.2
2016 1848.5 566.4 2414.9
2017 1881.2 595.8 2477.0
2018 1915.2 627.9 2543.1
2019 1951.9 660.4 2612.2
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -4.9 -8.2 -5.6
2010/2009 2.7 6.2 3.4
2011/2010 0.3 5.6 1.5
2012/2011 1.4 0.7 1.3
2013/2012 1.8 1.5 1.7
2014/2013 3.1 -0.8 2.2
2015/2014 3.2 6.1 3.8
2016/2015 2.6 5.5 3.2
2017/2016 1.8 5.2 2.6
2018/2017 1.8 5.4 2.7
2019/2018 1.9 5.2 2.7
Decomposition of growth in GDP
2009 -5.0 -2.4 -7.4
2010 2.8 1.8 4.5
2011 0.3 1.7 2.0
2012 1.5 0.2 1.7
2013 1.8 0.5 2.3
2014 3.1 -0.2 2.9
2015 3.3 1.8 5.1
2016 2.6 1.7 4.3
2017 1.8 1.6 3.5
2018 1.9 1.8 3.6
2019 2.0 1.7 3.7
Total Net GDP
imports (c) trade at
market
prices
2009 476.6 -31.5 1561.6
2010 518.2 -45.3 1591.5
2011 523.3 -23.8 1617.7
2012 539.6 -36.8 1628.3
2013 547.4 -37.1 1655.4
2014 551.4 -45.2 1698.0
2015 587.5 -50.6 1747.6
2016 623.7 -57.3 1786.9
2017 644.7 -48.9 1828.1
2018 665.9 -38.0 1873.0
2019 689.6 -29.2 1918.4
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -9.8 -4.3
2010/2009 8.7 1.9
2011/2010 1.0 1.6
2012/2011 3.1 0.7
2013/2012 1.4 1.7
2014/2013 0.7 2.6
2015/2014 6.5 2.9
2016/2015 6.2 2.3
2017/2016 3.4 2.3
2018/2017 3.3 2.5
2019/2018 3.6 2.4
Decomposition of growth in GDP
2009 3.2 0.7 -4.3
2010 -2.7 -0.9 1.9
2011 -0.3 1.4 1.6
2012 -1.0 -0.8 0.7
2013 -0.5 0.0 1.7
2014 -0.2 -0.5 2.6
2015 -2.1 -0.3 2.9
2016 -2.1 -0.4 2.3
2017 -1.2 0.5 2.3
2018 -1.2 0.6 2.5
2019 -1.3 0.5 2.4
Notes: (a) Non-profit institutions serving households, (b) Including
acquisitions less disposals of valuables and quarterly alignment
adjustment, (c) Includes Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud, (d)
Components may not add up to total GDP growth due to rounding and the
statistical discrepancy included in GDP.
Table A4. External sector
Exports Imports Net
of goods (a) of goods (a) trade in
goods (a)
billion [pounds sterling],
2011 prices (b)
2009 261.2 355.3 -94.1
2010 289.4 398.9 -109.5
2011 309.2 405.7 -96.5
2012 306.6 416.2 -109.6
2013 305.1 419.1 -114.0
2014 301.4 428.0 -126.6
2015 324.1 451.6 -133.5
2016 344.1 487.7 -143.6
2017 361.9 504.2 -142.4
2018 381.4 520.7 -139.3
2019 401.3 539.1 -137.8
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -10.1 -10.8 -5.9
2010/2009 10.8 12.2 -0.4
2011/2010 6.8 1.7 3.8
2012/2011 -0.8 2.6 3.1
2013/2012 -0.5 0.7 4.6
2014/2013 -1.2 2.1 -0.2
2015/2014 7.5 6.9 3.9
2016/2015 6.2 6.6 4.5
2017/2016 5.2 3.4 5.2
2018/2017 5.4 3.3 5.4
20/9/2018 5.2 3.5 5.1
Exports Imports Net
of of trade in
services services services
billion [pounds sterling],
2011 prices (b)
2009 184.0 120.5 63.5
2010 183.4 119.3 64.1
2011 190.3 117.6 72.7
2012 196.2 123.4 72.8
2013 205.1 128.3 76.8
2014 204.8 123.4 81.4
2015 212.8 129.9 82.9
2016 222.3 136.1 86.3
2017 233.9 140.4 93.5
2018 246.5 145.2 101.3
2019 259.1 150.5 108.6
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -7.3 -5.1 -10.6
2010/2009 -1.0 2.0 10.1
2011/2010 -1.4 4.0 5.7
2012/2011 4.9 1.7 2.3
2013/2012 4.0 0.1 2.5
2014/2013 -3.8 3.1 3.2
2015/2014 5.3 -4.4 5.3
2016/2015 4.8 1.0 5.2
2017/2016 3.2 -0.6 4.6
2018/2017 3.4 -0.4 5.2
20/9/2018 3.6 -0.5 5.3
Export World Terms of Current
price trade (d) trade (e) balance
competitiveness (c)
2011=100 % of GDP
2009 94.3 86.0 100.0 -2.8
2010 96.2 94.6 101.2 -2.6
2011 100.0 100.0 100.0 -1.7
2012 101.7 102.3 100.4 -3.7
2013 101.9 104.8 100.7 -4.5
2014 105.1 108.1 101.4 -5.5
2015 100.5 113.8 103.5 -3.9
2016 101.4 119.7 103.5 -3.8
2017 100.8 125.2 102.7 -3.4
2018 100.4 131.7 102.5 -2.4
2019 99.9 138.6 102.6 -1.2
Percentage changes
2009/2008 1.6
2010/2009 1.1
2011/2010 -1.2
2012/2011 0.4
2013/2012 0.3
2014/2013 0.7
2015/2014 2.0
2016/2015 0.0
2017/2016 -0.8
2018/2017 -0.2
20/9/2018 0.1
Notes: (a) Includes Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud, (b) Balance
of payments basis, (c) A rise denotes a loss in UK competitiveness,
(d) Weighted by import shares in UK export markets, (e) Ratio of
average value of exports to imports.
Table A5. Household sector
Average (a) Compensation Total Gross
earnings of employees personal disposable
income income
2011=100 billion [pounds sterling], current
prices
2009 95.8 792.0 1299.7 999.8
2010 99.1 817.0 1358.0 1052.8
2011 100.0 827.8 1383.5 1067.9
2012 102.2 849.4 1424.2 1107.0
2013 104.2 875.9 1457.3 1129.8
2014 105.7 903.5 1501.0 1164.6
2015 108.0 938.9 1571.5 1216.3
2016 111.1 975.3 1643.3 1267.7
2017 114.8 1014.0 1723.1 1327.1
2018 118.6 1054.7 1811.9 1394.1
2019 122.4 1094.6 1903.2 1462.4
Percentage changes
2009/2008 1.9 -0.1 2.1 3.9
2010/2009 3.5 3.2 4.5 5.3
2011/2010 0.9 1.3 1.9 1.4
2012/2011 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.7
2013/2012 1.9 3.1 2.3 2.1
2014/2013 1.5 3.2 3.0 3.1
2015/2014 2.2 3.9 4.7 4.4
2016/2015 2.9 3.9 4.6 4.2
2017/2016 3.3 4.0 4.9 4.7
2018/2017 3.3 4.0 5.1 5.0
2019/2018 3.2 3.8 5.0 4.9
Real Final Saving House Net
disposable consumption ratio prices worth
income (b) expenditure (c) (d) to
income
Total Durable ratio
(e)
billion [pounds sterling], per 2011=100
2011 prices cent
2009 1079.2 1034.6 91.2 9.3 94.1 6.2
2010 1088.6 1038.3 89.3 11.0 101.0 6.3
2011 1067.9 1039.1 90.4 8.6 100.0 6.6
2012 1084.6 1050.8 96.9 8.0 101.6 6.8
2013 1086.1 1068.5 102.8 6.4 105.2 6.7
2014 1103.3 1092.9 111.5 6.8 115.8 7.2
2015 1142.7 1129.6 120.9 7.1 123.7 7.3
2016 1170.8 1157.7 127.0 7.1 125.2 7.2
2017 1199.4 1180.0 131.3 7.7 125.7 7.0
2018 1233.6 1204.4 135.4 8.6 125.8 6.9
2019 1268.9 1232.4 139.0 9.2 125.6 6.7
Percentage changes
2009/2008 2.3 -3.1 -2.4 -7.8
2010/2009 0.9 0.4 -2.1 7.2
2011/2010 -1.9 0.1 1.3 -1.0
2012/2011 1.6 1.1 7.2 1.6
2013/2012 0.1 1.7 6.1 3.5
2014/2013 1.6 2.3 8.4 10.1
2015/2014 3.6 3.4 8.4 6.8
2016/2015 2.5 2.5 5.1 1.2
2017/2016 2.4 1.9 3.4 0.4
2018/2017 2.9 2.1 3.2 0.1
2019/2018 2.9 2.3 2.6 -0.2
Notes: (a) Average earnings equals total labour compensation divided
by the number of employees, (b) Deflated by consumers' expenditure
deflator, (c) Includes adjustment for change in net equity of
households in pension funds, (d) Office for National Statistics,
mix--adjusted, (e) Net worth is defined as housing wealth plus net
financial assets.
Table A6. Fixed investment and capital
billion [pounds sterling], 2011 prices
Gross fixed investment
Business Private General Total
investment housing (a) government
2009 138.7 52.3 49.5 240.6
2010 143.7 60.5 50.6 254.9
2011 152.3 62.2 46.3 260.8
2012 158.7 60.2 43.7 262.7
2013 167.2 64.0 40.4 271.6
2014 178.0 71.3 41.5 290.7
2015 191.0 76.1 43.3 310.4
2016 202.5 83.6 44.0 330.1
2017 207.8 90.6 45.2 343.6
2018 211.1 97.1 46.0 354.2
2019 212.8 103.0 47.0 362.8
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -14.4 -31.6 12.6 -14.4
2010/2009 3.7 15.7 2.3 5.9
2011/2010 6.0 2.8 -8.5 2.3
2012/2011 4.2 -3.1 -5.5 0.7
2013/2012 5.3 6.2 -7.7 3.4
2014/2013 6.5 11.4 2.7 7.0
2015/2014 7.3 6.7 4.4 6.8
2016/2015 6.0 9.9 1.6 6.3
2017/2016 2.6 8.4 2.7 4.1
2018/2017 1.6 7.3 1.8 3.1
2019/2018 0.8 6.0 2.2 2.4
User Corporate Capital stock
cost profit
of share of Private Public (b)
capital (%) GDP (%)
2009 15.8 24.7 2954.5 757.8
2010 15.7 24.1 2965.0 780.9
2011 15.3 25.0 2980.7 794.9
2012 13.3 24.6 3005.0 815.1
2013 12.5 24.9 3033.1 841.7
2014 13.6 24.7 3076.1 856.7
2015 12.9 25.9 3133.5 873.0
2016 13.4 26.4 3205.1 889.6
2017 13.9 26.8 3283.6 906.8
2018 14.3 27.4 3366.3 924.3
2019 14.6 28.0 3450.8 942.2
Percentage changes
2009/2008 0.0 4.3
2010/2009 0.4 3.0
2011/2010 0.5 1.8
2012/2011 0.8 2.5
2013/2012 0.9 3.3
2014/2013 1.4 1.8
2015/2014 1.9 1.9
2016/2015 2.3 1.9
2017/2016 2.4 1.9
2018/2017 2.5 1.9
2019/2018 2.5 1.9
Notes: (a) Includes private sector transfer costs of non-produced
assets, (b) Including public sector non-financial corporations.
Table A7. Productivity and the labour market
Thousands
Employment ILO Labour Population
unemploy- force (b) of
Employees Total (a) ment working
age
2009 25092 29156 2403 31559 38529
2010 25017 29229 2497 31725 38759
2011 25117 29376 2593 31969 39243
2012 25214 29697 2572 32268 39441
2013 25516 30043 2476 32519 39699
2014 25933 30732 2024 32756 39984
2015 26371 31137 1781 32918 40267
2016 26632 31424 1749 33172 40582
2017 26803 31656 1782 33439 40934
2018 26984 31901 1798 33698 41261
2019 27126 32103 1832 33935 41694
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -1.9 -1.6 34.5 0.5 0.5
2010/2009 -0.3 0.2 3.9 0.5 0.6
2011/2010 0.4 0.5 3.8 0.8 1.2
2012/2011 0.4 1.1 -0.8 0.9 0.5
2013/2012 1.2 1.2 -3.7 0.8 0.7
2014/2013 1.6 2.3 -18.3 0.7 0.7
2015/2014 1.7 1.3 -12.0 0.5 0.7
2016/2015 1.0 0.9 -1.8 0.8 0.8
2017/2016 0.6 0.7 1.9 0.8 0.9
2018/2017 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8
2019/2018 0.5 0.6 1.9 0.7 1.1
Productivity Unemployment, %
(2011 = 100)
Claimant ILO
Per hour Manufacturing rate unemployment
rate
2009 97.2 90.5 4.6 7.6
2010 98.7 97.9 4.6 7.9
2011 100.0 100.0 4.7 8.1
2012 98.8 98.3 4.8 8.0
2013 98.6 98.2 4.2 7.6
2014 98.5 99.4 3.1 6.2
2015 99.8 101.8 2.5 5.4
2016 101.1 105.3 2.5 5.3
2017 102.8 108.6 2.6 5.3
2018 104.6 112.1 2.7 5.3
2019 106.5 116.0 2.7 5.4
Percentage changes
2009/2008 -1.6 -2.7
2010/2009 1.5 8.2
2011/2010 1.3 2.2
2012/2011 -1.2 -1.7
2013/2012 -0.3 -0.2
2014/2013 -0.1 1.3
2015/2014 1.3 2.4
2016/2015 1.3 3.5
2017/2016 1.6 3.1
2018/2017 1.8 3.3
2019/2018 1.8 3.4
Notes: (a) Includes self-employed, government-supported trainees and
unpaid family members, (b) Employment plus ILO unemployment.
Table A8. Public sector financial balance and borrowing requirement
billion [pounds sterling], fiscal years
2012-13 2013-14
Current receipts: Taxes on income 363.9 373.8
Taxes on
expenditure 209.7 221.7
Other current
receipts 21.1 22.8
Total 594.7 618.3
(as a % of GDP) 35.8 35.7
Current expenditure: Goods and services 341.4 347.3
Net social
benefits paid 217.2 220.1
Debt interest 36.5 35.5
Other current
expenditure 51.8 51.9
Total 646.9 654.7
(as a % of GDP) 38.9 37.8
Depreciation 32.8 33.9
Surplus on public sector
current budget (a) -85.0 -70.3
(as a % of GDP) -5.1 -4.1
Gross investment 68.4 59.8
Net investment 35.6 25.9
(as a % of GDP) 2.2 1.5
Total managed expenditure 715.3 714.5
(as a % of GDP) 43.0 41.2
Public sector net borrowing 120.5 96.2
(as a % of GDP) 7.3 5.5
Financial transactions 22.9 24.7
Public sector net cash
requirement 97.7 71.5
(as a % of GDP) 5.9 4.1
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 77.4 79.8
GDP deflator at market
prices (2011 = 100) 101.9 104.1
Money GDP 1663.1 1733.0
Financial balance under
Maastricht (% of GDP) (b) -8.3 -5.7
Gross debt under Maastricht
(% of GDP) (b) 85.8 87.3
2014-15 2015-16
Current receipts: Taxes on income 387.9 407.7
Taxes on
expenditure 228.5 236.6
Other current
receipts 21.9 18.8
Total 638.3 663.2
(as a % of GDP) 35.2 34.9
Current expenditure: Goods and services 355.3 360.4
Net social
benefits paid 224.6 225.8
Debt interest 38.2 39.6
Other current
expenditure 55.9 57.3
Total 674.0 683.0
(as a % of GDP) 37.2 36.0
Depreciation 35.3 37.5
Surplus on public sector
current budget (a) -71.0 -57.3
(as a % of GDP) -3.9 -3.0
Gross investment 63.5 64.6
Net investment 28.2 27.1
(as a % of GDP) 1.6 1.4
Total managed expenditure 737.5 747.6
(as a % of GDP) 40.7 39.4
Public sector net borrowing 99.2 84.5
(as a % of GDP) 5.5 4.5
Financial transactions -0.3 -0.3
Public sector net cash
requirement 99.5 84.8
(as a % of GDP) 5.5 4.5
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 81.9 82.8
GDP deflator at market
prices (2011 = 100) 105.9 107.9
Money GDP 1811.3 1897.5
Financial balance under
Maastricht (% of GDP) (b) -5.5 -5.2
Gross debt under Maastricht
(% of GDP) (b) 89.5 90.1
2016-17 2017-18
Current receipts: Taxes on income 436.0 459.8
Taxes on
expenditure 246.4 256.7
Other current
receipts 18.6 18.4
Total 701.0 734.9
(as a % of GDP) 35.6 35.7
Current expenditure: Goods and services 344.7 337.6
Net social
benefits paid 233.0 241.6
Debt interest 40.5 40.9
Other current
expenditure 59.0 61.0
Total 677.3 681.0
(as a % of GDP) 34.4 33.1
Depreciation 39.5 41.5
Surplus on public sector
current budget (a) -15.9 12.3
(as a % of GDP) -0.8 0.6
Gross investment 67.2 66.0
Net investment 27.7 24.5
(as a % of GDP) 1.4 1.2
Total managed expenditure 744.6 747.0
(as a % of GDP) 37.8 36.3
Public sector net borrowing 43.6 12.1
(as a % of GDP) 2.2 0.6
Financial transactions -18.1 -12.0
Public sector net cash
requirement 61.7 24.1
(as a % of GDP) 3.1 1.2
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 82.7 80.3
GDP deflator at market
prices (2011 = 100) 109.7 111.9
Money GDP 1970.5 2057.6
Financial balance under
Maastricht (% of GDP) (b) -3.2 -1.4
Gross debt under Maastricht
(% of GDP) (b) 89.4 86.6
2018-19 2019-20
Current receipts: Taxes on income 486.4 513.7
Taxes on
expenditure 267.7 279.4
Other current
receipts 18.3 19.1
Total 772.3 812.2
(as a % of GDP) 35.9 36.1
Current expenditure: Goods and services 336.4 336.4
Net social
benefits paid 251.7 261.6
Debt interest 40.7 40.5
Other current
expenditure 63.1 65.4
Total 692.0 703.8
(as a % of GDP) 32.2 31.3
Depreciation 43.7 46.0
Surplus on public sector
current budget (a) 36.6 62.4
(as a % of GDP) 1.7 2.8
Gross investment 68.1 74.1
Net investment 24.4 28.2
(as a % of GDP) 1.1 1.3
Total managed expenditure 760.1 777.9
(as a % of GDP) 35.3 34.6
Public sector net borrowing -12.2 -34.2
(as a % of GDP) -0.6 -1.5
Financial transactions -7.9 -9.7
Public sector net cash
requirement -4.3 -24.5
(as a % of GDP) -0.2 -1.1
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 76.6 72.3
GDP deflator at market
prices (2011 = 100) 114.2 116.5
Money GDP 2151.7 2247.7
Financial balance under
Maastricht (% of GDP) (b) -0.1 0.9
Gross debt under Maastricht
(% of GDP) (b) 82.5 77.6
Notes: These data are constructed from seasonally adjusted national
accounts data.This results in differences between the figures here
and unadjusted fiscal year data. Data exclude the impact of financial
sector interventions, but include flows from the Asset Purchase
Facility of the Bank of England, (a) Public sector current budget
surplus is total current receipts less total current expenditure and
depreciation, (b) Calendar year.
Table A9. Saving and investment
As a percentage of GDP
Households Companies General government
Saving Investment Saving Investment Saving Investment
2009 6.6 3.9 11.3 8.0 -5.7 3.1
2010 7.9 4.3 11.4 9.1 -5.6 2.9
2011 6.0 4.5 12.8 9.3 -4.2 2.6
2012 5.6 4.5 11.6 9.6 -4.5 2.4
2013 4.4 4.7 10.9 10.3 -2.8 2.1
2014 4.7 4.9 10.9 10.9 -3.0 2.2
2015 4.9 5.1 11.7 11.1 -2.3 2.1
2016 4.9 5.5 10.6 11.5 -0.3 2.0
2017 5.4 5.9 9.2 11.6 1.4 2.0
2018 6.0 6.2 8.4 11.4 2.6 1.9
2019 6.5 6.4 8.1 11.2 3.7 1.8
Whole economy Finance from Net
abroad (a) national
saving
Saving Investment Total Net factor
income
2009 12.1 14.9 2.8 -0.1 -1.6
2010 13.7 16.3 2.6 -1.1 0.4
2011 14.7 16.4 1.7 -1.2 1.5
2012 12.8 16.5 3.7 0.3 -0.5
2013 12.6 17.0 4.5 0.9 -0.7
2014 12.5 18.0 5.5 1.9 -0.8
2015 14.3 18.2 3.9 0.9 1.0
2016 15.2 19.0 3.8 0.5 1.9
2017 16.0 19.4 3.4 0.4 2.7
2018 17.1 19.5 2.4 -0.1 3.8
2019 18.3 19.5 1.2 -0.8 5.0
Notes: Saving and investment data are gross of depreciation unless
otherwise stated, (a) Negative sign indicates a surplus for the UK.
Table A10. Medium and long-term projections
All figures percentage change unless otherwise stated
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP (market prices) 1.6 0.7 1.7 2.6 2.9
Average earnings 0.9 2.2 1.9 1.5 2.2
GDP deflator (market prices) 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9
Consumer Prices Index 4.5 2.8 2.6 1.4 0.6
Per capita GDP 0.8 0.0 1.0 1.9 2.2
Whole economy
productivity (a) 1.3 -1.2 -0.3 -0.1 1.3
Labour input (b) 0.4 1.9 1.8 2.6 1.5
ILO unemployment rate (%) 8.1 8.0 7.6 6.2 5.4
Current account (% of GDP) -1.7 -3.7 -4.5 -5.5 -3.9
Total managed expenditure
(% of GDP) 43.7 43.9 41.1 40.9 39.7
Public sector net borrowing
(% of GDP) 7.5 8.1 5.3 5.7 4.7
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 70.6 74.6 78.3 80.6 82.2
Effective exchange rate
(2011 = 100) 100.0 104.2 102.9 111 112.7
Bank Rate (%) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
3 month interest rates (%) 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6
10 year interest rates (%) 3.1 1.8 2.4 2.5 1.8
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020-24
GDP (market prices) 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.7
Average earnings 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.5
GDP deflator (market prices) 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.0
Consumer Prices Index 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9
Per capita GDP 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.1
Whole economy
productivity (a) 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.1
Labour input (b) 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
ILO unemployment rate (%) 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.2
Current account (% of GDP) -3.8 -3.4 -2.4 -1.2 -0.3
Total managed expenditure
(% of GDP) 38.2 36.7 35.5 34.8 34.5
Public sector net borrowing
(% of GDP) 2.8 1.0 -0.3 -1.3 -1.2
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 83.0 81.9 78.9 75.0 61.5
Effective exchange rate
(2011 = 100) 112.9 113.1 113.3 113.6 113.9
Bank Rate (%) 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.2 3.3
3 month interest rates (%) 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.4 3.5
10 year interest rates (%) 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.5 4.0
Notes: (a) Per hour, (b) Total hours worked.
REFERENCES
Barker, K. (2004), Securing our Future Housing Needs: Interim
Report Analysis, Review of Housing Supply, HM Treasury.
Barnett, A., Batten, S., Chiu, A., Franklin, J. and
Sebastia-Barriel, M. (2014), The UK productivity puzzle', Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, 2014 Q2, pp. 114-27.
Carney, M. (2014), speech given at the Trades Union Congress,
Liverpool.
Holmans,A.E., (2013),'New estimates of housing demand and need
in England, 201 I to 2031 '.Town and Country Planning Association.
OBR (2010), An Assessment of the Effect of Oil Price Fluctuations
on the Public Finances.
Osborne, G. (2015), Annual Royal Economics Society Policy Lecture,
http://www.res.org.uk/view/policyLectures.html.
Pope. N. (2013), 'Public service productivity estimates: total
public services 2010', available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
dcp171766_307152.pdf.
NOTES
(1) A similar pattern of revisions have occurred in the IMF's
WEO update published in January 2015, available at http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/update/01 /pdf/0115.pdf.
(2) https://www.ofgem.gov.uk//gas/retail-market/monitoring-data-
and-statistics/understanding-energy-prices-great-britain/supply-
market-indicator.
(3) The remainder of government output is measured as equal to
inputs.
Simon Kirby *, with Oriol Carreras **, Jack Meaning **, Rebecca
Piggott ** and James Warren **
* NIESR and Centre For Macroeconomics. E-mail: s.kirby@niesr.ac.uk.
** NIESR. Unless otherwise stated, the source of all data reported in
the figures and tables is the NiGEM database and forecast baseline. The
UK forecast was completed on 27 January 2015.
Table 1. Summary of the forecast
Percentage change
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP 1.6 0.7 1.7 2.6 2.9
Per capita GDP 0.8 0.0 1.0 1.9 2.2
CPI Inflation 4.5 2.8 2.6 1.4 0.6
RPIX Inflation 5.3 3.2 3.1 2.4 1.4
RPDI -1.9 1.6 0.1 1.6 3.6
Unemployment, % 8.1 8.0 7.6 6.2 5.4
Bank Rate, % 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Long Rates, % 3.1 1.8 2.4 2.5 1.8
Effective exchange rate -0.1 4.2 -1.2 7.9 1.5
Current account as % of GDP -1.7 -3.7 -4.5 -5.5 -3.9
PSNB as % of GDP (a) 7.5 7.3 5.5 5.5 4.5
PSND as % of GDP (a) 72.3 77.4 79.8 81.9 82.8
2016 2017 2018 2019
GDP 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.4
Per capita GDP 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8
CPI Inflation 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.9
RPIX Inflation 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.3
RPDI 2.5 2.4 2.9 2.9
Unemployment, % 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4
Bank Rate, % 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.2
Long Rates, % 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.5
Effective exchange rate 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Current account as % of GDP -3.8 -3.4 -2.4 -1.2
PSNB as % of GDP (a) 2.2 0.6 -0.6 -1.5
PSND as % of GDP (a) 82.7 80.3 76.6 72.3
Notes: RPDI is real personal disposable income. PSNB is public sector
net borrowing. PSND is public sector net debt, (a) Fiscal year,
excludes the impact of financial sector interventions, but includes
the flows from the Asset Purchase Facility of the Bank of England.
Table 2.The effect of APF flows on the fiscal forecast
Per cent of GDP, fiscal years
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
Surplus on the current budget
Excluding APF flows -5.8 -4.8 -4.6 -3.7
Including APF flows -5.1 -4.1 -3.9 -3.0
Public sector net borrowing
Excluding APF flows 8.0 6.3 6.2 5.1
Including APF flows 7.3 5.5 5.5 4.5
Public sector net cash
requirement
Excluding APF flows 6.6 4.8 6.2 5.2
Including APF flows 5.9 4.1 5.5 4.5
Public sector net debt
Excluding APF flows 77.4 79.8 85.2 86.7
Including APF flows 77.4 79.8 81.9 82.8
2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20
Surplus on the current budget
Excluding APF flows -1.5 -0.1 1.0 2.2
Including APF flows -0.8 0.6 1.7 2.8
Public sector net borrowing
Excluding APF flows 2.9 1.3 0.1 -0.9
Including APF flows 2.2 0.6 -0.6 -1.5
Public sector net cash
requirement
Excluding APF flows 3.8 1.9 0.5 -0.5
Including APF flows 3.1 1.2 -0.2 -1.1
Public sector net debt
Excluding APF flows 87.1 85.1 81.9 78.0
Including APF flows 82.7 80.3 76.6 72.3
Source: NIESR database and forecast.
Note: APF is Asset Purchase Facility.